Bad News for Moral Error Theorists: There Is No Master Argument Against Companions in Guilt Strategies

A ‘companions in guilt’ (CG) strategy against moral error theory aims to show that the latter proves too much: if sound, it supports an implausible error-theoretic conclusion in other areas such as epistemic or practical reasoning. Christopher Cowie [2016 Cowie, C. 2016. Good News for Moral Error Theorists: A Master Argument Against Companions in Guilt Strategies, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94/1: 115–30.[Taylor &; Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]] has recently produced what he claims is a ‘master argument’ against all such strategies. The essence of his argument is that CG arguments cannot work because they are afflicted by internal incoherence or inconsistency. I argue, first, that Cowie's master argument does not succeed. Beyond this, I argue that there is no good reason to think that any such argument—one that purports to identify an internal incoherence in CG arguments—can succeed. Second, I argue that the main substantive area of disagreement between error theorists and CG theorists essentially concerns the conceptual profile of epistemic reasons—specifically, whether they are strongly categorical—not the ontological question of whether such reasons exist (in some form or other). I then develop an argument in favour of the CG theorist's position by considering the moral error theorist's arguments in support of the conceptual claim that moral reasons are strongly categorical. These include, notably, criticisms made by Joyce [2011] and Olson [2014] of Finlay's [2008] ‘end relational’ view of morality, according to which moral reasons are relative to some end or standard, hence not strongly categorical. Examining these criticisms, I argue that, based on what moral error theorists have said regarding the conceptual profile of moral reasons, there is a strong case to be made that moral reasons are strongly categorical (hence, according to the moral error theorist, ontologically problematic) if and only if epistemic reasons are.     

A Very Good Reason to Reject the Buck-Passing Account

This paper presents a new objection to the buck-passing account of value. I distinguish the buck-passing account of predicative value from the buck-passing account of attributive value. According to the latter, facts about attributive value reduce to facts about reasons and their weights. But since facts about reasons’ weights are themselves facts about attributive value, this account presupposes what it is supposed to explain. As part of this argument, I also argue against Mark Schroeder's recent account of the weights of reasons, which purports to explain the weights of reasons in terms of further reasons without circularity. I then argue that if we abandon the buck-passing account of attributive value, it would be ad hoc and unjustifiable to continue to endorse the buck-passing account of predicative value. In short, there seems to be little hope for the buck-passing account in either form. The paper ends by sketching a novel alternative theory according to which reasons are analysed in terms of the attributive value of motives. I suggest that a normative reason to ? is something that would be a good motive for ?-ing. At least at first glance, this view has numerous merits and few problems.     

道德理论的新进展--道德判断的社会直觉模式

道德判断的研究一直遵循皮亚杰和柯尔伯格的理性主义模式．但随着人们对认知双重过程论的逐渐认可,传统的道德判断理论受到了挑战。本文介绍了道德判断的一种新的理论模式——道德判断的社会直觉模式。该理论认为,道德判断是由迅速、自动的评价(直觉)所导致。     

Epistemic Instrumentalism and the Too Few Reasons Objection

Abstract

According to epistemic instrumentalism (EI), epistemic normativity arises from and depends on facts about our ends. On that view, a consideration C is an epistemic reason for a subject S to Φ only if Φ-ing would promote an end that S has. However, according to the Too Few Epistemic Reasons objection, this cannot be correct since there are cases in which, intuitively, C is an epistemic reason for S to Φ even though Φ-ing would not promote any of S’s ends. After clarifying both EI and the Too Few Epistemic Reasons objection, I examine three major instrumentalist replies and argue that none of them is satisfactory. I end by briefly sketching a fourth possible response, which is, I suggest, more promising than the other three.     

关于儿童道德情绪判断的研究进展

该阐释了道德情绪的基本概念,论述了关于儿童道德情绪判断的近期研究结论及其影响因素。3～10岁儿童的道德情绪判断经历了一个从不高兴到高兴再到不高兴的发展过程,这一进程受到儿童的内在社会认知能力(儿童能否理解愿望是一种主观的心理特性、考虑道德因素的能力、观点采择能力,对犯过人格特质的理解等)及其所处的外在情境因素(所面临情境或事件的性质、情境的不一致性等)的影响。最后,作对该领域的研究趋向做出了展望。     

道德困境决策中的忽略偏差:现象与测量

道德困境决策中的忽略偏差效应是指在道德困境中,当作为和不作为都会造成消极结果的情况下,个体认为作为导致的消极结果比不作为导致的消极结果更不道德,从而使人们在道德决策时更倾向于不作为的现象。由于传统道德决策研究范式存在义务论决策倾向性和一般性不作为反应倾向相混淆的局限,道德困境决策中的忽略偏差效应尚未做进一步探索。本文梳理了道德困境决策中忽略偏差效应的表现,通过CNI模型提出甄别和测量道德困境决策中忽略偏差效应的策略:创设研究情景; 分离不作为倾向性和忽略偏差效应; 综合探索忽略偏差效应的群体和个体特征。针对CNI模型的局限性,结合CAN算法和漂移扩散模型对未来的研究方向进行了展望。     

NON‐RELATIVE REASONS AND HUMEAN THOUGHT: IF WHAT IS A REASON FOR YOU IS A REASON FOR ME,WHERE DOES THAT LEAVE THE HUMEAN?

Abstract: A variety of strategies have been used to oppose the influential Humean thesis that all of an agent's reasons for action are provided by the agent's current wants. Among these strategies is the attempt to show that it is a conceptual truth that reasons for action are non‐relative. I introduce the notion of a basic reason‐giving consideration and show that the non‐relativity thesis can be understood as a corollary of the more fundamental thesis that basic reason‐giving considerations are generalizable. I then consider the relationship between the generalizability thesis and the Humean thesis that all of an agent's reasons for action are provided by the agent's current wants. I argue that, contrary to a common assumption, there is a subtle and clearly motivated version of the Humean thesis that does not deny, and so is not threatened by, the generalizability thesis.     

道德相对主义和厌恶情绪对道德直觉判断的影响

社会直觉模型认为有意识的道德推理过程发生在道德直觉判断之后。那么,道德直觉判断又是怎么形成的,是否受认知推理和情绪的影响?实验1首先验证道德直觉判断的存在;实验2考察了道德相对主义对道德直觉判断的影响;实验3考察了厌恶情绪对道德直觉判断的影响。结果发现:(1)道德绝对主义比道德相对主义条件下,个体更倾向于做出道德直觉判断,说明道德直觉判断受认知推理影响。(2)厌恶情绪比中立情绪启动条件下,个体更倾向于做出道德直觉判断,说明道德直觉判断受情绪影响。因此,道德直觉判断会受认知推理和情绪的影响。     

道德推脱对员工道德决策的影响：德行领导的调节作用

运用问卷调查的方法,以819名员工为研究被试,探讨了德行领导在道德推脱影响道德决策过程中的调节作用。采用层次回归分析的方法研究发现：德行领导对道德推脱与道德识别、道德判断之间的关系具有调节作用;但德行领导不会对道德推脱与道德意图之间的关系产生调节作用,而会对道德意图产生显著的直接影响。     

Non-Cognitivism and Fundamental Moral Certitude: Reply to Eriksson and Francén Olinder

Accommodating degrees of moral certitude is a serious problem for non-cognitivism about ethics. In particular, non-cognitivism has trouble accommodating fundamental moral certitude. John Eriksson and Ragnar Francén Olinder [2016] have recently proposed a solution. In fact, Eriksson and Francén Olinder offer two different proposals—one ‘classification’ account and one ‘projectivist’ account. We argue that the classification account faces the same problem as previous accounts do, while the projectivist account has unacceptable implications. Non-cognitivists will have to look elsewhere for a plausible solution to the problem of accommodating fundamental moral certitude.     

Ethical Predispositions to Violate or Obey Traffic Rules and the Mediating Role of Driving Styles

Traffic law violations are the most important determinants of traffic accidents. This study examined the influence of drivers' ethical perspective on their traffic violations and the mediating role of driving styles in these relationships. A sample of 313 drivers participated in the study. Contrary to expectations, high ethical relativism was found to be associated with fewer aggressive traffic violations. This suggests that the informal normative system that parallels the official traffic regulations is the more salient reference against which drivers usually assess the adequacy of their behaviors, highly relativistic drivers being more willing to also take into consideration the official traffic code in these appraisals. We also found significant interactions between idealism and relativism on both ordinary and aggressive violations. Idealism emerged as a predictor of these violations only in drivers low in relativism. In this group, one's concern about the harm that he/she might cause to other traffic participants induces higher traffic law abidingness. These influences of idealism were mediated by certain driving styles. Drivers' general ethical perspective fosters a specific pattern of driving styles and, consequently, the tendency to commit or to refrain from traffic violations.