The impact of context on pattern category learning and representation

Context traditionally has been regarded in vision research as a determinant for the interpretation of sensory information on the basis of previously acquired knowledge. Here we propose a novel, complementary perspective by showing that context also specifically affects visual category learning. In two experiments involving sets of Compound Gabor patterns we explored how context, as given by the stimulus set to be learned, affects the internal representation of pattern categories. In Experiment 1, we changed the (local) context of the individual signal classes by changing the configuration of the learning set. In Experiment 2, we varied the (global) context of a fixed class configuration by changing the degree of signal accentuation. Generalization performance was assessed in terms of the ability to recognize contrast-inverted versions of the learning patterns. Both contextual variations yielded distinct effects on learning and generalization thus indicating a change in internal category representation. Computer simulations suggest that the latter is related to changes in the set of attributes underlying the production rules of the categories. The implications of these findings for phenomena of contrast (in)variance in visual perception are discussed.     

Timing of Stressful Life Events Affects Stability and Change of Neuroticism

Neuroticism is a predictor of many health problems. To study the determinants of within‐subject change in neuroticism, three hypotheses were tested: (i) subjects who experienced stressful life events (SLEs) show an increase in neuroticism; (ii) high baseline neuroticism moderated this effect; and (iii) recent SLEs had a greater impact on neuroticism than distant SLEs. Data came from the Finnish Twin Cohort. Neuroticism data were collected in 1975 and 1981 and SLEs data in 1981 (n = 21 085). By entering baseline neuroticism as a predictor for neuroticism at follow‐up, the outcome measure was change in neuroticism. Changes in neuroticism were predicted from SLE indices or their interaction with baseline neuroticism. Timing of SLEs was taken into account by distinguishing recent from distant SLEs. To control for confounding by shared genes and environments, both within‐twin pair and between‐twin pair effects were tested for monozygotic and dizygotic twin pairs separately. Neuroticism's six‐year stability was high (r = .58, p < .001). Exposure to SLEs modestly increased neuroticism (βs > .55, ps < .001), unconfounded by shared genes. This effect was not moderated by high baseline neuroticism. Recent SLEs (.09 < βs < .15) had more impact than distant SLEs (.03 < βs < .11; ps < .01). In conclusion, the findings strongly supported a model of environmentally driven SLEs causing dynamic fluctuations around a person's set point of neuroticism. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Visual significance of pupillary response to an auditory task.

Subjects simultaneously performed visual and auditory detection tasks. Pupillary dilation accompanies increased cognitive load such as that caused by the auditory tasks. Errors in the visual task increased when the auditory task became more difficult. The increase was greater when the effects of pupillary dilation were blocked by an artificial pupil.     

Judging the plausibility of arguments in scientific texts: a student–scientist comparison

The ability to evaluate scientific claims and evidence is an important aspect of scientific literacy and requires various epistemic competences. Readers spontaneously validate presented information against their knowledge and beliefs but differ in their ability to strategically evaluate the soundness of informal arguments. The present research investigated how students of psychology, compared to scientists working in psychology, evaluate informal arguments. Using a think-aloud procedure, we identified the specific strategies students and scientists apply when judging the plausibility of arguments and classifying common argumentation fallacies. Results indicate that students, compared to scientists, have difficulties forming these judgements and base them on intuition and opinion rather than the internal consistency of arguments. Our findings are discussed using the mental model theory framework. Although introductory students validate scientific information against their knowledge and beliefs, their judgements are often erroneous, in part because their use of strategy is immature. Implications for systematic trainings of epistemic competences are discussed.     

Memory distortion and attitude change—Two routes to cognitive balance

We report novel research investigating memory distortion as an alternative route to cognitive balance, comparing it with attitude change as a well‐known balancing mechanism. Participants received statements from multiple communicators about a controversial topic (national pride in Study 1 and climate protection in Study 2) and remembered these statements immediately or 1 week later. This resulted in initially balanced or unbalanced combinations of the liking for individual communicators and the communicators' statements and in subsequent balance increases due to liking change or misremembering of statements. The contribution of memory distortion to balance was significant but weaker and less efficient than that of liking change, and the contributions were empirically independent (i.e., uncorrelated and differentially related to third variables—specifically, memory strength and individual cognitive consistency motivation). They also had a different temporal trajectory (liking change fast and memory distortion slow). We discuss theoretical and practical implications.     

Effects of Comparing Contrasting Cases on Learning From Subsequent Explanations

In an experiment, prior to processing instructional explanations N = 75 students received either (a) contrasting cases plus comparison prompts, (b) contrasting cases plus provided comparisons (i.e., model answers to the comparison prompts), or (c) no preparation intervention. We found that the learners with preparation intervention learned more and with a higher degree of efficiency, perceived less extraneous load, and experienced a higher feeling of smooth automatic running while they processed the explanations than the learners without a preparation intervention. These findings suggest that comparing contrasting cases serves a focusing function. Furthermore, we found that the learners in the provided comparisons condition acquired more conceptual knowledge from the explanations than the learners in the prompted comparisons condition. This result indicates that providing high amounts of instructional guidance while learners compare contrasting cases can have an added value in comparison to providing comparison prompts concerning the resulting preparation for future learning.     

Newborn temperament and Sudden Infant Death Syndrome: A comparison of victims and their cotwins

Temperament assessed in the newborn period was compared for four twin infants who subsequently died of Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS) and their surviving cotwins. The assessment focused on irritability, resistance to soothing, reactivity, reinforcement value, activity while awake, and activity during sleep. No differences were observed between cotwins on a combined irritability rating. SIDS victims, however, were less irritable than their siblings in response to aversive stimuli. When irritable, the SIDS infants were more difficult to soothe than their cotwins. While awake, SIDS infants were less active than their cotwins, but during sleep, no activity differences were observed. The SIDS infants were more reactive to orienting stimuli, and neither group was found to be more or less rewarding to the examiner. It was concluded that this study has helped to define behavioral variables that might be characteristic of infants whose subsequent deaths are attributed to SIDS.     

Passing‐over: The Death of the Author in Hegel's Philosophy

Criticism of Hegel has been a central preoccupation of “postmodern” philosophy, from critical theory and deconstruction to Lacanian psychoanalytic theory and Foucauldian “archaeology.” One of the most frequent criticisms is that Hegel's invocation of “absolute knowledge” installs him in a position of authorial arrogance, of God‐like authority, leaving the reader in a position of subservience to the Sage's perfect wisdom. The argument of this article is that this sort of criticism is profoundly ironic, since Hegel's construction of the role of the Sage possessing absolute knowledge is in fact an elaborate mask covering over a radical project of disappearance of the author by which it becomes the reader who is left to author the text. The article explores Hegel's commitment to his own death as an author in his invention of a new method of demonstration, his epistemology, his philosophy of language, his theory of desire, and even in the seemingly least likely place of all, his portrait of “absolute knowledge.”