To Apologize or Justify: Leader Responses to Task and Relational Mistakes

Abstract

Leadership roles are complex, creating an environment where leaders are likely to make mistakes that result in negative outcomes. We shift the conversation in the literature from examining the effectiveness of mistake responses toward exploring why leaders use different mistake recovery methods. We employ an online experimental method to distinguish between task and relationship mistakes for leaders and suggest that different attributions are made for these two types of mistakes (Study 1). We found that task mistakes are viewed by leaders as more specific and less personal, and that relationship mistakes are viewed as more global, describing the leader’s stable characteristics rather than a specific event. From these findings, we predict that leaders are more likely to apologize for task mistakes and are more likely to justify their relationship mistakes rather than admit wrongdoing for them. We find support for these predictions using a mixed methods approach, employing a laboratory experiment (Study 2) and a critical incident method surveying a panel of leaders (Study 3). As such, this paper extends our understanding of the mistake recovery process for leaders by demonstrating that 1) leaders’ relationship mistakes are viewed as more globally representative of the leader than task mistakes, and 2) leaders are more likely to apologize for task mistakes but more likely to justify relationship mistakes. Relational and task mistakes, however, were not found to be different in regard to their ambiguity or the extent to which they were viewed as a mistake.     

Mind your errors: evidence for a neural mechanism linking growth mind-set to adaptive posterror adjustments

How well people bounce back from mistakes depends on their beliefs about learning and intelligence. For individuals with a growth mind-set, who believe intelligence develops through effort, mistakes are seen as opportunities to learn and improve. For individuals with a fixed mind-set, who believe intelligence is a stable characteristic, mistakes indicate lack of ability. We examined performance-monitoring event-related potentials (ERPs) to probe the neural mechanisms underlying these different reactions to mistakes. Findings revealed that a growth mind-set was associated with enhancement of the error positivity component (Pe), which reflects awareness of and allocation of attention to mistakes. More growth-minded individuals also showed superior accuracy after mistakes compared with individuals endorsing a more fixed mind-set. It is critical to note that Pe amplitude mediated the relationship between mind-set and posterror accuracy. These results suggest that neural mechanisms indexing on-line awareness of and attention to mistakes are intimately involved in growth-minded individuals' ability to rebound from mistakes.     

Medical malpractice, mistake prevention, and compensation.

Clinicians' fear of malpractice litigation is the most significant obstacle to the open reporting of medical mistakes. Without open reporting of medical mistakes, however, root cause analysis of mistakes cannot be done, thus undermining efforts to implement safeguards to minimize the occurrence of future mistakes. Efforts to prevent medical mistakes, therefore, must first directly address clinicians' fear of malpractice litigation. In this paper, we explore the relationship between the current malpractice system and clinicians' fear of litigation. Ultimately, we argue that both the prevention of medical mistakes and the goals of malpractice litigation itself will be better served if substantial malpractice reform is undertaken.     

Reconsidering a transplant: A response to Wagner

Nils-Frederic Wagner takes issue with my argument that influential critics of “transplant” thought experiments make two cardinal mistakes. He responds that the mistakes I identify are not mistakes at all. The mistakes are rather on my part, in that I have not taken into account the conceptual genesis of personhood, that my view of thought experiments is idiosyncratic and possibly self-defeating, and in that I have ignored important empirical evidence about the relationship between brains and minds. I argue that my case still stands and that transplant thought experiments can do damage to rivals of a psychological continuity theory of personal identity like Marya Schechtman’s Person Life View.     

Mistakes as Pathways Towards Creativity in Counseling: A Case Example

ABSTRACT

The relationship between mistakes, improvisation, and counseling process is explored through the use of a case example involving a failed clinical intervention. Exploration of mistakes offers an opportunity to examine multiple elements of counseling while highlighting the creative nature of the counseling process. Counselor educators are encouraged to incorporate discussions of mistakes and creative development into training.     

Category mistakes and figurative language

Category mistakes are sentences such as ‘The number two is blue’ or ‘Green ideas sleep furiously’. Such sentences are highly infelicitous and thus a prominent view claims that they are meaningless. Category mistakes are also highly prevalent in figurative language. That is to say, it is very common for sentences which are used figuratively to be such that, if taken literally, they would constitute category mistakes. (Consider for example the metaphor ‘The poem is pregnant’, the metonymy ‘The White House decided to change its policy’, or a fictional use of ‘The tree was happy’.) In this paper I argue that the view that category mistakes are meaningless is inconsistent with many central and otherwise plausible theories of figurative language. Thus if the meaninglessness view is correct, the theories in question must each be rejected, and conversely, if any of the theories in question is correct, the meaninglessness view must be wrong. The debates concerning the semantics of figurative language and concerning the semantic status of category mistakes are closely connected.     

Do the wrong thing: How toddlers tell a joke from a mistake

We investigated whether 19–36-month-olds (1) differentiate mistakes from jokes, and (2) understand humorous intentions. The experimenter demonstrated unambiguous jokes accompanied by laughter, unambiguous mistakes accompanied by the experimenter saying, “Woops!”, and ambiguous actions that could either be a mistake or a joke, accompanied by either laughter or, “Woops!” Toddlers were asked to try. Nineteen- to 36-month-olds differentiated jokes and mistakes by copying unambiguous jokes and correcting unambiguous mistakes. Only 25–36-month-olds differentiated mistakes and humorous intentions by copying ambiguous actions marked by laughter, and correcting those marked by, “Woops!” Understanding humorous intentions precedes understanding intentions behind pretense, lying, and false beliefs, thus may be a first step in understanding that others can intend to do the wrong thing.     

Les erreurs commises lors de la résolution du problème source favorisent-elles le transfert analogique ? Un réexamen de la recherche de Gick et McGarry (1992)

Gick and McGarry (1992) show that inducing source problem difficulty by reducing the salience of its structural elements improves analogical transfer. According to them, this result is explained by similarities between mistakes made when solving the difficult source and target mistakes. In this study, we replicate Gick and McGarry study in order to do an analysis, not made by the authors, in the aim of testing the role of mistakes in analogical transfer. Our results replicate the effects Gick and McGarry observed, but show that theses effects are not explained by mistakes made on the source problem.     

Normative and Substantive Expertise in Multiple Hypotheses Evaluation

We distinguish two criteria for evaluating the judgments of trained professionals. One criterion is conformance with a theoretical model and the other is conformance with known external criteria. Further, we label judgments that depart from a theoretical model as errors and those that depart from known external criteria as mistakes. Following this distinction, we hypothesize that auditors′ multiple hypotheses judgments will be characterized by errors but not mistakes. This hypothesis was tested by asking professional auditors to evaluate multiple hypotheses. The results confirm our expectations. Auditors′ judgments reflected ecological base rate information, and they appropriately ignored nondiagnostic evidence. Moreover, auditors did not exhibit a perseverance bias and 84% of them identified the correct hypothesis. The absence of mistakes reflect substantive expertise. Conversely, auditors′ probabilities were not additive, and, when a hypothesis was eliminated, they did not adjust beliefs for the remaining hypotheses. These errors reflect a lack of normative expertise. A second study employed inexperienced subjects to establish whether the strong substantive performance of the professional auditors was attributed to their expertise or was an artifact of the task. The results from the second study were strongly supportive of the substantive expertise explanation. Taken together, these results suggest that substantive expertise can help contain mistakes but it is not sufficient to mitigate errors. Further, lack of normative expertise can lead to errors but these errors do not translate into mistakes. The paper concludes that the distinction between normative and substantive expertise on one hand and errors and mistakes on the other is crucial to understanding when basic findings will generalize to professional settings.     

The Ingredients of Aristotle’s Theory of Fallacy

In chapter 8 of the Sophistical Refutations, Aristotle claims that his theory of fallacy is complete in the sense that there cannot be more fallacies than the ones he lists. In this article I try to explain how Aristotle could have justified this completeness claim by analysing how he conceptualizes fallacies (dialectical mistakes which do not appear so) and what conceptual ingredients play a role in his discussion of fallacies. If we take the format of dialectical discussions into account, we will see that there are only so many mistakes one can make which still do not appear to be mistakes. Aristotle’s actual list is almost identical to these apparent mistakes.     

Mistakes as a social construct: an historical approach.

The Institute of Medicine (IOM) published To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System in November 1999. The report focused public attention on the errors that occur within the medical system that cause death and harm to patients. It outlined a series of changes for health care that are aimed at reducing these errors by 50 percent over the next five years.This paper examines the problem of medical mistakes historically. It documents how legal, scientific, and medical trends during the years 1890-1934 intersected to effect the reporting of mistakes in the subspecialty of neurosurgery. At the start of this timeframe, mistakes were reported openly in journal articles as an educational tool. By its end, however, mistakes had gone "underground" and were buried amid a more objective, scientific reporting system. Using this historical perspective as a baseline, the paper concludes by re-examining the IOM's suggestions for change and comments on what they mean for the culture of medicine.     

SHOULD SIGNIFICANCE TESTS BE BANNED?

Abstract— Significance testing of null hypotheses is the standard epistemologicat method for advancing scientific knowledge in psychology, even though a has drawbacks and it leads to common inferential mistakes These mistakes include accepting the null hypothesis when it fails to be rejected, automatically interpreting rejected null hypotheses as theoretically meaningful, and failing to consider the likelihood of Type II errors Although these mistakes have been discussed repeatedly for decades, there is no evidence that the academic discussion has had an impact A group of methodologists is proposing a new approach simply ban significance tests in psychology journals The impact of a similar ban in public-health and epidemiology journals is reported     

Social genomics: genomic inventions in society. The nature of what's to come

This paper identifies several kinds of intellectual mistakes that proponents of genetic engineering make, in defending their views and characterizing the views of their opponents. Results from research in the social sciences and humanities illuminate the nature of these mistakes. The mistakes themselves play a role in allowing proponents to gather support from other protagonists in the social controversies involving science and technology. Understanding the controversies requires understanding that innovations are components of complex and ill-structured social problems; the "right answer" does not follow from scientific or technological breakthroughs. If the problems are identified correctly, issues of non-economic or non-market values and political and individual rights will need to be addressed.     

《四库提要》易类补正

《四库提要》是中国古典目录学史上的经典著作,具有极高的学术价值,但也不可避免存在一些错误.本文对其易类17条提要的谬误进行了补正.     

``Mistakes'

A suggestion famously made by Peter Winch and carried through to present discussions holds that what constitutes the social as a kind consists of something shared – rules or practices commonly learned, internalized, or otherwise acquired by all members belonging to a society. This essays argues against the explanatory efficacy of appeals to this shared something as constitutive of a social kind by examining a violation of social norms or rules, viz., mistakes. I argue that an asymmetric relation exists between the notion of mistakes and that of the social. In particular, mistakes do not presuppose a concept of the social, but the concept of the social requires prior specification of a category of mistakes. But no such prior specification proves possible. The very notion of a mistake is so inchoate that it makes it impossible to provide the kind of regimentation required for a rule-governed domain. Thus, there may be recognized mistakes even in the absence of a unified system or common knowledge of norms.Later writers attempt to avoid Winch's over-strong assumption that something shared and internal constitutes the social but cannot. Extending recent work by Stephen Turner, I argue that ``the social' is not a domain that is susceptible to lawlike treatment, but rather a heterogeneous, motley collection. For absent the assumption of a shared something, no social object exists to be explained. So, I conclude, we have at present no clear way of marking out the social as a coherent or unified domain of inquiry.     

Failure, mistakes, regret and other subjugated stories in family therapy

This paper discusses the notions of failure and mistakes in family therapy, arguing that there are insufficient accounts in the literature which reflect the untidiness and disorder of everyday practice. The idea of dominant and subjugated stories is invoked to map the influence of notions of failure upon family therapy practice. It is argued that our practice would benefit if more accounts of our work routinely included stories of failure, mistakes and regret.     

What is Radical Behaviorism? A Review of Jay Moore's Conceptual Foundations of Radical Behaviorism

B. F. Skinner founded both radical behaviorism and behavior analysis. His founding innovations included: a versatile preparation for studying behavior; explicating the generic nature of stimulus and response; a pragmatic criterion for defining behavioral units; response rate as a datum; the concept of stimulus control; the concept of verbal behavior; and explicating the explanatory power of contingencies. Besides these achievements, however, Skinner also made some mistakes. Subsequent developments in radical behaviorist thought have attempted to remedy these mistakes. Moore's book presents a “party line” version of radical behaviorism. It focuses narrowly on a few of Skinner's concepts (mostly mentalism and verbal behavior) and contains no criticism of his mistakes. In fact, Moore adds a few mistakes of his own manufacture; for example, he insists that the mental realm does not exist—an unprovable and distracting assertion. The book's portrayal of behavior analysis would have been current around 1960; it mentions almost none of the developments since then. It also includes almost no developments in radical behaviorism since Skinner. Moore's book would give an unwary reader a highly distorted picture of contemporary behavior analysis and radical behaviorism.     

Cheating,intention, and punishment from an equity theory perspective

Male college students were given the opportunity to deliver aversive noise to a partner (confederate) contingent on the partner's “mistakes” in a learning task. Subjects were either not informed about a reward or told that they, their partner, or a charity would receive a monetary reward for speedy learning. Half of the subjects observed the confederate cheat, while half did not observe any deceptive behavior. The intensity of punitive behavior seemed to vary in accordance with predictions derived from equity theory. That is, cheating for a charity, a “good cause” resulted in less intense punishment than did cheating for selfish gain. On the other hand, mistakes, uncomplicated by cheating, which deprived a charity were punished more intensely than were mistakes whose only result accrued to the confederate himself.     

Response to Abrusán,Shaw, and Elbourne

In my book Category Mistakes (OUP 2013), I discuss a range of potential accounts of category mistakes and defend a pragmatic, presuppositional account of the phenomenon. Three commentators discuss the book: Márta Abrusán focuses on a comparison between my book and Asher’s Lexical Meaning in Context, suggesting that Asher’s theory has the advantage of accounting not only for category mistakes, but also for additional phenomena such as so-called ‘coertion’ and ‘co-predication’. I argue that Asher’s account of all three phenomena is deficient, and, moreover, that it is far from clear that the latter two phenomena are related to that of category mistakes. James Shaw challenges two of my arguments against the MBT view. I respond to these challenges. Paul Elbourne provides a novel argument in support of my account of category mistakes, involving multi-sentence discourses and ERP experiments. I show that it is not entirely straightforward for my account to explain this data, but that his argument does ultimately provide support for my view.