无觉知条件下的客体注意效应

采用双矩形范式变式考察在对客体无觉知的条件下的客体注意效应,共包括两个实验：实验一考察对完整矩形客体无觉知的条件下能否出现客体注意效应,发现在完整矩形客体不可见的情况下依然出现了客体注意效应。实验二考察对虚拟矩形客体无觉知的情况下是否能够出现客体注意效应,发现在虚拟矩形客体不可见的情况下也能够出现客体注意效应。研究结果表明客体注意效应在无觉知条件下依然存在,为注意与觉知在功能上相互分离的观点提供了新的证据。     

无觉知条件下的客体注意效应

采用双矩形范式变式考察在对客体无觉知的条件下的客体注意效应,共包括两个实验：实验一考察对完整矩形客体无觉知的条件下能否出现客体注意效应,发现在完整矩形客体不可见的情况下依然出现了客体注意效应。实验二考察对虚拟矩形客体无觉知的情况下是否能够出现客体注意效应,发现在虚拟矩形客体不可见的情况下也能够出现客体注意效应。研究结果表明客体注意效应在无觉知条件下依然存在,为注意与觉知在功能上相互分离的观点提供了新的证据。     

Comment on Shomstein, Kimchi, Hammer, and Behrmann (2010): A case study in methodological anosagnosia?

Shomstein, Kimchi, Hammer, and Behrmann (2010) try to capitalize on the apparent dissociation between vision and the processes that seem to mediate neglect patients’ attentional selection and awareness to investigate the processing of perceptual grouping in the absence of visual attention. We argue that to assess this type of dissociation requires specific methodological adaptations to determine whether visual attention is in operation. We caution that Shomstein et al.’s article does not present convincing evidence of grouping without attentional selection because they do not directly assess attentional selection in their experimental task.     

Conscious awareness of methodological choices: A reply to Milberg and McGlinchey (2010)

Milberg and McGlinchey (2010) claim that the conclusions we reach in "Perceptual Grouping Operates Independently of Attentional Selection: Evidence From Hemispatial Neglect" are unwarranted. Specifically, it is asserted that insufficient methodological control was exerted over the attentional status of the patients and that partial attention to the contralesional field could have resulted in the congruency effects we observe. Although we agree with their methodological cautions in general, we argue that our investigation is, in fact, methodologically sound. In particular, we reiterate and highlight that our investigation is unprecedented in the characterization of a patient sample with multiple clinical, psychophysical, and experimental measures; in our use of a stringent, rigidly controlled paradigm specifically designed for investigating perceptual grouping without awareness; in our modification of the experimental procedure to make it even more stringent; and in our specific methodological choices for comparison/control conditions within this experimental paradigm. We also demonstrate that partial attention to the contralesional left cannot support the robust congruency effects we observe. In light of this, we remain confident of our interpretation of our findings and suggest that perceptual grouping can indeed operate in the absence of attention.     

Attentional requirements in perceptual grouping depend on the processes involved in the organization

Previous studies on the role of attention in perceptual grouping have yielded contradicting findings, some suggesting that grouping requires attention and others indicating that it does not. Kimchi and Razpurker-Apfeld (Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 11(4), 687–696, 2004) showed that attentional demands in grouping could vary according to the processes involved. The current study expanded on this, examining whether attentional demands vary for (a) different grouping principles and (b) as a function of contingent processing of element segregation and shape formation. We used the inattention paradigm with an online measure, in which participants engaged in an attentionally demanding change-detection task on a small matrix presented on a task-irrelevant backdrop of grouped elements. The backdrop grouping changed or stayed the same independently of any change in the target. Congruency effects produced by changes in backdrop grouping on target-change judgments indicate that the backdrop grouping was accomplished under inattention. The results showed congruency effects when grouping formed columns/rows by proximity but not by shape similarity, and when grouping into a distinct shape by collinearity did not involve element segregation. No congruency effects were found when grouping into a shape by collinearity or connectedness involved element segregation, except when connectedness was combined with color similarity. These results suggest that attentional demands depend on the combination of grouping principles and the complexity of the processes involved in the organization. These findings provide further support for the view that perceptual organization is a multiplicity of processes that vary in attentional demands.     

多目标视觉追踪中物体属性加工的眼动研究*

采用多目标视觉追踪任务(MOT),探讨物体颜色特征对视觉追踪的影响,同时记录被试的眼动情况,探讨追踪过程中颜色特征对眼动模式的影响。结果发现,视觉追踪机制能够对物体的颜色特征进行加工,但加工程度受制于目标物与分心物之间的特征竞争关系。在物体颜色特征条件下,视觉系统采用知觉组织加工策略,以被追踪目标构成的多边形中心为注意中心。在对物体颜色特征的加工中,内源性注意与外源性注意相互影响。     

At first glance, transparency enhances assimilation

We investigated the role of transparency, perceptual grouping, and presentation time on perceived lightness. Both transparency and perceptual grouping have been found to result in assimilation effects, but only for ambiguous stimulus displays and with specific attentional instructions. By varying the presentation times of displays with two partly overlapping transparent E-shaped objects, we measured assimilation in unambiguous stimulus displays and without specific attentional instructions. The task was to judge which of two simultaneously presented E-shaped objects was darker. With unrestrained presentation times, if a transparency interpretation was possible, assimilation was not found. Inhibiting a transparency interpretation by occluding the local junctions between the two E-shaped objects, did lead to assimilation. With short presentation times, if a transparency interpretation was possible, assimilation was now also found. Thus, we conclude that, although transparency appears to enhance assimilation, with unambiguous stimulus displays and without specific attentional instructions, perceptual grouping is more important for assimilation to occur.     

Priming outside of awareness and subsequent stimulus identification.

The influence of priming outside of awareness on performance of a color-recognition task was investigated. Using a tachistoscope, a color word that matched ("congruent prime") or did not match ("incongruent prime") the target color or a blank prime was followed by a pattern mask and the target color. Identification performance was superior on the blank prime trials to the congruent prime trials, with performance on the incongruent prime trials being the lowest. A subsequent study included a meaningless (XXX) prime condition, and it was found that meaningless primes interfered with target-color identification more than the congruent and blank prime conditions, but less than the incongruent prime condition, suggesting that primes, in addition to producing semantic activation, impose demands on information-processing capacity of the perceptual system.     

Accurate forced-choice recognition without awareness of memory retrieval

Recognition confidence and the explicit awareness of memory retrieval commonly accompany accurate responding in recognition tests. Memory performance in recognition tests is widely assumed to measure explicit memory, but the generality of this assumption is questionable. Indeed, whether recognition in nonhumans is always supported by explicit memory is highly controversial. Here we identified circumstances wherein highly accurate recognition was unaccompanied by hallmark features of explicit memory. When memory for kaleidoscopes was tested using a two-alternative forced-choice recognition test with similar foils, recognition was enhanced by an attentional manipulation at encoding known to degrade explicit memory. Moreover, explicit recognition was most accurate when the awareness of retrieval was absent. These dissociations between accuracy and phenomenological features of explicit memory are consistent with the notion that correct responding resulted from experience-dependent enhancements of perceptual fluency with specific stimuli--the putative mechanism for perceptual priming effects in implicit memory tests. This mechanism may contribute to recognition performance in a variety of frequently-employed testing circumstances. Our results thus argue for a novel view of recognition, in that analyses of its neurocognitive foundations must take into account the potential for both (1) recognition mechanisms allied with implicit memory and (2) recognition mechanisms allied with explicit memory.     

Perception without attention: results of a new method.

Having found by the use of a new method for examining perception without attention that grouping and texture segregation do not seem to occur (see Mack, Tang, Tuma, Kahn, & Rock (1992) Cognitive Psychology, 24, we go on to ask what is perceived without attention using this new method. Our subjects receive only one inattention trial in a sequence of trials involving a visual distraction task. In addition to the distraction task in the inattention trial, subjects received a stimulus of which they had no prior knowledge or expectation and were questioned or tested directly afterward for their perception of that stimulus. Two subsequent trials containing test stimuli serve as within-subject controls. The results of a series of experiments indicate that the presence of one or more stimulus objects and their locations are preattentively perceived, as is their color, but shape is not. Because individual items are detected without attention, we conclude that perceptual organization is initially based on a principle in which connected regions of uniform stimulation are inferred to be discrete units (the principle of uniform connectedness). One striking, unexpected finding is that without attention many subjects have no awareness at all of the stimulus object, an effect we call inattentional blindness.     

Perceptual grouping and attention: Not all groupings are equal

We examined grouping under inattention using Driver, Davis, Russell, Turatto, & Freeman’s (2001) method. On each trial, two successive displays were briefly presented, each comprising a central target square surrounded by elements. The task was to judge whether the two targets were the same or different. The organization of the background elements stayed the same or changed, independently of the targets. In different conditions, background elements grouped into columns/rows by color similarity, a shape (a triangle/arrow, a square/cross, or a vertical/horizontal line) by color similarity, and a shape with no other elements in the background. We measured the influence of the background on the target same-different judgments. The results imply that background elements grouped into columns/rows by color similarity and into a shape when no segregation from other elements was involved and the shape was relatively “good.” In contrast, no background grouping was observed when resolving figure-ground relations for segregated units was required, as in grouping into a shape by color similarity. These results suggest that grouping is a multiplicity of processes that vary in their attentional demands. Regardless of attentional demands, the products of grouping are not available to awareness without attention.     

Adaptation to tempo changes in sensorimotor synchronization: Effects of intention, attention, and awareness

Adaptation to tempo changes in sensorimotor synchronization is hypothesized to rest on two processes, one (phase correction) being largely automatic and the other (period correction) requiring conscious awareness and attention. In this study, participants tapped their finger in synchrony with auditory sequences containing a tempo change and continued tapping after sequence termination. Their intention to adapt or not to adapt to the tempo change was manipulated through instructions, their attentional resources were varied by introducing a concurrent secondary task (mental arithmetic), and their awareness of the tempo changes was assessed through perceptual judgements. As predicted, period correction was found to be strongly dependent on all three variables, whereas phase correction depended only on intention.     

Perception of ensemble statistics requires attention

To overcome inherent limitations in perceptual bandwidth, many aspects of the visual world are represented as summary statistics (e.g., average size, orientation, or density of objects). Here, we investigated the relationship between summary (ensemble) statistics and visual attention. Recently, it was claimed that one ensemble statistic in particular, color diversity, can be perceived without focal attention. However, a broader debate exists over the attentional requirements of conscious perception, and it is possible that some form of attention is necessary for ensemble perception. To test this idea, we employed a modified inattentional blindness paradigm and found that multiple types of summary statistics (color and size) often go unnoticed without attention. In addition, we found attentional costs in dual-task situations, further implicating a role for attention in statistical perception. Overall, we conclude that while visual ensembles may be processed efficiently, some amount of attention is necessary for conscious perception of ensemble statistics.     

Object-based attentional selection and awareness of objects

This study examined whether object-based attentional selection depends on the observer's awareness of objects, using objects defined by perceptual completion. As an indicator of object-based attention, we studied the same-object advantage, where observers respond faster to a target within a cued object than within a noncued object. The same-object advantage was not found in the condition where observers were unaware of the objects (inattentional blindness). On the other hand, the same-object advantage was observed in the condition where observers were aware of the objects. These results suggest that the intensity of object representations can be influenced by observers’ awareness of objects, which affects the occurrence of object-based effects. We propose that attention/inattention (or awareness/unawareness) is graded and observers’ awareness of the objects might serve to boost an otherwise noisy/low signal representation for obtaining object-based effects.     

Gradedness of visual awareness depends on attentional scope: Global perception is more graded than local perception

The gradedness or discreteness of our visual awareness has been debated. Here, we investigate the influence of spatial scope of attention on the gradedness of visual awareness. We manipulated scope of attention using hierarchical letter-based tasks (global: broad scope; local: narrow scope). Participants reported the identity of a masked hierarchical letter either at the global level or at the local level. We measured subjective awareness using the perceptual awareness scale ratings and objective performance. The results indicate more graded visual awareness (lesser slope for the awareness rating curve) at the global level compared to the local level. Graded perception was also observed in visibility ratings usage with global level task showing higher usage of the middle PAS ratings. Our results are in line with the prediction of level of processing hypothesis and show that global/local attentional scope and contextual endogenous factors influence the graded nature of our visual awareness.     

Exogenous attention during perceptual group formation and dissolution

Under natural viewing conditions, a large amount of information reaches our senses, and the visual system uses attention and perceptual grouping to reduce the complexity of stimuli in order to make real-time perception possible. Prior studies have shown that attention and perceptual grouping operate in synergy; exogenous attention is deployed not only to the cued item, but also to the entire group. Here, we investigated how attention and perceptual grouping operate during the formation and dissolution of groups. Our results showed that reaction times are higher in the presence of perceptual groups than they are for ungrouped stimuli. On the other hand, attentional benefits of perceptual grouping were observed during both the formation and the dissolution of groups. The dynamics were similar during group formation and dissolution, showing a gradual effect that takes approximately half a second to reach its maximum level. In the case of group dissolution, the attentional benefits persisted for about a quarter of a second after dissolution of the group. Taken together, our results reveal the dynamics of how attention and grouping work in synergy during the transient period when groups form or dissolve.     

强迫症患者反应抑制缺陷及注意的调节作用

使用内外源线索结合不同冲突水平的侧抑制任务,考察强迫症患者对分心刺激的抑制有无缺陷、注意定向对分心刺激的干扰效应有无调节作用及在何水平上发挥作用。结果表明:强迫症患者不同冲突水平的侧抑制任务均无明显反应抑制缺陷,可能与其注意威胁性信息等有关;集中注意在知觉冲突水平上对强迫症患者和正常人的反应冲突进行调节且无显著性差异,可能与强迫症患者关注内容非空间定向有关。     

False recognition and perception without awareness

Jacoby and Whitehouse (1989) demonstrated that the probability of calling new test words "old" (i.e., false recognition) is biased by context words. When context words were briefly exposed and subjects were not informed of their presence, new words were called "old" more often if the context and test words were identical than if the context and test words were different. When the context words were presented at longer exposure durations and subjects were informed of their presence, the opposite pattern of results occurred. In Experiment 1, we replicated the critical qualitative difference across conditions reported by Jacoby and Whitehouse. In addition, the combined results of Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrated that the exposure duration of the context words, and not the instructions to the subjects, is the primary factor determining which pattern of false recognition occurs. However, in contrast with the findings of Jacoby and Whitehouse, both patterns of false recognition were associated with significant recognition memory for the context words. The latter finding presents problems for any interpretation of false recognition, which implies that the briefly exposed context words are perceived without awareness.     

Color segregation and selective attention in a nonsearch task

Relations between selective attention and perceptual segregation by color were investigated in binary-choice reaction time experiments based on the non search paradigm of Eriksen and Eriksen (1974). In focused attention conditions (Experiment 1), noise letters flanking a central target letter caused less interference when they differed from the target in color, although color carried no information as to whether or not a letter was the target. When blocking of trials favored a strategy of dividing attention between target and noise letters (Experiment 2), no benefit accrued from difference between target color and noise color. The results supported an attentional interpretation of the effect of color demonstrated in Experiment 1, implying that perceptual segregation by color improved the efficiency of focusing attention on the target.     

Perception without awareness: perspectives from cognitive psychology

Four basic approaches that have been used to demonstrate perception without awareness are described. Each approach reflects one of two types of experimental logic and one of two possible methods for controlling awareness. The experimental logic has been either to demonstrate a dissociation between a measure of perception with awareness and a measure that is sensitive to perception without awareness or to demonstrate a qualitative difference between the consequences of perception with and without awareness. Awareness has been controlled either by manipulating the stimulus conditions or by instructing observers on how to distribute their attention. The experimental findings based on all four approaches lead to the same conclusion; namely, stimuli are perceived even when observers are unaware of the stimuli. This conclusion is supported by results of studies in which awareness has been assessed with either objective measures of forced-choice discriminations or measures based on verbalizations of subjective conscious experiences. Given this solid empirical support for the concept of perception without awareness, a direction for future research studies is to assess the functions of information perceived without awareness in determining what is perceived with awareness. The available evidence suggests that information perceived without awareness both biases what stimuli are perceived with awareness and influences how stimuli perceived with awareness are consciously experienced.