Seeing beyond the target: environmental context affects distance perception

It is commonly assumed that perceived distance in full-cue, ecologically valid environments is redundantly specified and approximately veridical. However, recent research has called this assumption into question by demonstrating that distance perception varies in different types of environments even under full-cue viewing conditions. We report five experiments that demonstrate an effect of environmental context on perceived distance. We measured perceived distance in two types of environments (indoors and outdoors) with two types of measures (perceptual matching and blindwalking). We found effects of environmental context for both egocentric and exocentric distances. Across conditions, within individual experiments, all viewer-to-target depth-related variables were kept constant. The differences in perceived distance must therefore be explained by variations in the space beyond the target.     

Seeing is believing: Utilization of subliminal symbols requires a visible relevant context

Sensory input that is not available for conscious report can still affect our behavior. Recent findings suggest that such subliminal information has the potency to influence behavior in a way that is dependent on the observer’s current intentions. Here, we investigate whether conscious observation of stimulus relevance provides an incentive for the utilization of nonconscious stimuli. We manipulated the predictive power of directional cues to selectively affect the incentive to utilize them for a subsequent target detection task. Central arrow cues rendered invisible by interocular suppression elicited a facilitatory cuing effect, but only when intermixed with visible arrow cues that were highly predictive with respect to (i.e., 80 % congruent with) the subsequent target location. When the visible cues were nonpredictive (50 % congruent), no subliminal cuing effect was found. An analysis of learning effects corroborates these findings; Cuing effects elicited by both visible and invisible cues increased over the course of the experiment, but only when intermixed visible cues were highly predictive. In a second experiment, we demonstrated that the intrinsic relevance of invisible cues (either 50 % or 100 % congruent) has no effect on the utilization of visible cues. We conclude that conscious perception is required to make statistical inferences about the relevance of symbolic cues. Once statistical information is extracted consciously, it affects subsequent nonconscious processing in a way that fits the current context. Accordingly, one of the possible functions of consciousness could be to extract general rules out of the conscious information, to provide guidelines for future behavior.     

Seeing Small,Seeing the Future

The Role of Science in Law by Feldman analyzes the vexed relationship between science and law. The book provides a good overview on the ongoing debate on the topic, but the author's attempt to suggest a guideline for the conflict between science and law falls short of any satisfactory conclusion.     

Seeing aspects

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -     

Seeing mind in action

Much recent work on social cognition and empathy in philosophy of mind and cognitive science has been guided by the assumption that minds are composed of intracranial phenomena, perceptually inaccessible and thus unobservable to everyone but their owners. I challenge this claim. I defend the view that at least some mental states and processes??or at least some parts of some mental states and processes??are at times visible, capable of being directly perceived by others. I further argue that, despite its initial implausibility, this view receives robust support from several strands of empirical research.     

Seeing absence

Intuitively, we often see absences. For example, if someone steals your laptop at a café, you may see its absence from your table. However, absence perception presents a paradox. On prevailing models of perception, we see only present objects and scenes (Marr, Gibson, Dretske). So, we cannot literally see something that is not present. This suggests that we never literally perceive absences; instead, we come to believe that something is absent cognitively on the basis of what we perceive. But this cognitive explanation does not do justice to the phenomenology. Many experiences of absence possess immediate, perceptual qualities. One may further argue that the ability to detect certain absences confers strong adaptive advantage and therefore must be as primitive and fundamental to humans as seeing positive things. I argue that we can literally see absences; in addition to representing objects, perception represents absences of objects. I present a model of seeing absence based on visual expectations and a visual matching process. The phenomenon of seeing absence can thus serve as an adequacy-test for a theory of perceptual content. If experiences of absence are possible, then we have another reason (following Siegel) to reject the view that perceptual content is restricted to colors and shapes. Furthermore, if the proposed account is correct, then we have grounds for dissociating seeing absence from other imagery-based phenomena termed “perceptual presence-in-absence” (Noë, Macpherson).     

Seeing patterns in the noise

How do observers detect the presence of objects or features in visual images? Stochastic stimuli (for example, white noise) have become popular choices for providing a linear characterization of early sensory mechanisms. A recent paper by Neri and Heeger takes this type of methodology a step further, and succeeds in isolating and characterizing non-linear mechanisms responsible for the detection and identification of a specific visual target.     

Seeing the Impossible

I defend the view that it is not impossible to see the impossible. I provide two examples in which one sees the impossible and defend these examples from potential objections. Theories of depiction should make room for impossible depictions.     

Seeing and thinking

According to ratiomorphic theories of perception every visual phenomenon would be the result of unconscious inferences through which the visual system, starting from a set of axioms and premises, reaches certain conclusions (which constitute actually the visual phenomena) by a process analogous to a reasoning process. The author presents some examples from the area of amodal completion which, according to him, hardly support a ratiomorphic theory. Instead they constitute counterexamples that rather support the hypothesis that seeing and thinking function according to different rules.     

Seeing Through Technology

In examining representations of cities, disease, and human biology, this paper reflects on what technologies reveal of the conditions to which they’re turned.

Seeing Empty Space

Abstract: In this paper I offer an account of a particular variety of perception of absence, namely, visual perception of empty space. In so doing, I aim to make explicit the role that seeing empty space has, implicitly, in Mike Martin's account of the visual field. I suggest we should make sense of the claim that vision has a field—in Martin'ss sense—in terms of our being aware of its limitations or boundaries. I argue that the limits of the visual field are our own sensory limitations, and that we are aware of them as such. Seeing empty space, I argue, involves a structural feature of experience that constitutes our awareness of our visual sensory limitations, and thus, in virtue of which vision has a field.