RELATIVISM AND NORMATIVE NONREALISM: BASING MORALITY ON RATIONALITY

Normative nonrealism denies (a) that some things are good or bad or right or wrong independently of facts about the attitudes of moral agents, and (b) that attitude-independent normative facts determine what is rational. An influential nonrealist approach to rationality comes from Richard Brandt's account of rationality in terms of “full information.” Using Brandt's account as illustrative, this paper identifies a serious problem for nonrealist normative theories based on theories of rationality. The paper argues that nonrealist accounts of rationality that oppose relativism cannot successfully handle the most serious threat from relativists: namely, a threat from a ‘Why care?’ open-question argument that stems from the question why one should care about being rational in a certain respect or sense. The paper identifies the bearing of ‘Why care?’ questions on the conflict between internalism and externalism regarding practical reasons. The main lesson is that ‘Why care?’ questions wreak havoc for nonrelativist nonrealist approaches to rationality and reason-based morality.     

THE LIMITS OF PRAGMATISM AND THE LIMITS OF REALISM

Abstract. I argue here for a limited version of pragmatism—called conceptual pragmatism—that recognizes that conceptual systems are to be evaluated according to their usefulness for helping us get around in the world. Once a conceptual system is in place, however, the truth of sentences is a matter of both empirical tit and coherence with the rest of our knowledge. The error of critical realists is to fail to take into account the limited conceptual relativity that is to be expected on the basis of conceptual pragmatism. The conceptual realist thesis applies equally in science and theology.     

EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE RATIONALITY OF FAITH

This paper evaluates the role that evolutionary psychology can play in examining the rationality of faith in the Christian sense. It is argued that because evolutionary psychology enables us to understand human nature, it can help us understand what faith is. I argue that faith is not a universal human instinct that all religions tap into. Rather, we must understand how the early Christian community used the basic building blocks provided by human nature in a particular way. It is argued that it is a misunderstanding of the nature of faith to assert that faith is intrinsically irrational. However, evolutionary psychology cannot tell us whether or not faith is rational.     

TESTIMONY,MEMORY AND THE LIMITS OF THE A PRIORI

Philosophical Studies -     

INTENTIONAL ACTION AND THE UNINTENTIONAL FALLACY

Much of the recent work in action theory can be organized around a set of objections facing the Simple View and other intention‐based accounts of intentional action. In this paper, I review three of the most popular objections to the Simple View and argue that all three objections commit a common fallacy. I then draw some more general conclusions about the relationship between intentional action and moral responsibility.     

THE SACRED AND THE LIMITS OF THE TECHNOLOGICAL FIX

Abstract. Three points are discussed: first, that limits of technological fixes are revealed by current economic, social, and environmental problems; second, that these problems cannot be solved by a technological fix but require alternative forms of activity and being; third, that realizing these limits makes possible the re-emergence of the sacred. Two attitudes toward technology, nature, and the sacred are described: Technocrats desacralize nature and strive to shape it technologically for human ends alone; pernetarians resacralize nature and develop a perennial philosophy (synthesized from elements of different spiritual disciplines) allied with an enlarged, artful science, so as to design activities compatible with nature.     

COGNITIVE CLOSURE AND THE LIMITS OF UNDERSTANDING

The paper begins by distinguishing between two ways of effecting the dissolution of a philosophical problem: reductive and philosophical. Of these, the former holds out deflationary prospects greater than those of the latter. Attention focuses specifically on McGinn's proposed dissolution of the mind-body problem. Examination of his argument reveals that his naturalist dissolution involves traditional non-naturalist constraints, in a way that counts against his deflationary conclusions. At best his treatment constitutes a philosophical, rather than a reductive dissolution. But there is reason to think that it might in fact constitute a mere relocation of what is, essentially, the same problem that it set out to dissolve.     

AUGUSTINE AND THE LIMITS OF PREEMPTIVE AND PREVENTIVE WAR

While Michael Walzer's distinction between preemptive and preventive wars offers important categories for current reflection upon the Bush Doctrine and the invasion of Iraq, it is often treated as a modern distinction without antecedent in the classical Christian just war tradition. This paper argues to the contrary that within Augustine's corpus there are passages in which he speaks about the use of violence in situations that we would classify today as preemptive and preventive military action. While I do not claim that Augustine makes an explicit distinction between the two types of war (such would be anachronistic), I will argue that based on examinations of De libero arbitrio I.v.11–12 and De civitate Dei I.30 Augustine's discussions of hypothetical cases or actual wars in history provide insights helpful for contemporary reflection on preemptive and preventive wars.