Thanks for being,loving, and believing

Philosophical Studies - Gratitude to others is typically understood as a response to good things people give to us or do for us. Occasionally, though, we thank people for things other than gifts or...     

The distinction between desires and intentions

Within attitude theory the concepts of desires and intentions are not differentiated but are often treated as synonyms. However, we argue that there are theoretical reasons for distinguishing between desires and intentions, and we articulate three main criteria, perceived performability, action‐connectedness, and temporal framing, that differentiate between the two constructs. Two studies are reported to test the distinction. Study 1 (n = 188) revealed that desires, compared to intentions, are less performable, are less connected to actions, and are enacted over longer time frames. Study 2 (n = 249) showed, among other things, that the perceived feasibility for actions that are desired and intended is higher than for those that are only desired, but only when the action refers to relatively short time frames (i.e. 1 week or 4 weeks vs. 4 months). The findings are discussed in the light of the distinction between intentions and desires and the role that they play in individual decision making. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The ontological distinction between units and entities

The base units of the SI include six units of continuous quantities and the mole, which is defined as proportional to the number of specified elementary entities in a sample. The existence of the mole as a unit has prompted comment in Metrologia that units of all enumerable entities should be defined though not listed as base units. In a similar vein, the BIPM defines numbers of entities as quantities of dimension one, although without admitting these entities as base units. However, there is a basic ontological distinction between continuous quantities and enumerable aggregates. The distinction is the basis of the difference between real and natural numbers. This paper clarifies the nature of the distinction: (i) in terms of a set of measurement axioms stated by H?lder; and (ii) using the formalism known in metrology as quantity calculus. We argue that a clear and unambiguous scientific distinction should be made between measurement and enumeration. We examine confusion in metrological definitions and nomenclature concerning this distinction, and discuss the implications of this distinction for ontology and epistemology in all scientific disciplines.     

促进型和抑制型建言的差异

本文系统地回顾了促进型和抑制型建言在前因与后果上的差异。这些差异的理论基础包括计划行为理论、调节焦点理论、目标导向理论、社会期望理论、资源保存理论、归因理论、自我损耗理论、认知评价理论以及情感事件理论。与理论相对应, 两类建言前因的差异体现在建言者特质(如人格、动机)、领导风格与行为、领导成员交换和组织层面的因素(如组织政治、组织公平)等方面; 后果的差异体现在建言者工作态度与行为(如绩效、工作满意度)、领导建言采纳和团队绩效等方面。未来可能的研究方向包括:探讨两类建言在团队中的共存、两类建言的文化差异等。     

The distinction between positive and negative reinforcement: use with care

It is customary in behavior analysis to distinguish between positive and negative reinforcement in terms of whether the reinforcing event involves onset or offset of a stimulus. In a previous article (Baron & Galizio, 2005), we concluded that a distinction of these terms is not only ambiguous but has little if any functional significance. Here, we respond to commentaries by a group of distinguished behavior analysts about the issues we raised. Although several of the commentators argued for preservation of the distinction, we remain unconvinced that its benefits outweigh its weaknesses. Because this distinction is so deeply embedded in the language of behavior analysis, we hardly expect that it will be abandoned. However, we hope that the terms positive and negative reinforcement will be used with circumspection and with full knowledge of the confusion they can engender.     

On the distinction between artifacts and information

Sperling, Landy, Dosher, and Perkins (1989) argued that all previous research on the kinetic depth effect has been contaminated by stimulus artifacts, and they developed a new task that they believe can successfully overcome this problem. The present discussion offers a counter-argument that artifacts are not as pervasive in previous research as Sperling et al. imply and that their proposed method is subject to precisely the same limitations as earlier studies. Also discussed are some general guidelines of experimental design in this type of research to minimize the possibility that subjects will adopt an inappropriate response strategy that does not truly reflect their visual perceptions of three-dimensional form.