Ratings of Orally Presented Verbal Expressions of Probability by a Heterogeneous Sample

Verbal expressions of probability are used in daily conversations, physician-physician and physician-patient communications, and questionnaire and interview responses. To assess the degree of agreement among English-speaking Australian adults in allocating numerical probabilities to these verbal expressions of probability, 966 interviewees provided estimates for 60 isolated expressions of probability and a sequence of seven items placed in a sequence. Means and median scores appeared to be consistent with common sense and with findings from other countries. Mirror-imaged terms were neither symmetrical nor equidistant, with the means and medians for the positive terms being closer to the mid-points of the scale than the means and medians of the negative terms. Items in a sequence of probability terms showed greater symmetry and less variability than isolated expressions. For most items, there was an unacceptably high level of within-subject and between-subject variability. Although subjects with higher levels of education and/ or mathematics education showed less variability, these factors accounted for very little of the variance. The greater variability in Australian results relative to those reported elsewhere was partly attributed to the use of interviews rather than questionnaires. There were no particular stems that yielded greater consistency. It was concluded that the use of these expressions leads to very imprecise communication.     

Prediction of early social and academic adjustment of children from the inner city

Investigated predictors of five measures of early school adjustment for an ethnically diverse cohort of 683 inner-city kindergartners and first graders. Data from 2 consecutive years were collected from teachers, school records, and children. A multiple-regression preduction model significantly explained children's competence behavior, problem behavior, reading achievement, mathematics achievement, and school absences. Prior adjustment and sociodemographic factors explained a majority of the variance in adjustment. Perceived quality of parent involvement was signifcantly related (in the expected direction) to all five outcomes. Exposure to life events was significantly associated in the expected direction with competence behavior, problem behavior, and school absences but not with reading and mathematics achievement. Together, parent involvement and life-event variables explained as much as 12% of the variance in adjustment independent of sociodemographic and prior adjustment factors. The role of family and school factors in the adjustment of children at risk is discussed [corrected].     

Parenting stress among families of children with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder

Prior research has shown that parenting stress levels can be quite high among families of children with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). This study investigated the degree to which such stress was related not only to the child's ADHD, but also to various other child, parent, and family-environment circumstances. Multimethod assessments were conducted on 104 clinic-referred children with ADHD. Data collected from these subjects were entered into hierarchical multiple-regression analyses, utilizing the Parenting Stress Index as the criterion. The results showed that child and parent characteristics accounted for a substantial portion of the variance in overall parenting stress. The child's oppositional-defiant behavior and maternal psychopathology were especially potent predictors. The severity of the child's ADHD, the child's health status, and maternal health status also emerged as significant predictors. These findings are discussed in terms of their impact upon the clinical management of children with ADHD.The authors are grateful to Mary Maher and Paula Nevins for their assistance in collecting and coding the data. The authors would also like to thank Dr. Kenneth Fletcher for his helpful comments regarding the statistical analyses.     

Neighborhood frequency effects and letter visibility in visual word recognition

Two experiments are described that measured lexical decision latencies and errors to five-letter French words with a single higher frequency orthographic neighbor and control words with no higher frequency neighbors. The higher frequency neighbor differed from the stimulus word by either the second letter (e.g.,astre-autre) or the fourth letter (chope-chose). Neighborhood frequency effects were found to interact with this factor, and significant interference was observed only tochope-type words. The effects of neighborhood frequency were also found to interact with the position of initial fixation in the stimulus word (either the second letter or the fourth letter). Interference was greatly reduced when the initial fixation was on the critical disambiguating letter (i.e., the letterp inchope). Moreover, word recognition was improved when subjects initially fixated the second letter relative to when they initially fixated the fourth letter of a five-letter word, but this second-letter advantage practically disappeared when the stimulus differed from a more frequent word by its fourth letter. The results are interpreted in terms of the interaction between visual and lexical factors in visual word recognition.     

Stress as a state of anticipatory vigilance

The pituitary-adrenocortical system is activated in stressful situations, and the adrenocortical hormones have been implicated by Selye in the diseases of stress. Evidence indicates that the adrenocortical hormones peak during the period of anticipation of stressful events, not during actual confrontation with them. The circadian cortisol rhythm shows peaks before waking, not during active periods of the day, and cortisol does not appear to be required during physical activity. The role of these hormones appears to be to suppress ongoing physiological activity in order to increase vigilance and to get the organism ready to take action before the impact of dangers.     

Ineffability and intelligibility: Towards an understanding of the radical unlikeness of religious experience

Conclusion I do not for a moment question the fact that many people have experiences of a special type which may be termed religious, that such experiences often involve reference to something which appears to display a radical unlikeness to all else and that they are therefore in some sense inexpressible. Doubtless the ideas I have put forward about the possible source of such unlikeness and ineffability might suggest models of God which would not find much theological approval, at least within any mainstream theistic tradition, since some sort of pantheism seems inevitably to be implied. But however this might be, the concept of radical unlikeness as it has been analyzed here can, I think, help us towards understanding certain problematic areas in religion quite apart from the issue of intelligibility, which has been the focus of this discussion.To begin with, radical unlikeness suggests a way in which the historical continuity of concepts of the transcendent might be upheld against the discontinuity suggested by the diversity of interpretations through which they have moved. Ancient and modern outlooks on, say, God differ enormously, as indeed do the range of co-temporal accounts at many particular moments. But, by and large, theologians firmly maintain that it is a single and unchanging phenomenon which is being dealt with. Unless we can point to some common element which is both specific enough to create a binding sense of common tradition, yet never completely expressed by any attempt at understanding it within that tradition (thus persistently demanding new attempts to apprehend it), then given the widely differing views of God within, for example, the Christian community, it is difficult to see how we could assume that in fact they all stemmed from the same source and were talking about the same thing. The idea of radical unlikeness could provide an element with just these required characteristics: it could be seen as what all the accounts attempt to net, with varying degrees of adequacy, within their offered interpretations. It could be seen as what remains constant, constantly elusive yet constantly generative of fresh attempts to apprehend it, throughout a history of intra-religious diversity. Secondly, radical unlikeness might suggest a possible way of understanding inter-religious diversity in a way which allows that whilst such diversity exists, whilst the differences between religions are real, they are grounded in a similar root-experience. It may, at first sight, seem difficult to continue thinking of the various religious traditions as truly separate phenomena if they are taken as being grounded on experiences whose ineffability stems from the unlikeness of experiencing things as a whole. Here we must stress again that if they are to be considered intelligible, radically unlike experiences cannot be considered completely so - or putting this another way, we cannot more than approach experience of totality. Sense can be given to religious claims of ineffability by suggesting experience of near totality, where we reach the last point on the scale of inclusiveness which complies with the logical criteria demanded of something for it to be possible for us to be aware of it. We might thus attempt an explanation of inter-religious diversity based on the view that Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, Islam etc. acquire their differences from the different elements included in their experience of near totality. Taking totality to be represented by the scale of one to ten, Hinduism might be seen as grounded on experience of 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-9-10, Buddhism on experience of 1-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10 and so on. The resulting dissimilarities are thus centred not on different types of experience, but on different areas of inclusiveness. This is, of course, to suppose that the various religious traditions are all based on the same degree (as opposed to the same elements) of inclusiveness, but it is by no means clear that such a supposition is justified. Continuing with our decimal analogy, might it not be suggested that whilst Christianity stemmed from experience of 2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10, Jainism was founded on a less extensive encounter with the divine (say 4-5-6-7-8-9-10)? It is, however, uncertain how we can compare and evaluate different religious traditions in such a way as to be able to comment on such claims. The analysis of radical unlikeness and ineffability which has been advanced might also suggest a way in which certain passages in religious writings could be understood, passages which at first sight can be seriously perplexing. If, for example, to return to the quotation given in the introductory section of this paper, we continue to think of accounts of the nature of Shiva as being attempts to describe some discrete, objective entity, then it is inevitable that either we will share the Puranic writer's puzzlement or that much of what we read about Shiva will appear as the muddled and extravagant thinking thrown up by an uncritical and over-fertile mythological imagination, consisting of little more than a hotch-potch of contradictory elements. But if we see such accounts as attempting to say something about everything, as symbols of near totality stemming from experiences which verge on the holistic, then what we read - with all its ambiguities - may become somewhat more meaningful. This analysis of ineffability and intelligibility seeks to introduce for debate a possible way of understanding the radical unlikeness which accounts of religious experience apparently attempt to speak about. It does not, however, claim to present an exhaustive treatment of the issues raised, on the contrary, I am conscious of many shortcomings and omissions. For instance, it remains to be seen under precisely what conditions something counts as being an elucidating likeness (presumably all experiences are, for example, temporal, yet temporality alone would not seem to offer a particularly elucidating comparison). Moreover, the degree to which appeal to likeness is allowed operation in actual accounts of religious experience needs to be explored. In addition, the notion of categorizing experiences according to the extent to which they approach a point of total inclusion requires careful clarification. To begin with, according to what criteria could we establish that one experience was more inclusive than another? However, such issues can only be mentioned here, any adequate consideration of them would require a separate paper.In conclusion, I would suggest that to use radical unlikeness and/or ineffability simply as devices by which to halt any process of investigation, proclaiming that the thing in question is not like anything and so is beyond all words, risks making unintelligible and placing beyond all further inquiry an important and extensive area of human experience. As William Alston put it, to label something ineffable in an unqualified way is to shirk the job of making explicit the ways in which it can be talked about. It is surely more accurate to take ineffability as a qualifier which multiplies models without end than as an absolute which prevents the construction of any elucidating models.An early draft of this paper was read to a seminar group at the University of St. Andrews during Martinmas term 1984. I am grateful to Dr. Gordon Graham & Mr. Tony Ellis, both of the Department of Moral Philosophy, and to Dr. George Hall, of the Department of Divinity, for remarks which stimulated some subsequent revisions of the argument.

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