Tyler Burge on disjunctivism (II)

In McDowell (2010), I responded to Burge's attack (2005) on disjunctivism. In Burge (2011) Burge rejects my response. He stands by his main claim that disjunctivism is incompatible with the science of perception, and in a supplementary spirit he argues against the detail of my attempt to defend disjunctivism. Here I explain how disjunctivism is compatible with the science, and I respond to some of Burge's supplementary arguments.     

Vahid,Burge, and Perceptual Entitlement

Hamid Vahid criticizes Tyler Burge's account of perceptual entitlement. Vahid argues that Burge's account fails to satisfy a criterion of adequacy that any correct account of perceptual warrant must satisfy. According to Vahid, a correct account of perceptual warrant must allow for perceptual beliefs which are produced by a properly functioning perceptual system yet which lack warrant. The present article argues that Vahid's critique of Burge fails. It presents numerous examples of such beliefs that are consistent with Burge's account of perceptual entitlement.     

Identification with the aggressor and the ‘normal traumas’: clinical implications

Ferenczi's (1933) surprisingly unknown concept of identification with the aggressor – an abuse victim's ‘eliminating’ her own subjectivity and ‘becoming’ precisely what an attacker needs her to be – has radical implications for our understanding of analytic technique. Its very frequent occurrence also forces us to broaden our understanding of what constitutes trauma. Ferenczi saw the experience of ‘traumatic aloneness’ or ‘emotional abandonment’ as the key element of trauma, since this is what enforces the traumatic responses of dissociation and identification with the aggressor. Identification with the aggressor operates in the analytic relationship in both patient and analyst. This has various consequences, including the structuring of the relationship through unconscious collusions – mutually coordinated, defensive identifications designed to help both participants feel secure. This view of the analytic relationship has clinical implications in at least four areas: the understanding of the patient's free associations, which may reflect the patient's compliance with the analyst's wishes rather than the contents of the patient's own unconscious; the need for some kind of mutuality of analysis; the traumatizing potential of the analyst's authority; and the tendency of some patients to take blame and responsibility reflexively, as a way of protecting the analyst.     

The Agential Point of View

Agentialist accounts of self‐knowledge seek to do justice to the connection between our identities as rational agents and our capacity to know our own minds. There are two strategies that agentialists have employed in developing their position: substantive and non‐substantive. My aim is to explicate and defend one particular example of the non‐substantive strategy, namely, that proposed by Tyler Burge. In particular, my concern is to defend Burge's claim that critical reasoning requires a relation of normative directness between reviewing and reviewed perspectives. My defence will involve supplementing Burge's view with a substantive agentialist account of self‐knowledge.     

Impervious and intrusive: The impenetrable object in transference and countertransference

The author describes an internal object that he calls the ‘impenetrable object’ which has two characteristics: being impervious to the projections from the patient and being intrusive, i.e. projecting into the patient. It arises out of an early relationship with a mother who may be generally disturbed or traumatized so that she is unable to take in or tolerate the child's projections and may use the child as a receptacle for her own projections. He links the concept of an impenetrable object with other concepts such as Williams's ‘reversal of the container–contained relationship’ and Green's ‘dead mother’. If such an object dominates the patient's internal world, it can lead to severe difficulties in the analytic process. Interpretations may be experienced as violent projections from the analyst which the patient has to ward off and the analyst may enact an impervious or intrusive object in various ways. The author describes a case in which such dynamics played a significant role. He argues that intensive work in the countertransference is required to detect subtle enactments and allow a shift in the analyst, which in turn can enable change in the patient. He gives clinical material that demonstrates such work by the analyst and illustrates the shift from an impenetrable object to a more permeable one in the patient's internal world.     

Perception and the Origins of Temporal Representation

Is temporal representation constitutively necessary for perception? Tyler Burge argues that it is, in part because perception requires a form of memory sufficiently sophisticated as to require temporal representation. I critically discuss Burge's argument, maintaining that it does not succeed. I conclude by reflecting on the consequences for the origins of temporal representation.     

Burge on Perceptual Entitlement

This article is concerned with the question of the nature of the epistemic liaison between experience and belief. The problem, often known as the problem of nondoxastic justification, is to see how a causal transition between experience and belief could assume a normative dimension, that is, how perceptual experience serves to justify beliefs about the world. Currently a number of theories have been proposed to resolve this problem. The article considers a particular solution offered by Tyler Burge which, among other things, introduces a new type of positive epistemic status or warrant, namely, entitlement. It contends that Burge's notion of entitlement cannot be of any help in resolving the problem of nondoxastic justification. Burge's account is compared and contrasted with other, similar, approaches to the problem of nondoxastic justification.     

Heidegger and the Supposition of a Single,Objective World

Christina Lafont has argued that the early Heidegger's reflections on truth and understanding are incompatible with ‘the supposition of a single objective world’. This paper presents her argument, reviews some responses that the existing Heidegger literature suggests (focusing, in particular, on work by John Haugeland), and offers what I argue is a superior response. Building on a deeper exploration of just what the above ‘supposition’ demands (an exploration informed by the work of Bernard Williams and Adrian Moore), I argue that a crucial assumption that Lafont and Haugeland both accept must be rejected, namely, that different ‘understandings of Being’ can be viewed as offering ‘rival perspectives’ on a common subject‐matter. I develop this case by drawing on an alternative account of what a Heideggerian ‘understanding of Being’ might be like.     

Food and violence: Childhood violence and emotional abuse as complicating factors in the inpatient treatment of eating disorders

SUMMARY

This paper considers the treatment, on an inpatient eating disorders ward, of patients who have suffered violence and emotional abuse during childhood. The complex web of relationships surrounding these patients is discussed, and it is suggested that there are multiple transferences — to the institution, to various members of staff, and to other patients — and that splitting of these transferences is inevitable. Staff experience powerful countertransference feelings, related to the patient's violent history. A central task for the staff team as a whole is to understand and contain the patient's disturbance — taking on, tolerating, and processing the projections. This demands the close working-together of the members of the multidisciplinary team, so that staff can together openly examine the patient's interaction with them and their own emotional responses to the patient and to other members of staff. If these responses are not understood by the ward staff, they can lead to conflict and inappropriate decisions. On the other hand, if the staff team together can build up a picture of the patient's relationships on the ward, and their meaning for the patient, this picture, like a particular projection of the world in an atlas, provides a ‘map’ of the patient's inner world. This ‘map’ can be used by the staff team in navigating their interactions with the patient. It can also assist the psychotherapist in her work to help the patient recognise and, eventually, own the split-off parts of herself.     

Sheldon Smith on Newton’s Derivative: Retrospective Assignation,Externalism and the History of Mathematics

To illustrate the view that a speaker can have a partial understanding of a concept, Burge uses the example of Leibniz’s and Newton’s understanding of the concept of derivative. In a recent article, Sheldon Smith criticizes this example and maintains that Newton’s and Leibniz’s use of their derivative symbols does not univocally determine their references. The present article aims at challenging Smith’s analysis. It first shows that Smith misconstrues Burge’s position. It second suggests that the philosophical lessons one should draw from the practice of the historians of philosophy are more ambivalent than what Smith thinks.

     

Bare Personhood? Velleman on selfhood

In the Introduction to Self to Self, J. David Velleman claims that ‘the word “self” does not denote any one entity but rather expresses a reflexive guise under which parts or aspects of a person are presented to his own mind’ (Velleman 2006, 1). Velleman distinguishes three different reflexive guises of the self: the self of the person's self-image, or narrative self-conception; the self of self-sameness over time; and the self as autonomous agent. Velleman's account of each of these different guises of the self is complex and repays close philosophical attention. The first aim of this paper is therefore to provide a detailed analysis of Velleman's view. The second aim is more critical. While I am in agreement with Velleman about the importance of distinguishing the different aspects of selfhood, I argue that, even on his own account, they are more interrelated than he acknowledges. I also analyse the role of the concept of ‘bare personhood’ in Velleman's approach to selfhood and question whether this concept can function, as he wants it to, to bridge the gap between a naturalistic analysis of reasons for action and Kantian moral reasons.     

Addictive states of mind

This paper explores the meaning of the pregnancy of the therapist as a challenge to the maintenance of the setting for therapy. The patient I shall describe was born ‘black’ in a ‘white’ family and was thus a challenge to her father's sense of paternity and her parents as a couple. She was the visual evidence of an infidelity. The problem had been denied in various ways, going as far as the attempt to deny her very existence. The therapist's pregnancy signified a betrayal of the ideal of a stable setting which was compounded by an earlier absence through illness. This ‘breaking of rules or promises' was then the setting for a re-working of the patient's story.

Setting, it is argued, can helpfully be seen as the mental space created by the partnership within the therapist between maternal and paternal relating to the ‘baby’ of the therapy. This enables a sense of negotiation and relationship in the creation of setting, which can include disruptions and other babies. At the same time the therapy had to work with a fundamental issue of illegitimacy or lack of belonging and the therapist's response to this. The ‘rules' of setting are a means to ensure a place to belong or attach to, but this work emphasized ‘setting’ and belonging as issues of relationship supported and enabled by our rules of engagement, but not reducible to them.     

Full and empty spaces in the analytic process2

In this paper the author discusses two categories of patients which differ in terms of the impact they have in the countertransference. On the one hand, there are patients who create an empty space in the analyst's mind. The response they provoke is a kind of depressive feeling that remains after they leave. The patient may bring dreams and associations, but they do not reverberate in the analyst's mind. The experience is of dryness, a dearth of memory, which may‐at times‐leave the analyst with a sense of exclusion from the patient's internal world. At the other extreme, there are patients who fill the consulting room. They do that with their words, dreams and associations but also with their emotions and their actions. The experience is that the analyst is over‐included in the patient's world. They have dreams that directly refer to the analyst and the analyst feels consistently involved in the patient's analysis. The pathway through which the analyst can understand both these types of patients is via the countertransference or, to put it another way, the analyst's passion. In ‘Analysis terminable and interminable’ Freud suggested that the bedrock of any analysis is the repudiation of femininity. The author believes this statement may be viewed as lying at the crossroads of the discussion about the limits of the theoretical and clinical psychoanalytic formulations which she refers to. In the examples presented the author relates the repudiation of femininity in its connections to the gaps implicit in psychoanalytic understanding.     

Thought and the social community

The anti‐Cartesian idea that a person's thoughts are not entirely fixed by what goes on inside that person's head is suggested by Hegel, and echoed in Wittgenstein and Frege. An argument for the view has recently been given by Tyler Burge. This paper claims that Burge's data can be explained better by an individualistic theory. The basic idea is that an individual's thoughts are specified analogically, in ordinary discourse, through the model of a language. Though the modelling‐sentences are public, the thoughts of the individual are inner states whose identity does not depend upon those sentences. They have content naturally, whether or not content happens to be ascribed to them.     

NEUTRALITY IN THE FIELD: ALPHA‐FUNCTION AND THE DREAMING DYAD IN PSYCHOANALYTIC PROCESS

Analysts have interpreted the concept of neutrality in a variety of ways, beginning with Strachey's use of that word to translate Freud's (1915) term, Indifferenz. In this paper, neutrality is linked to Freud's notions of free association and evenly suspended attention. A history of psychoanalytic attempts to clarify the concept are presented, with special attention to issues of ambiguity and the patient's role in the determination of neutrality. Neutrality is further elaborated in relation to the bipersonal field as described by the Barangers and contemporary field theorists. Understood in terms of the field, neutrality becomes a transpersonal concept, here conceived in terms of alpha‐function and a dreaming dyad. Two clinical examples cast in the light of a Bionian perspective are discussed to suggest an alternative understanding of analytic impasses and their relation to alpha‐function and neutrality.     

Commentary on ‘The arms of the chimeras’ by Béatrice Ithier

In this Commentary I will first of all summarise my understanding of the proposal set out by Béatrice Ithier concerning her concept of the ‘chimera’. The main part of my essay will focus on Ithier's claim that her concept of the chimera could be described as a ‘mental squiggle’ because it corresponds to Winnicott's work illustrated in his book ‘Therapeutic Consultations’ (1971). At the core of Ithier's chimera is the notion of a traumatic link between analyst and patient, which is the reason she enlists the work of Winnicott. I will argue, however, that Ithier's claim is based on a misperception of the theory that underpins Winnicott's therapeutic consultations because, different from Ithier's clinical examples of work with traumatised patients, Winnicott is careful to select cases who are from an ‘average expectable environment’ i.e. a good enough family. Moreover, Winnicott does not refer to any traumatic affinity with his patients, or to experiencing a quasi‐hallucinatory state of mind during the course of the consultations. These aspects are not incorporated into his theory. In contrast (to the concept Ithier attempts to advance), Winnicott's squiggle game constitutes an application of psychoanalysis intended as a diagnostic consultation. In that sense Winnicott's therapeutic consultations are comparable with the ordinary everyday work between analyst and analysand in a psychoanalytic treatment. My Commentary concludes with a question concerning the distinction between the ordinary countertransference in working with patients who are thinking symbolically in contrast to an extraordinary countertransference that I suggest is more likely to arise with patients who are traumatised and thus functioning at a borderline or psychotic level.     

What is the function of faith and trust in psychoanalysis?1

Unlike other concepts such as ‘illusion’, ‘capacity to tolerate frustration’ and ‘libidinal investment’, the concept of faith has not yet found a well‐defined position in psychoanalytic theory. Bion focused on faith and placed it in an unusual context: scientific work. Through the Act of Faith a researcher can give some consistency to certain ideas, hunches or intuitions that may appear during observation, though he cannot represent them by existing theory. Through the Act of Faith an analyst can ‘see’, ‘hear’ and ‘feel’ those mental phenomena, the reality of which leaves no practising psychoanalysts in doubt, even if they cannot represent them by current formulations. In this paper, the author aims to expand Bion's proposals into the clinical and therapeutic fields. In the first part, the author examines how faith and trust overlap, and how they depart from each other, and he gives an example. Faith possesses an igniting and driving force which trust doesn't possess to the same extent. In the second part, the author looks at F as a psychic function of the analyst, which aids him in supporting a depressed and hopeless patient while waiting for the return of the patient's desire to live. In the final part, he focuses on F from the patient's point of view and studies the transformations of F that may occur during an analysis.     

The body of the analyst and the analytic setting: Reflections on the embodied setting and the symbiotic transference

In this paper the author questions whether the body of the analyst may be helpfully conceptualized as an embodied feature of the setting and suggests that this may be especially helpful for understanding patients who develop a symbiotic transference and for whom any variance in the analyst's body is felt to be profoundly destabilizing. In such cases the patient needs to relate to the body of the analyst concretely and exclusively as a setting ‘constant’ and its meaning for the patient may thus remain inaccessible to analysis for a long time. When the separateness of the body of the analyst reaches the patient's awareness because of changes in the analyst's appearance or bodily state, it then mobilizes primitive anxieties in the patient. It is only when the body of the analyst can become a dynamic variable between them (i.e. part of the process) that it can be used by the patient to further the exploration of their own mind.