“Part of the Very Concept”: Wittgensteinian Moral Philosophy1

X is “part of the very concept” of Y. This formulation recurs throughout Raimond Gaita's philosophy and informs Christopher Cordner's. I elucidate the formulation's meaning and the nature of the necessity posited, then conclude with a criticism. One cannot love evil. One cannot love cow dung. For Gaita, these claims differ in type. The first testifies to a conceptual relation, but the second to a “mere fact.” I see no clear basis for assigning to claims one type over another, which challenges the footing of Wittgensteinian moral philosophy. Why do no moral“mere facts” partly define our form of life?     

Correlations between rats' spatial location and intracranial stimulation administration affects rate of acquisition and asymptotic level of time allocation preference in the open field

The present experiment explores the effects of the response (1-sec occupancy of a target area in an open field)-reinforcer (intracranial stimulation) contingency on time allocation in the open field in rats. The probability of reinforcement given response (X) and the probability of reinforcement given nonresponse (Y) were varied randomly across sessions within a subject. The 21 contingency treatments explored included all possible combinations of values (0, .1, .2, .3, .4, .5) of X and Y such that X ≥ Y. The results indicate that rate of acquisition and asymptotic level of time allocation preference to the target area are negatively related to the value of Y (for any given value of X). Variations in X (for any given value of Y) were less effective. Evaluation of proposed contingency metrics revealed that the Weber fraction (X − Y)/X most closely approximates performance, and that the value of the difference detection threshold derived from the Weber fraction is a constant.     

Thinking About a Word—Love,for Example

What is it we do when we philosophize about a word? How are we to act as we ask the philosophical question par excellence, “What is … ?” These questions are addressed here with particular focus on Troy Jollimore's Love's Vision and contemporary theories of love. Jollimore's rationalist account of love, based on a specific understanding of “reasons for love,” illustrates a particular philosophical mistake: When we think about a word, we are prone to believe that even though “the sense of the word” that we investigate may be up for grabs, the other words we use when we do these investigations are not. Jollimore's exploration of love is guided by specific conceptions of “reasons” and “rationality” that remain unquestioned. The article argues that we may have to rethink a great number of words as we embark on the task of uncovering the sense of one word.     

Subject‐Relative Reasons for Love

Can love be an appropriate response to a person? In this paper, I argue that it can. First, I discuss the reasons why we might think this question should be answered in the negative. This will help us clarify the question itself. Then I argue that, even though extant accounts of reasons for love are inadequate, there remains the suspicion that there must be something about people which make our love for them appropriate. Being lovable, I contend, is what makes our love for them appropriate, just as being fearsome is what makes our fear of certain situations appropriate. I finally propose a general account of this property which avoids the major problems facing the extant accounts of reasons for love.     

Loving People for Who They Are (Even When They Don't Love You Back)

The debate on love's reasons ignores unrequited love, which—I argue—can be as genuine and as valuable as reciprocated love. I start by showing that the relationship view of love cannot account for either the reasons or the value of unrequited love. I then present the simple property view, an alternative to the relationship view that is beset with its own problems. In order to solve these problems, I present a more sophisticated version of the property view that integrates ideas from different property theorists in the love literature. However, even this more sophisticated property view falls short in accounting for unrequited love's reasons. In response, I develop a new version of the property view that I call the experiential view. On this view, we love a person not only in virtue of properties shaped by and experienced in a reciprocal loving relationship, but also in virtue of perspectival properties, whose value can be properly assessed also outside of a reciprocal loving relationship. The experiential view is the only view that can account not only for reciprocated love's reasons, but also for unrequited love's reasons.     

Works of Love in a World of Violence: Kierkegaard,Feminism, and the Limits of Self‐Sacrifice

Feminist scholars adopt wide‐ranging views of self‐sacrifice: their critiques claim that women are inordinately affected by Christianity's valorization of self‐sacrifice and that this traditional Christian value is inherently misogynistic and necrophilic. Although Søren Kierkegaard's Works of Love deems Christian love essentially sacrificial, love, in his view, sets significant limits on the role of self‐sacrifice in human life. Through his proposed response to one who requests forgiveness, “Do you now truly love me?” Kierkegaard offers a model of forgiveness that subverts traditional ideals of the self‐sacrificing and submissive woman while keeping love central. The question asserts self‐love, involves redoubling and double danger, and expresses a refusal to imitate Christ's suffering. I propose a reading in keeping with Grace Jantzen's vision for a feminist philosophy of religion, which reads against the grain and “seeks to break through to new ways of thinking that may open up divine horizons.” My reading is further supported by Kierkegaard's contention that everything essentially Christian bears a double meaning. In light of the subversive potential found in the discrepancy between apparent love and actual love, as well as the duty to name the sin of one who has behaved in an unloving manner, I argue that Kierkegaard's philosophy of love resists simplistic understandings of self‐sacrificing love.     

How Interesting is the “Boring Problem” for Luck Egalitarianism?

Imagine a two‐person distributive case in which Ernest's choices yield X and Bertie's choices yield X + Y, producing an income gap between them of Y. Neither Ernest nor Bertie is responsible for this gap of Y, since neither of them has any control over what the other agent chooses. This is what Susan Hurley calls the “Boring Problem” for luck egalitarianism. Contrary to Hurley's relatively dismissive treatment of it, it is contended that the Boring Problem poses a deep problem for standard luck egalitarianism. To counter it, luck egalitarianism needs to be recast as a baseline‐relative theory. This new version of luck egalitarianism is then put to work against some significant problems that have been encountered by luck egalitarianism: Saul Smilansky's “Paradox of the Baseline,” the “Partiality Worry,” and the “Pluralism Worry.” But baseline‐relative luck egalitarianism is not without problems of its own.     

The psychological side of Hempel’s paradox of confirmation

People often test hypotheses about two variables (X andY), each with two levels (e.g.,X1 andX2). When testing “IfX1, thenY1,” observing the conjunction ofX1 andY1 is overwhelmingly perceived as more supportive than observing the conjunction ofX2 andY2, although both observations support the hypothesis. Normatively, theX2&Y2 observation provides stronger support than theX1&Y1 observation if the former is rarer. Because participants in laboratory settings typically test hypotheses they are unfamiliar with, previous research has not examined whether participants are sensitive to the rarity of observations. The experiment reported here showed that participants were sensitive to rarity, even judging a rareX2&Y2 observation more supportive than a commonX1&Y1 observation under certain conditions. Furthermore, participants’ default strategy of judgingX1&Y1 observations more informative might be generally adaptive because hypotheses usually regard rare events.     

What Invariance Is and How to Test for It

Causal assessment is the problem of establishing whether a relation between (variable) X and (variable) Y is causal. This problem, to be sure, is widespread across the sciences. According to accredited positions in the philosophy of causality and in social science methodology, invariance under intervention provides the most reliable test to decide whether X causes Y. This account of invariance (under intervention) has been criticised, among other reasons, because it makes manipulations on the putative causal factor fundamental for the causal methodology; consequently, the argument goes, the account is ill-suited to those contexts where manipulations are not performed, for instance, the social sciences. The article aims to extend the account of invariance (under intervention), in a way that manipulations on the putative causal factors are not methodologically fundamental, and yet invariance remains key for causal assessment both in experimental and non-experimental contexts.     

On the correlation of a naturally and an artificially dichotomized variable

A method is suggested for estimating the correlation of a naturally (X) and an artificially (Y) dichotomized variable. It is assumed that a normal random variable (L) underlies the artificially dichotomized variable. The proposed correlation coefficient recovers the product moment correlation coefficient between X and L from a fourfold table of X and Y. The suggested correlation coefficient ν is contrasted with the phi correlation and the biserial η. The biserial η was proposed by Karl Pearson and is conceptually related to the new correlation coefficient. However, in addition, Pearson's biserial η invokes the assumption that the marginal distribution of L is normal, which contradicts its basic assumptions and thus does not recover the true correlation of L and X. Finally, an approximation is provided to simplify the calculation of ν and its standard error.     

Weekly Cycles in Daily Report Data: An Overlooked Issue

Daily diaries and other everyday experience methods are increasingly used to study relationships between two time‐varying variables X and Y. Although daily data potentially often have weekly cyclical patterns (e.g., stress may be higher on weekdays and lower on weekends), the majority of daily diary studies have ignored this possibility. In this study, we investigated the effect of ignoring existing weekly cycles. We reanalyzed an empirical dataset (stress and alcohol consumption) and performed Monte Carlo simulations to investigate the impact of omitting weekly cycles. In the empirical dataset, ignoring cycles led to the inference of a significant within‐person X–Y relation whereas modeling cycles suggested that this relationship did not exist. Simulation results indicated that ignoring cycles that existed in both X and Y led to bias in the estimated within‐person X–Y relationship. The amount and direction of bias depended on the magnitude of the cycles, magnitude of the true within‐person X–Y relation, and synchronization of the cycles. We encourage researchers conducting daily diary studies to address potential weekly cycles in their data. We provide guidelines for detecting and modeling cycles to remove their influence and discuss challenges of causal inference in daily experience studies.     

Trivial Personal Differences

Abstract

In Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit argues that personal identity is indeterminate and that identity is not what matters in personal survival. Parfit argues that traditional views of personal identity have counterintuitive consequences and that they violate a plausible requirement, suggested by Bernard Williams, that must be met by any acceptable criterion of identity. Parfit argues that, unlike traditional determinate views of personal identity, his view succeeds in accommodating intuitions and in meeting (an analogue to) Williams' requirement. I argue that Parfit's view has more counterintuitive consequences than do the traditional views of identity. Though the traditional views do seem to violate Williams' requirement, Parfit's view fares no better. In fact, it seems that any theory of personal survival that appeals to connections that may hold to a greater or lesser extent will fail to meet the relevant requirement. This is an important general point, since the requirement is a plausible one.     

Intuitive prediction: ecological validity versus representativeness

Insufficiently regressive intuitive predictions have been attributed to mistaken reliance on the representativeness heuristic. In contrast, we suggest that intuitive predictions stem from a conceptualization of ‘goodness of prediction’ that differs from the accepted statistical definition in terms of error minimization, namely, ecological validity—that is, representation of the substantive characteristics of the predicted variable Y and its distribution as well as of the relationship between Y and the predictor X—rather than minimization of prediction errors. Simultaneous satisfaction of the above representation requirements is achieved by multivalued prediction: The prediction of different Y′ values for the same X value, resulting in conditional distributions Y′|X for at least some X values. Empirical results supporting this hypothesis are presented and discussed. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Sequential Dominance Argument for the Independence Axiom of Expected Utility Theory

Independence is the condition that, if X is preferred to Y, then a lottery between X and Z is preferred to a lottery between Y and Z given the same probability of Z. Is it rationally required that one’s preferences conform to Independence? The main objection to this requirement is that it would rule out the alleged rationality of Allais and Ellsberg Preferences. In this paper, I put forward a sequential dominance argument with fairly weak assumptions for a variant of Independence (called Independence for Constant Prospects), which shows that Allais and Ellsberg Preferences are irrational. Hence this influential objection (that is, the alleged rationality of Allais and Ellsberg Preferences) can be rebutted. I also put forward a number of sequential dominance arguments that various versions of Independence are requirements of rationality. One of these arguments is based on very minimal assumptions, but the arguments for the versions of Independence which are strong enough to serve in the standard axiomatization of Expected Utility Theory need notably stronger assumptions.     

Local measures of association: Estimating the derivative of the regression line

A local measure of association that allows both heteroscedasticity and a non‐linear association was developed during the 1990s. The basic goal is to measure the strength of the association between X and Y, given X, when Y=θ(X)+τ(X)ε for some unknown functions θ(X) and τ(X). Application of this method requires the estimation of the derivative of θ(X). The focus in this paper is on four alternatives to a very slight modification of the method used by Doksum et al. when estimating this derivative. The main result is that in simulations, a certain robust analogue of their method dominates in terms of mean squared error, even under normality. The bias of the method is found to be small but a little larger than the bias associated with the method used by Doksum et al. The method is based in part on bootstrap bagging followed by a lowess smooth.     

Maximum likelihood estimation of the joint covariance matrix for sections of tests given to distinct samples with application to test equating

Consider an old testX consisting ofs sections and two new testsY andZ similar toX consisting ofp andq sections respectively. All subjects are given testX plus two variable sections from either testY orZ. Different pairings of variable sections are given to each subsample of subjects. We present a method of estimating the covariance matrix of the combined test (X ₁, ...,X _s ,Y ₁, ...,Y _p ,Z ₁, ...,Z _q ) and describe an application of these estimation techniques to linear, observed-score, test equating.The author is indebted to Paul W. Holland and Donald B. Rubin for their encouragement and many helpful comments and suggestions that contributed significantly to the development of this paper.This research was supported by the Program Statistics Research Project of the ETS Research Statistics Group.     

Can There Be Full Excuses for Morally Wrong Actions?*

Most people (and philosophers) distinguish between performing a morally wrong action and being blameworthy for having performed that action, and believe that an individual can be fully excused for having performed a wrong action. My purpose is to reject this claim. More precisely, I defend what I call the “Dependence Claim”: A's doing X is wrong only if A is blameworthy for having done X. I consider three cases in which, according to the traditional view, a wrong action could be excused: duress, mental illness, and mistake. I try to show that the reasons for excusing in either case are not relevantly distinguishable from the reasons for claiming that the prima facie wrong action is not wrong all things considered.     

Christ's Love as the Basis of the Church's Faith Witness to Muslims

According to the Christian view, the essence of the triune God is revealed in the relational event between God the Father, the Son Jesus Christ, and the Holy Spirit. The Bible says of this God, “God is love” (1 John 4:8, 16). By way of example, the article explores “God's love” to show that the Qur'an's conception of God is incompatible with key tenets of the New Testament. Thus, when keeping both conceptions of God in view, we cannot speak of one and the same God. Now what does this mean for the pursuit of conciliatory relations between Christians and Muslims? Which relational paradigms need to be kept in mind? After reflecting on the concepts of neighbourliness, companionship, and hospitality, the article goes on to trace the conceptual outlines of Christian mission as a mission of God's love (missio amoris Dei). Its hypothesis is that a characteristically Christian conception of God can supply useful motifs for appreciative and conciliatory actions by Christians toward Muslims. Finally, the author proposes a theology of interreligious relations (which he has elaborated upon elsewhere) as an alternative approach to conventional theologies of religion.     

The effects of response-reinforcer contingency on time allocation in the open field

The present experiment explores the effects of the response (1-sec occupancy of a target area in an open field)—reinforcer (intracranial stimulation) contingency on time allocation in the open field in rats. The probability of reinforcement given a response (X) and the probability of reinforcement given the absence of a response (Y) were varied randomly across sessions within a subject. The following (X, Y) values were utilized: (.05, 0), (.15, 0), (.25, 0), (.15, .05), and (.15, .15). The results of this experiment indicate that rate of acquisition of time allocation preference is uniformly rapid during all contingency treatments wherein Y = 0 and is negatively related to the value of Y when X = .15. The relationship between the asymptote of the time allocation acquisition function and the value of X (when Y = 0) is positively sloped and negatively accelerated, while the relationship between asymptote and the value of Y (when X = .15) is negatively sloped with zero acceleration. Proposed contingency metrics are evaluated.