The neural basis of insight problem solving: an event-related potential study

The electrophysiological correlates of successful insight problem solving (Chinese logogriphs) were studied in 18 healthy subjects using high-density event-related potentials (ERPs). A new experimental paradigm (learning-testing model) was adopted in order to make subjects find a solution on their own initiative rather than receive an answer passively. Results showed that Successful guessed logogriphs elicited a more positive ERP deflection (P200-600) than did Unsuccessful guessed logogriphs in the time window from 200 to 600 ms after onset of the stimuli. Subsequently Successful logogriphs elicited a more negative ERP deflection than did Unsuccessful logogriphs in the time windows of 1500-2000 ms (N1500-2000) and 2000-2500 ms (N2000-2500). Maps of the P200-600 showed strong activity in the midline parieto-occipital scalp regions. Dipole analysis localized the generator of P200-600 in the left superior temporal gyrus and parietotemporo-occipital cortex areas. The N1500-2000 and N2000-2500 had a distinct activation over left frontal scalp regions. Dipole analysis localized the generator of the N1500-2000 in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and the N2000-2500 in the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC). This result indicates that the parietotemporo-occipital cortex areas might be involved in forming rich associations in the early stage of successful logogriph solving. Then, the ACC might play an important role in the breaking mental set and the forming of novel associations. At last, "Aha" feeling might activate the PCC.     

Using another's gaze as an explicit aid to insight problem solving

Research has shown that implicitly guiding attention via visual cues or unrelated tasks can increase the likelihood of solving insight problems. We examined whether following another person making specific skin-crossing saccades could induce similar attentional shifts and increase solution rates for Duncker's ((1945) Duncker, K. 1945. On problem solving. Psychological Monographs, 58 (5, Whole No. 270)[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) radiation problem. We presented 150 participants with one of three 30-s eye movement patterns from another problem solver: (a) focusing solely on the central tumour; (b) naturally making skin-crossing saccades between the outside area and the tumour from multiple angles; or (c) making deliberate skin-crossing saccades between the outside area and the tumour from multiple angles. Following another person making skin-crossing saccades increased the likelihood of solving the radiation problem. Our results demonstrate that another person's eye movements can promote attentional shifts that trigger insight problem solving.     

Multiple paths to transfer and constraint relaxation in insight problem solving

In two experiments participants received various training methods designed to relax constraints present in the Four-Tree problem (deBono, 1967 deBono, E. 1967. The use of lateral thinking, London: Jonathan Cape.  [Google Scholar]), a difficult insight problem. Geometry misconceptions were corrected via direct instruction. Participants’ difficulty with developing three-dimensional representations was addressed via spontaneous analogical transfer (Experiment 1) or via cued analogical transfer (Experiment 2). We found that, while both training methods were effective, alleviating multiple constraints was more effective than the alleviation of single constraints via training programmes (c.f. Kershaw & Ohlsson, 2004 Kershaw, T. C. and Ohlsson, S. 2004. Multiple causes of difficulty in insight: The case of the nine-dot problem. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning Memory and Cognition, 30: 3–13. doi: 10.1037/0278-7393.30.1.3[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). Providing single difficulty hints was ineffective in promoting solution. Implications for multiple paths to transfer (Nokes, 2009 Nokes, T. J. 2009. Mechanisms of knowledge transfer. Thinking & Reasoning, 15: 1–36. doi: 10.1080/13546780802490186[Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]; Nokes & Ohlsson, 2005 Nokes, T. J. and Ohlsson, S. 2005. Comparing multiple paths to mastery: What is learned?. Cognitive Science, 29: 769–796. doi: 10.1207/s15516709cog0000_32[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) and multiple constraints are discussed.     

Interactive insight problem solving

Insight problem solving was investigated with the matchstick algebra problems developed by Knoblich, Ohlsson, Haider, and Rhenius (1999 Knoblich, G., Ohlsson, S., Haider, H. and Rhenius, D. 1999. Constraint relaxation and chunk decomposition in insight problem solving. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 25: 1534–1555. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). These problems are false equations expressed with Roman numerals that can be made true bymoving one matchstick. In a first group participants examined a static two-dimensional representation of the false algebraic expression and told the experimenter which matchstick should be moved. In a second group, participants interacted with a three-dimensional representation of the false equation. Success rates in the static group for different problem types replicated the pattern of data reported in Knoblich et al. (1999 Knoblich, G., Ohlsson, S., Haider, H. and Rhenius, D. 1999. Constraint relaxation and chunk decomposition in insight problem solving. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 25: 1534–1555. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). However, participants in the interactive group were significantly more likely to achieve insight. Problem-solving success in the static group was best predicted by performance on a test of numeracy, whereas in the interactive group it was best predicted by performance on a test of visuo-spatial reasoning. Implications for process models of problem solving are discussed.     

A proposed universal model of problem solving for design,science and cognate fields

A modestly generic, innovative, problem solving process with roots in the study of design and scientific research problem solving is presented and motivated. It is argued to be the shared core process of all problem solving. At its heart is a recognition of five foci or nodes of change vital to the process (changes in problem and solution formulation, method, constraints, and partial solution proposals) together with a bootstrap marked by the formation of higher order knowledge about problem solving in the domain in tandem with the solving of specific problems, the essential feature of all learned improvement. None of these elements is entirely original, but the way they are made explicit and developed (rather than folded into fewer, more abstract, boxes) is argued to provide fresh understanding of the organisation and power of the process to deal with complex practical problems.     

Insight versus analysis: Evidence for diverse methods in problem solving

Since the Gestalt psychologists made the distinction approximately 100 years ago, psychologists have differentiated between solving problems through analysis versus insight. The present paper presents evidence to support the idea that, rather than conceptualising insight versus analysis as distinct modes of solving problems, it is more useful to conceive of insight and analysis as two approaches within a set of possible solving methods. In the present research, 60 participants solved insight problems while thinking aloud, which provided evidence concerning the processes underlying problem solution. Comparison with performance of a nonverbalisation control group (n = 35) indicated no negative effects of thinking aloud on insight in problem solving. The results supported the idea that various methods are utilised in solving insight problems. The “classic” impasse–restructuring–insight sequence occurred in only a small minority of solutions. A number of other solution methods were found, ranging from relatively direct applications of knowledge, to various heuristic methods, to restructuring arising from new information gleaned from a failed solution. It is concluded that there is not a sharp distinction between solving a problem through analysis versus insight, and implications of that conclusion are discussed.     

Insight problem solving in individuals with high versus low schizotypy

Insight problem solving requires restructuring of a problem space by stepping out of the framework provided by the commonly activated cognitive schemas and acquiring a new perspective on the problem. Schizotypy has been linked with loosened associative and overinclusive thinking that may be advantageous for this process. The present study tested this hypothesis and found that individuals with a high degree of schizotypy show better performance on a set of insight problems relative to individuals with low schizotypy, but not on a set of incremental problems that required focused goal-related thinking. Results support the notion that schizotypy is associated not only with enhanced abilities in creative processes involved in divergent thinking but also in creative operations during analytical problem solving.     

Time of day effects on problem solving: When the non-optimal is optimal

In a study examining the effects of time of day on problem solving, participants solved insight and analytic problems at their optimal or non-optimal time of day. Given the presumed differences in the cognitive processes involved in solving these two types of problems, it was expected that the reduced inhibitory control associated with non-optimal times of the day would differentially impact performance on the two types of problems. In accordance with this expectation, results showed consistently greater insight problem solving performance during non-optimal times of day compared to optimal times of day but no consistent time of day effects on analytic problem solving. The findings indicate that tasks involving creativity might benefit from a non-optimal time of day.     

A microgenetic study of insightful problem solving

An eight-session microgenetic study of acquisition of an insightful problem-solving strategy was conducted. A total of 35 second graders who did not use this insightful strategy initially were assigned to two groups that differed in the frequency of problems likely to facilitate discovery and generalization of the strategy. Children in the facilitative problems group discovered the insightful strategy earlier, used it more often subsequently, and transferred it more often to novel problems than did those in the nonfacilitative problems group. Children generally discovered the insightful strategy on the most facilitative items and extended it progressively to items on which its advantages were smaller but still substantial. The results indicate that experience outside the experimental situation, as well as experience inside the experimental situation, influences use of new strategies.     

Using a bad tool with good intention: young children's imitation of adults' questionable choices

We present three studies exploring 2- to 4-year-olds’ imitation on witnessing a model whose questionable tool use choices suggested her untrustworthiness. In Study 1, children observed the model accidentally select a physically optimal tool for a task and then intentionally reject it for one that was functionally nonaffordant. When asked to perform the task for her, children at all ages ignored the model’s intentional cues and selected the optimal tool. Study 2 found that when the model’s nonaffordant tool choice was emphasized by claims about its design, 3-year-olds increased imitation. They also imitated, as did 2-year-olds, when the model selected a suboptimal rather than nonaffordant tool. The 4-year-olds consistently avoided imitation. Study 3 replicated these findings with new tools and participants. Additional measures indicated that knowledge about artifact design predicted children’s tendency to ignore the model. These results shed light on developmental trends in the social and cognitive functions of imitation.     

Gesture offers insight into problem‐solving in adults and children

When asked to explain their solutions to a problem, both adults and children gesture as they talk. These gestures at times convey information that is not conveyed in speech and thus reveal thoughts that are distinct from those revealed in speech. In this study, we use the classic Tower of Hanoi puzzle to validate the claim that gesture and speech taken together can reflect the activation of two cognitive strategies within a single response. The Tower of Hanoi is a well‐studied puzzle, known to be most efficiently solved by activating subroutines at theoretically defined choice points. When asked to explain how they solved the Tower of Hanoi puzzle, both adults and children produced significantly more gesture‐speech mismatches—explanations in which speech conveyed one path and gesture another—at these theoretically defined choice points than they produced at non‐choice points. Even when the participants did not solve the problem efficiently, gesture could be used to indicate where the participants were deciding between alternative paths. Gesture can, thus, serve as a useful adjunct to speech when attempting to discover cognitive processes in problem‐solving.     

Covert shifts of attention function as an implicit aid to insight

Previous research shows that directed actions can unconsciously influence higher-order cognitive processing, helping learners to retain knowledge and guiding problem solvers to useful insights (e.g. Cook, S. W., Mitchell, Z., & Goldin-Meadow, S. (2008). Gesturing makes learning last. Cognition, 106, 1047-1058; Thomas, L. E., & Lleras, A. (2007). Moving eyes and moving thought: on the spatial compatibility between eye movements and cognition. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 14, 663-668). We examined whether overt physical movement is necessary for these embodied effects on cognition, or whether covert shifts of attention are sufficient to influence cognition. We asked participants to try to solve Duncker’s radiation problem while occasionally directing them, via an unrelated digit-tracking task, to shift their attention (while keeping their eyes fixed) in a pattern related to the problem’s solution, to move their eyes in this pattern, or to keep their eyes and their attention fixed in the center of the display. Although they reported being unaware of any relationship between the digit-tracking task and the radiation problem, participants in both the eye-movement and attention-shift groups were more likely to solve the problem than were participants who maintained fixation. Our results show that by shifting attention in a pattern compatible with a problem’s solution, we can aid participants’ insight even in the absence of overt physical movements.     

Reasoning about artifacts at 24 months: the developing teleo-functional stance

From the age of 2.5, children use social information to rapidly form enduring function-based artifact categories. The present study asked whether even younger children likewise constrain their use of objects according to teleo-functional beliefs that artifacts are "for" particular purposes, or whether they use objects as means to any desired end. Twenty-four-month-old toddlers learned about two novel tools that were physically equivalent but perceptually distinct; one tool was assigned implicit function information through a short demonstration. At test, toddlers returned to the demonstrated tool when asked to repeat the task, but, unlike older children, also used it for another task. Results imply that at 24 months, toddlers expect artifacts to have functions and proficiently use a model's intentional use to inform tool choices, suggesting cognition that differs from that of tool-using monkeys. However, their artifact representations are not yet specified enough to support exclusive patterns of tool use.     

A brighter side to memory illusions: false memories prime children's and adults' insight-based problem solving

Can false memories have a positive consequence on human cognition? In two experiments, we investigated whether false memories could prime insight problem-solving tasks. Children and adults were asked to solve compound remote associate task (CRAT) problems, half of which had been primed by the presentation of Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) lists whose critical lures were also the solutions to the problems. In Experiment 1, the results showed that regardless of age, when the critical lure was falsely recalled, CRAT problems were solved more often and significantly faster than problems that were not primed by a DRM list. When the critical lure was not falsely recalled, CRAT problem solution rates and times were no different from when there was no DRM priming. In Experiment 2, without an intervening recall test, children and adults still exhibited higher solution rates and faster solution times to CRAT problems that were primed than to those that were not primed. This latter result shows that priming occurred as a result of false memory generation at encoding and not at retrieval during the recall test. Together, these findings demonstrate that when false memories are generated at encoding, they can prime solutions to insight-based problems in both children and adults.     

The contributions of convergent thinking,divergent thinking,and schizotypy to solving insight and non-insight problems

The ability to generate diverse ideas (divergent thinking) is valuable in solving creative problems (e.g., insight problems); yet, however advantageous, this ability is insufficient to solve the problem alone and requires the ability to logically deduce an assessment of correctness of each solution (convergent thinking). Positive schizotypy may help isolate the aspects of divergent thinking prevalent in insight problem solving. Participants were presented with a measure of schizotypy (Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences), divergent and convergent thinking tasks, insight problems, and non-insight problems. We found no evidence for a relationship between schizotypy and insight problem solving. Relationships between divergent thinking and insight problem solving were also surprisingly weak; however, measures of convergent thinking had a stronger relationship with problem solving. These results suggest that convergent thinking is more important than divergent thinking in problem solving.     

Dissociable stages of problem solving (II): first evidence for process-contingent temporal order of activation in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex

In a companion study, eye-movement analyses in the Tower of London task (TOL) revealed independent indicators of functionally separable cognitive processes during problem solving, with processes of building up an internal representation of the problem preceding actual planning processes. These results imply that processes of internalization and planning should also be distinguishable in time and space with respect to concomitant brain activation patterns. To investigate this possibility, here we conducted analyses of fMRI data for left and right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) during problem solving in the TOL task by accounting for the trial-by-trial variability of onsets and durations of the different cognitive processing stages. Comparisons between stimulus-locked and response-locked modeling approaches affirmed that activation in left dlPFC was elicited particularly during early processes of internalization, comprising the extraction of goal information and the generation of an internal problem representation, whereas activation in right dlPFC was predominantly attributable to later processes of mental transformations on this representation, that is planning proper. Thus, present data corroborate the proposal that often observed bilateral dlPFC activation patterns during complex cognitive tasks such as problem solving may reflect functionally and, to some extent, even temporally separable processes with opposing lateralizations.     

Young children’s analogical problem solving: Gaining insights from video displays

This study examined how toddlers gain insights from source video displays and use the insights to solve analogous problems. The sample of 2- and 2.5-year-olds viewed a source video illustrating a problem-solving strategy and then attempted to solve analogous problems. Older, but not younger, toddlers extracted the problem-solving strategy depicted in the video and spontaneously transferred the strategy to solve isomorphic problems. Transfer by analogy from the video was evident only when the video illustrated the complete problem goal structure, including the character’s intention and the action needed to achieve a goal. The same action isolated from the problem-solving context did not serve as an effective source analogue. These results illuminate the development of early representation and processes involved in analogical problem solving. Theoretical and educational implications are discussed.     

The plausibility of spiritual intelligence: spiritual experience,problem solving and neural sites

Australian teachers in Church related schools have begun to use the term ‘spiritual intelligence’ in their educational discourse. Is it accurate to describe spirituality as a form of intelligence? This paper explores whether the notion of spiritual intelligence is plausible. It addresses this firstly by discussing the notion of spiritual experience as a mechanism for problem solving—one of the central themes that underlies the concept of intelligence. Secondly, it examines some of the neural sites of the human brain that have been found to be active in those who apperceive spiritual experience. In light of this discussion, this paper argues that although some concerns prevail in considering spirituality as a form of intelligence, the concept of spiritual intelligence may nonetheless be rendered as plausible.     

The role of stimulus preexposure in problem solving by Octopus vulgaris

Octopus vulgaris is able to open transparent glass jars closed with plastic plugs and containing live crabs. The decrease in performance times for removing the plug and seizing the prey with increasing experience of the task has been taken to indicate learning. However, octopuses’ attack behaviors are typically slow and variable in novel environmental situations. In this study the role of preexposure to selected features of the problem-solving context was investigated. Although octopuses failed to benefit from greater familiarity with the training context or with selected elements of the task of solving the jar problem, the methodological strategies used are instructive in potentially clarifying the role of complex problem-solving behaviors in this species including stimulus preexposure and social learning. Received: 27 April 1998 / Accepted after revision: 24 July 1998