Philosophical Feminism in Latin America and Spain: An Introduction

Introduction to the special cluster of feminist philosophy papers from Spain and Latin America.     

天、象、辞与《易传》哲学基本问题

《周易》包含《经》与《传》两个部分。《经》重占卜,《传》在诠释。《易传》面临的核心问题是:天意、卦象与言辞之间关系如何?《周易》认为,天是本原;象是符号,天的象征;辞是陈述,再现符号、指称命运。天意经过卦象,由言辞得以彰显。三者实现了统一。这三者的关系,从根本上来说,依然体现了性的问题。它是儒家人性论的一种特殊形态。《周易》将圣人神化,为言辞提供了权威基础。     

Neuroscience, Artificial Intelligence, and Human Nature: Theological and Philosophical Reflections

I develop a multilevel, holistic view of persons, emphasizing embodiment, emotions, consciousness, and the social self. In successive sections I draw from six sources: 1. Theology . The biblical understanding of the unitary, embodied, social self gave way in classical Christianity to a body-soul dualism, but it has been recovered by many recent theologians. 2. Neuroscience . Research has shown the localization of mental functions in regions of the brain, the interaction of cognition and emotion, and the importance of social interaction in evolutionary history and child development. 3. Artificial intelligence . Some forms of robotics use embodied systems that learn by interacting with their environment, but the possibilities for emotion, socialization, and consciousness in robots remain problematic. 4. Relations between levels . Concepts that can help us relate studies of neurons and persons include the hierarchy of levels, the communication of information, thebehavior of dynamic systems, and epistemological and ontological emergence. 5. Philosophy of mind . Two-aspect theories of the mind-brain relation offer an alternative between the extremes of eliminative materialism and the thesis that consciousness is irreducible. 6. Process philosophy . I suggest that process thought provides a coherent philosophical framework in which these themes can be brought together. It combines dipolar monism with organizational pluralism, and it emphasizes embodiment, emotions, a hierarchy oflevels, and the social character of selfhood.     

I Enjoy Being a Girl: Collective Self-Esteem,Feminism, and Attitudes Toward Women

This article examines the self-esteem thatfeminists, anti-feminists, and those who labelthemselves as mixed receive from their gender group.Feminists and anti-feminists were expected to havesimilarly high levels of gender collective self-esteem(CSE) on three of the four CSE subscales: Private, one'sjudgments of the goodness of one's group; Identity, theimportance of one's group to one's self-concept; and Membership, personal evaluation of oneselfas a group member. Similar levels on CSE subscales forfeminists and anti-feminists were expected as a resultof differing levels of adherance to traditional attitudes toward women. Anti-feminists wereexpected to have higher means than feminists on PublicCSE, which measures judgment of how other's evaluateone's group. Participants were undergraduate women (91.4% white, 5.6% Black, 1.3% Hispanic, .4%Asian, .9% biracial) who selflabeled as feminist,anti-feminist or mixed. Feminists and anti-feminists didhave similarly high levels of Membership CSE, higher than those who were more non-committal.Feminists were the highest in Identity CSE, whileantifeminists had the highest overall Public CSE. Thesefindings are relevant to those who work with bothfeminists and those who reject feminism, as they suggesta need to recognize the amount of self-esteem women getfrom their gender.     

Warren, Plumwood, a Rock and a Snake: Some Doubts about Critical Ecological Feminism

In this paper I expound and criticise the arguments of two leading exponents of critical ecological feminism. According to critical ecological feminism responsibility for the oppressions of the natural world and the oppressions of racism and sexism can be traced to a logic of domination that is based on suspect value dualities and presupposes an unacceptable 'moral extensionism'(the view that moral status depends on membership of a specified class). I argue firstly that critical ecological feminism's critique of value dualism presupposes the truth of the thesis that humans and non-humans are morally equal, a thesis for which it offers no persuasive arguments (indeed critical ecological feminism advocates a kind of virtue ethic which is itself incompatible with such supposed equality). Secondly I maintain that moral extensionism, contrary to the claims of critical ecological feminism, can support a genuine respect for the natural world. Finally I suggest that the arguments for one version of critical ecological feminism, in order to be made convincing, themselves require the truth of moral extensionism.     

The Discrepancy Between How Women See Themselves and Feminists Predicts Identification with Feminism

Many women who accept the basic tenets of feminist ideology are reluctant to call themselves feminists, which is problematic because feminist self-identification is related to a variety of positive outcomes. The present research tests the idea that discrepancies between women’s self-view and feminist-view on the dimensions of competence and warmth are related to identification with feminism. This supposition is guided by the idea that a full understanding of why women have difficulty embracing feminism must take into account not only their view of feminists, but also whether women see themselves as different from feminists. Three online survey studies, which included 387, 288, and 116 adult U.S. women, demonstrate that perception of warmth identification with feminism was lower if women regard feminists as less warm than they see themselves. For perceptions of competence, the direction of this discrepancy was irrelevant: The more women see feminists as differently competent (i.e., higher or lower), the less they identify with feminists. Moreover, perceived discrepancy predicted identification with feminism even after controlling for women’s agreement with feminist values. Both endorsement of feminist values and perceived discrepancy are important in predicting identification with feminism and therefore practical interventions to maximize identification should target both of these components. For perceived discrepancy, interventions to reduce feminist-self discrepancies will likely be most effective if they target stereotypes of feminists as being cold.     

Two Potential Problems with Philosophical Intuitions: Muddled Intuitions and Biased Intuitions

One critique of experimental philosophy is that the intuitions of the philosophically untutored should be accorded little to no weight; instead, only the intuitions of professional philosophers should matter. In response to this critique, “experimentalists” often claim that the intuitions of professional philosophers are biased. In this paper, we explore this question of whose intuitions should be disqualified and why. Much of the literature on this issue focuses on the question of whether the intuitions of professional philosophers are reliable. In contrast, we instead focus on the idea of “muddled” intuitions—i.e. intuitions that are misdirected and about notions other than the ones under discussion. We argue that the philosophically untutored are likely to have muddled intuitions and that professional philosophers are likely to have unmuddled intuitions. Although being umuddled does not, by itself, establish the reliability of the intuitions of professional philosophers, being muddled is enough to disqualify the intuitions of the philosophically untutored. We then turn to the charge that, despite being unmuddled, professional philosophers still have biased intuitions. To evaluate this charge, we switch focus from the general notion of biased intuition to the more specific notion of theory-laden intuition. We argue that there is prima facie evidence—in the form of the presence of conflicts of intuition—for thinking that at least some of the intuitions of professional philosophers are theory-laden. In summary, we conclude that that there is no clean and easy answer to the question of whose intuitions should matter.     

Respect,Religion, and Feminism: Comments on Lori Watson and Christie Hartley,Equal Citizenship and Public Reason: A Feminist Political Liberalism

There is significant disagreement among feminists and liberals about the compatibility between the two doctrines. Political liberalism has come under particular criticism from feminists, who argue that its restricted form of equality is insufficient. In contrast, Lori Watson and Christie Hartley argue that political liberalism can and must be feminist. This article raises three areas of disagreement with Watson and Hartley’s incisive account of feminist political liberalism. First, it argues that an appeal to a comprehensive doctrine can be compatible with respecting others, if that appeal is to the value of equality. Second, it takes issue with Watson and Hartley's defence of religious exemptions to equality law. Third, it argues that political liberalism can be compatible with feminism but that it is not itself adequately feminist. It concludes that political liberalism is not enough for feminists.     

Feminism and Sex Trafficking: Rethinking Some Aspects of Autonomy and Paternalism

This paper argues that potential cases of oppression, such as sex trafficking, can sometimes comprise autonomous choices by the trafficked individuals. This issue still divides radical from liberal feminists, with the former wanting to ‘rescue’ the ‘victims’ and the latter insisting that there might be good reasons for ‘hiding from the rescuers.’ This article presents new arguments for the liberal approach and raises two demands: first, help organizations should be run by affected women and be open-minded about whether or not the trafficked individuals should remain in the sex industry. Second, the career choices of trafficked individuals should be expanded by the introduction of an opportunity-extending right to asylum.     

Getting the Story Straight: Kierkegaard,MacIntyre and Some Problems with Narrative

As part of the widespread turn to narrative in contemporary philosophy, several commentators have recently attempted to sign Kierkegaard up for the narrative cause, most notably in John Davenport and Anthony Rudd's recent collection Kierkegaard After MacIntyre: Essays on Freedom, Narrative and Virtue. I argue that the aesthetic and ethical existence‐spheres in Either/Or cannot adequately be distinguished in terms of the MacIntyre‐inspired notion of ‘narrative unity’. Judge William's argument for the ethical life contains far more in the way of substantive normative content than can be encapsulated by the idea of ‘narrative unity’, and the related idea that narratives confer intelligibility will not enable us to distinguish Kierkegaardian aesthetes from Kierkegaardian ethicists. ‘MacIntyrean Kierkegaardians’ also take insufficient notice of further problems with MacIntyre's talk of ‘narrative unity’, such as his failure to distinguish between literary narratives and the ‘enacted dramatic narratives’ of which he claims our lives consist; the lack of clarity in the idea of a ‘whole life’; and the threat of self‐deception. Finally, against the connections that have been drawn between Kierkegaardian choice and Harry Frankfurt's work on volitional identification, I show something of the dangers involved in putting too much stress on unity and wholeheartedness.     

个人经验、哲学问题与世界哲学大会——德莫特·莫兰教授访谈

<正>一、个人经验访者(以下简称为访):莫兰教授,很荣幸能与您做这次访谈。正如我们所知,您在都柏林大学获得学士学位之后,获得资助在耶鲁大学进行硕士和博士研究生学习。您能和我们分享您的学术经验吗?尤其是您在耶鲁大学的学习和研究     

Race and Women's Identity Development: Distinguishing Between Feminism and Womanism Among Black and White Women

Black and White women may experience feminist identity development differently, and the womanist (Ossana, Helms, & Leonard, 1992) and feminist (Downing & Roush, 1985) identity development models may differ in their ability to capture those experiences. Black (n = 29) and White (n = 94) female college students completed a questionnaire that included feminist identity, womanist identity, and self-esteem scales. Results provided partial support for the hypothesis that Black women would agree more strongly with the womanist model, whereas White women would agree more strongly with the feminist model. In addition, the womanist model better differentiated between stages of identity development than did the feminist model for Black women. Results also partially supported the hypothesis that race would moderate the relationships between the womanist and feminist identity models and self-esteem.     

Rethinking Sadomasochism: Feminism,Interpretation, and Simulation

In reexamining the “sex war” debates between radical feminists and lesbian feminist sadomasochists, I find that the actual practice of sadomasochism provides the basis for a philosophically more complex position than has been articulated. In response to the anti-SM radical perspective, I develop a distinction between simulation and replication of patriarchal dominant/submissive activities. In light of this important epistemological and ethical distinction, I claim that the radical feminist opposition to SM needs reassessment.