An inexpensive real-time microcomputer-based cognitive laboratory system

A computer system, based on the Radio Shack Color Computer, for running experiments in cognitive psychology is described. The system was designed according to the following principles: first, all of the equipment should consist of inexpensive, off-the-shelf components; second, the language used to implement experiments should have real-time commands embedded within the character strings to be displayed, and these real-time commands should be interpreted at run time; third, the system should serve multiple subjects, yet one host should be able to run display terminals for several subjects on independent experiments; and fourth, the system should be able to interface to other display devices and other response-recording devices. Two examples of other devices are discussed: an oscilloscope for rapid visual display and an Apple Macintosh for display of pictures.     

A model of visual spatio-temporal memory: The icon revisited

With a minimal set of assumptions resulting from considerations about the perception of temporal structure, we argue for the existence of a spatio-temporal memory established by the mapping of time into simultaneous physical properties. The important point of this model is the distinction between external, physical time and the internal representation of time. An immediate consequence of such a structure is the emergence of properties usually associated with the concept of iconic memory or informational persistence. Some of these properties may hence be regarded as epiphenomena produced by the testing of a spatio-temporal system with tachistoscopic spatial stimuli. The model can explain properties of the immediate memory span, the lack of effect of exposure duration on tachistoscopic report, the partial-report superiority, the decay of iconic memory, and effects of a backward mask. It does not only avoid the incompatibility problems of the frozen-image concept in dynamic vision, but also provides an adequate basis for the processing of time-varying scenes.     

Adaptation in very old age: exploring the role of resources, beliefs, and attitudes for centenarians' happiness

When individuals reach very old age, accumulating negative conditions represent a serious challenge to their capacity to adapt and are likely to reduce the quality of life. By examining happiness and its determinants in centenarians, this study investigated the proposal that psychological resilience may come to an end in extremely old age. Data from the population-based Heidelberg Centenarian Study indicated high levels of happiness. Basic resources (i.e., job training, cognition, health, social network, extraversion) explained a substantial proportion of variance in happiness, but some resource effects were mediated through self-referent beliefs (e.g., self-efficacy) and attitudes toward life (e.g., optimistic outlook). Results challenge the view that psychological resilience reaches a critical limit or that the self-regulatory adaptation system loses its efficiency in very advanced age.     

Posture based motor planning in a sequential grasping task

Movement planning in sequential tasks is revealed by grasping postures. We explored aspects of planning a sequential drawer opening and object manipulation task with regard to arm and torso postures. We conducted a detailed kinematic analysis of joint postures at the wrist, elbow, and shoulder for a one-grasp and a two-grasp sequence of movement. The second of the two-grasp sequence was constrained (uncomfortable). We predicted that planning for the second grasp in a two-grasp sequence would influence arm, torso, and whole-body postures at the first grasp. Participants prepared for the second grasp by adjusting the posture of the elbow and shoulder and the distance they stepped to the drawer. The joint postures at the elbow and shoulder changed in the direction of the intended object grasp. These findings show that anticipatory adjustments are revealed at postures other than the end-effector and lend insight into the mechanisms of sequential movement planning.     

Do ‘Contextualist Cases’ Support Contextualism?

This paper addresses the argument from ‘contextualist cases’—such as for instance DeRose’s Bank cases—to attributor contextualism. It is argued that these cases do not make a decisive case against invariantism and that the debate between contextualists and invariantists will have to be settled on broader theoretical grounds.     

On the measurement of criterion noise in signal detection theory: the case of recognition memory

Traditional approaches within the framework of signal detection theory (SDT; Green & Swets, 1966), especially in the field of recognition memory, assume that the positioning of response criteria is not a noisy process. Recent work (Benjamin, Diaz, & Wee, 2009; Mueller & Weidemann, 2008) has challenged this assumption, arguing not only for the existence of criterion noise but also for its large magnitude and substantive contribution to individuals' performance. A review of these recent approaches for the measurement of criterion noise in SDT identifies several shortcomings and confoundings. A reanalysis of Benjamin et al.'s (2009) data sets as well as the results from a new experimental method indicate that the different forms of criterion noise proposed in the recognition memory literature are of very low magnitudes, and they do not provide a significant improvement over the account already given by traditional SDT without criterion noise.     

Defeat and proficiencies

Virtue epistemology is the view that beliefs are attempts at truth (or perhaps knowledge) and, as a result, can be assessed as successful, competent, and apt. Moreover, virtue epistemology identifies central epistemic properties with normative properties of beliefs as attempts. In particular, knowledge is apt belief and justified belief is competent belief. This paper develops a systematic virtue epistemological account of defeat (of justification/competence). I provide reason to think that defeat occurs not only for beliefs but for attempts more general. The key constructive idea is that defeaters are evidence that attempting (in a certain way) isn't successful and that defeaters defeat the competence of an attempt when one stands in a certain normative relation to the defeater. I argue that while this account handles paradigm cases of defeat both within epistemology and beyond nicely, cases of external (sometimes also ‘normative’ or ‘propositional’) defeat continue to cause trouble. To handle these cases, I develop a distinctively functionalist version of virtue epistemology. This functionalist version of virtue epistemology allows me to countenance proficiencies, that is, roughly, abilities that have the function to produce successes under certain conditions. It is the normative import of proficiencies that delivers the normative relation that serves to explain defeat in cases of external defeat. In this way, the functionalist version of virtue epistemology ushers the way towards a satisfactory account even of external defeat.     

Subgroup differences in situational judgment test scores: Evidence from large applicant samples

To promote diversity in organizations it is important to have accurate knowledge about subgroup differences associated with selection procedures. However, current estimates of subgroup differences in situational judgment tests (SJTs) are overwhelmingly based on range‐restricted incumbent samples that are downwardly biased. This study provides much‐needed applicant level estimates of SJT subgroup differences (N = 37,530). As a key finding, Black‐White differences (d = 0.66) were higher than in incumbent samples (d = 0.38). Overall, sex differences were small. Females scored higher for management jobs (d = ?0.13) and males scored higher for administrative jobs (d = 0.15). By analyzing applicant samples that do not suffer from range restriction, this study adds knowledge about subgroup differences in SJTs.     

Automatic actions: Agency,intentionality, and responsibility

This article discusses a challenge to the traditional intentional-causalist conceptions of action and intentionality as well as to our everyday and legal conceptions of responsibility, namely the psychological discovery that the greatest part of our alleged actions are performed automatically, that is unconsciously and without a proximal intention causing and sustaining them. The main part of the article scrutinizes several mechanisms of automatic behavior, how they work, and whether the resulting behavior is an action. These mechanisms include actions caused by distal implementation intentions, four types of habit and habitualization, mimicry, and semantically induced automatic behavior (which is later disregarded because of its lack of clarity). According to the intentional-causalist criterion, the automatic behaviors resulting from all but one of these mechanisms turn out to be actions and to be intentional; and even the behavior resulting from the remaining mechanism (naturally acquired habits) is something we can be responsible for. Hence, the challenge, seen from close up, does not really call the traditional conception of action and intentionality into question.