Toward a perceptual theory of transparency

Theories of perceptual transparency have typically been developed within the context of a physical model that generates the percept of transparency (F. Metelli's episcotister model, 1974b). Here 2 fundamental questions are investigated: (a) When does the visual system initiate the percept of one surface seen through another? (b) How does it assign surface properties to a transparent layer? Results reveal systematic deviations from the predictions of Metelli's model, both for initiating image decomposition into multiple surfaces and for assigning surface attributes. Specifically, results demonstrate that the visual system uses Michelson contrast as a critical image variable to initiate percepts of transparency and to assign transmittance to transparent surfaces. Findings are discussed in relation to previous theories of transparency, lightness, brightness, and contrast-contrast.     

The role of transparency in perceptual grouping and pattern recognition.

The shortest stimulus exposure time for which transparency can be seen was examined. In the first experiment, overlapping digits were presented for 120 ms and the luminance in the overlapping regions was varied. Subjects reported, in separate blocks of trials, either the apparent transparency of the digits or the identity of the digits. When the luminance was set so that one set of digits appeared to be seen through the other, recognition of the digits was high. When the luminance in the overlapping regions did not produce impressions of transparency, digit recognition was low. In the second experiment, digit identification at several stimulus durations was compared between stimuli that had luminance that was valid for transparency and stimuli that had invalid luminance. Performance was found to be higher in the valid luminance condition than in the invalid condition after as little as 60 ms exposure duration. This result suggests that the impression of transparency requires only relatively short exposure durations.     

Perceptual continuation and depth in visual phantoms can be explained by perceptual transparency

We try to explain perceptual continuation and depth in the visual-phantom illusion in terms of perceptual transparency. Perceptual continuation of inducing gratings across the occluder in stationary phantoms could be explained with unique transparency, a notion proposed by Anderson (1997 Perception 26 419-453). This view is consistent with a number of previous reports including that of McCourt (1994 Vision Research 34 1609-1617) who criticized the stationary phantom illusion from the viewpoint of his counterphase lightness induction or grating induction, which might involve invalid transparency. Here we confirm that the photopic phantom illusion (Kitaoka et al, 1999 Perception 28 825-834) really gives in-phase lightness induction and involves bistable transparency. It is thus suggested that perceptual continuation and depth in the visual-phantom illusion depend on perceptual transparency.     

Lightness induction revisited

Lightness induction is the classical visual phenomenon whereby the lightness of an object is shown to depend on its immediate surround. Despite the long history of its study, lightness induction has not yet been coherently and satisfactorily explained in all its variety. The two main theories that compete to explain it descend (i) from H von Helmholtz, who believed that lightness induction originates from some central mechanisms that take into account the whole viewing situation, with particular stress upon the apparent illumination of the object; and (ii) E Hering who argued in favour of more peripheral sensory mechanisms based on local luminance contrast. The balance between these theories has recently been shifted towards Helmholtz's position by E H Adelson who has provided additional evidence that lightness induction depends on perceptual interpretation and, particularly, on apparent transparency. I challenge Adelson's conclusions by introducing modified versions of his tile pattern that use luminance gradients. In the first of these new demonstrations there is a strong lightness induction even though no apparent transparency is experienced. In the second there is a clear impression of transparent strips, yet no lightness induction is present. And the third shows that breaking up the Adelson tile pattern, while it affects neither the impression of transparency nor the type of grey-level junctions, makes the lightness-induction effect vanish. This implies that Adelson's illusion can be accounted for by neither local contrast, nor the apparent transparency, nor the type of grey-level junctions. Presented here is an alternative look at lightness induction as a phenomenon of the pictorial (as contrasted to natural) vision, which rests on the lightness-shadow invariance, much as Gregory's 'inappropriate constancy scaling' theory of geometrical illusions rests on the apparent size-distance invariance.     

Lightness compression and hue changes

Two experiments were performed to relate the Bezold-Brücke (B-B) and lightness compression effects. The first used a calibrated screen to present an achromatic luminance staircase. In addition, it reproduced, the methodology and the essential aspects the lightness compression effect discovered by Cataliotti and Gilchrist (1995). That is, observers perceived a truncated grey scale (from white to medium grey) when the staircase was the only stimulation in the near background (Gelb condition), but not when presented on a Mondrian background, because of the high articulation level provided by this background. Experiment 1 design also included two other backgrounds that produced a partial compression effect. In Experiment 2, two chromatic staircases were used. Employing a naming task, changes in hue perception were only observed for the susceptible staircase. The observed changes were of two types. First, for the full staircase presentations, a Gelb background produced maximum lightness compression (more similarity in the lightness of the staircase stimuli) and, also, a minimum B-B effect (fewer differences in hue). Second, only for the Gelb condition, there were changes in the hue of the lowest luminance staircase stimuli depending on the staircase extension. Results are discussed in the framework of the anchoring theory of lightness perception.     

Lightness constancy and illumination discounting

Contrary to the implication of the term "lightness constancy", asymmetric lightness matching has never been found to be perfect unless the scene is highly articulated (i.e., contains a number of different reflectances). Also, lightness constancy has been found to vary for different observers, and an effect of instruction (lightness vs. brightness) has been reported. The elusiveness of lightness constancy presents a great challenge to visual science; we revisit these issues in the following experiment, which involved 44 observers in total. The stimuli consisted of a large sheet of black paper with a rectangular spotlight projected onto the lower half and 40 squares of various shades of grey printed on the upper half. The luminance ratio at the edge of the spotlight was 25, while that of the squares varied from 2 to 16. Three different instructions were given to observers: They were asked to find a square in the upper half that (i) looked as if it was made of the same paper as that on which the spotlight fell (lightness match), (ii) had the same luminance contrast as the spotlight edge (contrast match), or (iii) had the same brightness as the spotlight (brightness match). Observers made 10 matches of each of the three types. Great interindividual variability was found for all three types of matches. In particular, the individual Brunswik ratios were found to vary over a broad range (from .47 to .85). That is, lightness matches were found to be far from veridical. Contrast matches were also found to be inaccurate, being on average, underestimated by a factor of 3.4. Articulation was found to essentially affect not only lightness, but contrast and brightness matches as well. No difference was found between the lightness and luminance contrast matches. While the brightness matches significantly differed from the other matches, the difference was small. Furthermore, the brightness matches were found to be subject to the same interindividual variability and the same effect of articulation. This leads to the conclusion that inexperienced observers are unable to estimate both the brightness and the luminance contrast of the light reflected from real objects lit by real lights. None of our observers perceived illumination edges purely as illumination edges: A partial Gelb effect ("partial illumination discounting") always took place. The lightness inconstancy in our experiment resulted from this partial illumination discounting. We propose an account of our results based on the two-dimensionality of achromatic colour. We argue that large interindividual variations and the effect of articulation are caused by the large ambiguity of luminance ratios in the stimulus displays used in laboratory conditions.     

The Bearable Lightness of Being

How are philosophical questions about what kinds of things there are to be understood and how are they to be answered? This paper defends broadly Fregean answers to these questions. Ontological categories—such as object, property, and relation—are explained in terms of a prior logical categorization of expressions, as singular terms, predicates of varying degree and level, etc. Questions about what kinds of object, property, etc., there are are, on this approach, reduce to questions about truth and logical form: for example, the question whether there are numbers is the question whether there are true atomic statements in which expressions function as singular terms which, if they have reference at all, stand for numbers, and the question whether there are properties of a given type is a question about whether there are meaningful predicates of an appropriate degree and level. This approach is defended against the objection that it must be wrong because makes what there depend on us or our language. Some problems confronting the Fregean approach—including Frege’s notorious paradox of the concept horse—are addressed. It is argued that the approach results in a modest and sober deflationary understanding of ontological commitments.     

Rapid image-segmentation and perceptual transparency share a process which utilises X-junctions generated by temporal integration in the visual system

Perceptual transparency requires local same-polarity X-junctions, which can also be generated by temporal integration under natural dynamic conditions. In this study, segmentation performance and target appearance were measured for a uniform gray target embedded in a random-dot frame presented with a temporally adjacent mask. Although static cues for both segmentation and transparency were unavailable, transparency was observed only when collinear same-polarity edges reduced backward masking, in both the fovea and the perifovea. These results suggest that the visual system has a common underlying mechanism for rapid segmentation and transparency, which utilises same-polarity X-junctions generated by temporal integration.     

Lightness, equivalent backgrounds, and anchoring

Observers compared two center/surround configurations haploscopically. One configuration consisted of a standard surface surrounded by two, three, or four surfaces, each with a different luminance. The other configuration consisted of a comparison surface surrounded by a single annulus that varied in luminance. Center surfaces always had the same luminance but only appeared to have the same lightness with certain annuli (equivalent backgrounds). For most displays, the luminance needed to obtain an equivalent background was close to the highest luminance in the standard surround configuration. Models based on the space-average luminance or the space-average contrast of the standard surround configuration yielded poorer fits. Implications for computational models of lightness and for candidate solutions to the anchoring problem are discussed.     

Lightness contrast in CRT and paper-and-illuminant displays

The increased use of CRT monitors for displaying and controlling stimuli in studies of surface color poses problems of comparability with data obtained with traditional paper-and-illuminant methods. A review of comparable studies using the two methodologies revealed that CRT studies tend to report larger contrast effects. To investigate factors that may be responsible for this difference, simultaneous lightness contrast was measured using both CRT and paper-and-illuminant presentations. The spatial distribution of luminance in the whole field of view and the visual angles subtended by the displays were controlled. The CRT presentation yielded contrast effects twice as big as those measured for a paper surface in a homogeneously illuminated room. However, a paper display under Gelb lighting yielded almost exactly the same effect size as that measured in the CRT presentation. These results demonstrate that contrast effects in both modes of presentation are affected by the spatial distribution of luminance beyond the basic experimental stimuli.     

Lightness constancy: Ratio invariance and luminance profile

The term simultaneous lightness constancy describes the capacity of the visual system to perceive equal reflecting surfaces as having the same lightness despite lying in different illumination fields. In some cases, however, a lightness constancy failure occurs; that is, equal reflecting surfaces appear different in lightness when differently illuminated. An open question is whether the luminance profile of the illumination edges affects simultaneous lightness constancy even when the ratio invariance property of the illumination edges is preserved. To explore this issue, we ran two experiments by using bipartite illumination displays. Both the luminance profile of an illumination edge and the luminance ratio amplitude between the illumination fields were manipulated. Results revealed that the simultaneous lightness constancy increases when the luminance profile of the illumination edge is gradual (rather than sharp) and homogeneous (rather than inhomogeneous), whereas it decreases when the luminance ratio between the illumination fields is enlarged. The results are interpreted according to the layer decomposition schema, stating that the visual system splits the luminance into perceived lightness and apparent illumination components. We suggest that illumination edges having gradual and homogeneous luminance profiles facilitate the luminance decomposition process, whereas wide luminance ratios impede it.     

Lightness constancy through a veiling luminance

Observers were asked to select samples from a Munsell chart to match the lightness of seven identified surfaces in an outdoor scene they were shown. A separate group that was given the same task but viewed the same scene covered with a veiling luminance equal in intensity to the highest luminance in the scene selected almost the same matches. The same lightness constancy results were obtained using an abstract laboratory display to rule out memory color. These results challenge ratio and contrast theories because a veiling luminance, by adding a constant luminance to every poing in the image, dramatically alters luminance ratios. Lightness constancy was not obtained, however, when these three-dimensional real-world-type displays were replaced by a flat, Mondrian-type display consisting of surface grays from white to black, whether or not colored regions were present in the display; lightness matches were consistent with ratio predictions both with and without the veil.     

Lightness depends on immediately prior experience

The lightness hangover illusion is an unusually robust, long-lasting, prior-experience-based lightness effect. The effect occurs in the Mondrian world, a miniature chamber with interior walls covered with dark gray to black patches. The lightest patch in this scene, physically dark gray, looks white. When real whites and light grays are added to the scene, all the patches darken, but at an unusually slow rate. For several seconds, the white patches look self-luminous and the other patches continue to look very light. The luminosity fades and the other patches darken only after 2 min. We tested three possible explanations for this illusion: retinal adaptation, lightness persistence, and anchor persistence. The results clearly support anchor persistence, which is caused by the presence of steady patches, surfaces that retain their luminance values across scenes. The data also show that the size of the illusion varies directly with the number of these steady patches.