Managing motivational conflict: How self-esteem and executive resources influence self-regulatory responses to risk

This article explores how self-esteem and executive resources interact to determine responses to motivational conflict. One correlational and 3 experimental studies investigated the hypothesis that high and low self-esteem people undertake different self-regulatory strategies in "risky" situations that afford opportunity to pursue competing goals and that carrying out these strategies requires executive resources. When such resources are available, high self-esteem people respond to risk by prioritizing and pursuing approach goals, whereas low self-esteem people prioritize avoidance goals. However, self-esteem does not influence responses to risk when executive resources are impaired. In these studies, risk was operationalized by exposing participants to a relationship threat (Studies 1 and 2), by using participants' self-reported marital conflict (Study 3), and by threatening academic competence (Study 4). Executive resources were operationalized as cognitive load (Studies 1 and 2), working memory capacity (Study 3), and resource depletion (Study 4). When executive resources were ample, high self-esteem people responded to interpersonal risk by making more positive relationship evaluations (Studies 1, 2, and 3) and making more risky social comparisons following a personal failure (Study 4) than did low self-esteem people. Self-esteem did not predict participants' responses when executive resources were impaired or when risk was absent. The regulatory function of self-esteem may be more resource-dependent than has been previously theorized. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Religious Orthodoxy and the Complexity of Thought about Religious and Nonreligious Issues

Two studies examined the relationship between religious orthodoxy and the complexity of thinking about religious and nonreligious issues. In both studies, participants who were high or low in religious orthodoxy wrote a paragraph outlining their thoughts about a religious issue (life after death in Study 1; existence of God in Study 2) and/or a nonreligious issue (capital punishment in Study 1; free trade between Canada and the U.S. in Study 2). The results of both studies indicated that participants who were high in religious orthodoxy were less complex in their thinking about religious issues than those low in religious orthodoxy, but did not differ in the complexity of their thinking about nonreligious issues. These results do not support the notion that orthodoxly religious individuals are dispositionally inclined to think in simpler or more rigid ways overall, but they do suggest a tendency to think less complexly about religious issues.     

Discrimination against facially stigmatized applicants in interviews: an eye-tracking and face-to-face investigation

Drawing from theory and research on perceived stigma (Pryor, Reeder, Yeadon, & Hesson-McInnis, 2004), attentional processes (Rinck & Becker, 2006), working memory (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974), and regulatory resources (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000), the authors examined discrimination against facially stigmatized applicants and the processes involved. In Study 1, 171 participants viewed a computer-mediated interview of an applicant who was facially stigmatized or not and who either did or did not acknowledge the stigma. The authors recorded participants' (a) time spent looking at the stigma (using eye tracker technology), (b) ratings of the applicant, (c) memory recall about the applicant, and (d) self-regulatory depletion. Results revealed that the participants with facially stigmatized applicants attended more to the cheek (i.e., where the stigma was placed), which led participants to recall fewer interview facts, which in turn led to lower applicant ratings. In addition, the participants with the stigmatized (vs. nonstigmatized) applicant depleted more regulatory resources. In Study 2, 38 managers conducted face-to-face interviews with either a facially stigmatized or nonstigmatized applicant, and then rated the applicant. Results revealed that managers who interviewed a facially stigmatized applicant (vs. a nonstigmatized applicant) rated the applicant lower, recalled less information about the interview, and depleted more self-regulatory resources.     

Thanking in the times of the plague: The role of holistic thinking in meaning-making and gratitude

Two studies examined the role of holistic thinking in meaning-making and gratitude during the COVID-19 pandemic. Correlational and mediational evidence showed that participants with high holistic thinking tended to construct more meaning from the pandemic and feel grateful, compared to participants with low holistic thinking (Study 1). Experimental manipulation of holistic thinking elicited behavioral choice for books on life meaning, which predicted gratitude (Study 2). These results cannot be explained by individual differences in the perception of threat (Study 1) or distress (Studies 1–2) associated with the pandemic. They cannot be explained by demographic factors such as age or gender, or cultural constructs such as ethnicity, educational level, or religiosity (Studies 1–2). These findings push understanding forward. They strengthen interdisciplinary links, fusing positive psychology with the social cognition of thinking styles. We discuss promising directions for future research with cross-cultural implications.     

Regulatory mode effects on counterfactual thinking and regret

The present studies examined the influence of two regulatory mode concerns—a locomotion concern with movement from state to state and an assessment concern with making comparisons [see Higgins, E. T., Kruglanski, A. W., & Pierro, A. (2003). Regulatory mode: Locomotion and assessment as distinct orientations. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (Vol. 35, pp. 293-344). New York: Academic Press]—on engaging in counterfactual thinking and experiencing post-decisional regret. When contemplating a decision with a negative outcome, it was predicted that high (vs. low) locomotion would induce less counterfactual thinking and less regret, whereas the opposite would be true for high (vs. low) assessment. Locomotion and assessment orientations were measured as chronic individual differences in Study 1 and 2, and were induced experimentally in Study 3. In Study 1 and 3 a purchase scenario with a negative outcome was used to elicit counterfactuals and regret, while in Study 2 participants were asked to recall one of their own personal purchases that had a negative outcome. The results supported our predictions. We discuss the implications of these findings for the nature of counterfactual thinking and regret from the perspective of their relation to regulatory mode.     

Ostracism,resources, and the perception of human motion

Is perception of human motion affected by psychosocial resources? According to the Resources and Perception Model, perception is jointly affected by subjective threat and psychosocial resources that buffer threat. Two experiments tested whether social threat (i.e., ostracism) and psychosocial resources affect perception of human motion. Observers attempted to identify human movement in ambiguous point‐light displays after being ostracized or not ostracized. Additionally, trait resources (self‐esteem plus social support) were measured (Studies 1 and 2), and self‐affirmation was manipulated (Study 2). Study 1 showed that ostracism reduced sensitivity for detecting human motion but not among people with ample trait resources. Study 2 replicated this ostracism‐by‐trait resources interaction. It also showed that self‐affirmation improved human motion perception for all included participants but only benefited ostracized participants with ample trait resources. These studies show that a basic visual skill—detecting human motion—is jointly affected by social threats and psychosocial resources.     

Moral value transfer from regulatory fit: what feels right is right and what feels wrong is wrong

People experience regulatory fit (E. T. Higgins, 2000) when the strategic manner of their goal pursuit suits their regulatory orientation, and this regulatory fit feels right. Fit violation feels wrong. Four studies tested the proposal that experiences of fit can transfer to moral evaluations. The authors examined transfer of feeling wrong from fit violation by having participants in a promotion or prevention focus recall transgressions of commission or omission (Studies 1 and 2). Both studies found that when the type of transgression was a fit violation, participants expressed more guilt. Studies 3 and 4 examined transfer of feeling right from regulatory fit. Participants evaluated conflict resolutions (Study 3) and public policies (Study 4) as more right when the means pursued had fit.     

Principled moral sentiment and the flexibility of moral judgment and decision making

Three studies test eight hypotheses about (1) how judgment differs between people who ascribe greater vs. less moral relevance to choices, (2) how moral judgment is subject to task constraints that shift evaluative focus (to moral rules vs. to consequences), and (3) how differences in the propensity to rely on intuitive reactions affect judgment. In Study 1, judgments were affected by rated agreement with moral rules proscribing harm, whether the dilemma under consideration made moral rules versus consequences of choice salient, and by thinking styles (intuitive vs. deliberative). In Studies 2 and 3, participants evaluated policy decisions to knowingly do harm to a resource to mitigate greater harm or to merely allow the greater harm to happen. When evaluated in isolation, approval for decisions to harm was affected by endorsement of moral rules and by thinking style. When both choices were evaluated simultaneously, total harm -- but not the do/allow distinction -- influenced rated approval. These studies suggest that moral rules play an important, but context-sensitive role in moral cognition, and offer an account of when emotional reactions to perceived moral violations receive less weight than consideration of costs and benefits in moral judgment and decision making.     

Fast similarities: efficiency advantages of similarity-focused comparisons

People constantly have to make efficient use of their limited cognitive resources. Recently, T. Mussweiler and K. Epstude (2009) demonstrated that comparative thinking simplifies information processing and increases the efficiency of judgment. However, there are different types of comparative thinking. While comparing 2 entities, people may focus on either similarities or dissimilarities between target and standard. The authors propose that these 2 comparative thinking styles differ in their efficiency. Specifically, the authors hypothesize that comparisons with a focus on similarities lead to more focused information processing and faster judgments than comparisons with a dissimilarity focus. In line with these hypotheses, the authors demonstrate that participants are indeed faster at judging the similarity of 2 stimuli (Study 1) and that they search for less target information in a comparative judgment task (Study 2) if they focus on similarities rather than dissimilarities. Focusing on similarities thus appears to be the more efficient comparative thinking style.     

复杂情境下不同角度及思维方式的决策表现差异:决策视角-心理距离的作用

本研究运用2个行为实验探讨了复杂情境下自我决策、为他人决策和预期他人决策在无意识思维方式和有意识思维方式下的决策表现差异。实验1发现复杂情境中无意识思维方式下,自我决策和为他人决策的决策表现显著优于预期他人决策,自我决策和为他人决策表现没有显著差异。实验2发现复杂情境中有意识思维时,在陌生人条件下,为他人决策表现分数显著高于自我决策与预期他人决策,自我决策和预期他人决策表现无显著差异;在朋友条件下,为他人决策和预期他人决策的决策表现显著优于自我决策,为他人决策和预期他人决策表现无显著差异。研究结果支持了本文提出的决策视角-心理距离作用假设(the Perspective-Distance Effect Hypothesis,PDEH)。     

Risk-Taking and Creativity: Convergent,but Not Divergent Thinking Is Better in Low-Risk Takers

The relationship between risk-taking and creativity is critical to understanding social harmony and innovation. Although some studies have assessed the link between risk-taking and divergent thinking, the association between risk-taking and convergent thinking remains unclear. Two studies were conducted to systemically investigate whether risk-taking is linked to convergent thinking. In Study 1, a sample of 127 healthy participants performed a Chinese remote associate test (RAT) and completed a risk-taking questionnaire. As predicted, risk-taking was negatively correlated with RAT performance, implying that risk-taking has a negative association with convergent thinking. Study 2 was an online survey study that replicated Study 1 and extended the measures to include self-rated risk and a measure of divergent thinking (the alternate uses task). The findings were fully replicated, showing that low risk-taking goes with better convergent thinking and risk-taking was not significantly correlated with divergent thinking. Furthermore, the risk-taking/convergent-thinking relationship was best described by a linear regression model in both studies. Taken together, these results suggest that appropriate reductions in risk-taking can boost convergent thinking.     

Consequences of stereotype suppression and internal suppression motivation: a self-regulation approach

The present research studied the effects of suppression of stereotypes on subsequent stereotyping. Moreover, the moderating influence of motivation to suppress stereotypes was examined. The first three experiments showed that suppression of stereotypes leads to the experience of engaging in self-control (Study 1), to depleted regulatory resources as indicated by worse performance on an unrelated subsequent task that involves self-regulation (Study 2), and to hyperaccessibility of the suppressed thoughts (Study 3). However, these effects were moderated by internal suppression motivation: Increased self-control, depleted regulatory resources, and hyperaccessibility of suppressed thoughts only occur for people with low internal suppression motivation. Furthermore, in line with the argument that depletion of regulatory resources after suppression also should result in increased stereotyping in general, it was found that suppression of a specific stereotype leads to an increased use of stereotypes in general, but only for people with low internal suppression motivation (Study 4).     

The asymmetric connection between money and material vs. experiential purchases

We examined the relationship between having a monetary mindset and the pursuit of material goods over experiences and found that people tend to think of their material purchases more in monetary terms than their experiential purchases. Purchase price correlated more highly with participants’ satisfaction with their material goods than their experiences (Study 1) and participants reported that the amount spent on significant components of a purchase (Study 2) would have more impact on their satisfaction with material goods than with experiences, as would a change in purchase price (Study 3). When the same purchase (a 3D TV) was framed in material terms (vs. experiential terms), participants reported that a price change would have a greater impact on their satisfaction. These findings suggest experiences suffer less than material possessions from the extrinsic psychology that comes with thinking about purchases in monetary terms.     

The perceived impact of tax and regulatory changes

People believe that shared events, events that impact everyone to the same degree, will nonetheless impact them more than others. Across four studies we examined whether this impacts people's reactions to proposed changes to tax and regulatory policies. We found that participants thought that tax (Study 1a and 1b) and regulatory (Study 2) changes would have more of an impact on their own lives than on the lives of people in their same financial situation. We then examined whether these findings are the product of a broad focalism bias or its narrower relative, egocentrism. Because we observed the bias both when participants were asked about their own financial situation or that of someone else, the former appears to be the better explanation (Study 3). We discuss the implications of this bias for people's willingness to embrace policy proposals designed to advance the common good.     

Ideological and personal zeal reactions to threat among people with high self-esteem: motivated promotion focus

After a mortality salience manipulation, participants completed measures of either ideological zeal (Study 1) or personal project zeal (Study 3). Mortality salience increased both kinds of zeal but only among participants with high self-esteem. High self-esteem was positively correlated with dispositional tendencies toward promotion focus, action orientation, and behavioral activation; it was negatively correlated with behavioral inhibition and rumination (Study 2). These findings clarify the role of dispositional self-esteem in mortality salience research and confirm that, as has been found with various other threats, zealous reactions to mortality salience are most pronounced among participants with high self-esteem. Results support a regulatory focus perspective on zealous reactions to threat. Ideological and personal zeal reflect motivated promotion focus reactions that are rewarding because they decrease the motivational relevance, regulatory fit, and subjective salience of threats.     

Putting your best pet forward: Language patterns of persuasion in online pet advertisements

This paper evaluates persuasion dynamics of animal adoption using text data from a large archive of online pet advertisements. In Study 1, 184,805 adoption profiles from Petfinder indicated how long a pet will remain online and unadopted. Consistent with evidence from related persuasion settings such as peer-to-peer lending, pets spent less time online if profile writers had an analytic thinking style and advertisements contained few peripheral processing cues such as social words. Study 2 (N = 676,004 adoption profiles) replicated Study 1 patterns and found that adopted pet profiles contained more markers of analytic thinking and fewer social words than unadopted pet profiles. In an experiment (Study 3, N = 987), participants read an adoption advertisement typical of adopted or unadopted pets. Participants self-reported that they would be more likely to adopt a pet and visit its shelter after reading a more analytic and less social adoption profile (indicators of adopted pets) than a less analytic and more social profile (indicators of unadopted pets). Finally, Study 4 (N = 3,245 Tweets) demonstrated that more analytic and less social word patterns relate to increased engagement online, such as likes and retweets. These data suggest pet adoption that begins online is a social and psychological process, enhanced by messages with markers of complex thinking and few humanizing references. Advances to persuasion theory are discussed, underscored by the implications for pet adoption and how language patterns in online advertisements can reflect influence at scale.     

Evidence for the DTA hypothesis II: Threatening self-esteem increases death-thought accessibility

Three studies assessed the impact of self-esteem threat on death-thought accessibility (DTA). Increased DTA resulted from three distinct types of self-esteem threat. Studies 1 and 2 employed negative feedback procedures in which participants were told that they scored below average on an intelligence test (Study 1), or that their personality was incongruent for their desired career path (Study 2). In Study 3, participants were led to believe that they would give an ill prepared speech in front of their peers. In Studies 1 and 2 DTA was assessed via reaction times on a lexical decision task, while Study 3 employed a word-fragment completion task. Study 3 demonstrated the DTA buffering effect of fortifying self-esteem via self-affirmation. Discussion focused on general implications for TMT, self-esteem, and mental health.     

When fit matters more: The effect of regulatory fit on adaptation to change

Regulatory fit theory predicts that motivation and performance are enhanced when individuals pursue goals framed in a way that fits their regulatory orientation (promotion vs. prevention focus). Our aim was to test the predictions of the theory when individuals deal with change. We expected and found in three studies that regulatory fit is beneficial only when a prevention focus is involved. In Study 1, an experiment among students, prevention- but not promotion-focused participants performed better in a changed task when it was framed in fit with their regulatory orientation. In Study 2, a survey among employees experiencing organizational changes, only the fit between individual prevention (and not promotion) focus and prevention framing of the changes by the manager was associated with higher employee adaptation to changes. In Study 3, a weekly survey among employees undergoing organizational change, again only prevention regulatory fit was associated with lower employee exhaustion and higher employee work engagement. Theoretical and practical implications of applying regulatory focus theory to organizational change are discussed.     

Reconstruing intolerance: abstract thinking reduces conservatives' prejudice against nonnormative groups

Myrdal (1944) described the "American dilemma" as the conflict between abstract national values ("liberty and justice for all") and more concrete, everyday prejudices. We leveraged construal-level theory to empirically test Myrdal's proposition that construal level (abstract vs. concrete) can influence prejudice. We measured individual differences in construal level (Study 1) and manipulated construal level (Studies 2 and 3); across these three studies, we found that adopting an abstract mind-set heightened conservatives' tolerance for groups that are perceived as deviating from Judeo-Christian values (gay men, lesbians, Muslims, and atheists). Among participants who adopted a concrete mind-set, conservatives were less tolerant of these nonnormative groups than liberals were, but political orientation did not have a reliable effect on tolerance among participants who adopted an abstract mind-set. Attitudes toward racial out-groups and dominant groups (e.g., Whites, Christians) were unaffected by construal level. In Study 3, we found that the effect of abstract thinking on prejudice was mediated by an increase in concerns about fairness.