常人疾病观及其对医患关系的影响

常人疾病观是普通人对于某一疾病的认知、解释和态度的集合。与专业医务人员相比, 普通人更关注心理、家庭和社会因素而非生物学因素的致病作用, 就医选择多元而并不遵循标准化的就医模式, 同时更愿意将疾病体验视为个人生活的特殊问题加以建构性理解。常人疾病观与科学医学观之间的不一致性可能降低患者的就医满意、对医信任和医嘱依从性, 从而影响治疗效果。立足中国社会的医学文化与医疗制度, 研究中国人的常人疾病观, 并探讨其对医患关系的影响作用与社会心理机制, 可为改善当下中国医患关系紧张现状提供有益建议。     

How lay theories of prejudice shape prejudice confrontations: Examining beliefs about prejudice prevalence,origins, and controllability

The formative framework in prejudice confrontations research has focused on the utility of confrontations to activate one's self-regulation strategies to interrupt unintentional prejudice, discrimination, and stereotyping. As this framework remains dominant in the literature, little research has examined everyday people's theories about prejudice that diverge from this framework and accounted for these theories in investigating confrontation rates and outcomes. In this paper, we review key lay theories of prejudice and discuss the ways in which they may influence prejudice confrontations. First, we summarize lay theories regarding the prevalence, origins, and controllability of prejudice. Next, we consider how lay theories of prejudice may factor into the circumstances under which people confront prejudice, goals that people may hold when confronting, and outcomes of confronting for confronters and perpetrators. Throughout, we highlight fundamental research questions and hypotheses that integrate lay theories of prejudice and prejudice confrontations. We propose that better understanding lay theories of prejudice and how they influence prejudice confrontations may help to advance translational and theoretical research in social psychology.     

Implicit and Explicit Knowledge of Linear and Exponential Growth in 5- and 9-Year-Olds

The present study examined children's implicit and explicit knowledge of linear and non-linear processes. Five- and nine-year-olds (N = 60) were asked to forecast linear and exponential growth by providing the corresponding number of beads. Implicit knowledge was assessed via the magnitudes of the forecasts; explicit knowledge was investigated through children's verbal explanations of the growth process. Five year olds demonstrated a primary understanding of both linearity and nonlinearity. These concepts were more stable and more advanced in 9 year olds. Although implicit and explicit knowledge were significantly correlated, results suggested that implicit knowledge develops prior to explicit knowledge in this domain. Furthermore, knowledge of linearity emerged earlier than knowledge of nonlinearity.     

Do negative implicit associations indicate negative attitudes? Social explanations moderate whether ostensible “negative” associations are prejudice-based or empathy-based

The present work challenges the idea that implicit evaluative associations with outgroups necessarily provide information about negative or prejudiced attitudes. We argue that the manner in which one explains outgroup status and action shapes whether one's implicit “negative” associations are prejudice-based or empathy-based. Four studies are consistent with this possibility. Study 1 suggests that whereas implicit “negative” associations are predictive of negative explicit attitudes among those who reject external explanations for African American status and action, such implicit “negativity” predicts positive explicit attitudes among those who endorse external explanations. Study 2 provides experimental evidence that the provision of external explanations results in the formation of implicit “negative” associations that are predictive of compassionate responding. Study 3 provides more direct support for the idea that implicit “negative” associations are empathy-based among external explainers by showing that such “negative” associations are positively correlated with a measure of dispositional empathy-proneness. Finally, Study 4 demonstrates that IAT “negativity” is associated with automatic activation of empathy-related associations among those who strongly endorse external explanations. Discussion centers on the importance of considering factors—such as social explanations—that may moderate whether implicit “negativity” is prejudice-based or empathy-based.     

Explanations for unemployment in Britain

Psychological studies on unemployment in the 1930's and the 1970's and 1980's have concentrated on the psychological impact of unemployment on such things as people's health, self-esteem and social interaction. Furthermore studies have, not unnaturally, concentrated almost exclusively on the unemployed neglecting the employed altogether. Very few studies have concerned the range and determinants of lay explanations or attributions about the causes of unemployment. This study set out to examine differences in the explanations for unemployment as a function of whether people were employed or unemployed, as well as their age, sex, education and voting pattern, The results showed a predictable pattern of differences between the employed and unemployed, the former believing more in individualistic explanations and less in societal explanations than the latter. Whereas there were few sex and age differences, education and vote revealed numerous differences in explanations for unemployment. As in the case with explanations for poverty, Conservatives found individualistic explanations for unemployment more important than Labour voters who in turn found societal explanations more important than Conservative voters. Results were discussed in terms of the psychology of explanations, political socialization and the experience of unemployment. Problems in this study as well as the limitations and difficulties in research of the kind were also discussed.     

Not all automatic associations are created equal: How implicit normative evaluations are distinct from implicit attitudes and uniquely predict meaningful behavior

We propose a new construct (implicit normative evaluations) that purports to measure automatic associations about societal evaluations. We develop a new measure of this construct based on a modification of the Implicit Association Test (IAT) and describe how it is related to but not redundant with implicit attitudes and explicit normative evaluations. Study 1 provided evidence that implicit normative evaluations and implicit attitudes uniquely predicted evaluations measured by the traditional IAT. Study 2 demonstrated that Asian-Canadian immigrants' implicit normative evaluations toward older people became more negative the longer they were in Canada. Study 3 found that engineering students' (both men and women) implicit normative evaluations toward female engineers became more negative as they were exposed to engineering and that for women these negative normative evaluations predicted their intention to drop out of engineering. Study 4 demonstrated that implicit normative evaluations predicted the speed at which participants decide to “shoot” an African Canadian target on a shooter bias task (Correll, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2002). Finally, in Study 5, an experimental manipulation of an audience's reaction to racist jokes targeting people from the Middle East affected implicit normative evaluations about this group and that these implicit normative evaluations in turn affected discrimination. The implications of these results for the importance of social influence and culture in shaping thoughts and behavior are discussed.     

Foxhole atheism,revisited: The effects of mortality salience on explicit and implicit religious belief

Although fear of death features prominently in many historical and contemporary theories as a major motivational factor in religious belief, the empirical evidence available is ambivalent, and limited, we argue, by imprecise measures of belief and insufficient attention to the distinction between implicit and explicit aspects of cognition. The present research used both explicit (questionnaire) and implicit (single-target implicit association test; property verification) measurement techniques to examine how thoughts of death influence, specifically, belief in religious supernatural agents. When primed with death, participants explicitly defended their own religious worldview, such that self-described Christians were more confident that supernatural religious entities exist, while non-religious participants were more confident that they do not. However, when belief was measured implicitly, death priming increased all participants' beliefs in religious supernatural entities, regardless of their prior religious commitments. The results are interpreted in terms of a dual-process model of religious cognition, which can be used to resolve conflicting prior data, as well as to help explain the perplexing durability of religious belief.     

CHILDREN'S EXPERIENCE OF THREE TYPES OF CARTOON AT TWO AGE LEVELS*

Three cartoons were shown to 87 children at two age levels: 5–6 years, and 9 years. The children's experience was assessed in interviews. The younger children experienced the cartoons in a fragmentary manner and not as a continuous story, understood less of the cartoons, and tended to base their moral judgements of a character's behaviour on whether or not they identified with that character. Six months later, the younger children remembered best those scenes that had made them the most anxious earlier. A subgroup of children with abundant aggressive fantasies had a lower level of moral reasoning than the other children, preferred violent scenes, became less anxious while watching them and tended to give illogical explanations for the behaviour of the cartoon characters. The degree of anxiety provoked by a cartoon depended not on the amount of explicit violence shown but on the way the violence was presented. One cartoon, which contained no explicit violence, was considered the most frightening one due to its sound effects.     

Ordinary Explanations and Career Theories

The author highlights the relatively unexplored relationship between ordinary language explanations of career behavior and formal theories of career development. As in Gergen and Gergen's (1982) framework, several ordinary explanations of career behavior are classified along two dimensions—the extent to which explanations are founded in the person or the situation and the extent to which they account for predictability and control or chance and change. The value of the framework for both theory development and practice is outlined. The use of ordinary explanations addresses a number of issues faced by counselors as they move between their clients' explanations and formal career and counseling theories.     

A reassessment of cultural deviance theory: The use of underclass measures

This paper reassesses Miller's version of cultural deviance theory utilizing underclass measures to define the subculture. Previous research has ignored the potential of underclass measures such as unemployment and welfare status, despite evidence suggesting that such measures are strongly correlated with delinquency. The results in this paper are for the most part consistent with Miller's theory. We find that a number of indicators of subcultural focal concerns are significantly associated with underclass membership. Further, these indicators of focal concerns are also significantly associated with delinquent behavior. However, tests of the socialization process notions implicit in delinquency theories yield results more consistent with social control theory than with cultural deviance theory.     

A model of dual attitudes

When an attitude changes from A1 to A2, what happens to A1? Most theories assume, at least implicitly, that the new attitude replaces the former one. The authors argue that a new attitude can override, but not replace, the old one, resulting in dual attitudes. Dual attitudes are defined as different evaluations of the same attitude object: an automatic, implicit attitude and an explicit attitude. The attitude that people endorse depends on whether they have the cognitive capacity to retrieve the explicit attitude and whether this overrides their implicit attitude. A number of literatures consistent with these hypotheses are reviewed, and the implications of the dual-attitude model for attitude theory and measurement are discussed. For example, by including only explicit measures, previous studies may have exaggerated the ease with which people change their attitudes. Even if an explicit attitude changes, an implicit attitude can remain the same.     

You don't have to go to church to be a good Christian: the implicit religion of the cathedral carol service congregation

The notion that you don't have to go to church to be a good Christian is accepted as an indicator of the form of implicit religiosity espoused by those who (in Bailey's analysis) say that they “believe in Christianity.” The present paper builds on the findings of a recently published survey of rural Anglican churchgoers celebrating harvest which suggested that de-institutionalised implicit religion may be superseding commitment to conventional explicit religious attendance. The responses of 1081 people who attended Christmas carol services in two English cathedrals in 2009 and 2010 are analysed. The findings of the previous paper that implicit religiosity is more prevalent among younger people and among those who attend church less frequently are replicated. Evidence is also found that women are more inclined to this view than men and that those who have a loose historical connection through baptism are more likely to endorse it than those with either no historical connections or stronger ones. Suggestions are made for further research.     

A paradoxical prediction from locus of control

Individual differences in attribution have been little researched. Beliefs about locus of control have been taken to be stable and important differences between people. They may provide some of the background assumptions on which people base their explanations of actions, especially insofar as these explanations imply that the cause of an action was within the agent or his environment, and that the action was or was not under the agent's control. Respondents were therefore asked to fill in Rotter and Levenson locus of control questionnaires and to provide explanations or ask questions about several actions. It was hypothesized that internals would be inclined to go for explanations which were personal and implied high control, while externals would not. However, what emerged was the paradoxical finding that internals provided explanations which implied that the causes of the actions lay outside the agent, while externals provided ones which implied that the causes lay within. This result is discussed in terms of the difference between actions and outcomes, and the possibility that an important difference between people may be in the rigidity and simplicity of their beliefs about causality.     

Lay theories and intergroup relations: A social-developmental perspective

Abundant research suggests that the study of lay theories helps to explain intergroup relations. Building on this work as well as “interactionist” theories for understanding social behaviour from developmental and social psychology, we propose an integrative social-developmental perspective examining how lay perceivers' characteristics (e.g., age, race, psychological motivations) interact with the environments in which they are nested to impact lay theory use over time and during life transitions. Using this perspective to guide our investigation of the Protestant work ethic (PWE) and colourblind theory, we show that a single lay theory can have a socially tolerant or intolerant meaning. We review work with US children and adults (Asians, Blacks, Latinos, Whites) as well as research with Colombian children and adults (Mestizos), showing similarities and differences in perceivers' uses of PWE and the colourblind theory. Even when both meanings are prevalent in a given culture, they are not necessarily equally emphasised in all environments or for all people living in those environments, nor are they responded to in the same way by all people. We discuss the implications of these results for theorising on lay theories and offer directions for future work in this area.     

Lay Theories of Personality: Cornerstones of Meaning in Social Cognition

Lay theories (or ‘implicit theories’) are cornerstones for social cognition: people use lay theories to help them make sense of complex and ambiguous behavior. In this study, we describe recent research on the entity and incremental theories (the belief that personality is fixed or malleable). In so doing, we demonstrate that each theory does not act alone. Instead, each is associated with a set of allied beliefs, the sum total of which cohere into two distinct meaning systems. We present evidence that these meaning systems produce systematic differences in a range of fundamental social cognition processes, with important implications for the field’s understanding of trait/situation attribution, moral judgment, person memory, and stereotyping. We further argue that because meaning systems serve a central meaning‐making function, people are motivated to believe that the meaning system they are using is effective and accurate. Accordingly, we present evidence that people exhibit processing distortions and compensatory mechanisms to minimize the impact of information that violates their meaning system. We discuss the implications of these findings for the field’s understanding of basic social cognition.     

Implicit understanding of belief

Implicit understanding of false belief was investigated by monitoring where children look in anticipation of a protagonist reappearing, when the protagonist mistakenly thinks that his desired object is in a different place from the place where it really is. This implicit measure of understanding was contrasted with children's explicit answers to the experimenter's question about where the protagonist would look for the object. Children from 2 years 5 months to 2 years 10 months erroneously looked at the object's real location, which they gave for their answer. From 2 years 11 months to 4 years 5 months, about 90% of the children looked at the empty location where the protagonist thought the object was.In sharp contrast, only about 45% of the children in this age span gave that location as their explicit answer to the experimenter's question. These results are explained in terms of a distinction between representing a fact and making a judgment about that fact.     

Goal-Based Explanation Evaluation

Many theories of explanation evaluation are based on context-independent criteria. Such theories either restrict their consideration to explanation towards a fixed goal, or assume that all valid explanations are equivalent, so that evaluation criteria can be neutral to the goals underlying the attempt to explain. However, explanation can serve a range of purposes that place widely divergent requirements on the information an explanation must provide. It is argued that understanding what determines explanations' goodness requires a dynamic theory of evaluation, based on analysis of the information needed to satisfy the many goals that can prompt explanation; this view conforms to the commonsense idea that people accept and apply explanations precisely if those explanations give the information they need. A range of goals that can underly explanation is examined, and a theory is presented for evaluating whether an explanation provides the information an explainer needs for these goals. The theory is illustrated by sketching its implementation in the computer program, ACCEPTER, which does goal-based evaluation of the goodness of explanations for surprising events in news stories.     

Intuition and the correspondence between implicit and explicit self-esteem

Four studies tested whether the perceived validity of intuition increases the correspondence between implicit and explicit self-esteem. Studies 1 and 2 found, with 2 different measures of implicit self-esteem, that people who chronically view their intuition as valid have more consistent implicit and explicit self-esteem. In contrast, people with relatively low faith in their intuition had a negative relation between implicit and explicit self-esteem, suggesting that they may overcorrect their explicit self-views for the potential bias posed by implicit self-esteem. In Studies 3 and 4, participants who were induced to view their intuition as valid reported explicit self-views (self-evaluations made under time pressure, or state self-esteem) that were more consistent with their implicit self-esteem. These results suggest that people experience implicit self-esteem as intuitive evaluations. The correspondence between implicit and explicit self-esteem among individuals who view their intuition as valid may suggest that these individuals incorporate implicit self-esteem into their explicit self-views.     

Investigating the link between validation seeking and lay dispositionism

In this study, the authors investigated the relationship between validation seeking (VS; Dykman, 1998) and lay dispositionism, the use of personality traits as the basis for social inference (Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997). Specifically, the authors sought to empirically address three questions: (a) Does VS predict the tendency to make dispositional inferences and, if so, do social comparison tendencies mediate this relationship? (b) Does VS mediate the association between implicit person theories and lay dispositionism? and (c) Does contingent parental regard indirectly predict lay dispositionism via its effects on VS and/or implicit person theories? Results suggest that both VS and entity person theories facilitate lay dispositionism, yet do so via distinct processes. Both processes are driven at least partly by contingent parental regard; however, their effects on lay dispositionism differ in scope and in the extent to which they entail social comparison.     

Assumptions about human nature: comparison of implicit and explicit personality theories

Hjelle and Ziegler (1981) believe that people's positions on nine fundamental dimensions of human nature affect their personality theories, and that differences between people on these dimensions contribute to differences between their personality theories. The present study was conducted in order to obtain information about the ordinary person's position on these dimensions and to compare the ordinary person's position with 10 personality theorists' positions. 84 subjects rated their positions on each of nine 11-step bipolar dimensions. The following results were obtained: (1) According to the ordinary person, the human being is free, changeable, influenced by the subjective world of experience, a product of the environment, and best understood from a holistic perspective; (2) The position of the ordinary person is most similar to Allport's position, and least similar to Skinner's position. The results are discussed in light of the relation between implicit (lay) and explicit (scientific) theories of personality.