Rebooting an Old Script by New Means: Teledildonics—The Technological Return to the ‘Coital Imperative’

Teledildonics, a form of digital-mediated sexual interaction, opens new possibilities for the understanding of sexual activity. At first glance, it disrupts conventional preconditions and assumptions about sexual interaction, by allowing the dimension of touch despite the physical distance between partners and, ultimately, promoting a sexual dimension definitely disconnected from the reproductive model of sexuality. However, by scrutinizing the design and functionality of the devices, as well as the discourses presented by three commercial companies—LovePalz, Lovense and Kiiroo—I suggest that this technology reinforces the ‘coital imperative’, by equating sexual interaction with penetration of the vagina by the penis. Although permitting other formulations, specifically for non-heterosexual couples, the penetrative act remains a presupposition. In spite of structurally disrupting the reproductive model of sex, teledildonics promotes its strongest corollary.     

The ‘workshy’

Abstract

This article is an attempt to apply the Kleinian ‘positions’ to long-term unemployment and to use them to suggest an alternative to punitive concepts such as ‘workshy’, while discussing the paradox in which a sincere attempt to find work exists alongside behaviour which seems designed to sabotage it. Such sabotaging behaviour not only offers secondary gains but affords channels for projections which mitigate unresolved aggression. While effective in coping with long-term unemployment, these mechanisms inhibit development and ‘benign cycles’ are gridlocked. Change and growth are seen as threats and aggression cannot be worked through and must be projected. Persecutory anxieties and a lack of enrichment by ‘otherness’ results and is reinforced by the reality of chronic unemployment. No opportunity for reparative work exists, so ‘concern’ and a sense of responsibility are inhibited. Narcissistic omnipotence and grandiosity is a feature. Long-term unemployment and homelessness show similar revolving door patterns connected to similar coping mechanisms.     

The ‘helping’ professions

A continuing series of scandals and tragedies is resulting in increasing public disquiet over the practice of the ‘helping’ professions. In the author's view, this disquiet is justified on both theoretical and practical grounds. Current practice is based on a natural-scientific, medical model. This introduces a bias analogous to the inquisitorial method in law, and results in misreading the nature of the problems of the people with whom the ‘caring’ professions deal. The author proposes an existential approach based on moral science in the Socratic tradition of elenchos — of conjoint personal enquiry. The general principles informing his stance are analogous to those of due process in law. He describes his method, which he calls social phenomenological analysis, and its theoretical basis, and illustrates it showing its application to the case of a fifteen year old boy, labelled delinquent, and his family.     

The ‘If’ in the ‘What If’

In this paper, I defend the view that any good account of the logical form of thought experiments should contain a conditional. Moreover, there are some reasons to think it should be a counterfactual conditional. First, I defend Williamson’s account of the logical form of thought experiments against a competing account offered by Ichikawa and Jarvis. The two accounts have a similar structure, but Williamson’s posits a counterfactual conditional where Ichikawa and Jarvis’ posits a strict conditional. Williamson’s motivation is related to the problem of deviant realizations, and Ichikawa and Jarvis propose to take care of this problem by enriching the content of the thought experiment in the way we enrich the content of a text of fiction. However, this sort of enrichment is also compatible with Williamson’s account. I then consider a different view, defended by Malmgren, on which a complex possibility claim exhausts our reasoning on typical thought experiments. I argue that this account, leaving out a conditional, fails to represent an important part of our reasoning with thought experiments. This is brought out by reflection on the relationship between thought experiments and similar actual cases and by reflection on the requirement, formulated by Malmgren herself, that our reasoning should have an adequate level of generality.

     

Nietzsche’s ‘Anti-Naturalism’ in ‘The Four Great Errors’

Abstract

This paper is primarily a response to ‘analytically-minded’ philosophers, such as Maudemarie Clark and Brian Leiter, who push for a ‘naturalistic’ interpretation of Nietzsche. In particular, this paper will consider Leiter’s (2007 Leiter, B. 2007. Nietzsche’s Theory of the Will. Philosophers’ Imprint, 7(7): 1–15.  [Google Scholar]) discussion of Nietzsche’s chapter in Twilight of the Idols, ‘The Four Great Errors’, and argue that Leiter has misinterpreted this chapter in at least four ways. I provide a superior interpretation of this chapter, which argues that Nietzsche is using a transcendental style of argument to argue against a common conception of causation. I argue that Nietzsche’s ultimate aim of this chapter is to argue for ‘the innocence of becoming’ rather than, as Leiter claims, the error of free will. I argue that this anti-naturalist methodology and conclusion are in tension with Leiter/Clark’s Nietzsche, and highlights the need to pay attention to the being/becoming distinction in Nietzsche.     

The Ways of ‘Being’ and ‘Becoming’ Human

We argue that developing integrative models of psychological phenomenon require dealing simultaneously with information-theoretic and meaning making processes at the individual and group levels. Attempts to fuse these across levels based on intentionality become difficult because phenomena at the lower level organisms are conceptualized employing concrete systems language, while in case of human and social systems both concrete and abstracted systems concepts are used. Intentionality also needs to be looked at as arising out of the processes of both being and becoming. Fusing of psycho-and socio-logics necessarily requires taking into consideration psychological processes and notions of intentionality and future within cultural contexts in a more holistic manner. It is also argued that both at personal and collective levels, human intentionality operate as bounded intentionality alternating between states of being and becoming.     

The indexicality of ‘knowledge’

Epistemic contextualism—the view that the content of the predicate ‘know’ can change with the context of utterance—has fallen into considerable disrepute recently. Many theorists have raised doubts as to whether ‘know’ is context-sensitive, typically basing their arguments on data suggesting that ‘know’ behaves semantically and syntactically in a way quite different from recognised indexicals such as ‘I’ and ‘here’ or ‘flat’ and ‘empty’. This paper takes a closer look at three pertinent objections of this kind, viz. at what I call the Error-Theory Objection, the Gradability Objection and the Clarification-Technique Objection. The paper concludes that none of these objections can provide decisive evidence against contextualism.     

The logic of obligation, ‘better’ and ‘worse’

Research for this paper was supported by a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities, FT-33794. I am grateful to an anonymous referee of this journal for remarks on an earlier version of this paper.     

‘Mutual Obligation’ and ‘New Deal’: Illegitimate and Unjustified?

It is now commonplace for governments in Western countries to require the unemployed to work in exchange for their unemployment benefits. In this article I raise some serious doubts about the most promising and philosophically interesting defence of this argument, which relies on the ‘principle of reciprocity’. I argue that it is seriously unclear whether the obligations imposed on welfare claimants by ‘workfare’ schemes are legitimate and justified according to the principle of reciprocity. I do this by reconstructing the arguments for the obligations of the unemployed put forward in both the United Kingdom and Australia.     

Old or New? Evaluating the Old/New Scoring Method for Divergent Thinking Tasks

When people generate responses during a divergent thinking task, some responses are “old” (retrieved from memory) and some are “new” (generated on the spot). K.J. Gilhooly, E. Fioratou, S.H. Anthony, and V. Wynn (2007) suggested that old and new responses stem from different cognitive strategies and differ in key ways. The present research explored the old/new scoring method in a sample of 143 young adults. After completing unusual uses tasks, the participants classified each response as old or new. The creativity of each response was also rated by three judges and by the participants themselves. As in past research, “old” responses appeared significantly earlier in the task and were rated as significantly less creative by both the judges and the participants. Old and new responses, however, correlated equally strongly with predictors of creative ability, such as openness to experience and its facets. Overall, the old/new scoring approach appears promising as a way of illuminating the diverse mental strategies people use to generate ideas.     

The New Alliance Between Science and Education: Otto Neurath’s Modernity Beyond Descartes’ ‘Adamitic’ Science

Starting from a suggestion of Stephen Toulmin and through an interpretation of the criticism to which Neurath, one of the founders of the Vienna Circle, submits Descartes’ views on science, the paper attempts to outline a pattern of modernity opposed to the Cartesian one, that has been obtaining over the last four centuries. In particular, it is argued that a new alliance has to be established between science and education, overcoming Descartes’ banishment against education. In a Neurathian perspective education is a key-moment of the scientific enterprise without which science itself is in danger of going astray and no scientific outlook is promoted in the society at large. Such an anti-Cartesian attitude is a leitmotiv of the whole Neurath’s production and characterizes his fundamental approach to the sense of modernity. For this reasons, despite all its shortcomings, Neurath’s proposal represents a very promising option for a new agenda of the modernity away from Descartes’ spell. By elaborating on Neurath’s (and Dewey’s) insights, the paper puts forward the idea that philosophy of science (such as it was originated by neopositivism in its Reichenbachian version) should give way to an educational philosophy of science which could allow us “to bring the genuine modern into existence”.     

Assessing Security Technology’s Impact: Old Tools for New Problems

The general idea developed in this paper from a sociological perspective is that some of the foundational categories on which the debate about privacy, security and technology rests are blurring. This process is a consequence of a blurring of physical and digital worlds. In order to define limits for legitimate use of intrusive digital technologies, one has to refer to binary distinctions such as private versus public, human versus technical, security versus insecurity to draw differences determining limits for the use of surveillance technologies. These distinctions developed in the physical world and are rooted in a cultural understanding of pre-digital culture. Attempts to capture the problems emerging with the implementation of security technologies using legal reasoning encounter a number of problems since law is by definition oriented backwards, adapting new developments to existing traditions, whereas the intrusion of new technologies in the physical world produces changes and creates fundamentally new problems.     

The Error In ‘The Error In The Error Theory’

In his paper ‘The Error in the Error Theory’[this journal, 2008], Stephen Finlay attempts to show that the moral error theorist has not only failed to prove his case, but that the error theory is in fact false. This paper rebuts Finlay's arguments, criticizes his positive theory, and clarifies the error-theoretic position.     

‘Analytic’ reading, ‘continental’ text: The case of Derrida’s ‘on forgiveness’

This paper seeks to apply some of the tools of analytic philosophy to a text written by a ‘continental’ philosopher, in order to evaluate the quality of its arguments. In ‘On Forgiveness’, Jacques Derrida seems to be making two different claims about forgiveness. First, he claims that an act of forgiveness is only truly meaningful as forgiveness when one is forgiving the unforgivable. Second, he is also recommending that we change our understanding of the concept of forgiveness for ethical reasons. I examine three lines of argument used in the essay to support the first claim. I find each of these lines of argument problematic. Since these arguments are unconvincing, I argue that this leaves only the second claim for Derrida to defend.     

The ‘Constitutive Thought’ of Regret

In this paper I defend and develop Bernard Williams’ claim that the ‘constitutive thought’ of regret is ‘something like “how much better if it had been otherwise”’. An introductory section on cognitivist theories of emotion is followed by a detailed investigation of the concept of ‘agent-regret’ and of the ways in which the ‘constitutive thought’ might be articulated in different situations in which agents acknowledge casual responsibility for bringing about undesirable outcomes. Among problematic cases discussed are those in which agents have caused harm through no fault of their own, or have been constrained to choose the lesser of two evils or to act against their moral values. R. Jay Wallace’s ‘bourgeois predicament’ and related cases, in which we recognize that our present advantages have flowed from regrettable antecedents, further show that regret is often not a simple emotion, and it is argued that conflicted regrets are sometimes unavoidable. Finally, the paper looks at Descartes’ account of regret as a form of sadness engendered by the recollection of irrecoverable happy experiences, to which the ‘constitutive thought’ does not readily apply. It is suggested that what Descartes is discussing is a different genre of emotion for which ‘nostalgia’ might be a better name.