Robust representations for faces: evidence from visual search.

We report evidence from visual search that people can develop robust representations for highly overlearned faces. When observers searched for their own face versus the face of an unfamiliar observer, search slopes and intercepts revealed consistently faster processing of self than stranger. These processing advantages persisted even after hundreds of presentations of the unfamiliar face and even for atypical profile and upside-down views. Observers not only showed rapid asymptotic recognition of their own face as the target, but could reject their own face more quickly as the distractor. These findings suggest that robust representations for a highly overlearned face may (a) mediate rapid asymptotic visual processing, (b) require extensive experience to develop, (c) contain abstract or view-invariant information, (d) facilitate a variety of processes such as target recognition and distractor rejection, and (e) demand less attentional resources.     

Transparency: relation to depth, subjective contours, luminance, and neon color spreading

The perception of transparency is highly dependent on luminance and perceived depth. An image region is seen as transparent if it is of intermediate luminance relative to adjacent image regions, and if it is perceived in front of another region and has a boundary which provides information that an object is visible through this region. Yet, transparency is not just the passive end-product of these required conditions. If perceived transparency is triggered, a number of seemingly more elemental perceptual primitives such as color, contour, and depth can be radically altered. Thus, with the perception of transparency, neon color spreading becomes apparent, depth changes, stereoscopic depth capture can be eliminated, and otherwise robust subjective contours can be abolished. In addition, we show that transparency is not coupled strongly to real-world chromatic constraints since combinations of luminance and color which would be unlikely to arise in real-world scenes still give rise to the perception of transparency. Rather than seeing transparency as a perceptual end-point, determined by seemingly more primitive processes, we interpret perceived transparency as much a 'cause', as an 'effect'. We speculate that the anatomical substrate for such mutual interaction may lie in cortical feed-forward connections which maintain modular segregation and cortical feedback connections which do not.     

A variable that may affect individual differences in the child-directed speech of Japanese women

Sixty-one single Japanese-speaking women between the ages of 18 and 26 years were recorded as they read aloud picture books to a young child and as they conversed with another Japanese-speaking woman. When their utterances were acoustically compared between the two settings with regard to prosodic features, both the average pitch and pitch excursions exhibited a significant increase when interacting with the child in 17 of the 61 women. In 36 of the remaining 44 subjects, neither of these parameters showed such changes. This individual variability was not related to the subjects' liking for picture books, previous experience with reading or being read them, or with baby-sitting. The only variable that could explain the results was whether the subjects had grown up with one or more siblings or as only children. If they were only children, the prosodic modification was significantly less likely to occur     

Development of infant crying behavior: A longitudinal case study

This study documents the development of infant crying behavior during the second half of the first year (across a key developmental transition). Two female infants were observed twice a month for 6 months when the infants were between 7 and 14 months of age. The infants exhibited crying behavior that seemed to become more sophisticated with increasing age. This marked a proactive stance in communicating with the mother on the part of the infant. Interestingly, at 11–12 months, “fake crying” was observed during a naturalistic interaction with the mother. This implied that deceptive infant behavior could be seen at quite an early stage.     

Illusory causal crescents: misperceived spatial relations due to perceived causality

When an object A moves toward an object B until they are adjacent, at which point A stops and B starts moving, we often see a collision--ie we see A as the cause of B's motion. The spatiotemporal parameters which mediate the perception of causality have been explored in many studies, but this work is seldom related to other aspects of perception. Here we report a novel illusion, wherein the perception of causality affects the perceived spatial relations among two objects involved in a collision event: observers systematically underestimate the amount of overlap between two items in an event which is seen as a causal collision. This occurs even when the causal nature of the event is induced by a surrounding context, such that estimates of the amount of overlap in the very same event are much improved when the event is displayed in isolation, without a 'causal' interpretation. This illusion implies that the perception of causality does not proceed completely independently of other visual processes, but can affect the perception of other spatial properties.     

Natural-scene perception requires attention

Is visual attention required for visual consciousness? In the past decade, many researchers have claimed that awareness can arise in the absence of attention. This claim is largely based on the notion that natural scene (or "gist") perception occurs without attention. This article presents evidence against this idea. We show that when observers perform a variety of demanding, sustained-attention tasks, inattentional blindness occurs for natural scenes. In addition, scene perception is impaired under dual-task conditions, but only when the primary task is sufficiently demanding. This finding suggests that previous studies that have been interpreted as demonstrating scene perception without attention failed to fully engage attention and that natural-scene perception does indeed require attention. Thus, natural-scene perception is not a preattentive process and cannot be used to support the idea of awareness without attention.