Some remarks about relativism and pseudo‐relativism in ethics

This article deals with socio‐cultural ethical relativism. An attempt is made to analyze an ethical relativistic statement, i.e. a statement which, prima facie, ascribes different value‐qualities to the same type of conduct, depending on the society in which it occurs. The conclusion arrived at is that, in the main, such statements do not express genuine relativism. On the other hand, views which can be regarded as genuinely relativistic, arc found to lack plausibility.     

Johannes Kepler’s computer simulation of the universe: Some remarks about theory in psychology

Computer simulation may be an overly seductive way of formulating theory in the social sciences. The capability of constructing complex computer simulation models may remove some of the incentive for finding simple laws. This point is illustrated via a fantasy in which the sixteenth century astronomical theorist, Johannes Kepler, uses Ms computer instead of his mind to account for extant data on stellar and planetary motion. Similarities between sixteenth century cosmology and twentieth century psychology are discussed.     

Nikolai Lossky’s Reception and Criticism of Husserl

Nikolai Lossky is key to the history of the Husserl-Rezeption in Russia. He was the first to publish a review of the Russian translation of Husserl’s first volume of the Logische Untersuchungen that appeared in 1909. He also published a presentation and criticism of Husserl’s transcendental idealism in 1939. An English translation of both of Lossky’s publications is offered in this volume for the first time. The present paper, which is intended as an introduction to these documents, situates Lossky within the Rezeptionsgeschichte of Husserl in Russia and explains why he is central to it. It also explains what Lossky principally found in Husserl: he saw in the latter’s critique of psychologism support for his own ontology, epistemology, and axiology. Lossky characterizes his ontology as an ideal-realism. According to ideal-realism, both the realm of ideal beings (in Plato’s sense) and the realm of real beings (i.e., the world of becoming) are mind-independent. Per his epistemology, which he calls “intuitivism,” real beings are intuited by sensual intuition and ideal beings by intellectual intuition. The realm of ideal beings includes the subrealm of values, which is intuited by axiological intuition. This thoroughly realist conception contrasted sharply with the subjectivist tendencies of the time. So, when Lossky took cognizance of Husserl’s critique of psychologism, he thereupon found an ally in his battle against the various subjectivisms. But, when Husserl took the transcendental idealist turn, Lossky was at the forefront of the backlash against the new direction Husserl wanted to give to phenomenology.     

Comprehension of direct and indirect sarcastic remarks in children and adolescents with Tourette’s syndrome

Previous research has reported that aspects of social cognition such as nonliteral language comprehension are impaired in adults with Tourette’s syndrome (TS), but little is known about social cognition in children and adolescents with TS. The present study aims to evaluate a measure of sarcasm comprehension suitable for use with children and adolescents (Experiment 1), and to examine sarcasm comprehension in children and adolescents with TS-alone or TS and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD; Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, the measure of sarcasm comprehension was found to be sensitive to differences in nonliteral language comprehension for typically-developing children aged 10 to 11 years old compared to children aged 8 to 9 years old; the older group performed significantly better on the comprehension of scenarios ending with either direct or indirect sarcastic remarks, whereas the two age groups did not differ on the comprehension of scenarios ending with sincere remarks. In Experiment 2, both the TS-alone and TS+ADHD groups performed below the level of the control participants on the comprehension of indirect sarcasm items but not on the comprehension of direct sarcasm items and sincere items. Those with TS+ADHD also performed below the level of the control participants on measures of interference control and fluency. The findings are discussed with reference to the possible contribution of executive functioning and mentalizing to the patterns of performance.     

Metaphysics as interpretation of conscious life: some remarks on D. Henrich’s and D. Kolak’s thinking

In this article, I discuss the manner in which Dieter Henrich’s theory of subjectivity has emerged from the fundamental questions of German Idealism, and in what manner and to what extent this theory effects a reinstatement of metaphysics. In so doing, I shall argue that Henrich’s position represents a viable refutation of the attempt of the physicalist explanation of the world to prove the concept of the subject to be superfluous. Henrich’s metaphysics of subjectivity is primarily focused on the ‘ultimate questions’ which also compose “the deep levels of our subjectivity” and concern the factors that should promote stability in our emotional, moral and intellectual life. I argue with Henrich that the indisputable facticity of our conscious life is worthy of our special consideration and interpretation, explanation and clarification, just as the deeper meaning (the individual and collective subconscious structure) hidden beneath the layers of apparent comprehensibility calls for urgent investigation. Such interpretation and elucidation of life’s meaning has a tripartite character: first, it consists of clarification of the totality of human experience together with the realities playing a part in it; second, it builds on the process by which the contents of experience are cognized, and the knowledge thereof which results; thirdly, it embraces the transcendental precondition enabling each and every one of us to consciously lead our lives—for life, in a human sense, does not merely happen to one. Henrich’s metaphysical foundation of subjectivity is compared with Kolak‘s position, according to which individual consciousness is not insular, but integrated into the totality of overall unity that some have called “the Universal Self”, “the Noumenal Self”.     

Parents’ Beliefs about Children’s Emotions and Parents’ Emotion-Related Conversations with Their Children

The goals of the current study were to describe parents’ emotion socialization patterns and to assess relations between parents’ emotion-related beliefs and socialization behaviors during conversations with their children. Participants were 125 parents and their 9- and 10-year-old children from three ethnic groups in the southeastern United States. Parents reported beliefs about children’s emotions. Parents and children were videotaped playing a board game to evoke emotion-related conversations, which were then coded for parents’ labeling, teaching, and encouragement of emotion. Parents used less labeling and teaching for positive than negative emotions, and greater encouragement for positive than negative emotions. Parents with stronger beliefs about the value of positive emotions engaged in less labeling of positive emotions, less teaching of all emotions, and less encouragement of negative emotions. Parents with stronger beliefs about the value of negative emotions engaged in more encouragement of negative emotions. Parents with stronger beliefs that all emotions are dangerous engaged in less labeling of negative emotions. The results of this study have potential clinical implications in helping clients to understand the foundational structures of their behaviors and how both beliefs and behaviors are distinct, yet interrelated constructs.     

Marx and God with anarchism: on Walter Benjamin’s concepts of history and violence

The article analyses relationships between profane and religious illumination, materialism and theology, politics and religion, Marxism and Messianism. For Walter Benjamin, every second is “the small gateway in time through which the Messiah might enter”. This is the starting point in the reading of Benjamin’s works, where we confront various liaisons and couplings of radical politics and messianic events. Through the reading of Benjamin and through the analysis of his conceptions of history and time, the article addresses the question what is possible in the world.     

Heroism and history in Merleau-Ponty’s existential phenomenology

Whereas Phenomenology of Perception concludes with a puzzling turn to “heroism,” this article examines the short essay “Man, the Hero” as a source of insight into Merleau-Ponty’s thought in the early postwar period. In this essay, Merleau-Ponty presented a conception of heroism through which he expressed the attitude toward post-Hegelian philosophy of history that underwrote his efforts to reform Marxism along existential lines. Analyzing this conception of heroism by unpacking the implicit contrasts with Kojève, Aron, Caillois, and Bataille, I show that its philosophical rationale was to supply experiential evidence attesting to the latent presence of human universality. It is a mythic device intended to animate the faith necessary for Marxist politics by showing that universal sociality is possible, and that the historically transformative praxis needed to realize it does not imply sacrifice. This sheds considerable light on Merleau-Ponty’s early postwar political thought. But inasmuch as the latter cannot be severed from his broader philosophical concerns, the prospect is raised that his entire phenomenological project in the early postwar period rested on a myth. Not necessarily a bad myth, but a myth nonetheless.     

Some myths about ‘mental illness’

Radical psychiatrists and others assert that mental illness is a myth. The opening and closing portions of the paper deal with the impact such argument has had in law and psychiatry. The body of the paper discusses the five versions of the myth argument prevalent in radical psychiatry: (A) that there is no such thing as mental illness; (B) that those called ‘mentally ill’ are really as rational as everyone else, only with different aims; that the only reasons anyone ever thought differently was (C) because of unsophisticated category mistakes or (D) because of an adherence to the epistemology of a sick society; and (E) that the phrase ‘mental illness’ is used to mask value judgments about others’ behavior in pseudo‐scientific respectability. Reasons are given for rejecting each of these versions of the argument that mental illness is a myth.     

Some differences between Kant’s and Husserl’s conceptions of transcendental philosophy

This article compares the differences between Kant’s and Husserl’s conceptions of the “transcendental.” It argues that, for Kant, the term “transcendental” stands for what is otherwise called “metaphysical,” i.e. non-empirical knowledge. As opposed to his predecessors, who had believed that such non-empirical knowledge was possible for meta-physical, i.e. transcendent objects, Kant’s contribution was to show how there can be non-empirical (a priori) knowledge not about transcendent objects, but about the necessary conditions for the experience of natural, non-transcendent objects. Hence the transcendental for Kant ends up connoting a philosophy that claims to show how subjective forms of intuition and thinking have objective validity for all objects as appearances. By contrast, Husserl’s phenomenological philosophy takes a different set of problems for its starting point. His quest is to avoid the uncertainty of empirical knowledge about all kinds of objects that present themselves to us as something other than, something transcendent to, consciousness. Transcendental or reliable knowledge is made possible through the phenomenological reduction that focuses strictly on consciousness as immediately self-given to itself—reflection upon “pure” consciousness. The contents of such consciousness are not the same for everyone and at every time, so they are not necessary and invariant in the way that Kant’s pure forms of subjectivity are. Since Husserl however also claims that the all objects, as intentional objects, are constituted in and for consciousness, an investigation into the structures of pure subjectivity can also be called “transcendental” in a further sense of showing the genesis of our knowledge of objects that are transcendent to consciousness. Moreover, since Husserl’s philosophical interest is precisely upon the structures of that consciousness, he also concentrates on necessary conditions for the constitution of these objects in his philosophical work. Hence, there ends up being a great deal of overlap between his own transcendental project and Kant’s in spite of the differences in what each of them means by the term “transcendental.”

Ockham’s razor and reasoning about information flow

What is the minimal algebraic structure to reason about information flow? Do we really need the full power of Boolean algebras with co-closure and de Morgan dual operators? How much can we weaken and still be able to reason about multi-agent scenarios in a tidy compositional way? This paper provides some answers.     

Clinical staff’s attributions about diabetes: Scale-development and staff vs. patient comparisons

Clinical staff’s attributions about diabetes management were measured using newly developed scales. Eighty-five physicians and nurses provided data to investigate the psychometric properties of the scales and to examine the patterns of attributions made. Alpha coefficients for the 7 six-item scales were satisfactory, ranging from .51 to .73. A comparison between attributions for positive and negative outcomes of diabetes management produced examples of self-serving bias. Comparisons were made with data from 286 insulin-dependent diabetes patients. Staff tended to rate patients as having less personal control over positive outcomes (t=2.94;df=338;p<.01) and tended to emphasize chance to a greater extent than did the patients (t=?4.32;df=338;p<.001). There was a tendency for staff to rate negative outcomes as being more foreseeable by the patients than the patients did themselves (t=?3.11;df=346;p<.01). Both patients and staff demonstrated bias towards dispositional attributions. The implications of between and within group differences in attribution patterns are discussed.     

Worries about Pritchard’s safety

I take issue with two claims that Duncan Pritchard makes in his recent book, Epistemic Luck. The first concerns his safety-based response to the lottery problem; the second his account of the relationship between safety and intellectual virtue.     

Vendler’s puzzle about imagination

Synthese - Vendler’s (Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale 84(2):161–173, 1979) puzzle about imagination is that the sentences ‘Imagine swimming in that water’ and...