When is enough enough? We are only beginning

Sheridan (1995) presents the problem of the psychologist consulting to a medical residency program as an example of the difficulty one experiences in attempting to challenge, even from a data-based perspective, the calcification inherent in health systems and medical education in particular. This paper responds to her challenging questions, “How much should we get involved in changing health care and medical education, and at what level (local, national) should psychology intervene (if at all)?” It is suggested that psychologists pick up the challenge to bring about change, whenever possible, with the admonition—we are only beginning.     

The clinical psychologist as program consultant: When is enough enough?

One of the most influential roles clinical psychologists play in health care settings is as consultant to medical colleagues. The psychologist consultant typically approaches either clinical or programmatic questions intending to tap both empirical research and clinical judgment perspectives in trying to answer them. This paper describes a specific “program consultation case,” a not atypical consultation situation in which graduate medical education directors asked for advice about their residency training program. The purpose is to use this example to generate ideas and provoke discussion about such consultation processes and their usefulness in the health care training and service delivery world. The psychologist may be faced with questions that have meaningful implications beyond the specific consultation. What if the concerns being posed by this particular program are concerns which have been raised before, have been researched before, and have generated reasonable suggestions, conclusions, and strategies for improvement? And what if no one has paid attention, so that the questions are being raised again? When empirical and clinical data consistently combine to identify problems within health-related training or service delivery systems, and when suggestions or alternatives for their solutions have been presented and, also presumably, ignored, what does the clinical psychologist consultant do next?     

When is enough, enough? A comment on Grodzinsky and Marek's "Algorithmic and heuristic processes revisited"

In this comment I argue that although Y. Grodzinsky & A. Marek's (1983, Brain and Language, 33, 216-225) criticism of the conclusions reached by A. Caramazza and E. B. Zurif (1976, Brain and Language, 3, 572-582) in their paper on comprehension disorders in so-called agrammatic patients is not entirely without technical merit, its impact on the claims made by Caramazza and Zurif is inconsequential. I show that there are deeper theoretical and methodological reasons which undermine the claims made by Caramazza and Zurif and the only superficially different proposal of Grodzinsky and Marek.     

“When is my Dutch good enough?” Experiences of refugee women with Dutch labour organizations

The basic assumption in the Dutch dominant discourse on integration is that knowledge of the Dutch language when combined with education is the key factor for integration into society. The aim of this article is to show how female refugees who have completed higher education in the Netherlands experience the process of integration into the Dutch labour market through contacts with and in Dutch organizations. We situate the narratives of these women in the broader discursive context of the Netherlands and show what these experiences can tell us about the policies and debates on integration in the Netherlands.     

Is continence enough?

The ideal of virtue demands not only right choice and right behavior but also right desire in the emotions. Homosexual desire, then, even if it does not result in overt homosexual behavior, is contrary to virtue, and the completion of virtue demands right desire. If a homosexual has no plan to marry, then right desire implies only the removal of homosexual desire and not the revival of heterosexual desire at which reorientation therapy aims. On the other hands, if a homosexual is married or plans to marry, then right desire includes heterosexual desire for one's spouse. If homosexual desire is viewed as an emotional disorder, and not merely as a moral defect, then it may require reorientation therapy to bring about heterosexual desire. The pursuit of virtue, then, may recommend reorientation therapy, but even this recommendation is fairly limited, since reorientation therapy may be burdensome and may not be that effective. In conclusion, married homosexuals or homosexuals planning to marry may have a limited moral obligation to pursue reorientation therapy.     

When is Death Bad,When it is Bad?

Philosophia - On a view most secularists accept, the deceased individual goes out of existence. How, then, can death be a bad thing for, or harm, the deceased? I consider the doctrine of...     

When is a picture?

Philosophical discussions of depiction sometimes suffer from a lack of differentiation between several questions concerning the ‘nature’ of pictorial representation. To provide a suitable framework I distinguish six such questions and several levels on which one might want to proceed in order to answer some of them. With this background, I reconstruct Goodman's and Elgin's answer to the specific question: ‘What distinguishes the pictorial from the verbal or linguistic?’ I try to reveal some major motivations behind their system-oriented approach and to indicate some reasons why a strategy of this kind is to a certain extent mandatory to grasp the ‘nature of the pictorial’. The system-relative and functional character of depiction has to be captured by every adequate theory.     

When Should we Regret?

In this paper, I develop and defend the ‘Justified Decision Perspective’ (JDP) in answer to the question of when we should regret the things we have done. I claim that one should not regret a past decision one has made so long as it was justified in relation to the kind of person one was at the time of acting. On this time-indexing account, judging a decision to be justified – at least for the purposes of assessing one’s regrets – is a matter of identifying the practical reasons that were epistemically available to the agent when she was deliberating about what to do. Accordingly, when responding to her regrets, an agent should not invoke (a) reasons that existed but were epistemically unavailable to her when she was deliberating; or (b) reasons that only came into existence after she acted. The JDP has important implications for prospective regret. In particular, it implies we should worry less about experiencing regret in the future than many of us do. Thus, my overall aim is to show that we often have reason to reject our regrets, which means that regret should play a less prominent and painful role in our lives than it does currently.     

When Do I Disclose?

SUMMARY

The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) heralded a new era of civil rights for the disabled, including the mentally ill. This article concerns Title I of the ADA, protections against discrimination in employment. It is a revised version of an article orginally published in a consumer publication, the MDSG/New York Newsletter (Mood Disorder Support Group) to provide guidance on the pro's and con's of making disclosure of mental illness in the job environment. As such it is a valuable reference for both therapists and service recipients who wish to learn more about how the ADA relates to the employment of people with mental illness and who may be faced with the difficult decision of whether or not they should disclose their condition and request reasonable accommodation. Occupational therapists should be well-informed on this topic, to assist consumers with questions on disclosure, reasonable accommodations and other aspects of Title T. Employers can benefit by providing them with information about appropriate accommodations. And occupational therapists can advise both consumers and employers on how a psychiatric illness may affect work performance.     

When does grouping happen?

Recent research on perceptual grouping is described with particular emphasis on identifying the level(s) at which grouping factors operate. Contrary to the classical view of grouping as an early, two-dimensional, image-based process, recent experimental results show that it is strongly influenced by phenomena related to perceptual constancy, such as binocular depth perception, lightness constancy, amodal completion, and illusory contours. These findings imply that at least some grouping processes operate at the level of phenomenal perception rather than at the level of the retinal image. Preliminary evidence is reported showing that grouping can affect perceptual constancy, suggesting that grouping processes must also operate at an early, preconstancy level. If so, grouping may be a ubiquitous, ongoing aspect of visual organization that occurs for each level of representation rather than as a single stage that can be definitively localized relative to other perceptual processes.     

When Is More Better?

Abstract— We examine three determinants of the relationship between the magnitude of a stimulus and a person's subjective "value" of that stimulus: the process by which value is assessed (either by feeling or by calculation), the evaluability of the relevant magnitude variable (whether the desirability of a given level of that variable can be evaluated independently), and the mode of evaluation (whether stimuli are encountered and evaluated jointly or separately). Reliance on feeling, lack of evaluability, and separate evaluation lead to insensitivity to magnitude. An analysis invoking these factors provides a novel account for why people typically become less sensitive to changes in the magnitude of a stimulus as magnitude increases.     

When is motion 'motion'?

Examples of visual motion have become more and more abstract over the years, leading up to 'third-order' stimuli where direction is actually determined by the observer through top - down attention. But how far can this be pushed--are there motion stimuli that are yet more arbitrary and abstract? Actually, there is a broad class of 'conceptual motion' stimuli--things like a moving grating of faces, or a shifting pattern of words--that are perfect analogs to traditional 'perceptual motion' stimuli, solvable by the same motion computation and for which observers can readily make direction-of-motion judgments. Interestingly though, these do not produce a sensation of motion (among other automatic consequences of motion detection). Here we compare a luminance-based perceptual motion stimulus to a semantic-based conceptual motion stimulus to contrast the psychophysical hallmarks of these motion categories.     

When is a Deleuzian becoming ?

Much has been written recently about the Deleuzian concept of becoming. Most of that writing, especially in feminist criticism, has drawn from the later collaborations with Guattari. However, the concept of a becoming arises earlier and appears more consistently across the trajectory of Deleuze's work than the discussion of specific becomings might lead one to believe. In this paper, I trace the concept of becoming in Deleuze's work, and specifically in the earlier works. By doing so, I hope to shed some light on the specific becomings that are the focus of the collaborative work with Guattari, and to deepen an understanding of the concept in general.