Reglobalizing Realism by Going Local, or (How) Should Our Formulations of Scientific Realism be Informed about the Sciences?

In order to examine the fit between realism and science, one needs to address two issues: the unit of science question (realism about which parts of science?) and the contents of realism question (which realism about science?). Answering these questions is a matter of conceptual and empirical inquiry by way local case studies. Instead of the more ordinary abstract and global scientific realism, what we get is a doubly local scientific realism based on a bottom-up strategy. Representative formulations of the former kind are in terms of the truth and reality of the posits of current science, in terms of warranted belief, in terms of mind-independent unobservable entities. Using illustrations mainly from the social sciences, doubly local scientific realism denies the global applicability of such formulations and seeks to make adjustments in their elements in response to information about local units of science: It is sufficient for a realist to give the existence of an entity (and the truth of a theory) a chance, while in some areas we may be in s position to make justified claims about actual existence (and truth). Logical inquiry-independent existence is sufficient for the social and human sciences, while mind-independence will be fine for many other domains. It should not be insisted that the theoretical posits of realist science be strict unobservables in all areas: most theoretical posits of the social sciences are idealized commonsensibles, such as elements in folk psychology. Unsurprisingly, this sort of local strategy will create space for realism that is able to accommodate larger areas of science without sacrificing traditional realist intuitions.     

Critique of the methodology of empirical research on individual modernity in Taiwan

Yang's 1974 to 1991 research on individual modernity and traditionalism in Taiwan is examined and the methodology for developing measurement instruments in this program critiqued. It is proposed that the proper strategy for research on indigenous psychology is to analyze a culture at the conceptual level with the symbolic approach, and then conduct empirical research on 'lifeworlds' using activity theory. Yang's research on individual modernity and traditionalism uses an inductive empirical approach without the theoretical grounding of conceptual analyses. Based on the philosophy of constructive realism, two types of knowledge (the scientific 'microworld' and the 'experienced lifeworld') are differentiated in order to explicate the significance of the discontinuity hypothesis of modernity for non-Western countries and to critique Yang's methodology for measuring individual modernity and traditionalism. It is proposed that the research strategy of cultural psychology be used in future study. This replacement would usher in the indigenous psychology approach as is evident in Yang's (1999, Yang, 2000) later works.     

A Voice and So Much More: The Neglect and Representation of Language in Social Psychology

Linguistic diversity is an irreducible characteristic of the world we live in today, yet the study of language remains relatively neglected in mainstream and critical social psychologies alike. In order to argue for a renewed confrontation between language and critical social psychology, this study presents an overview of both the absence of language from mainstream, experimental social psychology and of the emergence, since the 1970s, of the social psychology of language as a distinctive subfield in the discipline. It is argued that although the social psychology of language made the subject perceptible as a speaking and above all accented subject, foregrounding language as an index of class, ethnicity and race, it achieved this perceptibility without challenging the basic ideological coordinates according to which experimental social psychology conceptualises the world and subjects in relation to language. For this reason, the social psychology of language, despite its important contributions, reproduces an essentially national and monolingual imagination of language related phenomena and linguistic subjectivities. The task for a critical social psychology of language, it is argued, is to 'demythologise' and 'disinvent' language and language ideologies in the discipline.     

The Philosophical Foundations of Humanistic Psychology: A Reply to McMullen

McMullen (1982) attempted in his critique of humanistic psychology to attack its philosophical foundations, taking these to be phenomenology and a doctrine of self determination. In this paper we argue that McMullen has misrepresented the philosophical position of the humanists, then we examine McMullen's own philosophical assumptions. We show that he has assumed the philosophy of empirical realism which we argue is inadequate as a foundation for science. It is shown that it is the inadequacy of McMullen's assumptions which underlies his failure to comprehend the position of the humanists. We then present a version of theoretical realism and show how, in terms of this, a conception of being can be justified which allows for the emergence of hierarchical order. On the basis of this conception of being we reassess the nature of self-determination and motivation, showing how, in opposition to both the empirical realism of McMullen and the philosophical dualism of conventional humanistic psychology, a naturalistic form of humanistic psychology is justified.     

The rise and fall of deception in social psychology and personality research, 1921 to 1994

The frequency of the use of deception in American psychological research was studied by reviewing articles from journals in personality and social psychology from 1921 to 1994. Deception was used rarely during the developmental years of social psychology into the 1930s, then grew gradually and irregularly until the 1950s. Between the 1950s and 1970s the use of deception increased significantly. This increase is attributed to changes in experimental methods, the popularity of realistic impact experiments, and the influence of cognitive dissonance theory. Since 1980 there appears to have been a decrease in the use of deception as compared to previous decades which is related to changes in theory, methods, ethical standards, and federal regulation of research.     

A confederate's perspective on deception

In this article, I outline my position regarding the use of deception in psychology experiments, based on my experience as a confederate. I describe an experiment I participated in and the problems resulting from the study: subjects' differing responses to the deception; angry reactions of some subjects to the experiment; and the general discomfort of both the subjects and the confederates, in particular, who had their doubts concerning the external validity of the study and the ethics involved in running it. Issues of informed consent and debriefing are also addressed; it is argued that the success of deception depends on the subject being misinformed as to the experiment's true nature and that debriefing itself sometimes angers subjects. I encourage a decrease in the use of deception and the reexamination of a system that attempts to balance the pain of experimental participants with anticipated benefit to scientific knowledge.     

Is culture a problem for social psychology?

Culture has been regarded as an anathema to psychology as an empiricist research tradition. Despite the explosive growth of research on culture and psychology over the last decade of the 20th century and its importance in Asian social psychology, the ontological and epistemological tension between psychology as a science and psychology as a cultural/historical discipline introduced in the writings of the thinkers of the Enlightenment and counter-Enlightenment still lingers on in the contemporary discourse of psychology. Clifford Geertz once ominously suggested that cultural psychology may have chewed more than it can. In the present paper, the interpretive turn in social science as exemplified by writings of Charles Taylor and Paul Ricoeur is reviewed and how it may impinge on the practice of Asian social psychology as an empirical science in methodological, epistemological, and ontological respects is discussed. It is argued here that the current practice of Asian social psychology is largely, though not entirely, free of the challenges mounted by these theorists, and that Asian social psychology has an advantage of not being encumbered by this traditional tension due to a monist ontology that is prevalent in Asia.     

A confederate's Perspective on Deception

In this article, I outline my position regarding the use of deception in psychology experiments, based on my experience as a confederate. I describe an experiment I participated in and the problems resulting from the study: subjects' differing responses to the deception; angry reactions of some subjects to the experiment; and the general discomfort of both subjects and confederates, in particular, who had their doubts concerning the external validity of the study and the ethics involved in running it. issues of informed consent and debriefing are also addressed; it is argued that the success of deception depends on the subject being misinformed as to the experiment's true nature and that debriefing itself sometimes angers subjects. I encourage a decrease in the use of deception and the reexamination of a system that attempts to balance the pain of experimental participants with anticipated benefit to scientific knowledge.     

Virtues as Qualities of Character

Over the last two decades, a growing philosophical literature has subjected virtue ethics to empirical evaluation. Drawing on results in social psychology, a number of critics have argued that virtue ethics depends upon false presuppositions about the cross-situational consistency of psychological traits. Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue has been a prime target for the situationist critics. This essay assesses the situationist critique of MacIntyre’s account of virtue. It argues that MacIntyre’s social teleological account of virtue is not what his situationist critics take it to be. Virtues, for MacIntyre, are not reducible to psychological traits. They are qualities of one’s socially constituted character, and their intelligibility as virtues derives from their role in the narrative of one’s life. Recognizing this both clarifies and complicates debates about the implication of situationist social psychology for virtue ethics. It also grants a new significance to MacIntyre’s attention to the socio-historical context of virtue, a significance that should be especially interesting to religious ethicists.     

Is multicultural psychology a-scientific?: diverse methods for diversity research

This article asks, and answers three separate questions: What is multicultural psychology? What is psychological science? Are multicultural psychology and (empirical/positivist) psychological science incompatible? A brief overview of the history of science is provided emphasizing the emancipatory impulses behind a modernist, empirical, positivist approach to science. It is argued that such an approach is not incompatible with multicultural psychology. The author concludes that multicultural psychological will be strengthened if psychologists draw upon both qualitative and quantitative methods, including those that come from a positivist tradition, when investigating psychological and social issues as they affect diverse populations.     

Executive control within strategic deception: a window on early cognitive development?

Recently it has been claimed that the difficulty young children have with tests of strategic deception may be due to limitations in executive control rather than lack of insight into mental concepts. In the studies reported here we asked how reducing the executive demands of one measure of strategic deception, the windows task (J. Russell, N. Mauthner, S. Sharpe, & T. Tidswell, 1991), would affect performance. Study 1 demonstrated that both providing an artificial response medium and having children play in partnership enabled 3-year-olds to adopt a successful strategy. Study 2 examined whether social or executive factors accounted for the good performance of children when they played in partnership. Study 3 ruled out the possibility that the effectiveness of the artificial media was a result of reducing social intimidation-the manipulations were effective even in the presence the opponent. These results argue for executive factors playing a substantial role in the development of strategic deception.     

Culture,context and society – The underexplored potential of critical realism as a philosophical framework for theory and practice

This article explains how the meta‐theoretical framework of critical realism addresses methodological issues of concern to social psychologists and social scientists. The article outlines key tenets of critical realism – its notion of the stratified nature of reality and generative mechanisms as powers in natural and social objects that cause things; its notion of knowledge of reality as stratified rather than only empirical; its acceptance of epistemological but not judgmental relativism; and its monist ontology. The article then introduces realist social theory to provide a framework for understanding the society–person connection. It explains how issues relating to culture, context, and society raised in the indigenous psychology English literature might be addressed from a critical realist perspective. Some implications arising from adopting a critical realist perspective in research practice are outlined and social psychologists and social scientists are encouraged to explore the potential of critical realism as a meta‐theoretical framework and new paradigm.     

The Crisis issue Assessed: An Empirical Analysis

The effect of the crisis issue in social psychology-focusing on the validity of existing social psychological research methodologies-was examined through an analysis of research trends over the past 15 years. Articles selected from four representative social psychology journals in the 1974-1975, 1979-1980, and 1984-1985 periods were evaluated in terms of (a) type of methodology, (b) subject population (c) use of deception and (d) method of data analysis. Results indicate that, despite the predominance of laboratory experimentation in social psychological research, a significant increase in the use of surveys and questionnaires is noted. In addition, although the predominance of undergraduates as research subjects has shown no change over the 15-year period, deception in research has decreased significantly. Contrary to expectation, the increased availability of linear modeling procedures such as path analysis and multidimensional scaling has not resulted in significant changes in the methods of data analysis over the past 15 years. These results are discussed in terms of the role of the crisis literature on social psychological research of the past decade.     

Saint Thomas Aquinas’ ontological epistemology as clarified realism: The relating of subject to object for ontological knowledge

The Kantian revolution limited the possibility of ontological knowledge, severing subject from thing as is evident in its legacy in both continental and analytic philosophy. Consequently, if a thing cannot be known as it is, the philosophical status of empirical science as a study about existing natural things should be called into question. It could be construed, for instance, that a scientific theory is a construction about something to which the subjective constructor can never have ontological access. But, when empirical scientists develop evidence-based proofs for their theories the assumption of realism usually stands: scientific theories constructed by scientists are actually purported to represent natural entities back to these constructing scientists. Given that there is a danger of philosophy becoming isolated from empirical science, we attempt to bridge the gap between philosophical discourse and science-in-praxis through a recapitulation of Aquinas’ ontological epistemology. Aquinas argued for a clarified realism in which the epistemic is construed as an intersection between the thinking subject and the object. Contrary to naïve realism, then, it will be explicated how Aquinas’ realism was a precursor of “critical realism”, as he discerned the complex interaction of thinking subject and the being of the object as both bearing on the production of knowledge.     

Selection and self: Selection as a social process

Recent developments in theory and research in social psychology make possible an integrated account of selection construed as a social process. This account draws upon social psychological theories of the functions of the self, relationship development, social identity, self-categorization, and emotion. First, an account of the selection process in these theoretical terms is presented, together with some theoretical propositions. Next, research in one area, applicants' reactions to selection processes, which is consistent with this account is reviewed. Finally, implications for practice are drawn. It is argued that there are strategic implications both for organizations and for the psychology profession.     

Two Notions of Scientific Justification

Scientific claims can be assessed epistemically in either of two ways: according to scientific standards, or by means of philosophical arguments such as the no-miracle argument in favor of scientific realism. This paper investigates the basis of this duality of epistemic assessments. It is claimed that the duality rests on two different notions of epistemic justification that are well-known from the debate on internalism and externalism in general epistemology: a deontological and an alethic notion. By discussing the conditions for the scientific acceptability of empirical results, it is argued that intrascientific justification employs the deontological notion. Philosophical disputes such as those on scientific realism can by contrast be shown to rest on the alethic notion. The implications of these findings both for the nature of the respective epistemic projects and for their interrelation are explored.     

有关具身认知思潮的理论心理学思考

具身认知强调了心智或认知对身体及其感觉运动系统的依赖性。与传统认知心理学的符号加工模式不同的是, 它认为身体的构造和状态、身体的物理属性及其大脑与身体的特殊感觉—运动通道对认知具有塑造作用。认知既是具身的, 也是嵌入的, 大脑嵌入身体、身体嵌入环境, 构成了一体的认知系统。最初, 具身认知仅仅是一种反对笛卡尔身心二元论的哲学思潮, 经由认知科学哲学和理论心理学而逐渐进入了实验领域。具身认知研究充分利用了神经科学的方法和技术、数据和结论, 但是它并不主张把心理还原为生理或物理, 同时, 具身认知的神经科学取向仅仅给传统心理研究提供一个认识心智的新视角, 其目标并非取消行为水平的心理研究, 因此不会损害心理学的独立地位。     

Drivers’ illusions––no more risk

In this invited address to the International Congress of Applied Psychology, it is argued that traffic psychology has not had a major impact on accident prevention. The factors that have determined this are discussed. A review of the theories and models pertinent to drivers’ risk taking and road user behaviour in general is presented. It is argued that both risk-homeostasis theories and task capability model are not sufficiently precise to be used as a basis for preventive measures. Attitude–behaviour models derived from social psychology have proved to be powerful in identifying motivational factors influencing road user behaviour, but the majority of empirical evidence is based on self-reported rather than observed behaviour. It is argued that individual differences can provide a basis for accident prevention, in particular driver training.     

Deception in Experiments: Revisiting the Arguments in Its Defense

In psychology, deception is commonly used to increase experimental control. Yet, its use has provoked concerns that it raises participants' suspicions, prompts second-guessing of experimenters' true intentions, and ultimately distorts behavior and endangers the control it is meant to achieve. Over time, these concerns regarding the methodological costs of the use of deception have been subjected to empirical analysis. We review the evidence stemming from these studies.     

The evolution and psychology of self-deception

In this article we argue that self-deception evolved to facilitate interpersonal deception by allowing people to avoid the cues to conscious deception that might reveal deceptive intent. Self-deception has two additional advantages: It eliminates the costly cognitive load that is typically associated with deceiving, and it can minimize retribution if the deception is discovered. Beyond its role in specific acts of deception, self-deceptive self-enhancement also allows people to display more confidence than is warranted, which has a host of social advantages. The question then arises of how the self can be both deceiver and deceived. We propose that this is achieved through dissociations of mental processes, including conscious versus unconscious memories, conscious versus unconscious attitudes, and automatic versus controlled processes. Given the variety of methods for deceiving others, it should come as no surprise that self-deception manifests itself in a number of different psychological processes, and we discuss various types of self-deception. We then discuss the interpersonal versus intrapersonal nature of self-deception before considering the levels of consciousness at which the self can be deceived. Finally, we contrast our evolutionary approach to self-deception with current theories and debates in psychology and consider some of the costs associated with self-deception.