Spinozistic Pantheism,the Environment and Christianity

I am not a pantheist and I don’t believe that pantheism is consistent with Christianity. My preferred speculation is what I call the Swiss Cheese theory: we and our artefacts are the holes in God, the only Godless parts of reality. In this paper, I begin by considering a world rather like ours but without any beings capable of sin. Ignoring extraterrestrials and angels we could consider the world, say, 5 million years ago. Pantheism was, I say, true at that time. That is my qualified endorsement of pantheism. I then use the Sin premise, namely that we are capable of sinning, to argue that beings like us are not parts of God and I examine some consequences.     

Omniscience And Pantheism

This article argues that theism entails a species of pantheism on the grounds that there is simply no discernible difference between the God's knowledge of the world and the world that God knows. The case against this thesis begins with the traditional theory of distinctions. But since God is necessarily omniscient there is not even the possibility that these might be considered apart and thus distinguished in that way. But neither is it possible to do this by means of Leibnitz's law, that is, by finding some feature possessed by the one but not the other. Three potential areas of difference are considered but rejected, first, that knowledge unlike the world is representational, and second, that knowledge unlike the world is phenomenal – there is something that it is like to have. Both of these features, though able to distinguish ordinary knowledge from its objects, cease to provide the difference we require when extended to the case of divine knowledge. A final area of potential difference lies in the transcendent nature of God over the world, especially with respect to time, finitude and possibility. But this, in the end, is found no more able to distinguish God's knowledge from its object than the previous two suggestions.     

A Supervenient Trinity: An Alternative to Latin and Social Trinitarian Theories

The Latin Trinity (LT) and the Social Trinity (ST) represent the two dominant approaches for interpreting the doctrine of the Trinity in contemporary philosophical theology. Both approaches have consequences for Christian theology, however, and I believe that neither sufficiently overcomes the charges of modalism or tritheism, respectively. Moreover, the charge of the overall logical incoherency of the doctrine of the Trinity remains a viable criticism. In order to defend the doctrine of the Trinity against charges of incoherency, while avoiding the modalistic and tritheistic leanings of the LT and ST models, I argue that the unitary nature of God‐as‐three‐hypostases is best understood in terms of a relationship of supervenience between the revelation of (1) Deut. 6:4 and (2) the Gospel of John. The Hypostases of the Trinity supervene on the unitary identity of God insofar as to be ‘God’ is to entail the perichoretic relationship of unbegottenness, begottenness, and spiratation (procession). The Supervenient Trinity (SvT), as an analogical model, provides a way to understand God as (1) and (2) that better avoids the modalist and tritheistic difficulties raised by the LT and the ST approaches.     

Al-Ghazali’s Position on the ‘Second Proof’ of the ‘Philosophers’ for the Eternity of the World,in the First Discussion of the Incoherence of the Philosophers

In the Incoherence of the Philosophers, Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (1058-1111) raised objections against the doctrine of the ‘philosophers’ (represented chiefly by al-Farabi and Ibn Sina) on 20 specific points. In the first, and longest discussion, he examines and rebuts four of their proofs of the pre-eternity of the world—that is, that the universe as a whole had no beginning but extends perpetually into the past. Al-Ghazali rejects that doctrine. But his own position on the issue does not become clear until he discusses the philosophers’ ‘second proof.’ In this paper, I will examine the relevant text of the Incoherence of the Philosophers, in order to clarify the nature of Al-Ghazali’s position in relation to the second proof. I will explain why Al-Ghazali cannot adopt what I refer to as the ‘naïve’ theological position, according to which God temporally preceded the world. Instead, Al-Ghazali concurs with the philosophers that time is the measure of motion, but he asserts that time was created with the world, both having a beginning before which there was no time. God, on the other hand, is not temporally prior to the world, but neither is he simultaneous, as the second proof supposes. As timelessly eternal, God bears no temporal relation to the world at all. In conclusion, I describe what I refer to as a naïve philosophical position, which is entailed by the second proof, but distinct from both Al-Ghazali’s position and that adopted by Ibn Rushd in his critique of Al-Ghazali in the Incoherence of the Incoherence. I argue that this naïve philosophical position (and thus, the second proof) is incoherent.     

Antinomism, trinity and the challenge of Solov’?van pantheism in the theology of Sergij Bulgakov

The paper argues that Sergej Bulgakov??s sophiology was an attempt, via antinomism or the philosophy of antinomies, to overcome the rationalism, monism, and determinism (in a word, ??pantheism??) of Vladimir Solov???v??s philosophy of the Absolute understood as an abstract Trinitarianism. After detailing Solov???v??s thought on the Trinity and Bulgakov??s criticisms of it, the study then describes Bulgakov??s antinomism and its application to the doctrine of God. However, it is contended that Bulgakov??s antinomism ultimately falls into the same problems with pantheism found in Solov???v and so the last part of the paper tentatively proposes resources in his work, stated in the form of a suggested ??fourth (Bulgakovian) antinomy?? between ousia (divine Being as such) and Sophia (the revelation in God and the world of the divine Being), that might help to avoid a collapse of God and the world by making the divine Being proper utterly transcendent and unknowable.     

The Staurocentric Logic of Eberhard Jüngel: Pneumatology and Ecclesiology

Ecclesiology and pneumatology remain two areas of Eberhard Jüngel's thought that are repeatedly critiqued as being ‘underdeveloped’ or ‘deficient’ due to his reliance on an Augustinian grammar in describing the Holy Spirit. This article argues for a revised understanding of both Jüngel's trinitarian theology and ecclesiology in light of his commitment to staurocentrism. Jüngel's staurocentric doctrine of God, for which he is so often lauded, is only possible because of the Augustinian grammar he accepts for his pneumatology. Only as the bond of love, the relation between the relations, can the Spirit make clear how it is that the triune God, fully identified with the life of Jesus, can die. Ultimately, Jüngel builds on Augustine's doctrine of the Spirit to demonstrate two distinct, yet interrelated, theological principles: first, that the person of the Spirit is indispensible within the event of God's triune being; and second, that within the church it is the Spirit's personhood, uniquely, which makes possible ecclesial correspondence to God.     

Difficulties in Defining the Concept of God: Kierkegaard in Dialogue with Levinas,Buber, and Rosenzweig

This article investigates difficulties in defining the concept of God by focusing on the question of what it means to understand God as a ‘person.’ This question is explored with respect to the work of Søren Kierkegaard, in dialogue with Franz Rosenzweig, Martin Buber, and Emmanuel Levinas. Thereby, the following three questions regarding divine ‘personhood’ come into view: First, how can God be a partner of dialogue if he at the same time remains unknown and unthinkable, a limit-concept of understanding? Second, if God is love in person and at the same time a spiritual reality ‘between’ human agents, in what ways are his personal and trans-personal traits related to each other? Third, what exactly is revealed through God’s ‘name’? By way of an inconclusive conclusion, divine personhood is discussed in regard to prayer, where the problems of predication that arise in third-personal speech about God are linked with the second-personal encounter with God.

     

Schellenberg’s Hiddenness Argument and its Reversal

The article discusses a response to Schellenberg’s atheistic ‘hiddenness argument’ (A-argument) that neither objects to its premises nor formulates a new inductive argument in favour of the existence of God. According to the proposed response, it is sufficient for the task of defending theism to reverse Schellenberg’s reasoning and present a theistic meta-argument (T-argument) that takes as its assumption the fact that there are resistant believers in the world. The paper defends the claim that both arguments (A- as well as T-argument) have similar persuasive power. However, because of their contradictory conclusions both cannot be sound. It is argued that the way to decide the dilemma is to compare the demographics of theism and atheism and to compare accommodation strategies of both arguments. The first comparison favours theism, but it does not exclude the possibility that quantitative proportions between theists and atheists can change in the future. The second comparison refers to accommodation strategies of proponents of A-argument who have to give an account of how it is possible that in an atheistic world there exist resistant believers and of proponents of T-argument who have to give an account of how it is possible that in the world governed by an all-powerful and all-loving God there exist nonresistant nonbelievers. The conclusion of the considerations is the claim that the theistic accommodation strategy compares favourably to the atheistic one.

     

The Lure of Pan(en)theism

Abstract

This response to Karmen MacKendrick’s work follows the thematic trail of desire through Divine Enticement (2012), seeking to clarify the relationship in MacKendrick’s work between God and creation. While MacKendrick expresses an initial desire for an “immanent divine,” especially in relation to the work of St. Augustine, she later feels more drawn to “a world that in its beauty calls out the name of its creator” than to a world “in which the creator is simply present.” This brief engagement explores MacKendrick’s logic of seduction in relation to the panentheist and pantheist theologies of Cusa and Bruno, ultimately suggesting that “immanence” only collapses the distance of desire if creation is understood to be finite and self-identical.     

Reconsidering Relational Anthropology: A Critical Assessment of John Zizioulas's Theological Anthropology

Abstract:  There has been an increasing emphasis in theological anthropology on the constitution of the person through their relation to God, others, self and the world. In focusing on the relational dimensions of personhood other important facets have not received sufficient attention: the doctrine of sin, the discontinuity between divine and human persons and human embodiment in the world. This article offers a critical assessment of John Zizioulas's anthropology which can be considered a paradigmatic example of a relational anthropology. Although the concerns raised are in relation to Zizioulas's work, many of them are instructive for relational anthropologies more generally.     

Can God Create Abstract Objects? A Reply to Peter van Inwagen

The Platonic theist Peter van Inwagen argues that God cannot create abstract objects. Thus, the quantifier ‘everything’ in traditional statements of the doctrine of creation should be appropriately restricted to things that can enter into causal relations and abstract objects cannot: ‘God is the creator of everything distinct from himself…that can enter into causal relations.’ I respond to van Inwagen arguing that he has provided no good reason for thinking abstract objects must be uncreated. And if this is the case, then there is no good reason to think that God cannot create abstract objects.     

The place and understanding of the doctrine of God in Heinrich Bullinger’s theology

Abstract

The article examines the place of, and the main emphases in, the doctrine of God in Bullinger’s theology. In comprehensive presentations of his theology, the doctrine of God generally follows that of the Word of God. He usually begins with God as one (against the role of creatures such as the saints and images) and God as three. The other main elements (besides the knowledge of God) are God as creator, his providence and his predestination, usually in that order. Underlying all of them is the stress on God’s goodness. Highlighted is Bullinger’s appeal throughout to the Bible and Church Fathers, often identifying the views of his opponents with early Church heresies. This appeal also supports his claim to orthodoxy and catholicity, as do the creeds in his prefaces to The Decades and to The Second Helvetic Confession. His underlying pastoral and practical concerns are evident.     

Bulgakov's Account of Creation: Neglected Aspects,Critics and Contemporary Relevance

The article focuses on a central, yet neglected dimension of the ‘Sophia Debate’ in twentieth‐century Russian Orthodox theology: Bulgakov's panentheistic account of creation and its critique by Nikolai Lossky. Bulgakov understood the doctrine of creation to be negatively defined as creatio ex nihilo and positively defined as creatio ex Deo. Bulgakov's sophiology seeks to relate God and the world through the intermediate concept of Sophia, balancing an account of God's being in the world with an account of the world's eternal foundation in God. Lossky objected that Bulgakov's account underemphasizes novelty, contingency and the free character of creation. Lossky's objections notwithstanding, Bulgakov's version of panentheism – especially its trinitarian, antinomian and kenotic dimensions – finds significant points of contact with contemporary accounts of creation.     

All too skeptical theism

Skeptical theism contends that, due to our cognitive limitations, we cannot expect to be able to determine whether there are reasons which justify God’s permission of apparently unjustified evils. Because this is so, the existence of these evils does not constituted evidence against God’s existence. A common criticism is that the skeptical theist is implicitly committed to other, less palatable forms of skepticism, especially moral skepticism. I examine a recent defense against this charge mounted by Michael Bergmann. I point out that the Bergmannian skeptical theist is unable to determine concerning any event or feature of the world whether that feature or event is good or evil all-things-considered. Because of this the skeptical theist must abandon any attempt to act in such a way that the world becomes better rather than worse as a result. These, I claim, are seriously skeptical conclusions, and should cause us to be skeptical about skeptical theism itself.     

Divine timelessness: A coherent but unfruitful doctrine?

The author argues in this article that it is possible to have a consistent and coherent version of the doctrine of divine timelessness. Towards the objection that a timeless God cannot act it is defended that a timeless God can certainly act in the world and can love human people. In spite of the consistency and coherence of the doctrine of divine timelessness, however, the author has serious problems with the fruitfulness of this doctrine when it comes to essential practices of the Christian faith, such like seeking help from God, loving God, and prayer.     

Is penal substitution unjust?

Penal substitution in a theological context is the doctrine that God inflicted upon Christ the suffering which we deserved as the punishment for our sins, as a result of which we no longer deserve punishment. Ever since the time of Faustus Socinus, the doctrine has faced formidable, and some would say insuperable, philosophical challenges. Critics of penal substitution frequently assert that God’s punishing Christ in our place would be an injustice on God’s part. For it is an axiom of retributive justice that it is unjust to punish an innocent person. But Christ was an innocent person. Since God is perfectly just, He cannot therefore have punished Christ. Virtually every premiss in this argument is challengeable. Not all penal substitution theories affirm that Christ was punished for our sins. The argument makes unwarranted assumptions about the ontological foundations of moral duty independent of God’s commands. It presupposes without warrant that God is by nature an unqualified negative retributivist. It overlooks the possibility that the prima facie demands of negative retributive justice might be overridden in Christ’s case by weightier moral considerations. And it takes it for granted that Christ was legally innocent, which is denied by the classic doctrine of imputation. It thus fails to show any injustice in God’s punishing Christ in our place.     

Why Spinoza was Not a Panentheist

Philosophia - In spite of some panentheistic traits in his philosophy, Spinoza was clearly a pantheist. Spinoza’s God is not personal and not transcendent but immanent, as God is identical to...     

Suturing the Body Corporate (Divine and Human) in the Brahmanic Traditions

In this discussion, we ponder the discourse about the ‘body of the Divine’ in the Indian tradition. Beginning with the Vedas, we survey the major eras and thinkers of that tradition, considering various notions of the Supreme Divine Being it produced. For each, we ask: is the Divine embodied? If so, then in what way? What is the nature of the body of the Divine, and what is its relationship to human bodies? What is the value of the body of the Divine to the spiritual aspirant? We consider, where relevant, which views are pantheistic and which might be considered panentheistic. Panentheism is connected with discourse on the world as the body of God. It has origins in medieval Christian theology with anticipatory traces in Plato’s Timeaus. Under pantheism, were the world to end—were it to collapse or disappear irreversibly, perhaps, into a huge black hole—then God would disintegrate without a remainder as well; for in this view the Divine Spirit is the universe. The same is not true under panentheism which posits a more complex relationship between the Divine and the world. According to panentheism, God pervades the world—God is in the world—and at the same time, God sustains the world—the world is in God. This allows that God be greater than, transcendent of and independent of the world. In our conclusion we remark on how the views we have surveyed link to, resonate with, or dis-compare with the current—should one say revivified—interest in intellectual quarters with panentheism.     

Skeptical theism and the challenge of atheism

Skeptical theists hold that we should be skeptical about our ability to know the reasons that God would have for permitting evil, at least in particular cases. They argue for their view by setting aside actions that are wrong in themselves and focusing their attention on actions that are purportedly right or wrong simply in terms of their consequences. However, I argue in this paper that once skeptical theists are led to take into account actions that are wrong in themselves, as they must, they cannot escape the conclusion that there is a logical contradiction between the existence of an all-good, all-powerful God and what would have to be God’s permission of the significant and horrendous evil consequences of immoral actions found in our world.