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1.
While the philosophical puzzles about “life” that once confounded biology have all been solved by science, much of the “mystery of consciousness” remains unsolved due to multiple “explanatory gaps” between the brain and conscious experience. One reason for this impasse is that diverse brain architectures both within and across species can create consciousness, thus making any single neurobiological feature insufficient to explain it. We propose instead that an array of general biological features that are found in all living things, combined with a suite of special neurobiological features unique to animals with consciousness, evolved to create subjective experience. Combining philosophical, neurobiological and evolutionary approaches to consciousness, we review our theory of neurobiological naturalism that we argue closes the “explanatory gaps” between the brain and subjective experience and naturalizes the “experiential gaps” between subjectivity and third-person observation of the brain.  相似文献   

2.
Growing up traumatized means that survival systems are activated in both our minds and bodies. As a result, our lives become rooted in a different biological and psychological reality. I've called this parallel reality a “trauma-world.” At its core are fearfulness, disconnection, and shame. If a trauma-world is formed during childhood, it becomes our normality, whereupon we are unconscious of its impact on our lives. However, without consciousness, healing is impossible.

?Marion Woodman articulated the dynamics of trauma in a visceral and potent way, helping to bring trauma-worlds into consciousness. As importantly, together with dance educator Mary Hamilton and voice coach Ann Skinner, Woodman developed BodySoul Rhythms®, an embodied, creative, and integrative approach that can make a powerful contribution to healing.  相似文献   

3.
We employ the Zermelo–Fränkel Axioms that characterize sets as mathematical primitives. The Anti-foundation Axiom plays a significant role in our development, since among other of its features, its replacement for the Axiom of Foundation in the Zermelo–Fränkel Axioms motivates Platonic interpretations. These interpretations also depend on such allied notions for sets as pictures, graphs, decorations, labelings and various mappings that we use. A syntax and semantics of operators acting on sets is developed. Such features enable construction of a theory of non-well-founded sets that we use to frame mathematical foundations of consciousness. To do this we introduce a supplementary axiomatic system that characterizes experience and consciousness as primitives. The new axioms proceed through characterization of so-called consciousness operators. The Russell operator plays a central role and is shown to be one example of a consciousness operator. Neural networks supply striking examples of non-well-founded graphs the decorations of which generate associated sets, each with a Platonic aspect. Employing our foundations, we show how the supervening of consciousness on its neural correlates in the brain enables the framing of a theory of consciousness by applying appropriate consciousness operators to the generated sets in question.  相似文献   

4.
Illusionism about consciousness is the thesis that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, but merely seems to exist. Embracing illusionism presents the theoretical advantage that one does not need to explain how consciousness arises from purely physical brains anymore, but only to explain why consciousness seems to exist while it does not. As Keith Frankish puts it, illusionism replaces the “hard problem of consciousness” with the “illusion problem.” However, a satisfying version of illusionism has to explain not only why the illusion of consciousness arises, but also why it arises with its particular strength: Notably, why we are so deeply reluctant to recognize the illusory nature of consciousness. Explaining our strong intuitive resistance to illusionism means solving what I call the “illusion meta-problem,” which I think is a part of the illusion problem. In this paper, I argue that current versions of illusionism are unable to solve the illusion meta-problem. I focus on two of the most promising recent illusionist theories of consciousness, and I show why they fail to explain the peculiar reluctance we encounter whenever we try to accept that consciousness is an illusion.  相似文献   

5.
Hungarian philosopher István Mészáros’ more recent work expands our understanding of consciousness in a way that is particularly relevant to psychoanalysis. He underscores the tragedy of consciousness, increasingly alienated from the totality of our social and individual being, and replaced by its false analog. To make sustainable an anachronistic type of vertical social structure, ideologists of false consciousness join arms with those who control society's historically developed means to reproduce itself and its members. This results in the social phenomenon of alienation, whereby actively produced false consciousness creates a correlate individual unconscious. Mészáros’ theory seems compatible with the psychoanalytic paradigms developed by Karen Horney and the Neo-Freudians.  相似文献   

6.
Progressively Husserl started referring to the whole sphere of the life of intentional acts in terms of praxis. Perception, imagination, judgement, scientific consciousness, etc., are all seen as practices. What is the meaning of this move? A seemingly self-evident possibility is that intentionality is praxial, because even perception is not completely free from empty intending moments that demand fulfilment; and all fulfilment is attained by means of bodily activities that enable our senses to acquire the relevant contents. I reject this approach as insufficient and misguided. I argue that perception and intentionality in general is praxial because consciousness, in all of its constituting syntheses, is or becomes organized as a practice-structure. Intentional consciousness organizes its contents according to rules so as to accomplish the evident or true givenness of its intended correlates.  相似文献   

7.
Jack AI  Shallice T 《Cognition》2001,79(1-2):161-196
Most 'theories of consciousness' are based on vague speculations about the properties of conscious experience. We aim to provide a more solid basis for a science of consciousness. We argue that a theory of consciousness should provide an account of the very processes that allow us to acquire and use information about our own mental states - the processes underlying introspection. This can be achieved through the construction of information-processing models that can account for 'Type-C' processes. Type-C processes can be specified experimentally by identifying paradigms in which awareness of the stimulus is necessary for an intentional action. The Shallice (1988b) framework is put forward as providing an initial account of Type-C processes, which can relate perceptual consciousness to consciously performed actions. Further, we suggest that this framework may be refined through the investigation of the functions of prefrontal cortex. The formulation of our approach requires us to consider fundamental conceptual and methodological issues associated with consciousness. The most significant of these issues concerns the scientific use of introspective evidence. We outline and justify a conservative methodological approach to the use of introspective evidence, with attention to the difficulties historically associated with its use in psychology.  相似文献   

8.
With globalization, modern Western consciousness has spread across the world. This influx has affected the Japanese culture but ego consciousness has emerged through a long history and different course from that of the West. At a personal level, I have been interested in the establishment of a subject in a culture that values homogeneity and to understand this, I reflect on my own history of living in both the East and the West and on my experience practising psychotherapy. To show Japanese collective functioning at its best, I describe the human inter‐connectedness and collaboration during the 2011 disaster. I explore the ‘Nothing’ at the centre of the Japanese psyche, through a reading of Japanese myth, especially the most originary and almost pre‐human stories that come before the anthropomorphized ‘First Parents’. A retelling of this founding story, reveals the multiple iterations over time that manifest in embodied being; this gradual emergence of consciousness is contrasted with Western myths of origin that are more clear and specific. This study attempts to bring awareness of the value and meaning of Eastern consciousness and its centre in the ‘Nothing’.  相似文献   

9.
Abstract. Human action and experience are the outcome of genes and memes. Not only are both of these represented in consciousness, but consciousness mediates their claims and thus governs our choices. Hence it is important how consciousness is ordered and where it is directed. Sorokin's typology of the sensate and the ideational ("spiritual"), and the dialectic between them, is relevant to this issue. In our period of history, the sensate factors of materialism and secularism need to be dialectically counterbalanced by the reinforcement of memes that value the spiritual intimations of the realm beyond the senses. As we approach the twenty-first century, the memes that will undergird our spirituality will be those that resacralize nature and emphasize our unity as humans with all of universal reality, in an idea of common "beinghood." Spiritual systems that accord with this trend in evolution will have to respect three conditions. They will (1) integrate the sensate and the ideational; (2) reflect the importance of the "flow" state of optimal experience, which matches ever-complexifying skills with comparable challenges; and (3) move the fulcrum of their worldview from the human being to the network of beings and its evolution.  相似文献   

10.
Smith  D. W. 《Axiomathes》2001,12(1-2):55-85
Over the past century phenomenology has ably analyzed the basic structuresof consciousness as we experience it. Yet recent philosophy of mind, lookingto brain activity and computational function, has found it difficult to makeroom for the structures of subjectivity and intentionality that phenomenologyhas appraised. In order to understand consciousness as something that is bothsubjective and grounded in neural activity, we need to delve into phenomenologyand ontology. I draw a fundamental distinction in ontology among the form,appearance, and substrate of any entity. Applying this three-facet ontology toconsciousness, we distinguish: the intentionality of consciousness (its form),the way we experience consciousness (its appearance, including so-called qualia),and the physical, biological, and cultural basis of consciousness (its substrate).We can thus show how these very different aspects of consciousness fit togetherin a fundamental ontology. And we can thereby define the proper domains ofphenomenology and other disciplinesthat contribute to our understanding of consciousness.  相似文献   

11.
Dreaming     
The aim is to discover a principle governing the formation of the dream. Now dreaming has an analogy with consciousness in that it is a seeming-consciousness. Meanwhile consciousness exhibits a tripartite structure consisting of (A) understanding oneself to be situated in a world endowed with given properties, (B) the mental processes responsible for the state, and (C) the concrete perceptual encounter of awareness with the world. The dream analogues of these three elements are investigated in the hope of discovering the source of the kinship between dream and consciousness. The dream world (A) proves to be a logically impossible world, limited by nothing more than sheer narratability. The internal world (B) of the dreamer is notable for the limitlessness of the scope allotted to the imagination (exactly taking over the offices of rational function), together with the presence of two important phenomena encountered in waking consciousness: a measure of interiority, and the positing of a world. Finally (C), the dream further replicates consciousness in so far as we seem in dreaming concretely to experience our physical surrounds in the form of perceptual imagining. These properties play their part in enabling the dream to be a seeming-consciousness. At the same time they are such as to necessitate its not being consciousness. It is proposed that in the light of these properties, and those composing the state of consciousness, the dream simply is the imagining of consciousness.  相似文献   

12.
Abstract

Most scientists and theorists concerned with the problem of consciousness focus on our consciousness of the physical world (our sensations, feelings, and awareness). In this paper I consider our consciousness of the mental world (our thoughts about thoughts, intentions, wishes, and emotions).The argument is made that these are two distinct forms of consciousness, the evidence for this deriving from studies of autism. Autism is a severe childhood psychiatric condition in which individuals may be conscious of the physical world but not of the mental world. Relevant experimental evidence is described, including some recent neuroimaging studies pointing towards the neural basis of our consciousness of the mental.  相似文献   

13.
I argue that José Luis Bermúdez has not shown that there is a paradox in our concept of self–consciousness. The deflationary theory is not a plausible theory of self–consciousness, so its paradoxicality is irrelevant. A more plausible theory, 'the simple theory', is not paradoxical. However, I do think there is a puzzle about the connection between self–consciousness and 'I'–thoughts.  相似文献   

14.
I had an unexpected encounter on a far island off the coast of Australia with a group of young people. These young people wanted to escape from the modern world and they inspired my conviction: that we must do our best to reshape our world and make it a place acceptable for the younger generation. I realized that it is the dominant consciousness of an epoch that creates the structures and the practices of an epoch. We must now address the task of evolving or co-evolving our world's dominant consciousness. The fear and insecurity produced by this current dominant consciousness has created humanity's current sad condition. The Giordano Bruno GlobalShift University declares its mission to be a “state of the art” global institution. It has the clear-cut objective of fostering a new consciousness, defeating ignorance, and providing an affordable world-class education that permits economically less privileged people to take an active part in the construction of a better world. Our first tenet is the bio-epistemological “non- subordinate” horizontal model of education. This tenet is joined with our commitment to a cross-cultural social, interdisciplinary, and stereo-cognitive interaction-based academic platform. It is a platform that can empower young people to attain an innovative holistic view of the world and of themselves.  相似文献   

15.
Nye's (1998) core construct of relational consciousness in child spirituality embraces a wider dialogue with social and personality psychology. Relatedness in spirituality implies the importance of language, mind, and the self as guideposts for development. In this research we seek to qualitatively expand our understanding of relational consciousness around recent work in these three domains. Twelve school-age children are given detailed interviews dealing with spirituality framed by the relational consciousness core construct. Transcribed responses are analysed using grounded theory methodology. Theoretical categories are assembled into a preliminary framework for relational consciousness as a social and contextual phenomenon. The relationships between categories in the framework are outlined in terms of mental representation and self/other orientation in the child. We conclude that relational consciousness and its social framework commends a pedocentric, community-based approach to religious education.  相似文献   

16.
The future of humanity on this planet is not assured: we have reached a critical juncture in our history. Persistence in classical modes of thinking and acting will lead to growing problems and mounting crises; a new way of thinking is needed, joined with a new ethics and a new ethos. This presupposes a fundamental change in the way we perceive ourselves and our environment—a shift in the dominant consciousness of our time. The evolution of a “planetary consciousness” has become an objective precondition of approaching the future with confidence as well as responsibility. The Club of Budapest has been founded to promote this evolution through the insight and creativity of the artists, writers, spiritual leaders and young people who are its members and affiliates.  相似文献   

17.
This paper is a review of the work that has been carried out on machine consciousness. A clear overview of this diverse field is achieved by breaking machine consciousness down into four different areas, which are used to understand its aims, discuss its relationship with other subjects and outline the work that has been carried out so far. The criticisms that have been made against machine consciousness are also covered, along with its potential benefits, and the work that has been done on analysing systems for signs of consciousness. Some of the social and ethical issues raised by machine consciousness are examined at the end of the paper.  相似文献   

18.
Many work on flushing out what our consciousness means in cognitive and phenomenological terms, but no one has yet connected the dots on how consciousness and truth intersect, much less how our phenomenal consciousness can form the ground for most of our models of truth. Here, I connect those dots and argue that the basic structure of our phenomenal consciousness grounds the nature of truth as concordance, to harmonize in agreement, and that most extant theories on truth are well explained in that grounding. Said another way, the unifying and bifurcating intentional structure of phenomenal consciousness is the non-epistemic ground of truth, such that most theories of truth can be explained as particular expressions of concordance based upon the differing aspects of that ground.  相似文献   

19.
20.
Andreas Elpidorou 《Philosophia》2013,41(4):1181-1203
I respond to Chalmers’ (2006, 2010) objection to the Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS) by showing that his objection is faced with a dilemma that ultimately undercuts its force. Chalmers argues that no version of PCS can posit psychological features that are both physically explicable and capable of explaining our epistemic situation. In response, I show that what Chalmers calls ‘our epistemic situation’ admits either of a phenomenal or of a topic-neutral characterization, neither of which supports Chalmers’ objection. On the one hand, if our epistemic situation is characterized phenomenally, then Chalmers’ demand that PCS should explain our epistemic situation is misplaced. PCS can explain our epistemic situation only if there is a reductive explanation of consciousness. But according to PCS, no reductive explanation of consciousness can be given. On the other hand, if our epistemic situation is characterized topic-neutrally, then PCS is not only physically explicable, but it also explains our epistemic situation. Either way, PCS is safe.  相似文献   

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