Introduction to Bayesian Inference for Psychology

We introduce the fundamental tenets of Bayesian inference, which derive from two basic laws of probability theory. We cover the interpretation of probabilities, discrete and continuous versions of Bayes’ rule, parameter estimation, and model comparison. Using seven worked examples, we illustrate these principles and set up some of the technical background for the rest of this special issue of Psychonomic Bulletin & Review. Supplemental material is available via https://osf.io/wskex/.     

任务情境和证据信息对青少年贝叶斯推理的影响研究

采用生活情境测查任务和经典测查任务探讨了任务情境对青少年贝叶斯推理的影响,以及生活情境测查任务中不同证据信息对青少年贝叶斯判断的影响作用.结果表明:(1)在生活情境测查任务中,从小学六年级到大学二年级,被试的贝叶斯推理能力稳步缓慢提升(相邻的两个被试组之间差异不显著,而不相邻的两个被试组之间差异更容易达到显著水平),发展没有出现加速期,而经典测查任务情境下没有表现出年龄差异;(2)贝叶斯推理作为条件概率的判断不仅受任务情境的影响,而且同一任务情境中不同证据信息也会影响贝叶斯判断.当证据信息与先验信念一致时,被试可以充分利用线索进行推理.     

A Latent Semantic Analysis of Gender Stereotype-Consistency and Narrowness in American English

Using latent semantic analysis, we examined gender stereotypes in American English by submitting over 100 masculine, neutral, and feminine role-words and trait-words to pair-wise semantic similarity comparisons with masculine (man, he, him) and feminine (woman, she, her) referents separately. We expected to find: (a) Stereotyping—roles and traits would be more semantically similar to the ostensible ‘matching’ than ‘mismatching’ gender category referent; (b) Categorical narrowness—both categories would be less semantically similar to counterstereotypical than to neutral or stereotypical characteristics; but this would be especially so for the male category, indicating its relatively greater narrowness. Results supported these hypotheses, but only among role-words. American English reflects and reinforces gender stereotypes regarding gender roles at a level beyond that recognized previously.     

The Accuracy of Intuitive Judgment Strategies: Covariation Assessment and Bayesian Inference

Most of people′s apparent strategies for covariation assessment and Bayesian inference can lead to errors. However, it is unclear how often and to what degree the strategies are inaccurate in natural contexts. Through Monte Carlo simulation, the respective normative and intuitive strategies for the two tasks were compared over many different situations. The results indicate that (a) under some general conditions, all the intuitive strategies perform much better than chance and many perform surprisingly well, and (b) some simple environmental variables have large effects on most of the intuitive strategies′ accuracy, not just in terms of the number of errors, but also in terms of the kinds of errors (e.g., incorrectly accepting versus incorrectly rejecting a hypothesis). Furthermore, common to many of the intuitive strategies is a disregard for the strength of the alternative hypothesis. Thus, a key to better performance in both tasks lies in considering alternative hypotheses, although this does not necessarily imply using a normative strategy (i.e., calculating the φ coefficient or using Bayes′ theorem). Some intuitive strategies take into account the alternative hypothesis and are accurate across environments. Because they are presumably simpler than normative strategies and are already part of people′s repertoire, using these intuitive strategies may be the most efficient means of ensuring highly accurate judgment in these tasks.     

A Connectionist Approach to Knowledge Representation and Limited Inference

Although the connectionist approach has lead to elegant solutions to a number of problems in cognitive science and artificial intelligence, its suitability for dealing with problems in knowledge representation and inference has often been questioned. This paper partly answers this criticism by demonstrating that effective solutions to certain problems in knowledge representation and limited inference can be found by adopting a connectionist approach. The paper presents a connectionist realization of semantic networks, that is, it describes how knowledge about concepts, their properties, and the hierarchical relationship between them may be encoded as an interpreter-free massively parallel network of simple processing elements that can solve an interesting class of inheritance and recognition problems extremely fast—in time proportional to the depth of the conceptual hierarchy. The connectionist realization is based on an evidential formulation that leads to principled solutions to the problems of exceptions and conflicting multiple inheritance situations during inheritance, and the best-match or partial-match computation during recognition. The paper also identifies constraints that must be satisfied by the conceptual structure in order to arrive at an efficient parallel realization.     

进化心理学视角下的两性冲突与缓和

进化心理学观点认为两性冲突是一个性别达到最佳适应的过程被另一个性别所阻碍,其根本原因是两性繁衍成功的根本进化利益存在冲突。从进化心理学的角度,根据两性敌对性选择理论,两性冲突可以分为基因座内的两性冲突与基因座间的两性冲突,前者可由性选择理论解释,后者涉及到两性的适应与反适应以及在军备竞赛中的协同进化。而两性冲突缓和则可以由费舍尔模型与基因复制理论、性别二态性和一夫一妻制度解释。两性冲突及缓和也分别具有进化心理学的相关实证依据支持。未来两性冲突领域的研究需要提升研究方法的客观性及两性冲突特质的多样性,并关注两性冲突缓和的现实有效途径以及婚配制度与评估方式对繁衍成功的交互作用。     

Inference to the Best Explanation

The common role of research programs in science and religion is now widely accepted. The next step in the methodology debate is to specify more concretely the shared standards for adequate explanations. The article presents a detailed account of the method of inference to the best explanation and gives examples of how the method can structure the philosophical and theological interaction with science. The resulting approach dispenses with deductive and inductive proofs of religious propositions and limits itself to initially plausible hypotheses that are to be assessed according to their explanatory power. Only when a domain of data and a particular explanatory task have been specified can any serious claim be made that religious theories are equal or superior to their naturalistic alternatives.     

Right Motive, Wrong Action: Direct Consequentialism and Evaluative Conflict

In this paper I look at attempts to develop forms of consequentialism which do not have a feature considered problematic in Direct Consequentialist theories (that is, those consequentialist theories that apply the criterion of rightness directly in the evaluation of any set of options). The problematic feature in question (which I refer to as ‘evaluative conflict’) is the possibility that, for example, a right motive might lead an agent to perform a wrong act. Theories aiming to avoid this phenomenon must argue that causal relationship entails motives and acts (for example) having the same moral status. I argue that attempts to ensure such ‘evaluative consistency’ are themselves deeply problematic, and that we must therefore accept evaluative conflict.     

A Simple Solution to the Liar

Philosophical Studies -     

A Wittgensteinian Solution to the Sorites

I develop a solution to the Sorites Paradox, according to which a concatenation of valid arguments need not itself be valid. I specify which chains of valid arguments are those that do not preserve validity: those that pass the vague boundary between cases where the relevant concept applies and cases where that concept does not apply. I also develop various criticisms of this solution and show why they fail; basically, they all involve a petitio at some stage. I criticise the conviction that if every short argument in a long concatenated argument is valid, so is the long argument: it is, I argue, the result of an unjustified generalisation from the case of arguments that do not employ vague concepts (as in mathematics) to arguments that do employ them. My approach is Wittgensteinian in its “leaving everything as it is,” in its claiming that the “beginning” has been searched too far back (see paper's epigraph) and in its claim that the paradox was generated by a misapplication of a partial picture of the behaviour of arguments. I conclude my paper by comparing and contrasting my approach to the few precedents found in the vagueness literature and by answering a few additional objections that were raised there.     

A Bayesian approach to the evolution of perceptual and cognitive systems

We describe a formal framework for analyzing how statistical properties of natural environments and the process of natural selection interact to determine the design of perceptual and cognitive systems. The framework consists of two parts: a Bayesian ideal observer with a utility function appropriate for natural selection, and a Bayesian formulation of Darwin's theory of natural selection. Simulations of Bayesian natural selection were found to yield new insights, for example, into the co‐evolution of camouflage, color vision, and decision criteria. The Bayesian framework captures and generalizes, in a formal way, many of the important ideas of other approaches to perception and cognition.     

A Solution to the Paradox of Analysis

This essay attempts to solve the so-called paradox of analysis: if one is to have any questions about x , one must know x ; but if one knows x , one has no questions about x . The obvious solution is this: one can inquire into x if one knows some, but not all, of x 's parts. But this solution is erroneous. Let x ' be those parts of x with which one is acquainted, and let S be the percipient in question. As with x , either S knows x ', in which case he has no questions about it; or S does not know x ', in which case he has no questions about it.
My solution is this. Perception and cognition give us, not the thing-in-itself, but a certain analogue of the thing-in-itself. To inquire into x , it is necessary to know not x , but only some analogue of x ; and to learn more about x is to become acquainted with increasingly precise analogues of x .     

The Inference to the Best Means

I was in bondage in Missouri, too. I can't say that my treatment was bad. In one respect I say it was not bad, but in another I consider it was as bad as could be. I was a slave. That covers it all. I had not the rights of a man.

It cannot be too often repeated: peasants and workmen have no natural rights, not one. Only we ought instantly to add, that kings and nobles have none either.