Privacy as a value and as a right

Conclusions Knowledge of others, then, has value; so does immunity from being known. The ability to extend one's knowledge has value; so does the ability to limit other's knowledge of oneself. I have claimed that no interest can count as a right unless it clearly outweighs opposing interests whose presence is logically entailed. I see no way to establish that my interest in not being known, simply as such, outweighs your desire to know about me. I acknowledge the intuitive attractiveness of such a position; but my earlier discussion concluded that the value of privacy is ease, and the value of knowledge is understanding - and it's not obvious that either outweighs the other. Nor is it obvious that the freedom and autonomy which result from the power to limit what others know is more significant than the freedom and autonomy which result from the power to extend one's knowledge. I believe the intuitive attractiveness of the belief that privacy values outweigh knowledge values lies in the entirely correct belief that a society without any privacy would be unpleasant. But a society without mutual knowledge would be impossible.I conclude therefore that there is no right to privacy nor to control over it. Nevertheless, each of these things is a good, and a good made possible (given the presence of other people) by social structures. A desirable society will provide both privacy and control over privacy to some extent. Nothing in my analysis helps determine what the proper extent is, nor what areas of life particularly deserve protection. Those who would argue that privacy and control over it are entailed by respect for persons should, I think, choose instead some particular areas central to being a person, to counting as a person, and then show how one is less likely to exercise one's capacities there fully without privacy or without control over it. Although Gerstein's attempt fails because he inaccurately defines intimacy as a kind of absorption and incorrectly opposes absorption with publicity, I think it is the kind of attempt which must be made. Furthermore, he has probably chosen the right area of life - if anything has a special claim to privacy it is probably the union between people who care for one another. The value of being together alone may be more significant than the value of being alone, if only because words and actions are public while thoughts are not. But I will not try to develop that argument here.In any case both privacy and control over it are social goods; on egalitarian grounds they should, ceteris paribus, be equally available to everyone. This helps explain the dehumanizing effect of institutions which provide no privacy at all- prisons and some mental institutions. It is not so much that the inmates are totally known; it is rather that those who know them are not so fully known by them; further, that the staff has a great deal of control over what they disclose of themselves, and the inmates very little. The asymmetry of knowledge in those institutions is one aspect of the asymmetry of power; the completely powerless are likely to feel dehumanized.My analysis also helps account for the wrongness of covert observation. It is not simply that the observer violates the wishes of the observed, for the question is whose wishes trump. The observer is violating the justified expectations of the observed: expectations supported by weighty social conventions. These have more moral weight than simple desires do. The peeping torn is violating a convention which structures the distribution of knowledge, a convention from which he benefits. Without it his own activities might well be impossible. He might be more easily caught; or his victim, less trusting, might choose houses without windows. More deeply, the thrill of what he is doing depends on the existence of the convention. Even morally permissible excitement - the suggestiveness of some clothing- would disappear without conventions about nudity. Presumably, too, there are elements of his own personal life for which he values his privacy. He is on grounds of justice obligated to observe the rule which makes his benefits possible.(Some claims to privacy result from personal predilections, rather than from convention. Parent describes a person who is extremely sensitive about being short, for instance, and does not want his exact height to be common knowledge. The grounds for these claims are obviously different from those I've been discussing. The grounds are the moral obligation not to cause needless pain, or, if the information was given in confidence, to keep one's promises.)Although there is no right to privacy or to control over it as such, there is a right to equality of consideration and to a just distribution of benefits and burdens. To put it another way: there is no natural human right to privacy or to control over it; but a good society will provide some of each, and justice requires that the rules of a good society be observed.

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Medicine as a trade

The doctor-patient relationship is usually seen and accepted as a giving-taking association, in which the doctor is a giver and the patient is a taker. The paper challenges such a one-way relationship, and stresses the patient as a giver and the doctor as a receiver. The patient is described as a source for the emotional development of the doctor, and as a source of knowledge. He is also a source for what could be called ‘life experience’. By serving as a source for these three elements, the patient is also seen as a source for reward. There is a danger of under-utilisation of this reward by the doctor, when (1) he is engaged only in giving, (2) he wilfully obstructs the channel of information, and (3) he feels ‘saturation’ called by the doctor ‘experience’. This under-utilisation will ultimately lead to ‘medical parasitism’. This parasitism is seldom recognised by the patient, because the arrest of development of a doctor is usually hardly noticed, and this will lead to neglect of the patient, so that the ‘trade’ between doctor and patient becomes unfair, as the long-term investment which the patient has placed in the doctor, does not pay off any longer.     

Science as a justification for psychology as a social institution

Psychology seeks to justify its claims to privilege as a social institution largely on the basis of its scientific knowledge claims. These knowledge claims tend to be based on, and to reflect a particular view about the nature of science which is under increasing challenge. This situation is discussed and some of its implications examined.     

Psychoanalysis as a vocation

Psychoanalysis may be seen as caught between two different trends of disenchanted modernity: rationalization, which leads to the framing of our work as a professional discipline subordinate to the dictates of instrumental rationality, and self‐analysis, which frees us from the dictates of orthodoxy, inequality, and authority. But a further difficulty lies within the aspect of enlightenment, which has not only provided a greater role for our subjectivity but disguised relations of authority, conformity, and objectiflcation in our work. Psychoanalysis has objectified the other while idealizing its knowledge as objective, has paradoxically denied the very subjectivity that must serve as the source of the analyst's knowledge. However, the reaction against this condition, which may tend to produce counter‐ideals of not‐knowing and mutuality, must also be carefully deconstructed. Differences in the meaning given by different schools to the use of the analyst's subjectivity suggest that pluralism will make new knowledge demands on psychoanalysts. Analytic training should include the development of critical abilities that help to meet these demands within a context of education as a collaborative, democratic process. Knowledge itself can be used homeo‐pathically as an antidote to the old ideal of the knowing authority.     

Risk as a Consequence

Expected-utility theory advances representation theorems that do not take the risk an act generates as a consequence of the act. However, a principle of expected-utility maximization that explains the rationality of preferences among acts must, for normative accuracy, take the act’s risk as a consequence of the act if the agent cares about the risk. I defend this conclusion against the charge that taking an act’s consequences to comprehend all the agent cares about trivializes the principle of expected-utility maximization.

     

Demandingness as a Virtue

Philosophers who complain about the ‹demandingness’ of morality forget that a morality can make too few demands as well as too many. What we ought be seeking is an appropriately demanding morality. This article recommends a ‹moral satisficing’ approach to determining when a morality is ‹demanding enough’, and an institutionalized solution to keeping the demands within acceptable limits.     

Reliability as a virtue

This paper explores what constitutes reliability in persons, particularly intellectual reliability. It considers global reliability, the overall reliability of persons, encompassing both the theoretical and practical realms; sectorial reliability, that of a person in a subject-matter (or behavioral) domain; and focal reliability, that of a particular element, such as a belief. The paper compares reliability with predictability of the kind most akin to it and distinguishes reliability as an intellectual virtue from reliability as an intellectual power. The paper also connects reliability with insight, reasoning, knowledge, and trust. It is argued that insofar as reliability is an intellectual virtue, it must meet both external standards of correctitude and internal standards of justification.

Learning as a context for differences and differences as a context for learning

In this paper we describe how we, as two trainers with multiple differences, engaged with a group of trainees in a process of deconstructing the differences between the participants in the training group, using the acronym Social GRRAACCEESS as a heuristic. We will explore how these differences reflexively influenced the process of learning, through teaching, training and supervision, within the group.     

Psychotherapy as a moral enterprise

This article addresses the phenomenon of psychotherapy as a moral enterprise by discussing the notion of morality as it relates to the therapeutic task, enumerating ways in which the practices of psychotherapy can confuse a moral sense of things and by offering suggestions as to how psychotherapy can be undertaken as a moral enterprise.     

Development as a dynamic system

Development is about creating something more from something less, for example, a walking and talking toddler from a helpless infant. One current theoretical framework views the developmental process as a change within a complex dynamic system. Development is seen as the emergent product of many decentralized and local interactions that occur in real time. We examine how studying the multicausality of real-time processes could be the key to understanding change over developmental time. We specifically consider recent research and theory on perseverative reaching by infants as a case study that demonstrates this approach.     

Judging as a non-voluntary action

Many philosophers categorise judgment as a type of action. On the face of it, this claim is at odds with the seeming fact that judging a certain proposition is not something you can do voluntarily. I argue that we can resolve this tension by recognising a category of non-voluntary action. An action can be non-voluntary without being involuntary. The notion of non-voluntary action is developed by appeal to the claim that judging has truth as a constitutive goal. This claim, when combined with a conception of judging as a way of settling a question, explains both why judging is genuinely agential, and why it is nevertheless non-voluntary.     

The Psyche as a Process

This paper is about my experiences with psychoanalysis in Uruguay and Argentina during the upheaval of the 1960s and 1970s. It reflects the interweaving of personal, professional, and social factors at a given historical moment. During those years some psychoanalysts tried to expand the area of psychoanalysis to the larger community. This implied changes in praxis and training. The work was done in “operative groups” as a way of reaching a greater number of people. Some case examples show how this work was carried out. Eventually these changes were squelched by the military takeover in what became known as the “Dirty War.” All dissent was seen by the authorities as threatening to the social order and was eradicated with brutality and impunity. My experiences as participant/outsider during that time exemplified some of the personal adaptations and professional cost for advocating change.     

Improvisation as a Meta-Counseling Skill

Counselor education tends to see the development of basic counseling and communication skills as the foundation of clinical training. Improvisation has historically and primarily been connected to theater training and as a performance mechanism. By developing skills in spontaneity and the nature of narrative (or story) one becomes more able to be in-the-moment with a client or clients and thus less anxious and more able to meet the client where they are. As such, improvisation can really be seen as a meta-counseling skill—a skill that can form a firmer foundation for the learning of the basic counseling and communication micro-skills. This article outlines the core concepts of improvisational training for counselors and includes examples of improvisational games that can specifically help in preparing counselor trainees for their future clinical work.     

Cosmopolitanism as a Corrective Virtue

This paper defends an account of cosmopolitanism as a corrective virtue of the sort endorsed by Philippa Foot. In particular, it argues that cosmopolitanism corrects a common and dangerous tendency to form overly strong identifications with political entities such as countries, nations, and cultures. The account helps to unify the current heterogeneous collection of cosmopolitan theories, as is illustrated by a discussion of the cultural cosmopolitanism of Jeremy Waldron, and the political cosmopolitanism of Simon Keller. The account also helps distinguish cosmopolitans from their critics, most of whom share the cosmopolitan’s commitment to respect for human rights: for example, liberal patriots, liberal nationalists and liberal culturalists.     

Humility as a psychotherapeutic formulation

Humility training is conceptualized as an appropriate treatment for persons who occasionally describe themselves, but are most frequently described by others as overbearing, insensitive and deceitful. Procedures are outlined to identify unrecognized fears and improve interpersonal skills. Humility is presented as a counterpoint to assertiveness and aggression/anger control interventions.     

Recall as a self-limiting process

Presentation of only some category names as retrieval cues following presentation of a categorized list enhanced recall of the cued categories relative to free recall, but reduced recall of the noncued categories (Experiment 1). This recall interference from recall of cued categories increased with the number of category names presented (Experiment 2), and was not due merely to delaying the subject with an interfering interpolated task (Experiment 3). The results argue against theories assuming that categories are recalled via associations from previously recalled categories. Rather, the results suggest that recall of categories acts in a manner to limit recall of additional categories, in agreement with the characterization of recall as a sampling-with-replacement process as described by Rundus.     

Process as a world structure

Described is a space model of developmental process and its projection on a plane—the Diagram of development. The latter is used to interpret the process of human history both on universal scale and that of the twentieth century with Soviet history as an instance. Hence unexpected conclusions are received about the impending social change in the world. Summarized are results of the previous mathematical analysis of the Diagram, the content of qualitative changes in the developmental processes is exposed. Also described are probable effects of the world view change in science when the world is seen as a developmental process. Examined are also the perspectives of the distant future for the humankind as a most rapidly developing part of nature. The questions of the human destiny and the role of man's activities in the Universe are also dwelt upon.     

Interpretation as a misunderstanding

In the following article ‘who’ as the agent in the clinical session becomes questioned. By speaking we are introduced in the world of misunderstanding, where we are not merely speaking but being spoken to. Listening to what is being said and in this way misunderstanding what the patient is trying to say helps us in order to locate where the subject of the unconscious places himself in relation to the desire of the Other. In the article, it is conveyed how interpretation is not something that clarifies or explains to the patient his difficulties, but instead locates them by letting them take part in the session. In Lacanian psychoanalysis, locating the subject of the unconscious is crucial as this gives the patient a clue about where they place themselves in relation to the Other. This is why cutting the session is an essential element of its technique, as it stops in this way something that can disturb or hide where the subject of the unconscious has appeared. This allows patients to experience where they are gratifying themselves in their own difficulty. Interpretation is not speaking about the truth but instead, making the truth present in the session.     

Gossip as a Burdened Virtue

Gossip is often serious business, not idle chitchat. Gossip allows those oppressed to privately name their oppressors as a warning to others. Of course, gossip can be in error. The speaker may be lying or merely have lacked sufficient evidence. Bias can also make those who hear the gossip more or less likely to believe the gossip. By examining the social functions of gossip and considering the differences in power dynamics in which gossip can occur, we contend that gossip may be not only permissible but virtuous, both as the only reasonable recourse available and as a means of resistance against oppression.     

Consumerism as a moral attitude

In this theoretical and explorative essay, from an analysis of Pope Francis’, Cornel West's, and William T. Cavanaugh's works, it is argued that it is possible to construe a specific understanding of the concept of consumerism within the political theological discourse. From the analysis, consumerism is imagined as a fundamental attitude of remaining morally indifferent towards suffering. Accordingly, the proposed definition for consumerism is understood as the act of trivializing the good and remaining indifferent towards suffering. Furthermore, the article highlights how this definition of consumerism challenges the idea of consumerism as an “ersatz” religion, which is an understanding of consumerism that is often used within a Christian theological context.