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Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences - 相似文献
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Pete Mandik 《Philosophical Studies》2010,148(2):231-247
Deviant phenomenal knowledge is knowing what it’s like to have experiences of, e.g., red without actually having had experiences
of red. Such a knower is a deviant. Some physicalists have argued and some anti-physicalists have denied that the possibility
of deviants undermines anti-physicalism and the Knowledge Argument. The current paper presents new arguments defending the
deviant-based attacks on anti-physicalism. Central to my arguments are considerations concerning the psychosemantic underpinnings
of deviant phenomenal knowledge. I argue that physicalists are in a superior position to account for the conditions in virtue
of which states of deviants constitute representations of phenomenal facts. 相似文献
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Pete Mandik 《Metaphilosophy》2002,33(1&2):11-29
Computation and philosophy intersect three times in this essay. Computation is considered as an object, as a method, and as a model used in a certain line of philosophical inquiry concerning the relation of mind to matter. As object, the question considered is whether computation and related notions of mental representation constitute the best ways to conceive of how physical systems give rise to mental properties. As method and model, the computational techniques of artificial life and embodied evolutionary connectionism are used to conduct prosthetically enhanced thought experiments concerning the evolvability of mental representations. Central to this essay is a discussion of the computer simulation and evolution of three-dimensional synthetic animals with neural network controllers. The minimally cognitive behavior of finding food by exhibiting positive chemotaxis is simulated with swimming and walking creatures. These simulations form the basis of a discussion of the evolutionary and neurocomputational bases of the incremental emergence of more complex forms of cognition. Other related work has been used to attack computational and representational theories of cognition. In contrast, I argue that the proper understanding of the evolutionary emergence of minimally cognitive behaviors is computational and representational through and through. 相似文献
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Pete Mandik 《Synthese》2011,180(3):443-463
The philosophical technical term “supervenience” is frequently used in the philosophy of mind as a concise way of characterizing
the core idea of physicalism in a manner that is neutral with respect to debates between reductive physicalists and nonreductive
physicalists. I argue against this alleged neutrality and side with reductive physicalists. I am especially interested here
in debates between psychoneural reductionists and nonreductive functionalist physicalists. Central to my arguments will be
considerations concerning how best to articulate the spirit of the idea of supervenience. I argue for a version of supervenience,
“fine-grained supervenience,” which is the claim that if, at a given time, a single entity instantiates two distinct mental
properties, it must do so in virtue of instantiating two distinct physical properties. I argue further that despite initial
appearances to the contrary, such a construal of supervenience can be embraced only by reductive physicalists. 相似文献
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