Embodiment, ownership and disownership

There are two main pathways to investigate the sense of body ownership, (i) through the study of the conditions of embodiment for an object to be experienced as one's own and (ii) through the analysis of the deficits in patients who experience a body part as alien. Here, I propose that E is embodied if some properties of E are processed in the same way as the properties of one's body. However, one must distinguish among different types of embodiment, and only self-specific embodiment can lead to feelings of ownership. I address issues such as the functional role and the dynamics of embodiment, degrees and measures of ownership, and shared body representations between self and others. I then analyse the interaction between ownership and disownership. On the one hand, I show that there is no evidence that in the Rubber Hand Illusion, the rubber hand replaces the biological hand. On the other hand, I argue that the sense of disownership experienced by patients towards their body part cannot be reduced to the mere lack of ownership.     

Out of nowhere: Thought insertion,ownership and context-integration

We argue that thought insertion primarily involves a disruption of the sense of ownership for thoughts and that the lack of a sense of agency is but a consequence of this disruption. We defend the hypothesis that this disruption of the sense of ownership stems from a failure in the online integration of the contextual information related to a thought, in particular contextual information concerning the different causal factors that may be implicated in their production. Loss of unity of consciousness, manifested by incoherent subjective experiences is a general phenomenal characteristic of schizophrenia. This loss of coherence has been hypothesized to reflect a generalized deficit of contextual information integration not conveyed by, but related to, a target event. This deficit is manifested across many cognitive domains. We argue that it is also manifested in the process of thinking itself, resulting in causally decontextualized thoughts that are experienced as inserted thoughts.     

Gun control, gun ownership, and suicide prevention

The relationship of the extent of gun ownership and the strictness of gun control laws to suicide and homicide rates in the nine major geographic regions of the United States was explored. Gun ownership, rather than the strictness of gun control laws, was found to be the strongest correlate of the rates of suicide and homicide by guns. Regions with a higher extent of gun ownership had higher rates of suicide and homicide by firearms.     

Tablets,touchscreens, and touchpads: How varying touch interfaces trigger psychological ownership and endowment

As mouse-driven desktop computers give way to touchpad laptops and touchscreen tablets, the role of touch in online consumer behavior has become increasingly important. This work presents initial explorations into the effects of varying touch-based interfaces on consumers, and argues that research into the interfaces used to access content can be as important as research into the content itself. Two laboratory studies using a variety of touch technologies explore how touchscreen interfaces can increase perceived psychological ownership, and this in turn magnifies the endowment effect. Touch interfaces also interact with importance of product haptics and actual interface ownership in their effects on perceived product ownership, with stronger effects for products high in haptic importance and interfaces that are owned. Results highlight that perceptions of online products and marketing activities are filtered through the lens of the interfaces used to explore them, and touch-based devices like tablets can lead to higher product valuations when compared to traditional computers.     

Body ownership: When feeling and knowing diverge

Individuals with the peculiar disturbance of ‘overcompleteness’ experience an intense desire to amputate one of their healthy limbs, describing a sense of disownership for it (Body Integrity Identity Disorder – BIID). This condition is similar to somatoparaphrenia, the acquired delusion that one’s own limb belongs to someone else. In ten individuals with BIID, we measured skin conductance response to noxious stimuli, delivered to the accepted and non-accepted limb, touching the body part or simulating the contact (stimuli approach the body without contacting it), hypothesizing that these individuals have responses like somatoparaphrenic patients, who previously showed reduced pain anticipation, when the threat was directed to the disowned limb. We found reduced anticipatory response to stimuli approaching, but not contacting, the unwanted limb. Conversely, stimuli contacting the non-accepted body-part, induced stronger SCR than those contacting the healthy parts, suggesting that feeling of ownership is critically related to a proper processing of incoming threats.     

Scientific research, museum collections, and the rights of ownership

This article examines the question of how can museum professionals and the interested public resolve the competing claims of traditional ownership and continuing scientific research in relation to museum collections. An earlier version of this paper was presented at a symposium entitled “Ethics in Science: Special Problems in Anthropology and Archaeology” held at the 1998 Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), Philadelphia, PA, 15 February, 1998.     

Initial ownership in bargaining: introducing the giving, splitting, and taking ultimatum bargaining game

In three experiments, the authors studied the role of initial ownership of property in bargaining behavior. For this purpose, they created three new variations of the Ultimatum Bargaining Game (UBG): giving, splitting, and taking UBGs. On the basis of insights of loss aversion and the do-no-harm principle, the authors predicted and found that allocations to the recipient were highest in the taking UBG and lowest in the giving UBG. Additional measures to study the underlying mechanism of this effect indicate that the game type effect was mediated by perceptions of entitlement, which allocators did not want to infringe on. Moreover, the effect was not affected by strategic options as provided by deception or power.     

Introduction: Egoism,Altruism and Impartiality

The distinction between egoistic and altruistic motivation is firmly embedded in contemporary moral discourse, but harks back too to early modern attempts to found morality on an egoistic basis. Rejecting that latter premise means accepting that others’ interests have intrinsic value, but it remains far from clear what altruism demands of us and what its relationship is with the rest of morality. While informing our duties, altruism seems also to urge us to transcend them and embrace the other-regarding values and virtues constitutive of a good life. This rather wide conception of morality may strike us today as too demanding. At the same time, however, currently popular impartialist accounts of morality can disrupt much everyday altruism in their insistence that each person’s interests are weighed precisely equally. Having sketched this problematic of altruism, the second half of this Introduction outlines the arguments of the four papers and review essay in this collection, each of which, in a different way, negotiates the difficult relationships between egoism, altruism, morality and impartiality. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Biography, Narrative, and Lives: An Introduction

ABSTRACT The purpose of this special issue of the Journal of Personality is to spotlight some of the more fruitful ways in which contemporary personality psychologists are collecting, analyzing, and discerning stories about persons' lives The issue focuses both on current approaches to psychobiography and on new uses of life narratives in social research     

Bodily ownership and self-location: Components of bodily self-consciousness

Recent research on bodily self-consciousness has assumed that it consists of three distinct components: the experience of owning a body (body ownership); the experience of being a body with a given location within the environment (self-location); and the experience of taking a first-person, body-centered, perspective on that environment (perspective). Here we review recent neuroimaging studies suggesting that at least two of these components—body ownership and self-location—are implemented in rather distinct neural substrates, located, respectively, in the premotor cortex and in the temporo-parietal junction. We examine these results and consider them in relation to clinical evidence from patients with altered body perception and work on a variety of multisensory, body-related illusions, such as the rubber hand illusion, the full body illusion, the body swap illusion and the enfacement illusion. We conclude by providing a preliminary synthesis of the data on bodily self-consciousness and its neural correlates.