The Black Foe: Being Towards Death1

The ontology of death is universal, hence archetypal. Nowhere do we witness any organic creature escape its talons. Analytical psychology has had an intimate relationship to death for the simple fact that it contemplates the soul, the numinous, and an afterlife. From Hegel to Heidegger, Freud and Jung, death was an existential force that sustained and transformed life, the positive significance of the negative. Rather than merely a destructive phenomenon, death informs Being, the power of nothingness that dialectically drives life. In this paper, I will introduce the notion of what I call the omega principle, the psychological orientation and trajectory of our being towards death, which we may say is a universal preoccupation and recapitulation of the collective unconscious that subsumes our personal relation to death, an eternal return of the objective psyche constellated as esse in anima.     

Aqua vitae,aqua permanens: dreaming,drowning, swimming and surfing in analysis

In response to the question ‘Who is My Jung?’, this paper describes the profound personal impact of Jung's creative / artistic approach to the unconscious, beginning with my discovery of The Red Book at the age of twelve. Echoing the flow of my own dream‐life, I trace the course of two analyses through the alchemical process of solutio, which began with numinous dreams of tidal waves and plunged us into inter‐ and intra‐psychic analytic relationships that evoked vestigial memories of our first aquatic world in utero.     

Archetypes as symbolic forms

In Jung's psychology, archetypes are biologically inherited supra-individual predispositions of the collective unconscious, and in this paper this controversial theory of archetypes is evaluated in the context of Ernst Cassirer's philosophy of symbolic forms. The main thesis of the author is that with the help of the Cassirerian approach, archetypes can be understood as culturally determined functionary forms organizing and structuring certain aspects of man's cultural activity, namely those predominantly non-cognitive (for example, emotional, numinous, pathological) mental aspects of human life, which remain more or less unarticulated due to their non-discursive nature. The revision the author is proposing revolves around the notion that the archetypal theory can be removed from the rather unfruitful discourse on the genetic inheritance of archetypes. When archetypes are seen as symbolic forms, Jung's theory is in a position to make a potentially valuable contribution to hermeneutical and cultural studies, as archetypes function in this new context as active constituents of human experiences, which give these experiences a non-discursive, symbolic form. Thereby, archetypes can become accessible to historical and cultural analyses, and hermeneutical inquiry into the manifold symbolism of mental (including unconscious) phenomena can be enriched.     

The myth of the collective unconscious

This essay challenges the most basic tenet of Jung’s analytical psychology, namely, the existence of the collective unconscious. Despite the fact that there are purported to be universal processes and ontological features of mind throughout all psychoanalytical schools of thought, Jung’s is unique in the history of psychoanalytic ideas for positing a supraordinate, autonomous transpersonal psyche that remains the source, ground, and wellspring from which all unconscious and conscious manifestations derive. This bold claim is analyzed through a close inspection of Jung’s texts that questions the philosophical justification for postulating a supernatural macroanthropos or reified collective mind. Pointing out the problems of agency and fallacies of hypostatization, it is not necessary to evoke a transpersonal cosmogony to explain how universality suffuses individual subjectivity within social collectives. Here we may conclude that the collective unconscious construct is a signifier for the common psychological dynamics and characteristics of shared humanity. In this sense, the myth of the collective unconscious is better understood as a metaphor for a higher abstraction or ideal principle ordained with numinous value.     

Interpretation as a misunderstanding

In the following article ‘who’ as the agent in the clinical session becomes questioned. By speaking we are introduced in the world of misunderstanding, where we are not merely speaking but being spoken to. Listening to what is being said and in this way misunderstanding what the patient is trying to say helps us in order to locate where the subject of the unconscious places himself in relation to the desire of the Other. In the article, it is conveyed how interpretation is not something that clarifies or explains to the patient his difficulties, but instead locates them by letting them take part in the session. In Lacanian psychoanalysis, locating the subject of the unconscious is crucial as this gives the patient a clue about where they place themselves in relation to the Other. This is why cutting the session is an essential element of its technique, as it stops in this way something that can disturb or hide where the subject of the unconscious has appeared. This allows patients to experience where they are gratifying themselves in their own difficulty. Interpretation is not speaking about the truth but instead, making the truth present in the session.     

Wishful thinking and the unconscious

Abstract

This paper gives a sketch for a reconstruction of the Freudian unconscious, and an argument for its existence. The strategy followed attempts to side-step the extended debates about the validity of Freud’s methods and conclusions, by basing itself on the desire/belief schema for understanding and explaining human behaviour - a schema neither folk psychology nor scientific psychology can do without. People are argued to have, as ideal types, two fundamental modes of fulfilling their desires: engaging with reality, and wishful thinking. The first mode tries to acknowledge the constraints reality imposes on the satisfaction of desires, while the second mode tries to ignore, deny or disguise these constraints, inasmuch as they threaten to make such satisfaction impossible or unfeasible. Crucially, wishful thinking can be used so as to ignore or deny any desire that is incompatible with other strong desires. Thus we end up unaware of the existence or nature of some of our desires, of the fact that they are influencing our thought and behaviour, and of the process our own mind has used to thwart awareness of them. Once we acknowledge this possibility, we are already seriously entertaining the possibility of the Freudian unconscious, or something fairly close to it. The more aware the subject is that her wishful thinking is just that, the less effective it becomes. Wishful thinking thus requires an unconscious; it is inimical to a clear, complete and unambiguous acknowledgement of its own status. Next, various aspects of my account (and Freud’s) that allow a conception of the unconscious in non-Cartesian terms are emphasised: the unconscious is largely constituted by semantic phenomena of a particular type: forms of representation which would conceal their meaning even if the full light of ‘attention’, Cartesian ‘consciousness’ or ‘introspection’ were cast upon them. If wishful thinking is an integral part of mental life, philosophers and others wishing to “educate humanity” will have to proceed differently from what would have been appropriate had rational thought and action been the only available option for satisfying desires.     

Trieb und Instinkt

To say that human beings also have a self-preservation instinct just as animals is only meaningful in the sense of attachment and affection mediated by mutual communication. It is from the beginning covered up by the truly human sexual phenomena of seduction and narcissistic reciprocity. Beside that we have a sexual drive which has a more important, not to say, decisive role from birth until puberty. This latter is the subject of psychoanalysis because it is anchored in the unconscious. Finally, we also have an (innate, endogenic) sexual instinct which appears in puberty persisting the whole adult life and meets at its appearance the infantile sexual drive which was existing all the time. It is very difficult to give an epistemological definition of the (innate) sexual instinct because it does not manifest itself in a pure form, but only in unclear transactions with infantile sexuality dominating the unconscious. The subject of psychoanalysis is the unconscious and the unconscious is itself the sexuality sensu Freud, the pre-, para- or genital infantile sexuality. The sexual has its origins in the phantasy which is naturally anchored in our body.     

The felt presence of other minds: Predictive processing,counterfactual predictions,and mentalising in autism

The mental states of other people are components of the external world that modulate the activity of our sensory epithelia. Recent probabilistic frameworks that cast perception as unconscious inference on the external causes of sensory input can thus be expanded to enfold the brain’s representation of others’ mental states. This paper examines this subject in the context of the debate concerning the extent to which we have perceptual awareness of other minds. In particular, we suggest that the notion of perceptual presence helps to refine this debate: are others’ mental states experienced as veridical qualities of the perceptual world around us? This experiential aspect of social cognition may be central to conditions such as autism spectrum disorder, where representations of others’ mental states seem to be selectively compromised. Importantly, recent work ties perceptual presence to the counterfactual predictions of hierarchical generative models that are suggested to perform unconscious inference in the brain. This enables a characterisation of mental state representations in terms of their associated counterfactual predictions, allowing a distinction between spontaneous and explicit forms of mentalising within the framework of predictive processing. This leads to a hypothesis that social cognition in autism spectrum disorder is characterised by a diminished set of counterfactual predictions and the reduced perceptual presence of others’ mental states.     

Précis of Knowledge and its Limits1

A creature that is not aware of anything does not lead a genuinely intelligent life. Its activity is unintelligent because unguided by (conscious or unconscious) awareness. Although intelligent life does not consist solely of awareness, it is intelligent only where it is intimately related to awareness. Awareness of anything involves some awareness of how things are in some respect. Even awareness merely of how things appear to be is awareness of how they are in respect of appearance. Awareness of how things are is awareness, concerning some way, that they are that way. But awareness that they are that way is knowledge that they are that way. Thus all intelligent life involves an intimate relation to knowledge. The mental states of a creature are the states that make its life intelligent. Consequently, the state of knowing is a mental state; it is central to mentality.     

Fishing: Finding One’s Way to the Unconscious

By imagining ourselves to be fishing in the deep waters of the unconscious, we consider here many questions about the meeting of the personal ego and the powerful unknown energies that lie below—questions ranging from “Why should we even want to connect with such forces?” to “What’s the best way of doing it?” There are many more questions to ask, such as how does the unconscious express itself and when should we avoid a direct meeting with it and why?

As individuals and as cultures, we have long histories with the unconscious, sometimes welcoming it, sometimes trying to wall it off, sometimes being overwhelmed by it. In this article the author emphasizes the necessity of becoming aware of the unconscious, knowing it as something that is always active in us, recognizing that it is not under our control, and realizing that it is not of our own making.     

Neural synchronization as a hypothetical explanation of the psychoanalytic unconscious

Cognitive scientists have tried to explain the neural mechanisms of unconscious mental states such as coma, epileptic seizures, and anesthesia-induced unconsciousness. However these types of unconscious states are different from the psychoanalytic unconscious. In this review, we aim to present our hypothesis about the neural correlates underlying psychoanalytic unconscious. To fulfill this aim, we firstly review the previous explanations about the neural correlates of conscious and unconscious mental states, such as brain oscillations, synchronicity of neural networks, and cognitive binding. By doing so, we hope to lay a neuroscientific ground for our hypothesis about neural correlates of psychoanalytic unconscious; parallel but unsynchronized neural networks between different layers of consciousness and unconsciousness. Next, we propose a neuroscientific mechanism about how the repressed mental events reach the conscious awareness; the lock of neural synchronization between two mental layers of conscious and unconscious. At the last section, we will discuss the data about schizophrenia as a clinical example of our proposed hypothesis.     

Unconscious fantasy (or phantasy) as clinical concept

A clinical phenomenology of the concept ‘unconscious fantasy’ attempts to describe it from a ‘bottom‐up’ perspective, that is, from the immediate experience of the analyst working in session. Articles of psychoanalytic authors from different persuasions are reviewed, which taken as a whole would shed some light on how the concept of unconscious fantasy takes shape in the analyst's mind during the session with the patient. A clinical phenomenology in three steps is described. Each step is illustrated by clinical material. Current controversies around the concept of unconscious fantasy (or phantasy) are still trapped in the discussion about if and how they are really unconscious. The strategy to describe from a ‘bottom‐up’ perspective the process of how the analyst's mind embraces the idea that an emerging phenomenon in the relationship with the patient can be defined as ‘unconscious fantasy’, allows us to elude the question as to whether or not we believe that unconscious fantasies exist at all, since we are neither required to assert or deny such a prior existence in order to describe the process of elaboration which, in the end, does formulate a fantasy as fantasy.     

Unconscious sensations

D. M. Armstrong proposes to explain the possibility of unconscious sensations by means of a distinction between the perceptual consciousness, which is essentially involved in sensations, and our introspective consciousness of sensations. He holds that unconscious sensations are instances of perceptual consciousness of which we are not introspectively conscious. I contend that, although Armstrong's distinction is plausible and significant, it fails to explain his own examples of unconscious sensation. I argue that the puzzle of how unconscious sensations are possible arises at the level of perceptual consciousness and does not concern our introspective awareness of mental states.This paper grew out of research supported by the National Endowment for the Humanities at Cornell University in 1985. I would like to express my gratitude to the National Endowment, to Cornell, and to Sydney Shoemaker.     

IN DEFENSE OF THE WHAT‐IT‐IS‐LIKENESS OF EXPERIENCE

It is common parlance among philosophers who inquire into the nature of consciousness to speak of there being something it is like for the subject of a mental state to be in it. The popularity of the ‘what‐it‐is‐like’ phrase stems, in part, from the assumption that it enables us to distinguish, in an intuitive and illuminating way, between conscious and unconscious mental states: conscious mental states, unlike unconscious mental states, are such that there is something it is like for their subjects to be in them. The ‘what‐it‐is‐like’ phrase, however, has not gone unopposed; some very clever philosophers have vigorously disputed it. Peter Hacker, for example, argues that the phrase should be abandoned because it is ungrammatical, and Paul Snowdon argues that it should be abandoned because the propositions expressed by its usage are either trivial or false. This paper mounts a case for the claim that neither of these conclusions is warranted. Against Hacker, it is argued that the arguments he produces for the ungrammaticality of the phrase are unpersuasive; and, against Snowdon, it is argued that he fails to consider a plausible and independently motivated interpretation of the phrase and that on this interpretation, the propositions expressed by its usage are nontrivially true.     

Alpha synchronization as a brain model for unconscious defense: An overview of the work of Howard Shevrin and his team

Howard Shevrin and his team have developed a stringent subliminal priming methodology, which experimentally approximates a situation of an internal, mental triggering of unconscious defense. Through a series of four studies they thus are able to bring evidence for this type of unconscious defense. With event‐related potentials, three clinical studies show how synchronization of a specific brain wave, the alpha wave, known for its inhibitory function, is also induced by subliminally presented conflictual subject‐specific stimuli. Therefore, alpha synchronization could serve as the brain mechanism of unconscious defense. The results only make sense if we suppose the existence of a dynamic unconscious, which has inherited childhood conflicts, and with privileged connections to neurotic symptom characteristics. Moreover, by showing that the unconscious conflict phrases, inferred by clinicians from clinical interviews, have a similar brain behavior, Shevrin and his team provide evidence that these inferences are not simply clinician‐dependent subjective interpretations but also imply some form of independent mental reality. Finally, interpretation of the results has led us to propose two distinct physiological mechanisms for defense: one, unconscious defense, by alpha synchronization in connection with the drive derivatives, and another, repression, based on the indications of reality in connection with the ego.     

The Retentional and the Repressed: Does Freud's Concept of the Unconscious Threaten Husserlian Phenomenology?

This paper investigates the claims made by both Freudian psychoanalysic thought and Husserlian phenomenology about the unconscious. First, it is shown how Husserl incorporates a complex notion of the unconscious in his analysis of passive synthesis. With his notion of an unintentional reservoir of past retentions, Husserl articulates an unconscious zone that must be activated from consciousness in order to “come to life.” Second, it is explained how Husserl still does not account for the Freudian unconscious. Freud's unconscious could be called, in phenomenological terms, a repressed retentional zone that differs from both near and far retention. Finally, an analysis is offered for the significance of this psychoanalytic argument for phenomenology. Does phenomenology provide a complete account of the psychical life of the subject without the Freudian unconscious? Does phenomenology suggest, as is often done, that Freud's “discovery” of the unconscious is a fantastical invention? Or, does the Freudian unconscious represent a true stumbling block for phenomenology?     

GENETIC ENGINEERING AND THE SACRED

Abstract. Genetic engineering of life forms could well have a profound effect upon our sense of the sacred. Integrating the experience of the sacred as George Bataille does, we can characterize it as a phenomenological encounter with prelinguistic, noncategoreal experience. This view of the sacred is similar to Friedrich Nietzsche's Dionysian experience or Rudolf Otto's mysterium tremendum and diminishes one's sense of self. It seems similar to the eighteenth‐century aesthetic categorization of “the sublime.” Despite the dominant rational approach to religiosity in the United States, intimations of this experience persist in popular culture. What possible relationship does genetic engineering have to this allegedly inevitable and profound experience? If certain modifications of life occur, they are likely to create such an experience of the sacred in us. In principle, we can now resurrect the mammoth or even create beings designed to directly potentiate our experience of the numinous such as satyrs or centaurs. The creation of such beings could become an art form associated with awaking the sacred, in turn appropriated by religion, as art has always been. Such experimentation, though morally questionable, is probably inevitable.     

The Animal that Aspires to be an Angel: The Challenge of Transhumanism

Abstract :  In what is called its 'upper case' form, transhumanism (TH) projects a fantastical posthuman existence akin to science fiction, but in its 'lower case' form it permeates our American culture. TH is expressed in the conviction that we need not settle for our birth-nature; we can alter that nature in ways that we deem desirable. As such, TH represents a fundamental challenge to our understanding of human nature, and in particular what God has created us to become. The encounter with TH is more than an ethical challenge; it is an encounter with the numinous.     

Balance,wholeness, and healing in christianity

The nature of the spiritual journey inevitably leads us to examine our fears, doubts, and conflicts, in life and in our spiritual communities. Psychology and a true spiritual theology acknowledge an unconscious part of ourselves that is the reservoir for suppressed fears, pain, and anger. Unless these conflicted emotions and related experiences or imaginings are sought out and examined, an authentic spiritual search is denied. The result will be a superficial cognitive belief-system, predicated exclusively on shoulds, oughts, and constant accommodation. To make free, intelligent, mature decisions in our search, we need always to ascertain what we want that will bring fulfillment and spiritual and emotional freedom. This can only be done if we truly own the repressed, hidden, negative memories and behavior that often become self-destructive unconscious determinants. The psychological reality is that unless we look at the shadow part of ourselves, the part that is repressed, denied, hidden and which we often find discomforting, it will surface eventually in a more unhealthy, destructive fashion.