Literacy skills seem to fuel literacy enjoyment,rather than vice versa

Children who like to read and write tend to be better at it. This association is typically interpreted as enjoyment impacting engagement in literacy activities, which boosts literacy skills. We fitted direction-of-causation models to partial data of 3690 Finnish twins aged 12. Literacy skills were rated by the twins’ teachers and literacy enjoyment by the twins themselves. A bivariate twin model showed substantial genetic influences on literacy skills (70%) and literacy enjoyment (35%). In both skills and enjoyment, shared-environmental influences explained about 20% in each. The best-fitting direction-of-causation model showed that skills impacted enjoyment, while the influence in the other direction was zero. The genetic influences on skills influenced enjoyment, likely via the skills→enjoyment path. This indicates an active gene-environment correlation: children with an aptitude for good literacy skills are more likely to enjoy reading and seek out literacy activities. To a lesser extent, it was also the shared-environmental influences on children's skills that propagated to influence children's literacy enjoyment. Environmental influences that foster children's literacy skills (e.g., families and schools), also foster children's love for reading and writing. These findings underline the importance of nurturing children's literacy skills.

Highlights

• It's known that how much children enjoy reading and writing and how good they are at it correlates ∼0.30, but causality remains unknown.
• We tested the direction of causation in 3690 twins aged 12.
• Literacy skills impacted literacy enjoyment, but not the other way around.
• Genetics influence children's literacy skills and how much they like and choose to read and write, indicating genetic niche picking.

     

How to eliminate illusions in quantified reasoning

The mental model theory postulates that reasoners build models of situations described in premises. These models normally make explicit only what is true according to the premises. The theory has an unexpected consequence. It predicts the existence ofillusions in inferences: Certain inferences should have compelling but erroneous conclusions. Previous studies have corroborated the existence of such illusions. The present study reports the first effective antidote to them. For example, most people incorrectly answer “yes” to the following problem:Only one of the following statements is true . . . /At least some of the plastic beads are not red. /None of the plastic beads are red. /Is it possible that none of the red beads are plastic? In two experiments, we progressively eliminated this fallacy and others by using instructions designed to overcome the bias toward truth. The difference between the illusory and the control problems disappeared when the participants were instructed to work out both the case in which the first premise was true and the second premise was false and the case in which the second premise was true and the first premise was false.     

Developmental cognitive genetics: How psychology can inform genetics and vice versa

Developmental neuropsychology is concerned with uncovering the underlying basis of developmental disorders such as specific language impairment (SLI), developmental dyslexia, and autistic disorder. Twin and family studies indicate that genetic influences play an important part in the aetiology of all of these disorders, yet progress in identifying genes has been slow. One way forward is to cut loose from conventional clinical criteria for diagnosing disorders and to focus instead on measures of underlying cognitive mechanisms. Psychology can inform genetics by clarifying what the key dimensions are for heritable phenotypes. However, it is not a one-way street. By using genetically informative designs, one can gain insights about causal relationships between different cognitive deficits. For instance, it has been suggested that low-level auditory deficits cause phonological problems in SLI. However, a twin study showed that, although both types of deficit occur in SLI, they have quite different origins, with environmental factors more important for auditory deficit, and genes more important for deficient phonological short-term memory. Another study found that morphosyntactic deficits in SLI are also highly heritable, but have different genetic origins from impairments of phonological short-term memory. A genetic perspective shows that a search for the underlying cause of developmental disorders may be misguided, because they are complex and heterogeneous and are associated with multiple risk factors that only cause serious disability when they occur in combination.     

How to do philosophy of religion: towards a possible speaking about the impossible

Abstract

It is postulated from different philosophical traditions, and explicitly in recent literature, that there is no further need for doing philosophy of religion – it has become an impossible task. I argue, however, that there remains a philosophical space for this practice and that this space determines greatly how philosophy of religion can be done. The starting point of my argument is the current discussion in the SAJP between De Wet and Giddy and the significance of my article is that it puts this debate within the broader international philosophical context by engaging the work of Trakakis and Desmond to resolve some of the apparently intractable issues raised. Trakakis discusses the divide between the analytic and continental philosophical traditions in which De Wet and Giddy’s work is further contextualized and clarified. Desmond’s work is seminal in its search for a metaxology wherein he advocates a new ‘in between’ position for doing philosophy of religion. I take this view of Desmond further by applying it to the current debate in South Africa and also using it to indicate some possibilities of speaking about the impossible.     

How to turn a hawk into a dove and vice versa: Interactions between emotions and goals in a give-some dilemma game

The present study investigated emotional influences on behavior in a one-shot, simultaneous, give-some dilemma game. In accordance with functional perspectives on the role of discrete emotions, we found fear to reduce, and guilt to increase levels of cooperation. Moreover, we showed individual differences in the effect of induced emotional states. Specifically, results indicated that inducing fear reduced cooperation only for individuals with a pro-social value orientation, and that guilt induction increased cooperation only for individuals with a pro-self value orientation. We also established that both social value orientations could be adequately described in terms of differences in chronically accessible goals (as assessed by value-importance ratings). These results, therefore, seem to support our hypothesis that individual differences in the behavioral consequences of induced emotional states are related to variation in chronic accessibility of general goals associated with a particular emotional state.     

Social neuroscience: understanding the pieces fosters understanding the whole and vice versa

Social science and neuroscience perspectives represent two ends of a continuum of levels of organization studied in psychology. Human behavior as a whole unfolds at social levels of organization, whereas much of the research in psychology has focused on cognitive and biological pieces of this whole. Recent evidence underscores the complementary nature of social, cognitive, and biological levels of analysis and how research integrating these levels can foster more comprehensive theories of the mechanisms underlying complex behavior and the mind. This research underscores the unity of psychology and the importance of retaining multilevel integrative research that spans molar and molecular levels of analysis.     

Developmental cognitive genetics: how psychology can inform genetics and vice versa

Developmental neuropsychology is concerned with uncovering the underlying basis of developmental disorders such as specific language impairment (SLI), developmental dyslexia, and autistic disorder. Twin and family studies indicate that genetic influences play an important part in the aetiology of all of these disorders, yet progress in identifying genes has been slow. One way forward is to cut loose from conventional clinical criteria for diagnosing disorders and to focus instead on measures of underlying cognitive mechanisms. Psychology can inform genetics by clarifying what the key dimensions are for heritable phenotypes. However, it is not a one-way street. By using genetically informative designs, one can gain insights about causal relationships between different cognitive deficits. For instance, it has been suggested that low-level auditory deficits cause phonological problems in SLI. However, a twin study showed that, although both types of deficit occur in SLI, they have quite different origins, with environmental factors more important for auditory deficit, and genes more important for deficient phonological short-term memory. Another study found that morphosyntactic deficits in SLI are also highly heritable, but have different genetic origins from impairments of phonological short-term memory. A genetic perspective shows that a search for the underlying cause of developmental disorders may be misguided, because they are complex and heterogeneous and are associated with multiple risk factors that only cause serious disability when they occur in combination.     

Preferences and illusions in quantified spatial relational reasoning

The following presents the results of an investigation of strategies and preferences in human reasoning about quantified spatial relational assertions. An empirical study revealed a clear preference effect for specific models: The initially constructed model depends on the number of mental model operations. The participants' strategies can be classified as follows: (1) Models with grouped elements are preferred; (2) Models are constructed according to a parsimonious representation strategy. Systematic reasoning errors and illusions can be identified with logical connectors (AND: 86 % valid initial models; XOR: 47 %; Wilcoxon z = 4.6; p < .001). Error rates were smallest when using two universal quantifiers (All-All), they increase significantly when using one (Some-All; All-Some) and again using none (Some-Some) (Page's L = 436; z = 3.40 p < .001). Although the different assertions allowed for multiple situations, the difficulty can be traced back to specific quantifiers and logical connectors.     

From majority to minority and vice versa: the asymmetrical effects of losing and gaining majority position within a group

Two studies examined the effects of stable, partially changed, and completely changed majority and minority positions within a group on perception and evaluation of the group. It was hypothesized that loss of majority position (majority-to-minority change) would have stronger effects than gain of majority position (minority-to-majority change). The hypothesized asymmetrical effect was demonstrated in that loss of majority position decreased perception of group-self similarity, group attraction, and expectations for positive interactions with the group, whereas a corresponding gain of position did not increase them. Thus immediately following changes, the group is especially fragile because disintegrative forces created by the loss of majority position are stronger than integrative forces created by the gain of majority position.     

Actual and non-actual motion: why experientialist semantics needs phenomenology (and vice versa)

Experientialist semantics has contributed to a broader notion of linguistic meaning by emphasizing notions such as construal, perspective, metaphor, and embodiment, but has suffered from an individualist concept of meaning and has conflated experiential motivations with conventional semantics. We argue that these problems can be redressed by methods and concepts from phenomenology, on the basis of a case study of sentences of non-actual motion such as “The mountain range goes all the way from Mexico to Canada.” Through a phenomenological reanalysis of proposals of Talmy, Langacker, and Matlock, we show that non-actual motion is both experientially and linguistically non-unitary. At least three different features of human consciousness—enactive perception, visual scanning, and imagination—constitute experiential motivations for non-actual motion sentences, and each of these could be related to phenomenological analyses of human intentionality. The second problem is addressed by proposing that the experiential motivations of non-actual motion sentences can be viewed as sedimented through “passive” processes of acquisition and social transmission and that this implies an interactive loop between experience and language, yielding losses in terms of original experience, but gains in terms of communal signification. Something that is underestimated by phenomenology is that what is sedimented are not only intentional objects such as states of affairs, but aspects of how they are given, i.e., the original, temporal, bodily experiences themselves. Since cognitive semantics has emphasized such aspects of meaning, we suggest that phenomenology can itself benefit from experientialist semantics, especially when it turns its focus from prepredicative to predicative, linguistic intentionality.     

Hungry for money: the desire for caloric resources increases the desire for financial resources and vice versa

This report attempts to provide an evolutionary explanation for humans' motivation to strive for money in present-day societies. We propose that people's desire for money is a modern derivate of their desire for food. In three studies, we show the reciprocal association between the incentive value of food and of money. In Study 1, hungry participants were less likely than satiated participants to donate to charity. In Study 2, participants in a room with an olfactory food cue, known to increase the desire to eat, offered less money in a give-some game compared with participants in a room free of scent. In Study 3, participants' desire for money affected the amount of M&M's they ate in a subsequent taste test, but only among participants who were not restricting their food intake in order to manage their weight.     

Discrimination of possible and impossible objects in infancy

Adults can use pictorial depth cues to infer three-dimensional structure in two-dimensional depictions of objects. The age at which infants respond to the same kinds of visual information has not been determined, and theories about the underlying developmental mechanisms remain controversial. In this study, we used a visual habituation/novelty-preference procedure to assess the ability of 4-month-old infants to discriminate between two-dimensional depictions of structurally possible and impossible objects. Results indicate that young infants are sensitive to junction structures and interposition cues associated with pictorial depth and can detect inconsistent relationships among these cues that render an object impossible. Our results provide important insights into the development of mechanisms for processing pictorial depth cues that allow adults to extract three-dimensional structure from pictures of objects.     

Patterns of perceived similarity cannot be generalized from long to short exposure durations and vice versa

Subjects rated the perceived similarity between patterns and their 180-deg rotational variants. The stimuli, adapted from Halpern, Fishbein, and Warm (1979), were randomly generated dot patterns and line drawings and polygons generated from the dot patterns. Inspection time was varied in a between-subject design. As in the Halpern et al. (1979) study, it was found that the variables of form type (dots, lines, polygons) and axis of rotation (x, y, z) had no effect on perceived similarity in the long exposure conditions. However, when inspection time was limited to 150 msec, both variables had a substantial impact. This finding undermines the frequent practice of selecting stimuli for use in reaction time or other experiments with limited inspection time on the basis of similarity ratings gathered under typical free inspection conditions.     

How to use probabilities in reasoning

Conclusions Probabilities are important in belief updating, but probabilistic reasoning does not subsume everything else (as the Bayesian would have it). On the contrary, Bayesian reasoning presupposes knowledge that cannot itself be obtained by Bayesian reasoning, making generic Bayesianism an incoherent theory of belief updating. Instead, it is indefinite probabilities that are of principal importance in belief updating. Knowledge of such indefinite probabilities is obtained by some form of statistical induction, and inferences to non-probabilistic conclusions are carried out in accordance with the statistical syllogism. Such inferences have been the focus of much attention in the nonmonotonic reasoning literature, but the logical complexity of such inference has not been adequately appreciated.     

Deductive reasoning with factual, possible, and counterfactual conditionals

We compared reasoners' inferences from conditionals based on possibilities in the present or the past (e.g., "If Linda had been in Dublin then Cathy would have been in Galway") with their inferences based on facts in the present or the past (e.g., "If Linda was in Dublin then Cathy was in Galway"). We propose that people construct a richer representation of conditionals that deal with possibilities rather than facts: Their models make explicit not only the suppositional case, in which Linda is in Dublin and Cathy is in Galway, but also the presupposed case, in which Linda is not in Dublin and Cathy is not in Galway. We report the results of four experiments that corroborate this model theory. The experiments show that reasoners make more inferences from conditionals based on possibilities rather than on facts when the inferences depend on the presupposed case. The results also show that reasoners generate different situations to verify and falsify conditionals based on possibilities and facts.