Disappointment expression evokes collective guilt and collective action in intergroup conflict: the moderating role of legitimacy perceptions

Research on intergroup emotions has largely focused on the experience of emotions and surprisingly little attention has been given to the expression of emotions. Drawing on the social-functional approach to emotions, we argue that in the context of intergroup conflicts, outgroup members’ expression of disappointment with one’s ingroup induces the complementary emotion of collective guilt and correspondingly a collective action protesting ingroup actions against the outgroup. In Study 1 conducted immediately after the 2014 Gaza war, Jewish-Israeli participants received information about outgroup’s (Palestinians) expression of emotions (disappointment, fear, or none). As predicted, outgroup’s expression of disappointment increased collective guilt and willingness to participate in collective action, but only among those who saw the intergroup situation as illegitimate. Moreover, collective guilt mediated the relationship between disappointment expression and collective action, moderated, again, by legitimacy perception. In Study 2, we replicated these results in the context of racial tension between Black and White Americans in the US. We discuss the theoretical and applied implications of the findings.     

The impact of feminist stereotypes and sexual identity on feminist self-identification and collective action

ABSTRACT

The present study sought to examine the role of sexual identity and exposure to stereotypes of feminism on women’s self-identification as a feminist, endorsement of feminist attitudes, and intention to engage in collective action. Participants (N = 312; all women) disclosed their sexual identity as either heterosexual or non-heterosexual (sexual minority) and were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: exposure to positive stereotypes of feminists, to negative stereotypes of feminists, control condition (no exposure to stereotypes). Results showed stark differences between heterosexual and sexual minority women, with sexual minority women scoring significantly higher on self-identification as feminist, feminist attitudes, and collective action intentions. Exposure to positive stereotypes of feminists increased feminist self-identification regardless of sexual identity. Exposure to negative stereotypes reduced self-identification with feminism, and lower identification mediated the path between negative stereotyping and collective action. Implications of these findings for the advancement of women’s rights movements are discussed.     

当抗议遭遇挫折:集体行动失利情境下情绪反应对行动意愿的作用

在集体行动发展过程中,新的群际互动事件会对参与者心理及行为产生重要影响。本研究采取调查问卷与实验情境设计相结合的方法,考察了集体行动失利情境下参与者情绪体验对其未来行动意愿的影响,以及群体认同与群体效能对情绪的作用机制。研究结果显示:1)集体行动的消极结果会引发参与者愤怒与沮丧情绪体验,且愤怒情绪对其未来行动意愿有正向预测作用,沮丧情绪对其未来行动意愿有负向预测作用;2)群体认同与群体效能会影响群体成员因集体行动失利而产生的愤怒感与沮丧感,参与者对内群体的认同感越强,效能评估越高,在集体行动遭遇挫败时体验到的愤怒感就越强,体验到的沮丧感就越弱。本研究扩展了集体行动的情绪研究取向,并为探讨集体行动的动态演变提供了新的研究思路。     

Selective humanitarian intervention: moral reason and collective agents

This paper examines four interpretations of the observation that humanitarian intervention might be used ‘selectively’ or ‘inconsistently’ in order to elucidate the normative commitments of the deliberative process in international relations. The paper argues that there are several types of concerns that are implicit in the accusation of inconsistency, and only some of them amount to objections to humanitarian intervention as a whole. The paradox of humanitarian intervention is that intervention is prohibited except where the intervention is humanitarian, yet humanitarian reasons never exist in isolation, and it is nearly impossible to determine the real reason for intervention (or any other collective action) in the international arena. The problems revealed by an examination of inconsistency in the example of humanitarian intervention turn out to be general problems with applying the norms of practical reasoning to moral questions dealing with collective agents.     

Identity and injustice: Exploring women's participation in collective action

The present study is an investigation into the social psychological factors associated with women's reported participation in a range of different types of political action in the context of gender relations. At time 1,610 women were asked to rate their readiness to participate in various actions and to provide measures of social beliefs. Factor analysis extracted four types of action: participation in women's groups, collective protest, informal participation, and individual protest. One year later, at time 2, a subgroup of the same women were asked to say how much they had actually participated over the previous 12 months. Reported participation was related to gender identity, collective relative deprivation, efficacy, collectivist orientation, and identification as an activist. Regression analysis showed that identification as an activist was by far the most powerful correlate of participation, followed by gender identity; and that gender identity also played a role in moderating relationships between reported participation and other predictor variables. These findings show the important role of identity processes underlying participation in collective action and suggest the need to develop interaction models of participation.     

Nostalgia for America's past can buffer collective guilt

This research examined when, and for whom, American collective nostalgia can relieve feelings of collective guilt. In the Pilot Study, path analyses revealed that national glorification is associated with collective nostalgia, and collective nostalgia is associated with lower collective guilt. Our experimental studies test the role of these variables in determining responses to the elevated salience of past ingroup harm doing. Collective nostalgia was associated with lower collective guilt especially after reminders of America's harm doing in Study 1 . In Study 2 we predicted and showed that reminders of American harm doing would evoke spontaneous collective nostalgia for participants high in national glorification. The remaining studies tested the hypothesis that collective nostalgia serves to buffer collective guilt. Collective guilt was lower after reminders of past harm doing for participants who engaged in collective nostalgia ( Study 3 ), and this was especially pronounced for participants high in national glorification ( Study 4 ).     

Collective action and subordinate group identity in a simulated society game

Abstract: This research examined the effects of upward mobility and resource disparity on subordinates’ collective action and group identity in a context of intergroup negotiation by using a simulated society (SIMSOC) game. According to the social identity theory, it was hypothesized that when individual mobility opportunities for a subordinate group increase, the members of the subordinate group are less likely to participate in collective actions and to appreciate the merits of their own group identity. Four hundred and fifty‐four undergraduates participated in 12 separate SIMSOC games. For each game, approximately 40 undergraduates were divided into dominant and subordinate groups. Each of the four combinations of high/low levels of upward mobility and large/small resource disparity was played out three times. Subordinates in the low‐mobility condition acted collectively more frequently and evaluated their own group more positively than those in the high‐mobility condition. A signifificant positive correlation between the frequency of subordinates’ collective action and in‐group favoritism was found.     

Collective Action as Individual Choice

We argue that conceptual analyses of collective action should be informed by game-theoretic analyses of collective action. In particular, we argue that Ariel Rubenstein’s so-called ‘Electronic Mail Game’ provides a useful model of collective action, and of the formation of collective intentions.     

On collective intentions: collective action in economics and philosophy

Philosophers and economists write about collective action from distinct but related points of view. This paper aims to bridge these perspectives. Economists have been concerned with rationality in a strategic context. There, problems posed by “coordination games” seem to point to a form of rational action, “team thinking,” which is not individualistic. Philosophers’ analyses of collective intention, however, sometimes reduce collective action to a set of individually instrumental actions. They do not, therefore, capture the first person plural perspective characteristic of team thinking. Other analyses, problematically, depict intentions ranging over others’ actions. I offer an analysis of collective intention which avoids these problems. A collective intention aims only at causing an individual action, but its propositional content stipulates its mirroring in other minds.     

Why We Did It: An Anscombian Account of Collective Action

Abstract

In this paper, I am concerned with persons’ capacity for joint action. I start by suggesting that approaches which seek to account for that capacity in terms of collective intentionality face a problem: there are actions that clearly seem to qualify as collective even though the involved persons cannot be said to entertain an overarching ‘We’‐intention (however one characterizes this notion). I then go on to develop an alternative account of action that loosely draws on Elizabeth Anscombe’s action theory and show how this alternative account can be applied to joint action. In so doing, I stress the importance of the phenomenal dimension of agency.     

Internalized equality and protest against injustice: The role of disadvantaged group members’ self-respect in collective action tendencies

Recent research shows that self-respect (defined as seeing yourself as a person with equal rights) predicts assertive but not aggressive responses to injustice in interpersonal contexts. The present research focuses on the antecedents of self-respect and its consequences for collective action tendencies among members of disadvantaged groups. Across three studies (N = 227, N = 454, N = 131) using different contexts and samples (discrimination of Muslims in Germany; women regarding gender inequality), experiences with equality-based respect (defined as being treated as someone of equal worth) predicted self-respect. Moreover, across all three studies, self-respect predicted intentions for cooperative or normative but not support for hostile or non-normative protest. The results demonstrate the potential of self-respect for facilitating collective action in the face of injustice while still enabling positive intergroup relations.     

浅谈羌民族灾后心理自我修复中的集体潜意识

5.12汶川大地震给居于四川北川、阿坝等地区的羌族人民带来了深刻的痛苦与回忆,给幸存者心理上留下了不可磨灭的阴影。灾后如何做好对其心理自我修复的引导,是一个值得关注的课题。而面对这样一个特殊的历史悠久的民族,由于他们特殊的地域性和文化背景,其灾后心理自我修复的过程就会不同于一般群体。在灾后心理自我修复的过程中,羌族人民将经历怎样的一种心理过程,这种心理过程的根源是什么?如何借助其民族文化中心灵自愈的积极元素,运用正确的方法帮助他们医治心理创伤?本文将从集体潜意识的角度做一论述。     

Collective Guilt and Collective Guilt Feelings

Can collectives feel guilt with respect to what they have done? It hasbeen claimed that they cannot. Yet in everyday discourse collectives areoften held to feel guilt, criticized because they do not, and so on.Among other things, this paper considers what such so-called collectiveguilt feelings amount to. If collective guilt feelings are sometimesappropriate, it must be the case that collectives can indeed beguilty. The paper begins with an account of what it is for a collectiveto intend to do something and to act in light of that intention.According to this account, and in senses that are explained, there is acollective that intends to do something if and only if the members of agiven population are jointly committed to intend as a body to do thatthing. A related account of collective belief is also presented. It isthen argued that, depending on the circumstances, a group's action canbe free as opposed to coerced, and that the idea that a collective assuch can be guilty of performing a wrongful act makes sense. The ideathat a group might feel guilt may be rejected because it is assumed thatto feel guilt is to experience a ``pang'' or ``twinge'' of guilt –nothing more and nothing less. Presumably, though, there must becognitions and perhaps behavior involved. In addition, the primacy, eventhe necessity, of ``feeling-sensations'' to feeling guilt in theindividual case has been questioned. Without the presumption that it isalready clear what feeling guilt amounts to, three proposals as to thenature of collective guilt feelings are considered. A ``feeling ofpersonal guilt'' is defined as a feeling of guilt over one's own action.It is argued that it is implausible to construe collective guiltfeelings in terms of members' feelings of personal guilt. ``Membershipguilt feelings'' involve a group member's feeling of guilt over what hisor her group has done. It is argued that such feelings are intelligibleif the member is party to the joint commitment that lies at the base ofthe relevant collective intention and action. However, an account ofcollective guilt in terms of membership guilt feelings is found wanting.Finally, a ``plural subject'' account of collective guilt feelings isarticulated, such that they involve a joint commitment to feel guilt asa body. The parties to a joint commitment of the kind in question may asa result find themselves experiencing ``pangs'' of the kind associatedwith personal and membership guilt feelings. Since these pangs, byhypothesis, arise as a result of the joint commitment to feel guilt as abody, they might be thought of as providing a kind of phenomenology forcollective guilt. Be that as it may, it is argued the plural subjectaccount has much to be said for it.     

Group Wrongs and Guilt Feelings

Can it ever be appropriate to feel guilt just because one's group has acted badly? Some say no, citing supposed features of guilt feelings as such. If one understands group action according to my plural subject account of groups, however, one can argue for the appropriateness of feeling guilt just because one's group has acted badly - a feeling that often occurs. In so arguing I sketch the plural subject account of groups, group intentions and group actions: for a group to intend (in the relevant sense) is for its members to be jointly committed to intend that such-and-such as a body. Individual group members need not be directly involved in the formation of the intention in order to participate in such a joint commitment. The core concept of joint commitment is in an important way holistic, not being reducible to a set of personal commitments over which each party holds sway. Parties to a group intention so understood can reasonably see the resulting action as "ours" as opposed to "theirs" and thus appropriately respond to the action's badness with a feeling of guilt, even when they themselves are morally innocent in the matter. I label the feeling in question a feeling of "membership guilt." A number of standard philosophical claims about the nature of guilt feelings are thrown into question by my argument.     

公共领域中的集群效能研究述评

公共领域中的集群效能是指公众通过分享所在地区的公共信任和社会凝聚力, 从而对于共同努力实现所在地区特定目标的一种集体信念和预期。公共领域中的集群效能有其独特的测量方法和研究结论, 集群效能的相关前因变量可以分为社会认同、社会经济地位和社会参与, 集群效能的相关影响作用研究可以分为公共安全、政治行为、公共卫生三个领域内的研究。文章最后指出未来在公共领域中集群效能研究有必要加强作用机制、动态变化等方面的探讨。