Children’s developing understanding of the relation between variable causal efficacy and mechanistic complexity

Two experiments investigated 3–4-year-olds’ ability to infer the causal mechanisms for a pair of lights. In both experiments the exterior of the two lights appeared identical. In Experiment 1, one light displayed a stable activation pattern of a single color while the other light displayed a variable pattern of activation by cycling through a series of different colors (i.e., a more varied effect). Children were asked to judge which light had a more complex internal structure. Four-year-olds were more likely to match the light with the more variable effect with a more complex internal mechanism and the light with the more stable effect with a less complex mechanism. Three-year-olds’ responses were at chance. Experiment 2 replicated this finding when the activation patterns of the two lights were described verbally but never demonstrated. Taken together, these results suggest that 4-year-olds appreciate that the variability of an object’s causal efficacy is related to the complexity of its internal mechanistic structure.     

The development of causal categorization

Two experiments examined the impact of causal relations between features on categorization in 5- to 6-year-old children and adults. Participants learned artificial categories containing instances with causally related features and noncausal features. They then selected the most likely category member from a series of novel test pairs. Classification patterns and logistic regression were used to diagnose the presence of independent effects of causal coherence, causal status, and relational centrality. Adult classification was driven primarily by coherence when causal links were deterministic (Experiment 1) but showed additional influences of causal status when links were probabilistic (Experiment 2). Children's classification was based primarily on causal coherence in both cases. There was no effect of relational centrality in either age group. These results suggest that the generative model (Rehder, 2003a) provides a good account of causal categorization in children as well as adults.     

Towards a theory of intention revision

Although the change of beliefs in the face of new information has been widely studied with some success, the revision of other mental states has received little attention from the theoretical perspective. In particular, intentions are widely recognised as being a key attitude for rational agents, and while several formal theories of intention have been proposed in the literature, the logic of intention revision has been hardly considered. There are several reasons for this: perhaps most importantly, intentions are very closely connected with other mental states—in particular, beliefs about the future and the abilities of the agent. So, we cannot study them in isolation. We must consider the interplay between intention revision and the revision of other mental states, which complicates the picture considerably. In this paper, we present some first steps towards a theory of intention revision. We develop a simple model of an agent’s mental states, and define intention revision operators. Using this model, we develop a logic of intention dynamics, and then investigate some of its properties.     

The dynamic infrastructure of mind—A hypothesis and some of its applications

A mechanism underlying the computational properties of the cognitive architecture is construed based on a minimal list of operational clusters. This general processing mechanism constitutes the dynamic infrastructure of mind (DIM). DIM consists in categories of mental operations foundational for learning that contain inborn components called inner operations, which are self-developing in the interaction mind-environment. Within the DIM paradigm, the input cognitive systems are not domain specific or core-knowledge specific, they are operational specific and capable of further developments that become domain specific while experiencing the environment. Arguments for this construal come from three sources: literature review, data collected through classroom observations, and a four-year experimental study of teaching and learning mathematics in primary grades. The outcomes of that experiment led to a methodology of learning based on activating the operational infrastructure of mind, which enhances students' flexibility of thinking and predicts the capacity to solve creatively a variety of problems.     

Stroop-like effects in a new-code learning task: A cognitive load theory perspective

To determine whether and how learning is biased by competing task-irrelevant information that creates extraneous cognitive load, we assessed the efficiency of university students with a learning paradigm in two experiments. The paradigm asked participants to learn associations between eight words and eight digits. We manipulated congruity of the digits’ ink colour with the words’ semantics. In Experiment 1 word stimuli were colour words (e.g., blue, yellow) and in Experiment 2 colour-related word concepts (e.g., sky, banana). Marked benefits and costs on learning due to variation in extraneous cognitive load originating from processing task-irrelevant information were evident. Implications for cognitive load theory and schooling are discussed.     

Theory-of-mind, cognitive development, and children's interpretation of anxiety-related physical symptoms

The present study investigated developmental patterns in children's interpretation of anxiety-related physical symptoms and emotional reasoning, and to what extent these phenomena are influenced by children's level of cognitive development. A large sample of 4-13-year-old children (N=358) were exposed to vignettes in which the presence and absence of physical symptoms was systematically varied. In addition, children completed a series of conservation tasks and a theory-of-mind-test. Results demonstrated that from the age of 7, children were increasingly able to link physical symptoms to anxiety. Furthermore, cognitive development appeared to enhance children's ability to interpret physical symptoms as a sign of anxiety. Further, children's tendency to infer danger from vignettes with physical symptoms (i.e., emotional reasoning) was already prominent in 4-6-year-olds. The implications for physical symptom-based theories of childhood anxiety are briefly discussed.     

Reasoning about make-believe and hypothetical suppositions: Towards a theory of belief-contravening reasoning

The present study explores how suppositions which conflict with accepted beliefs are represented and reasoned about. Two studies test the predictions regarding the nature and developmental changes in children's ability to represent and reason about hypothetical or make-believe suppositions which violate their everyday knowledge and beliefs. In Study 1, 46 4th- and 5th-graders were introduced to a hand puppet, Freddy, who made claims inconsistent with generally accepted beliefs (e.g., “all dogs meow”) because he was pretending (Make-Believe Condition) or believed them (Hypothetical Condition). Participants were asked to think like Freddy and judge whether a conclusion (“There's a dog; does it meow?”) follows logically from the claim. In Study 2, 40 kindergarten (6-year-olds), 3rd–4th grade (10-year-olds), and college students were asked to represent belief contravening make-believe (pretend in a make-believe world that dogs meow) and hypothetical (imagine what the real world would be like if dogs meow) premises, evaluate conclusions of the premises (Rover is a dog, does Rover meow?) and make judgments about the attributes (growl, wag tail, purr, and eat mice) of the entity (a meowing dog) they created. The prediction that it would be easier to represent and reason from belief-contravening suppositions in the Make-Believe than Hypothetical conditions was confirmed in each study, although the two forms of reasoning were directly correlated (Study 2). The results were discussed in terms of the similarities (compartmentalization and integration) and differences (reconciliation) of processes involved in fancifully (make-believe) or seriously (hypothetical) representing and reasoning about belief-contravening suppositions.     

Deci and Ryan's cognitive evaluation theory of intrinsic motivation: A set of common sense theorems

Cognitive evaluation theory as put forward by Deci and Ryan (1985) is examined. The theory, which deals with intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, has inspired considerable amount of empirical research in the last two decades. However, contrary to the mainstream view and that of its authors, it is argued here that the theory consists of necessary truths of common sense (folk) psychology, rather than contingent and empirically testable hypotheses. As such the theory spells out what must necessarily be the case in human motivation and the empirical evidence amassed to test its validity is irrelevant. Such testing should be abandoned if its purpose is to appraise the truth value of the theory's propositions. To empirically test necessary true propositions is not only redundant in such cases, but also a waste of time and resources.     

Developmental changes in probabilistic reasoning: The role of cognitive capacity,instructions, thinking styles,and relevant knowledge

In three experiments we explored developmental changes in probabilistic reasoning, taking into account the effects of cognitive capacity, thinking styles, and instructions. Normative responding increased with grade levels and cognitive capacity in all experiments, and it showed a negative relationship with superstitious thinking. The effect of instructions (in Experiments 2 and 3) was moderated by level of education and cognitive capacity. Specifically, only higher-grade students with higher cognitive capacity benefited from instructions to reason on the basis of logic. The implications of these findings for research on the development of probabilistic reasoning are also discussed.     

Explicit and implicit cognition: a preliminary test of a dual-process theory of cognitive vulnerability to depression

Two studies were conducted to test a dual-process theory of cognitive vulnerability to depression. According to this theory, implicit and explicit cognitive processes have differential effects on depressive reactions to stressful life events. Implicit processes are hypothesized to be critical in determining an individual's immediate affective reaction to stress whereas explicit cognitions are thought to be more involved in long-term depressive reactions. Consistent with hypotheses, the results of study 1 (cross-sectional; N=237) showed that implicit, but not explicit, cognitions predicted immediate affective reactions to a lab stressor. Study 2 (longitudinal; N=251) also supported the dual-process model of cognitive vulnerability to depression. Results showed that both the implicit and explicit measures interacted with life stress to predict prospective changes in depressive symptoms, respectively. However, when both implicit and explicit predictors were entered into a regression equation simultaneously, only the explicit measure interacted with stress to remain a unique predictor of depressive symptoms over the five-week prospective interval.     

Semantic similarity of labels and inductive generalization: Taking a second look

Prior research suggests that preschoolers can generalize object properties based on category information conveyed by semantically-similar labels. However, previous research did not control for co-occurrence probability of labels in natural speech. The current studies re-assessed children’s generalization with semantically-similar labels. Experiment 1 indicated that adults made category-based inferences regardless of co-occurrence probability; however, 4-year-olds generalized with semantically-similar labels that co-occurred in child-directed speech (e.g., bunny–rabbit) but not with non-co-occurring labels (e.g., crocodile–alligator). Experiment 2 indicated that generalization with semantically-similar labels increased gradually between 4- and 6-years of age. These results are discussed in relation to theories of early learning.     

Working with chronic and relentless self‐hatred,self‐harm,and existential shame: a clinical study and reflections (Paper 2 of 2)

This second of two papers focuses on the shame which emerged in the first 14 years of analysis of a woman who was bulimic, self‐harmed, and repeatedly described herself as ‘feeling like a piece of shit’. To explore this intense and pervasive shame I draw on Jung's and Laplanche's emphasis on experiences of unresolvable, non‐pathological ‘foreignness’ or ‘otherness’ at the heart of the psyche. Images, metaphors, elements of clinical experience, and working hypotheses from a number of analytic traditions are used to flesh out this exploration. These include Kilborne's use of Pirandello's image of shame as like a ‘hole in the paper sky’ which, I suggest, points to a crack in subjectivity, and reveals our belief in the efficacy of the self to be illusory. Hultberg's observations on shame as having an existential mode (function) are also explored, as is the nature of analytic truth. Using these ideas I describe my patient's process of finding some small but freeing space in relation to her shame and self‐hatred. Through enduring and learning from her shame in analysis she realized that it was part of a desperate unconscious attempt to draw close to her troubled father and so to ‘love him better’.     

The Fibonacci Life‐Chart Method (FLCM) as a foundation for Carl Jung's theory of synchronicity

Since the scientific method requires events to be subject to controlled examination it would seem that synchronicities are not scientifically investigable. Jung speculated that because these incredible events are like the random sparks of a firefly they cannot be pinned down. However, doubting Jung's doubts, the author provides a possible method of elucidating these seemingly random and elusive events. The author draws on a new method, designated the Fibonacci Life‐Chart Method (FLCM), which categorizes phase transitions and Phi fractal scaling in human development based on the occurrence of Fibonacci numbers in biological cell division and self‐organizing systems. The FLCM offers an orientation towards psychological experience that may have relevance to Jung's theory of synchronicity in which connections are deemed to be intrinsically meaningful rather than demonstrable consequences of cause and effect. In such a model synchronistic events can be seen to be, as the self‐organizing system enlarges, manifestations of self‐organized critical moments and Phi fractal scaling. Recommendations for future studies include testing the results of the FLCM using case reports of synchronistic and spiritual experiences.     

The role of cognitive factors in the pathogenesis of obsessive-compulsive symptoms: a prospective study

Cognitive models of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) posit that specific kinds of dysfunctional beliefs (e.g., pertaining to responsibility and the significance of intrusive thoughts) underlie the development of this disorder. The present study was designed to prospectively evaluate whether dysfunctional beliefs thought to underlie OCD act as a specific vulnerability factor in the pathogenesis of obsessive-compulsive symptomatology. Eighty-five individuals were prospectively followed over a period of time thought to be associated with an increased onset of OCD symptoms -- childbirth and the postpartum. The majority of these new mothers and fathers experienced intrusive infant-related thoughts and performed neutralizing behaviors similar to, but less severe than, those observed in OCD. Scores on a measure of dysfunctional beliefs thought to underlie OCD predicted the development of obsessive-compulsive symptoms after controlling for pre-existing OCD symptoms, anxiety, and depression. Dysfunctional beliefs also predicted the severity of checking, washing, and obsessional OCD symptom dimensions, but not neutralizing, ordering, or hoarding symptom dimensions. These data provide evidence for specific dysfunctional beliefs as risk factors in the development of some types of OCD symptoms.     

Towards a Cognitive Theory of Cyber Deception

This work is an initial step toward developing a cognitive theory of cyber deception. While widely studied, the psychology of deception has largely focused on physical cues of deception. Given that present-day communication among humans is largely electronic, we focus on the cyber domain where physical cues are unavailable and for which there is less psychological research. To improve cyber defense, researchers have used signaling theory to extended algorithms developed for the optimal allocation of limited defense resources by using deceptive signals to trick the human mind. However, the algorithms are designed to protect against adversaries that make perfectly rational decisions. In behavioral experiments using an abstract cybersecurity game (i.e., Insider Attack Game), we examined human decision-making when paired against the defense algorithm. We developed an instance-based learning (IBL) model of an attacker using the Adaptive Control of Thought-Rational (ACT-R) cognitive architecture to investigate how humans make decisions under deception in cyber-attack scenarios. Our results show that the defense algorithm is more effective at reducing the probability of attack and protecting assets when using deceptive signaling, compared to no signaling, but is less effective than predicted against a perfectly rational adversary. Also, the IBL model replicates human attack decisions accurately. The IBL model shows how human decisions arise from experience, and how memory retrieval dynamics can give rise to cognitive biases, such as confirmation bias. The implications of these findings are discussed in the perspective of informing theories of deception and designing more effective signaling schemes that consider human bounded rationality.     

Applications of social cognitive theory to the career development of women of color

This article provides a review of the literature on the educational and career development of women of color within the context of social cognitive career theory (Lent, et al, 1994 and Lent, et al, 1996). Specifically, possible gender, ethnic, racial, and cultural influences on career self-efficacy and outcome expectations are explored to delinate the potential mechanisms whereby ethnicity, culture, and ethnic and racial identity development, in interaction with gender, affect career choice and adjustment. Suggestions for future research on social cognitive career theory and the career development of women of color are presented.     

Applications of social cognitive theory to the career development of women of color

This article provides a review of the literature on the educational and career development of women of color within the context of social cognitive career theory (Lent, et al, 1994 and Lent, et al, 1996). Specifically, possible gender, ethnic, racial, and cultural influences on career self-efficacy and outcome expectations are explored to delinate the potential mechanisms whereby ethnicity, culture, and ethnic and racial identity development, in interaction with gender, affect career choice and adjustment. Suggestions for future research on social cognitive career theory and the career development of women of color are presented.     

The case for a dual-process theory of transitive reasoning

Ever since its popularisation by Piaget around 60 years ago, transitive reasoning (deductively-inferring A > C from premises A > B and B > C) has been of psychological interest both as a mental phenomenon and as a tool in areas of psychological discourse. However, the focus of interest in it has shifted periodically first from child development, to learning disability, to non-humans and currently to cognitive and clinical neuroscience. Crucially, such shifts have always been plagued by one core question – the question of which of two competing paradigms (extensive-training paradigm versus non-training paradigm) is valid for assessing transitive reasoning as originally conceived in Piagetian research. The continued avoidance of this question potentially undermines several important findings recently reported: Such as about exactly what is involved in deducing transitive inferences, which brain regions are critical for reaching transitive inference, and what links exist between weakened deductive transitivity and mental illnesses like schizophrenia. Here, we offer the view that both of the competing paradigms are indexing transitivity, but each one tends to tap a different aspect of it. Then, we summarise studies from child and adult cognitive psychology, disabilities research, and from cognitive neuroscience. These, together with studies of non-human reasoning, seem to afford a theory of transitive reasoning that has two major components; one deductive but the other associative. It is proposed that only a dual-process theory of transitivity (having analytic versus intuitive routes approximate to deductive versus associative processing respectively) can account both for the variety of findings and the apparently-disparate paradigms. However, fuzzy-trace theory (“Gist” processes and representations), if not already embodying such a dual-process theory, will need to be incorporated into any complete theory.