A model for realism of confidence judgments: Implications for underconfidence in sensory discrimination

In a recent issue of this journal, Björkman, Juslin, and Winman (1993) presented a model of the calibration of subjective confidence judgments for sensory discrimination which they called “subjective distance theory.” They proposed that there was a robust underconfidence bias in such judgments, that the model predicted such a bias, and that two different models were needed for the calibration of subjective confidence for cognitive judgments and for sensory ones. This paper addresses issues they raised. It points out that they have not presented a new model, but rather a portion of a more general one, the “decision-variable partition model” originally proposed in Ferrell and McGoey (1980). This paper explores properties of the model and shows, contrary to Björkman, Juslin, and Winman’s hypotheses, that the model does not predict under-confidence, that the “hard-easy effect” can be observed with sensory discriminations, and that the model fits not only sensory, but also cognitive judgments.     

Calibration of sensory and cognitive judgments: A single model for both

In a recent issue of this journal, Winman and Juslin (34 , 135–148, 1993) present a model of the calibration of subjective probability judgments for sensory discrimination tasks. They claim that the model predicts a pervasive underconfidence bias observed in such tasks, and present evidence from a training experiment that they interpret as supporting the notion that different models are needed to describe judgment of confidence in sensory and in cognitive tasks. The model is actually part of the more comprehensive decision variable partition model of subjective probability calibration that was originally proposed in Ferrell and McGoey (Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 26 , 32–53, 1980). The characteristics of the model are described and it is demonstrated that the model does not predict underconfidence, that it is fully compatible with the overconfidence frequently found in calibration studies with cognitive tasks, and that it well represents experimental results from such studies. It is concluded that only a single model is needed for both types of task.     

Calibration of sensory and cognitive judgments: Two different accounts

The purpose of this study was to test predictions of two recent theories of realism of confidence. Ecological approaches to realism of confidence in one's general knowledge (Gigerenzer et al. , 1991; Juslin, in press a ; Björkman, in press) predict good calibration or, in the case of poor cognitive adjustment, overconfidence, within the cognitive domain. The subjective distance theory of confidence in sensory discriminations (Björkman et al. , 1992) predicts a pervasive underconfidence bias for sensory discriminations. Empirical data are reported showing that: (a) Calibration for sensory judgments is considerably poorer than calibration for well adapted cognitive judgements, a difference that can be entirely traced to underconfidence in the sensory domain. (b) While an initial overconfidence bias in the cognitive domain is removed by outcome feedback, the bias observed in sensory discriminations is unaffected even by a prolonged feedback session. It is suggested that the nature of confidence in sensory discriminations is different from the nature of confidence in cognitive judgments.     

Realism of confidence in sensory discrimination

Is there a common and general basis for confidence in human judgment? Recently, we found that the properties of confidence judgments in the sensory domain mirror those previously established in the cognitive domain; notably, we found underconfidence on easy sensory judgments and overconfidence on hard sensory judgments. In contrast, data from the Uppsala laboratory in Sweden suggest that sensory judgments are unique; they found a pervasive underconfidence bias, with overconfidence being evident only on very hard sensory judgments. Olsson and Winman (1996) attempted to resolve the debate on the basis of methodological issues related to features of the stimulus display in a visual discrimination task. A reanalysis of the data reported in Baranski and Petrusic (1994), together with the findings of a new experiment that controlled stimulus display characteristics, supports the position that the difference between the Canadian and the Swedish data is real and, thus, may reflect cross-national differences in confidence in sensory discrimination.     

Beauty: Neglected,but alive and kicking

This article is a commentary on ‘Ten years of a model of aesthetic appreciation and aesthetic judgments: The aesthetic episode – developments and challenges in empirical aesthetics’ (Leder & Nadal, 2014, this issue). It focuses on the importance of beauty in aesthetic appreciation and aesthetic judgments. Beauty is considered as a formal inherent property of visual stimuli that has the potential to elicit visual pleasure by direct sensory stimulation. It is argued that any comprehensive model of aesthetic experience must account fully for cognitive aspects of aesthetics (cultural, conceptual, psychological, and individual factors) as well as intrinsic properties of beautiful visual stimuli and how they relate to basic mechanisms of visual perception, which are universal among humans.     

Underconfidence in sensory discrimination: The interaction between experimental setting and response strategies

In a recent issue of this journal, Baranski and Petrusic (1994) presented empirical data revealing overconfidence in sensory discrimination. In this paper, we propose an explanation of Baranski and Petrusic’s results, based on an idiosyncrasy in the experimental setting that misleads subjects who are using an unwarranted symmetry assumption. Experiment 1 showed that when this hypothesis is controlled for, a large underconfidence bias is obtained with Baranski and Petrusic’s procedure. The results of Experiment 2 confirmed that overconfidence is difficult to obtain in subject-controlled sensory discrimination tasks, even for a very low proportion of correct responses. The different results obtained in sensory and cognitive tasks suggest that one should not uncritically draw parallels between confidence in sensory and cognitive judgments.     

Rational learning and information sampling: on the "naivety" assumption in sampling explanations of judgment biases

Recent research has argued that several well-known judgment biases may be due to biases in the available information sample rather than to biased information processing. Most of these sample-based explanations assume that decision makers are "naive": They are not aware of the biases in the available information sample and do not correct for them. Here, we show that this "naivety" assumption is not necessary. Systematically biased judgments can emerge even when decision makers process available information perfectly and are also aware of how the information sample has been generated. Specifically, we develop a rational analysis of Denrell's (2005) experience sampling model, and we prove that when information search is interested rather than disinterested, even rational information sampling and processing can give rise to systematic patterns of errors in judgments. Our results illustrate that a tendency to favor alternatives for which outcome information is more accessible can be consistent with rational behavior. The model offers a rational explanation for behaviors that had previously been attributed to cognitive and motivational biases, such as the in-group bias or the tendency to prefer popular alternatives.     

Implicit Mental Processes in Ethical Management Behavior

This article examines the relationship between implicit mental processes and ethical decisions made by managers. Based on the dual-process view in social and cognitive psychology, it is argued that social cognition (e.g., moral judgments) can rely on two different modes of information processing. On one hand, moral judgments reflect explicit, conscious, and extensive cognitive processes, which are attributed to explicit attitude. On the other hand, moral judgments may also be based on implicit, automatic, and effortless processes referring to implicit attitude. To test this thesis, a study involving 182 participants was conducted. The results support the thesis.     

Moral internalism and moral cognitivism in Hume’s metaethics

Most naturalists think that the belief/desire model from Hume is the best framework for making sense of motivation. As Smith has argued, given that the cognitive state (belief) and the conative state (desire) are separate on this model, if a moral judgment is cognitive, it could not also be motivating by itself. So, it looks as though Hume and Humeans cannot hold that moral judgments are states of belief (moral cognitivism) and internally motivating (moral internalism). My chief claim is that the details of Hume’s naturalistic philosophy of mind actually allow for a conjunction of these allegedly incompatible views. This thesis is significant, since readers typically have thought that Hume’s view that motivation is not produced by representations, coupled with his view that moral judgments motivate on their own, imply that moral judgments could never take the form of beliefs about, or representations of, the moral (virtue and vice).     

Further remarks on the role of cognition in the comparative analysis of behavior

Recent interest in comparative psychology has stimulated much research and debate concerning cognitive processes in animal behavior. The present paper relates to this general area by treating particular issues in the analysis of comparative cognition: specifically, how cognition is inferred from animal behavior; whether the postulation of intervening cognitive processes furthers our understanding of behavior; and how rival approaches help advance the science of behavior.     

On the similarity of features

Tversky's featural contrast model for similarity judgments is discussed and its featural definition of entities and Boolean characterization of judgments are criticized. Features are themselves identified on the basis of appraisals of similarity and so cannot be defined in an a priori or context-free manner. Tversky's model may assist the discovery of orderly psychological patterns, but misses the central cognitive issues of concern. Empirical findings relevant to this critique are reviewed. The criticisms of Tversky's model lead to a more general critique of the representational-computational model of mind and its associated methods.     

Arguments from Expert Opinion and Persistent Bias

Accounts of arguments from expert opinion take it for granted that expert judgments count as (defeasible) evidence for propositions, and so an argument that proceeds from premises about what an expert judges to a conclusion that the expert is probably right is a strong argument. In Mizrahi (Informal Log 33:57–79, 2013), I consider a potential justification for this assumption, namely, that expert judgments are significantly more likely to be true than novice judgments, and find it wanting because of empirical evidence suggesting that expert judgments under uncertainty are not significantly more likely to be true than novice judgments or even chance. In this paper, I consider another potential justification for this assumption, namely, that expert judgments are not influenced by the cognitive biases novice judgments are influenced by, and find it wanting, too, because of empirical evidence suggesting that experts are vulnerable to pretty much the same cognitive biases that novices are vulnerable to. If this is correct, then the basic assumption at the core of accounts of arguments from expert opinion, namely, that expert judgments count as (defeasible) evidence for propositions, remains unjustified.     

Allocation of self-paced study time and the "labor-in-vain effect"

This research explored the possibility that a metacognitive control process (namely, the allocation of self-paced study time) might be affected by the output from metacognitive monitoring processes (i.e., ease-of-learning and/or feeling-of-knowing judgments). In three experiments, university undergraduates received instructions that emphasized either accuracy of learning or speed of learning. The major findings were: (a) ease-of-learning judgments and feeling-of-knowing judgments are reliably related to study-time allocation, with more self-paced study time being allocated to the supposedly more difficult items; (b) even when instructed to master every item and when allowed unlimited study time to do so, people terminate study before learning is completed; and (c) large increases in self-paced study time can yield little or no increase in the subsequent likelihood of recall (the "labor-in-vain effect"). Implications are drawn for a model of the interplay between metacognitive monitoring processes and metacognitive control processes.     

Sensibility and understanding in perceptual judgments

The main aim of this paper is to work towards an account of how sensibility and understanding combine in perceptual judgments, with the emphasis on the role of sensibility in both the justification of such judgments and the explanation of how it is possible for them to apply to an objective world. I argue that in the normal course of events sensory intuitions function as (animal-level) beliefs about the objective world; and that these in turn acquire the status of perceptual judgments to the extent that they are imbedded in and engaged with the high-level patterns of consciousness and reasoning characteristic of full-blown human judgment. In terms of this account sensibility is seamlessly integrated with understanding in perceptual judgments. This does not, however, imply that its contribution to perceptual judgments cannot be separated analytically, for in my terms the basic justification and objective reference of perceptual judgments are directly inherited from the sensory intuitions (functioning as sensory beliefs) which constitute those judgments. I conclude by showing how this account can be used to undermine John McDowell's claim that any attempt to assign a separable contribution to sensibility cannot avoid a commitment to the Myth of the Given.     

Contrasting effects of self-schema priming on lexical decisions and interpersonal stroop task performance: evidence for a cognitive/interactionist model of interpersonal dependency

Four experiments tested a key tenet of Bornstein's (1992, 1993) cognitive/interactionist (C/I) model of interpersonal dependency: that priming the helpless self-schema (HSS) alters processing of dependency-related information in dependent--but not nondependent--individuals. Experiments 1 and 2 assessed the effects of subliminal lexical priming and an emotional priming manipulation on lexical decision (LD) judgments for dependency-related words and control words. Experiments 3 and 4 assessed the effects of these same priming procedures on Interpersonal Stroop Task (IST) performance. As predicted, priming the HSS produced contrasting effects on different outcome measures, decreasing LD latencies, but increasing IST response times. Results are discussed in the context of the C/I model, and suggestions for future studies are offered.     

相似性判断和差异性判断的不对称性及其机制探索

本文阐述了相似性判断和差异性判断不对称性的相关研究。首先介绍了不对称性的发展及理论解释。其次,根据事件相关电位的研究结果,阐述了图-词信息的双编码模型对相似性判断的影响。接着分析和介绍了相似性判断的双编码过程及其时间进程。最后,作者提出有待深入研究的几个问题：（1）差异性策略在分类和推理中的应用;（2）相似性双编码过程的实证研究及其应用;（3）从发展认知神经科学的角度探讨不对称的认知神经机制。     

SDT analysis of binary decisions and sensory intensity ratings to noxious thermal stimuli

During three sessions, each of 24 Ss responded to noxious thermal stimuli, using the following judgments: binary decision, S responded “high” or “low”; sensory intensity rating, S rated his sensory experience along a thermal intensity continuum; and concurrent report, S’s binary decision was followed by an intensity rating. The binary-decision d’ was significantly higher than the rating d′, suggesting that Ss could not maintain multiple thermal criteria in a consistent fashion. The criteria for pain obtained with single and concurrent intensity rating judgments did not differ. These results suggest that the most efficacious and valid method for the study of experimental pain is to obtain concurrent responses, and to use binary decisions to compute d’ and sensory intensity ratings to locate S’s criterion for reporting pain.     

Reliving,emotions, and fragmentation in the autobiographical memories of veterans diagnosed with PTSD

Fifty veterans diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) each recalled four autobiographical memories: one from the 2 years before service, one non‐combat memory from the time in service, one from combat, and one from service that had often come as an intrusive memory. For each memory, they provided 21 ratings about reliving, belief, sensory properties, reexperiencing emotions, visceral emotional responses, fragmentation, and narrative coherence. We used these ratings to examine three claims about traumatic memories: a separation of cognitive and visceral aspects of emotion, an increased sense of reliving, and increased fragmentation. There was evidence for a partial separation of cognitive judgments of reexperiencing an emotion and reports of visceral symptoms of the emotion, with visceral symptoms correlating more consistently with scores on PTSD tests. Reliving, but not fragmentation of the memories, increased with increases in the trauma relatedness of the event and with increases in scores on standardized tests of PTSD severity. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Working memory and spatial judgments: Cognitive load increases the central tendency bias

Previous work demonstrates that memory for simple stimuli can be biased by information about the distribution of which the stimulus is a member. Specifically, people underestimate values greater than the distribution’s average and overestimate values smaller than the average. This is referred to as the central tendency bias. This bias has been explained as an optimal use of both noisy sensory information and category information. In largely separate literature, cognitive load (CL) experiments attempt to manipulate the available working memory of participants in order to observe the effect on choice or judgments. In two experiments, we demonstrate that participants under high cognitive load exhibit a stronger central tendency bias than when under a low cognitive load. Although not anticipated at the outset, we also find that judgments exhibit an anchoring bias not described previously.