Attitude generalization: Similarity, valence, and extremity

Attitude generalization was explored as a function of object similarity and attitude valence and extremity. Participants in a computer game formed attitudes toward positive and negative, mild or extreme stimuli. How well these attitudes generalized to similar, novel stimuli was then examined. Visual similarity to game targets affected categorization of novel stimuli, such that greater resemblance resulted in more similar classification. However, generalization varied by valence and extremity. Negative attitudes generalized more than positive attitudes, requiring less resemblance for a novel target to be classified as negative. This pattern was more obvious with extreme attitudes than mild attitudes. That is, extreme attitudes were more influential and given more weight than mild attitudes. Also, specific conditions were identified under which positive attitudes proved more influential than negative attitudes.     

Gender-related traits in gay men, lesbian women, and heterosexual men and women: the virtual identify of homosexual-heterosexual diagnosticity and gender diagnosticity

Three studies investigated the relationship between gender-related traits and sexual orientation. Study 1 showed that gay men and lesbians in an unselected sample of 721 college students differed from same-sex heterosexuals most strongly on gender diagnosticity (GD) measures, which assess male- versus female-typicality of interests (effect sizes of 2.70 for men and .96 for women) and least strongly on measures of instrumentality (I) and expressiveness (E). In Study 2, GD measures showed large differences between 95 gay and 136 heterosexual men (effect sizes of 1.61 and 1.83) and between 46 lesbian and 225 heterosexual women (effect sizes of .98 and 1.28), whereas I and E showed much smaller differences. In Study 3, GD showed large differences between 90 gay and 81 heterosexual men (effect sizes of 1.76 and 1.97) and between 82 lesbians and 108 heterosexual women (effect sizes 1.67 and 1.70). whereas I and E showed much smaller differences. Using data from Studies 2 and 3, "gay-heterosexual diagnosticity" measures were computed for men and "lesbian-heterosexual diagnosticity" measures for women, based on occupational and hobby preferences. These measures correlated very strongly with GD measures.     

Color diagnosticity in object recognition

Does color influence object recognition? In the present study, the degree to which an object was associated with a specific color was referred to ascolor diagnosticity. Using a feature listing and typicality measure, objects were identified as either high in color diagnosticity or low in color diagnosticity. According to the color diagnosticity hypothesis, color should more strongly influence the recognition of high color diagnostic (HCD) objects (e.g., a banana) than the recognition of low color diagnostic (LCD) objects (e.g., a lamp). This prediction was supported by results from classification, naming, and verification experiments, in which subjects were faster to identify color versions of HCD objects than they were to identify achromatic versions and incongruent color versions. In contrast, subjects were no faster to identify color versions of LCD objects than they were to identify achromatic and incongruent color versions. Moreover, when shape information was degraded but color information preserved, subjects were less impaired in their recognition of degraded HCD objects than of degraded LCD objects, relative to their nondegraded versions. Collectively, these results suggest that color plays a role in the recognition of HCD objects.     

Color diagnosticity in object recognition.

Does color influence object recognition? In the present study, the degree to which an object was associated with a specific color was referred to as color diagnosticity. Using a feature listing and typicality measure, objects were identified as either high in color diagnosticity or low in color diagnosticity. According to the color diagnosticity hypothesis, color should more strongly influence the recognition of high color diagnostic (HCD) objects (e.g., a banana) than the recognition of low color diagnostic (LCD) objects (e.g., a lamp). This prediction was supported by results from classification, naming, and verification experiments, in which subjects were faster to identify color versions of HCD objects than they were to identify achromatic versions and incongruent color versions. In contrast, subjects were no faster to identify color versions of LCD objects than they were to identify achromatic and incongruent color versions. Moreover, when shape information was degraded but color information preserved, subjects were less impaired in their recognition of degraded HCD objects than of degraded LCD objects, relative to their nondegraded versions. Collectively, these results suggest that color plays a role in the recognition of HCD objects.     

The diagnosticity of color for emotional objects

Object classification can be facilitated if simple diagnostic features can be used to determine class membership. Previous studies have found that simple shapes may be diagnostic for emotional content and automatically alter the allocation of visual attention. In the present study, we analyzed whether color is diagnostic of emotional content and tested whether emotionally diagnostic hues alter the allocation of visual attention. Reddish-yellow hues are more common in (i.e., diagnostic of) emotional images, particularly images with positive emotional content. An exogenous cueing paradigm was employed to test whether these diagnostic hues orient attention differently from other hues due to the emotional diagnosticity. In two experiments, we found that participants allocated attention differently to diagnostic hues than to non-diagnostic hues, in a pattern indicating a broadening of spatial attention when cued with diagnostic hues. Moreover, the attentional broadening effect was predicted by self-reported measures of affective style, linking the behavioral effect to emotional processes. These results confirm the existence and use of diagnostic features for the rapid detection of emotional content.     

Insensitivity and oversensitivity to answer diagnosticity in hypothesis testing

Two experiments examined how people perceive the diagnosticity of different answers (“yes” and “no”) to the same question. We manipulated whether the “yes” and the “no” answers conveyed the same amount of information or not, as well as the presentation format of the probabilities of the features inquired about. In Experiment 1, participants were presented with only the percentages of occurrence of the features, which most straightforwardly apply to the diagnosticity of “yes” answers. In Experiment 2, participants received in addition the percentages of the absence of features, which serve to assess the diagnosticity of “no” answers. Consistent with previous studies, we found that participants underestimated the difference in the diagnosticity conveyed by different answers to the same question. However, participants' insensitivity was greater when the normative (Bayesian) diagnosticity of the “no” answer was higher than that of the “yes” answer. We also found oversensitivity to answer diagnosticity, whereby participants valued as differentially diagnostic two answers that were normatively equal in terms of their diagnosticity. Presenting to participants the percentages of occurrence of the features inquired about together with their complements increased their sensitivity to the diagnosticity of answers. We discuss the implications of these findings for confirmation bias in hypothesis testing.     

Play,agreement and consensus

In this paper I employ the analysis of play to clarify the distinction between an agreement and a consensus, and I argue that it is the conditions supplied by the playful process that enable us to partake in the recognition and creation of truth. Gadamer's hermeneutical truth, unlike propositional truth, speaks of the interpretive act whereby meaning is recognized. This interpretive recognition of meaning is described by Gadamer as an occurrence of interpretive play orgenuine understanding. Regarding Gadamer's conception of truth as modelled on agreement rather than consensus, I demonstrate that it is in the process of play that we achieve the making and maintaining of the conditions that are necessary for agreement, and that the nature of understanding is most clearly revealed by viewing it as a playful process.     

The role of color diagnosticity in object recognition and representation

The role of color diagnosticity in object recognition and representation was assessed in three Experiments. In Experiment 1a, participants named pictured objects that were strongly associated with a particular color (e.g., pumpkin and orange). Stimuli were presented in a congruent color, incongruent color, or grayscale. Results indicated that congruent color facilitated naming time, incongruent color impeded naming time, and naming times for grayscale items were situated between the congruent and incongruent conditions. Experiment 1b replicated Experiment 1a using a verification task. Experiment 2 employed a picture rebus paradigm in which participants read sentences one word at a time that included pictures of color diagnostic objects (i.e., pictures were substituted for critical nouns). Results indicated that the “reading” times of these pictures mirrored the pattern found in Experiment 1. In Experiment 3, an attempt was made to override color diagnosticity using linguistic context (e.g., a pumpkin was described as painted green). Linguistic context did not override color diagnosticity. Collectively, the results demonstrate that color information is regularly utilized in object recognition and representation for highly color diagnostic items.     

Play, agreement and consensus

In this paper I employ the analysis of play to clarify the distinction between an agreement and a consensus, and I argue that it is the conditions supplied by the playful process that enable us to partake in the recognition and creation of truth. Gadamer's hermeneutical truth, unlike propositional truth, speaks of the interpretive act whereby meaning is recognized. This interpretive recognition of meaning is described by Gadamer as an occurrence of interpretive play orgenuine understanding. Regarding Gadamer's conception of truth as modelled on agreement rather than consensus, I demonstrate that it is in the process of play that we achieve the making and maintaining of the conditions that are necessary for agreement, and that the nature of understanding is most clearly revealed by viewing it as a playful process.     

Character,Attitude and Disposition

Recent debate over the empirical psychological presuppositions of virtue ethics has focused on reactive behavioural dispositions. But there are many character traits that cannot be understood properly in this way. Such traits are well described by attitude psychology. Moreover, the findings of attitude psychology support virtue ethics in three ways. First, they confirm the role of habituation in the development of character. Further, they show virtue ethics to be compatible with the situation manipulation experiments at the heart of the recent debate. Finally, they show how the cognitive‐affective theory of personality and the two‐system theory of behavioural cognition are compatible, thereby undermining the current empirical challenge to virtue ethics. Empirical research into the nature and development of attitudes should therefore be central to philosophical discussions of virtue and character.     

Disagreement, consensus, and moral integrity

The Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments experienced some disagreements among its members in the course of its work. An epistemological controversy over the nature and degree of evidence required to draw ethical conclusions pervaded the Committee's deliberations. Other disagreements involved the proper role of a governmental advisory committee and the question of when it is appropriate to notify people that they were unknowing subjects of radiation experiments. In the end, the Committee was able to reach consensus on almost all of its findings and recommendations through a process that preserved the integrity of its members.     

A comparison of correlation, calibration, and diagnosticity as measures of the confidence-accuracy relationship in witness identification

The relationship between witness confidence and accuracy (CA) has traditionally been measured by the point-biserial correlation (rpb). Recently, 2 alternative indices for measuring the CA relation have been proposed, namely calibration and diagnosticity analyses (e.g., P. Juslin, N. Olsson, & A. Winman, 1996). In this study, the 3 measures were compared quantitatively using 52 independent data sets. The measures rpb and calibration were weakly correlated, whether computed across earwitness data sets, eyewitness data sets, or all data. Thus, when applied to the same data, these 2 measures sometimes yield different conclusions. A modest relation was observed between the rpb and the diagnosticity of confidence. Finally, calibration and degree of over- and underconfidence covaried with task difficulty, consistent with K. A. Deffenbachers' (1980) optimality hypothesis.     

How Emotional Media Reports Influence Attitude Formation and Change: The Interplay of Attitude Base,Attitude Certainty,and Persuasion

This study examined the influence of an emotionally arousing writing style on attitude formation and change. It has been proposed that different writing styles induce attitudes based on either affect or cognition and with either high or low certainty. Previous work indicates that the interplay of these attitude characteristics determines the persuasiveness of emotional and rational media appeals. To test the hypotheses, participants in an experimental study read articles from a magazine about a fictitious attitude object. In the first step, 4 different types of attitudes varying in base and level of certainty were induced through a respectively manipulated article. In the second step, these attitudes were challenged by an additional article, which presented either an emotional or rational persuasive appeal. The results supported hypotheses on attitude induction through media stimuli and 3 of 4 hypotheses regarding the persuasiveness of emotionally and rationally written articles.     

Belief,Affect, and Attitude: Alternative Models of the Determinants of Attitude

A recent debate in the Journal of Consumer Psychology illustrates many of the unresolved issues concerning the development and application of models to predict attitude. A central issue in the debate is whether a noncognitive factor, such as affect, may exert a direct influence on attitude, or whether its influence is mediated by the cognitive structure. We describe the results of two studies designed to determine (a) whether affect and attitude are separate constructs and (b) whether affect influences attitude independently of cognitive structure. The studies address the methodological criticisms levied against previous research and provide results to indicate that affect does influence attitudes directly and independently of cognitive structure.     

Values,Beliefs, and Proenvironmental Action: Attitude Formation Toward Emergent Attitude Objects1

Discoveries in environmental science become the raw material for constructing social attitude objects, individual attitudes, and broad public concerns. We explored a model in which individuals construct attitudes to new or emergent attitude objects by referencing personal values and beliefs about the consequences of the objects for their values. We found that a subset of the major clusters identified in value theory is associated with willingness to take proenvironmental action; that a biospheric value orientation cannot yet be discerned in a general population sample; that willingness to take proenvironmental action is a function of both values and beliefs, with values also predicting beliefs; and that gender differences can be attributed to both beliefs and values. Our model has promise for explicating the factors determining public concern with environmental conditions.     

Remembering first impressions: Effects of intentionality and diagnosticity on subsequent memory

People rely on first impressions every day as an important tool to interpret social behavior. While research is beginning to reveal the neural underpinnings of first impressions, particularly through understanding the role of dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), little is known about the way in which first impressions are encoded into memory. This is surprising because first impressions are relevant from a social perspective for future interactions, requiring that they be transferred to memory. The present study used a subsequent-memory paradigm to test the conditions under which the dmPFC is implicated in the encoding of first impressions. We found that intentionally forming impressions engages the dmPFC more than does incidentally forming impressions, and that this engagement supports the encoding of remembered impressions. In addition, we found that diagnostic information, which more readily lends itself to forming trait impressions, engages the dmPFC more than does neutral information. These results indicate that the neural system subserving memory for impressions is sensitive to consciously formed impressions. The results also suggest a distinction between a social memory system and other explicit memory systems governed by the medial temporal lobes.     

Attitude polarization,familiarization and group process

Our purpose was to gain insight into the processes linking interaction and attitude polarization. We wished to determine whether polarization might occur in an individual situation, during the task of familiarization with the object. Two experiments were undertaken, one relating to an individual situation and the other involving a group situation. No polarization took place in the individual situation. In addition as a result of the coercive normative pressure induced in the course of the group discussion, we were able to observe unwilling agreement by individuals, provoking in turn a noticeable regression during the post-consensus.