Carnap's inductive probabilities as a contribution to decision theory

Common probability theories only allow the deduction of probabilities by using previously known or presupposed probabilities. They do not, however, allow the derivation of probabilities from observed data alone. The question thus arises as to how probabilities in the empirical sciences, especially in medicine, may be arrived at. Carnap hoped to be able to answer this question byhis theory of inductive probabilities. In the first four sections of the present paper the above mentioned problem is discussed in general. After a short presentation of Carnap's theory it is then shown that this theory cannot claim validity for arbitrary random processes. It is suggested that the theory be only applied to binomial and multinomial experiments. By application of de Finetti's theorem Carnap's inductive probabilities are interpreted as consecutive probabilities of the Bayesian kind. Through the introduction of a new axiom the decision parameter λ can be determined even if no a priori knowledge is given. Finally, it is demonstrated that the fundamental problem of Wald's decision theory, i.e., the determination of a plausible criterion where no a priori knowledge is available, can be solved for the cases of binomial and multinomial experiments.     

Objective probability theory theory

I argue that to the extent to which philosophical theories of objective probability have offered theoretically adequateconceptions of objective probability (in connection with such desiderata as causal and explanatory significance, applicability to single cases, etc.), they have failed to satisfy amethodological standard — roughly, a requirement to the effect that the conception offered be specified with the precision appropriate for a physical interpretation of an abstract formal calculus and be fully explicated in terms of concepts, objects or phenomena understood independently of the idea of physical probability. The significance of this, and of the suggested methodological standard, is then briefly discussed.     

The theory of nomic probability

This article sketches a theory of objective probability focusing on nomic probability, which is supposed to be the kind of probability figuring in statistical laws of nature. The theory is based upon a strengthened probability calculus and some epistemological principles that formulate a precise version of the statistical syllogism. It is shown that from this rather minimal basis it is possible to derive theorems comprising (1) a theory of direct inference, and (2) a theory of induction. The theory of induction is not of the familiar Bayesian variety, but consists of a precise version of the traditional Nicod Principle and its statistical analogues.     

论卡尔纳普拒斥形而上学之得失

卡尔纳普是现代西方哲学家拒斥形而上学的典型代表,以哲学科学化的立场,分析科学概念和澄清哲学问题是他哲学活动的基本目标。卡尔纳普通过自己的哲学活动,极大推进了科学哲学的发展,为现代科学的发展做出了极大的贡献,然而他在激烈拒斥形而上学上,不可避免地存在着许多偏颇与失误之处。     

Feminism and Carnap's Principle of Tolerance

The logical empiricists often appear as a foil for feminist theories. Their emphasis on the individualistic nature of knowledge and on the value‐neutrality of science seems directly opposed to most feminist concerns. However, several recent works have highlighted aspects of Carnap's views that make him seem like much less of a straightforwardly positivist thinker. Certain of these aspects lend themselves to feminist concerns much more than the stereotypical picture would imply.     

Reconciling probability theory and coherentism

Recent results in the literature appear to show that it is impossible for two independent testimonies to jointly raise the probability of a proposition if neither testimony individually has any impact on that probability. I show that these impossibility results do not apply when testimonies agree on incidental details.     

Russell's Influence On Carnap's Aufbau

This paper concerns the debate on the nature of Rudolf Carnap'sproject in his 1928 book The Logical Structure of the Worldor Aufbau. Michael Friedman and Alan Richardson haveinitiated much of this debate. They claim that the Aufbauis best understood as a work that is firmly grounded inneo-Kantian philosophy. They have made these claims in oppositionto Quine and Goodman's ``received view' of the Aufbau. Thereceived view sees the Aufbau as an attempt to carry out indetail Russell's external world program. I argue that both sidesof this debate have made errors in their interpretation ofRussell. These errors have led these interpreters to misunderstandthe connection between Russell's project and Carnap's project.Russell in fact exerted a crucial influence on Carnap in the1920s. This influence is complicated, however, due to the factthat Russell and Carnap disagreed on many philosophical issues. Iconclude that interpretations of the Aufbau that ignoreRussell's influence are incomplete.     

A Diagrammatic Reconstruction of Carnap's Quasianalysis

In this paper, I am zeroing in on Carnap's formal method of quasianalysis, arguing against two interpretations of it, offered by Nelson Goodman and Thomas Mormann. In order to overcome their inadequacy, I propose a diagrammatic reconstruction, which takes advantage of the fact that the concept of local sign is no longer ignored. This will give me the opportunity to show that Quine'scriticism of Carnap's constitution of physical space fails, and will allow me to describe QUASIMODOS (QUASIanalytical Machine Oriented Diagrammatic Operation System) – a system designed to construct qualities in continuous domains.