Consider the source: One step in assessing premise acceptability

Premise acceptability is conceptually connected to presumption. To say that a premise is acceptable just when there is a presumption in its favor is to give a first approximation to this connection. A number of popular principles of presumption suggest that whether there is a presumption for a premise, belief, or claim depends on the sources which vouch for it. Sources consist of internal belief-generating mechanisms and external testimony. Alvin Plantinga's notion of warrant lays down four conditions upon a source for the belief which it generates to be warranted. We argue that there is a presumption for a premise, belief, or claim if and only if there is a presumption of warrant for that premise,belief or claim. This amounts to the thesis that there is a presumption for a belief from a challenger's point of view if and only if there is a presumption from that person's point of view that her cognitive faculties which have generated the belief have been functioning properly, in an appropriate cognitive environment, in accord with a segment of her design plan aimed at the truth, and that these faculties are reliable. In light of our argument for this thesis, we may legitimately claim that one way to determine that there is a presumption for a belief is to determine that there is a presumption of warrant for that belief, and thus that in determining whether there is a presumption for a belief or premise, we may consider the source.     

Temporal Predication with Temporal Parts and Temporal Counterparts

If ordinary objects have temporal parts, then temporal predications have the following truth conditions: necessarily, (a is F) at t iff a has a temporal part that is located at t and that is F. If ordinary objects have temporal counterparts, then, necessarily, (a is F) at t iff a has a temporal counterpart that is located at t and that is F. The temporal-parts account allows temporal predication to be closed under the parthood relation: since all that is required to be F at t is to have a temporal part, a t, that is located at t and that is F, every object that has a t as a temporal part is F at t. Similarly for the temporal-counterparts account. Both closure under parthood and closure under counterparthood are shown to have unacceptable consequences. Then strategies for avoiding closure are considered and rejected.     

Functionalism and type-type identity theories

Conclusion Token-token identity theorists do not and need not deny that it may frequently be the same (kind of) brain state which on different occasions fills the functional rôle definitive of a given mental state. That is not at issue. What is at issue is whether functionally-oriented identity theorists should make two claims or three claims.The two claims they customarily make are, first, that each instance of a mental state is an instance of a brain state, and, secondly, that being in a mental state is having in one a state filling the relevant functional rôle. But to be in a mental state is to have that state in one. To be in pain is to have pain, to desire water is to have desire for water, and so on; just as to be poisoned is to have poison in you. (It is to have what is poison for you at the time, of course; and likewise for pain, desire and so on.)Our paper has been about a third sort of claim — relating particularly not to being in a mental state, nor to instances of that state, but to the mental state itself. We have argued that functionally-oriented identity theorists can and should make, in addition to the first two claims, the third type-type identity claim that mental states are brain states. Consequently a token brain state is a token of pain in a derivative sense. What makes it a token of pain is that it is a token of the type of brain state which realizes the pain-rôle for the organism at the time.     

World Government,Social Contract and Legitimacy

Abstract

The notion of world government is anathema to most political theorists. This is the case due to the arguments that a world government is infeasible, undesirable and unnecessary. This threefold argument is partly predicated on the assumption that in world politics the larger a geographical and political entity is, the greater the chance of it becoming unstable, ungovernable and, ultimately, illegitimate. On the one hand, if this assumption is correct, then a world government is likely to be illegitimate. On the other hand, if the assumption is wrong, then it is not far-fetched to consider a world government to be legitimate. Considering a world government that emerges from a global social contract, this paper contends that the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a world government and the extent to which it is legitimate or illegitimate depends on the kind of social contract that produces it and the extent to which it fulfils or fails to fulfil the conditions of the social contract.     

Questioning Hermeneutics with Freud: How to interpret dreams and mute-speech in Sikh scripture

This paper begins to question the interpretive endeavor when it is applied to the Adi Granth. The text itself expresses a view that the ‘world is a dream’ and that there is real difficulty in communicating the truth about reality, since it is like a mute person who enjoys, but is unable to express, the taste of his sweet; that is the sweetness of the mystic experience. I raise the question: what is hermeneutics to this situation? How is one to interpret a dream and a text that is the ‘speech’ of a mute person? Traditional hermeneutic theories (conservative, moderate and critical) do not seem to cater for this problematic since they do not concern themselves with the unconscious, the sub-text, the dreams underlying waking thought. I thus turn to Freud to gain clues about the interpretation of dreams, and thus attempt a preliminary radicalization of hermeneutic theory. It is suggested that perhaps a reversal is required where dreams precede worldly reality, and interpretation is a sign of delusion, obviously locating and implicating this very text within the very problematic it attempts to illuminate. Beyond this ironic tautology I ask: could there be a self that does not dream and does not interpret?     

Probabilism Today: Permissibility and Multi-Account Ethics

In ethics, ‘probabilism’ refers to a position defended by a number of Catholic theologians, mainly in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. They held that, when one is uncertain which of a range of actions is the right one to perform, it is permissible to perform any which has a good chance of being the right one—even if there is another which has a better chance. This paper considers the value of this position from the viewpoint of modern ethical philosophy. The unusual nature of probabilism as a theory focusing upon permissibility, rather than right-making properties, is explored and related to some modern attempts to set out ‘satisficing’ and ‘hybrid’ ethical theories. Such theories try to distinguish between what is best and what is permissible, and probabilism can be understood as an alternative way of supplementing a theory of right-making properties by adding to it a theory of permissibility. But a more radical version is also possible, where one abandons any attempt to identify right actions or right-making properties, and instead considers permissibility alone. Accordingly, a ‘multi-account theory’ of permissibility is proposed and defended as a model of how many people actually make moral decisions.     

Formal operations and simulated thought

For reasons internal to the concepts of thought and causality, a series of representations must be semantics-driven if that series is to add up to a single, unified thought. Where semantics is not operative, there is at most a series of disjoint representations that add up to nothing true or false, and therefore do not constitute a thought at all. There is necessarily a gulf between simulating thought, on the one hand, and actually thinking, on the other. It doesn't matter how perfect the simulation is; nor does it matter how reliable the causal mechanism involved is. Where semantics is inert, there is no thought. In connection with this, this paper also argues that a popular doctrine—the so-called ‘computational theory of mind’ (CTM)—is based on a confusion. CTM is the view that thought-processes consist in ‘computations’, where a computation is defined as a ‘form-driven’ operation on symbols. The expression ‘form-driven operation’ is ambiguous, and may refer either to syntax-driven operations or to morphology-driven operations. Syntax-driven operations presuppose the existence of operations that are driven by semantic and extra-semantic knowledge. So CTM is false if the terms ‘computation’ and ‘form-driven operation’ are taken to refer to syntax-driven operations. So if CTM is to work, those expressions must be taken to refer to morphology-driven operations. But, as previously stated, an operation must be semantics-driven if it is to qualify as a thought. Thus CTM fails on every disambiguation of the expressions ‘formal operation’ and ‘computation’.     

Responsibility,Reaction, and Value

Many writers accept the following thesis about responsibility: (R) For one to be responsible for something is for one to be such that it is fitting that one be the object of some reactive attitude with respect to that thing. This thesis bears a striking resemblance to a thesis about value that is also accepted by many writers: (V) For something to be good (or neutral, or bad) is for it to be such that it is fitting that it be the object of some pro-attitude (or indifference, or some contra-attitude). V has been the subject of intense debate in recent years, in part because of its incorporation into what has come to be called the “buck-passing” account of value. In particular, V is open to three challenges: that it is not necessarily the case that whatever is good is the fitting object of a pro-attitude; that it is not necessarily the case that whatever is the fitting object of a pro-attitude is good; and that, even if there is a strict equivalence between what is good and what is the fitting object of a pro-attitude, still the former is not to be analyzed in terms of the latter. The resemblance between V and R has not been previously commented on, but, once it is recognized, it is clear that R is open to challenges that resemble those to which V is vulnerable. This paper explores both the challenges to V and the parallel challenges to R and discusses responses that may be given to these challenges. The interrelation between V and R is then examined, and a general lesson is drawn concerning how to adjudicate disputes about the nature of moral responsibility.     

Less willing to pay but more willing to buy: How the elicitation method impacts the valuation of a promotion

Willingness to pay (WTP—how much one is willing to pay for something) and willingness to buy (WTB—whether one is willing to buy something at a given price) are two common methods to elicit valuations and normatively should yield the same valuation order between two options. However, this research finds that WTP and WTB can yield opposite valuation orders between the regular offer and the promotional offer of a product. Specifically, it demonstrate that, (a) if the valuation of a product is only elicited with WTP, consumers value the product less when it is offered with a price promotion than when it is not; (b) if the valuation of a product is only elicited with WTB, consumers value the product more when it is offered with a price promotion than when it is not; and (c) if the valuation of a product is first elicited with WTP and then elicited with WTB, consumers always value the product less when it is offered with a price promotion than when it is not. A value‐inference account is proposed for the above findings, according to which, consumers infer the value of a promoted product differently when the valuation is elicited only with WTP or only with WTB. Theoretically, this research extends prior literature on sales promotion, showing that the valuation of a promotion is subject to the elicitation method. Practically, this research suggests how to help consumers manage their purchase intentions for promoted products.     

存在三议

存在是毋庸置疑的事实,存在在其存在过程中显现为由低到高的四重境界。存在也是一个从无到有到无的过程,存在之和谐在这一过程中得以彰显。哲学就是对存在之和谐的反思。哲学对存在之和谐的反思也应遵循从无到有到无的逻辑历程。这样的哲学才是和谐之路,这样的反思才是和谐的反思,这样的反思指导下的人的存在才是和谐的存在。     

Cogmic space for narrative-based world representation

Representing a world or a physical/social environment in an agent’s cognitive system is essential for creating human-like artificial intelligence. This study takes a story-centered approach to this issue. In this context, a story refers to an internal representation involving a narrative structure, which is assumed to be a common form of organizing past, present, future, and fictional events and situations. In the artificial intelligence field, a story or narrative is traditionally treated as a symbolic representation. However, a symbolic story representation is limited in its representational power to construct a rich world. For example, a symbolic story representation is unfit to handle the sensory/bodily dimension of a world. In search of a computational theory for narrative-based world representation, this study proposes the conceptual framework of a Cogmic Space for a comic strip-like representation of a world. In the proposed framework, a story is positioned as a mid-level representation, in which the conceptual and sensory/bodily dimensions of a world are unified. The events and their background situations that constitute a story are unified into a sequence of panels. Based on this structure, a representation (i.e., a story) and the represented environment are connected via an isomorphism of their temporal, spatial, and relational structures. Furthermore, the framework of a Cogmic Space is associated with the generative aspect of representations, which is conceptualized in terms of unconscious- and conscious-level processes/representations. Finally, a proof-of-concept implementation is presented to provide a concrete account of the proposed framework.     

Naming and Nonexistence

I defend a cluster of views about names from fiction and myth. The views are based on two claims: first, proper names refer directly to their bearers; and second, names from fiction and myth are genuinely empty, they simply do not refer. I argue that when such names are used in direct discourse, utterances containing them have truth values but do not express propositions. I also argue that it is a mistake to think that if an utterance of, for example, “Vulcan is a planet” fails to express a proposition, then an utterance of “Le Verrier believed that Vulcan is a planet” cannot express a proposition. The argument applies to claims about fiction, such as “Sherlock Holmes is strong,” and claims about the attitudes of authors and auditors. The upshot is a semantics for fictional statements that provides a satisfying way for direct reference theorists to avoid taking fictional entities to be abstract objects and to accept the commonsense view that what is true in a fiction is ultimately a matter of what is pretended to be the case.     

Danto's rejection of immanent causation

This article suggests first that the concept of interpersonal recognition be understood in a multidimensional (as opposed to one-dimensional), practical (as opposed to symbolic), and strict (as opposed to broad) way. Second, it is argued that due recognition be seen as a reason-governed response to evaluative features, rather than all normativity and reasons being seen as generated by recognition. This can be called a response-model, or, more precisely, a value-based model of due recognition. A further suggestion is that there is a systematic basis for distinguishing three dimensions of recognition, depending on whether recognition is given to someone qua a person, qua a certain kind of person, or qua a certain person. Finally, it is argued that recognition is a necessary condition of personhood, but whether it is of direct or indirect relevance depends on our theories of personhood (social vs. capacity-theory) and practical identity (dialogical definition model vs. feature-model). Despite the apparent opposition, it is shown that interpersonal recognition is both a response to value and a precondition of personhood.     

Prototypes,Location, and Associative Networks (PLAN): Towards a Unified Theory of Cognitive Mapping

An integrated representation of large-scale space, or cognitive map, colled PLAN, is presented that attempts to address a broader spectrum of issues than has been previously attempted in a single model. Rather than examining way-finding as a process separate from the rest of cognition, one or the fundamental goals of this work is to examine how the wayfinding process is integrated into general cognition. One result of this approach is that the model is “heads-up,” or scene-based, because it takes advantage of the properties of the human visual system and, particularly, the visual system's split into two pathways. The emphasis on the human location or “where” system is new to cognitive mapping and is port of an attempt to synthesize prototype theory, associative networks and location together in a connectionist system. Not all of PLAN is new, however. Many of its parts have analogues in one or another preexisting theory. What makes PLAN unique is integrating the various components into a coherent whole, and the capacity of this resulting system to speak to a wide range of constraints. Our approach emphasizes adaptiveness; thus, our focus on such issues as ease of use and efficiency of learning. The result is a model that has a stronger relationship both to the environment, and to the ways that humans interact with it, compared with previous models. The resulting model is examined in some detail and compared to other systems.     

'Perceiving the present' as a framework for ecological explanations of the misperception of projected angle and angular size

An implicit, underlying assumption of most Helmholtzian/Bayesian approaches to perception is the hypothesis that the scene an observer perceives is the probable source of the proximal stimulus. There is, however, a nontrivial latency (on the order of 100 ms) between the time of a proximal stimulus and the time a visual percept is elicited. It seems plausible that it would be advantageous for an observer to have, at any time t, a percept representative of what is out there at that very time t, not a percept of the recent past. If this is so, it implies a modification to the implicit hypothesis underlying most existing probabilistic approaches to perception: the new hypothesis is that, given the proximal stimulus, the scene an observer perceives is the probable scene present at the time of the percept. That is, the hypothesis is that what an observer perceives is not the probable source of the proximal stimulus, but the probable way the probable source will be when the percept actually occurs. A model of an observer's typical movements in the world is developed, and it is shown that projected angles are perceived in a way consistent with the way the probable source will project to the eye after a small time period of forward movement by the observer. The predicted and actual direction of projected-angle misperception is sometimes toward 90 degrees and sometimes away from 90 degrees, depending on whether the probable source angle is lying in a plane parallel or perpendicular to the probable direction of motion, respectively. The perception of angular size for lines in a figure with cues they are lying in a plane perpendicular to the direction of motion is also shown to fit the predictions of the model.     

Why I’m still a proportionalist

Mark Schroeder has, rather famously, defended a powerful Humean Theory of Reasons. In doing so, he abandons what many take to be the default Humean view of weighting reasons—namely, proportionalism . On Schroeder’s view, the pressure that Humeans feel to adopt proportionalism is illusory, and proportionalism is unable to make sense of the fact that the weight of reasons is a normative matter. He thus offers his own ‘Recursive View’, which directly explains how it is that the weight of reasons is a normative matter. In this paper, I argue against Schroeder that a Humean ought to be a proportionalist. On my view, proportionalism is clearly an intuitive theory of weighting for a Humean, so we should resist it only if Schroeder can demonstrate either that there is a serious problem with the view, or that there is a better alternative. I then further argue that Schroeder fails to deliver on either condition. As a result, I conclude that there are good intuitive reasons for a Humean to be a proportionalist, and no good reason not to be.     

A critique of van Fraassen's voluntaristic epistemology

Van Fraassen's epistemology is forged from two commitments, one to a type of Bayesianism and the other to what he terms voluntarism. Van Fraassen holds that if one is going to follow a rule in belief-revision, it must be a Bayesian rule, but that one does not need to follow a rule in order to be rational. It is argued that van Fraassen's arguments for rejecting non-Bayesian rules is unsound, and that his voluntarism is subject to a fatal dilemma arising from the non-monotonic character of reasoning.     

Negativism and countertransference

The purpose of this work is to explore the phenomenon of negativism and the analyst's response to it during the course of analytic work with a patient in whom negativism is a central behavioral pattern. Melville's short story, "Bartleby the Scrivener," describing in telling detail the response of a sympathetic lawyer to profound and pervasive negativism in his legal scribe, is discussed as a literary analogy to the analyst-analysand dyad. Aspects of the concept of negativism within psychoanalysis are discussed. The potential usefulness of understanding certain unexpected countertransference responses to pervasive negativism is explored, as this is a relatively neglected area of psychoanalytic technique. A case is presented describing the analysis of a patient whose character, like Bartleby's, is a mixture of profound negativism along with schizoid, obsessional, and masochistic elements.     

Deriving an empirical structure of personality pathology for DSM-5

The DSM-IV model of personality disorders is composed of trait sets arranged into 10 theoretically distinct, polythetically assessed categories, with little regard for how the traits comprising these disorders are interrelated and structured. Research since the publication of DSM-III has shown that this model is untenable. The question is not whether this model needs revision; rather, the question is how to move from the existing DSM-IV framework to a model better connected with data. Empirically-based models of personality trait variation provide a starting point for DSM-5, and ongoing research will be used to delineate further the empirical structure of personality traits in the pathological range. The ultimate goal is to frame future DSMs in a way that is maximally useful for clinicians as well as researchers. It is also critical to understand that the DSM-5 is intended to be a living document that will facilitate novel inquiry and clinical applications, as opposed to a document designed to promote and perpetuate a fixed set of constructs. Thus, we view a proposed trait system as a first step on a path to a well-validated, clinically-useful structure.     

Symmetry as a method of proof

This paper is a logical study of valid uses of symmetry in deductive reasoning, of what underlying principles make some appeals to symmetry legitimate but others illegitimate. The issue is first motivated informally. A framework is then given covering a fairly broad range of symmetry arguments, and the formulation of symmetry provided is shown to be a valid principle of reasoning, as is a slightly stronger principle of reasoning, one that is shown to be in some sense as strong as possible. The relationship between symmetry and isomorphism is discussed, and finally the framework is extended to a more general model-theoretic setting.