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International Journal for Philosophy of Religion - 相似文献
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Himma KE 《The International journal of applied philosophy》2003,17(1):89-109
I attempt to show that, under materialist assumptions about the nature of mind, it is a necessary condition for fetal personhood that electrical activity has begun in the brain. First, I argue that it is a necessary condition for a thing to be a moral person that it is (or has) a self--understood as something that is capable of serving as the subject of a mental experience. Second, I argue that it is a necessary condition for a fetus to be (or have) a self that some form of electrical brain activity occurs. Third, I argue that since the beginning of brain activity typically occurs at around 10 weeks of gestational age, most fetuses are not persons during the first 10 weeks of pregnancy and hence that abortion of most fetuses during this period does not rise to the moral level of murder. 相似文献
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International Journal for Philosophy of Religion - 相似文献
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Kenneth Einar Himma 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》1999,80(1):46-63
Jules Coleman has shown that positivism's pedigree thesis has a semantic sense and an epistemic sense. The semantic sense states the conditions a proposition must satisfy in order to be law. The epistemic sense constitutes a standard that can be used to identify the community's law. In this article, I argue the epistemic sense is considerably more modest than has often been supposed. At most, it provides a means for conclusively identifying those legislative utterances that give rise to statutory law. Accordingly, it is false that the pedigree thesis provides a test for deciding even questions of settled law. 相似文献
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