关于大学生心理障碍干预模式的理论建构

本文在已有研究的基础上,根据大学生心理发展与心理素质的特点和不同心理学派的理论观点建构了大学生心理障碍干预模式,该模式由多维系统的干预途径、多样渗透的干预方法、丰富全面的干预工作内容和完善化人性化的干预机制组成,它们之间的关系既是独立的,又是相互协调和影响的。体现了大学生心理障碍干预模式的系统完整性及实施干预的灵活多样性和明确针对性。     

A Natural Approach in Mental Health Practice: Occupational Adaptation Revealed

A single case study of the stories told by one occupational therapist about her clients in mental health settings is presented in this article. Qualitative analysis revealed key concepts of the role of the occupational therapist as defined by occupational adaptation theory, along with unique perspectives of occupational therapy in mental health settings. The outcome of this study is a demonstration of the unique insight occupational therapy brings to addressing client recovery in mental health settings, specifically from an occupational adaptation perspective. This insight should enlighten others as to the necessity of skilled occupational therapy in mental health settings.     

群体认同与个体心理健康的关系:调节变量与作用机制

近年来,群体认同与个体心理健康的关系得到了研究者的关注。本研究通过对相关文献的梳理与归纳发现:民族、国家、学校、家庭等不同种类群体的认同,群体认同数量与个体心理健康的关系显著;群体认同与个体心理健康之间的关系受群体认同动机和个体对群体评价的调节,并依赖于自尊、社会支持、控制知觉、归因方式等因素的中介;未来应利用多种方法继续研究群体认同与个体心理健康关系的调节变量与作用机制。     

幼儿对心理状态的认识

本研究探讨３—５岁儿童对自身和他人心理状态认识的发展过程．借助图片和玩具结合四种作业任务,对１９１名儿童进行了实验和短期追踪实验。结果表明：３岁儿童尚不能对心理状态作出认识,４岁半左右是儿童认识心理状态的转折期,到５岁末能完全把握自身和他人的心理状态．在四项作业任务中,儿童通过的先后次序为他人误念判断和他人未知判断、现象一实在区分、表征变换．这一方面与儿童的认知发展趋势有关,另一方面也与实验的情景和材料有关．     

Mental Simulation, Affect, and Personality: A Conceptual Framework

Recent advances in theory and research on the relations among mental simulation, affect, and personality are summarized and combined. Research has shown that (a) affect and mental simulations can influence each other, (b) mental simulations can serve diverse self-motives, and (c) personality characteristics are related to divergent functions of mental simulations. Findings in these three areas are synthesized into a conceptual framework on the basis of three attributes of mental simulations: (a) time, whether simulations are prospective or retrospective; (b) direction, whether simulations are upward or downward; and (c) focus, whether simulations are contrasted or assimilated. This integrated framework not only may enable a greater understanding of existing findings, but also suggests novel and unique predictions for future research on understanding personality processes, automaticity in simulations, and coping with life events.     

IAT效应的心理机制研究述评

介绍了IAT效应的心理机制的主要理论,包括概念联结提取模型、刺激-反应匹配理论、随机游动模型、任务集切换代价理论和图形-背景不对称性理论,并提出除概念联结提取模型外,其他理论关注另外可能的因素对IAT效应的作用,从而间接否定IAT效应和概念联结的对应联系,消解了IAT作为内隐测量方法的有效性。最后分析了这些理论的不足,认为IAT研究需要深入探讨个体在IAT反应中的心理活动过程。     

Young children's use of statistical sampling evidence to infer the subjectivity of preferences

A crucial task in social interaction involves understanding subjective mental states. Here we report two experiments with toddlers exploring whether they can use statistical evidence to infer the subjective nature of preferences. We found that 2-year-olds were likely to interpret another person’s nonrandom sampling behavior as a cue for a preference different from their own. When there was no alternative in the population or if the sampling was random, 2-year-olds did not ascribe a preference and persisted in their initial beliefs that the person would share their own preference. We found similar but weaker patterns of responses in 16-month-olds. These results suggest that the ability to infer the subjectivity of preferences based on sampling information begins to emerge between 16 months and 2 years. Our findings provide some of the first evidence that from early in development, young children can use statistical evidence to make rational inferences about the social world.     

The format of children’s mental images: Penetrability of spatial images

To investigate the format of mental images and the penetrability of mental imagery performance to top-down influences in the form of gravity information, children (4-, 6-, 8- and 10-year-olds) and adults (N = 112) performed mental rotation tasks. A linear increase in response time with rotation angle emerged at 6-years, suggesting that spatial properties are represented in children’s mental images. Moreover, 6-, 8-, and 10-year-olds, but not 4-year-olds or adults, took longer to respond to rotated stimuli pairs when gravity information was incongruent with the direction of rotation rather than congruent. Overall, findings suggest that in contrast to adults’, 6- to 10-year-olds’ mental rotation performance was penetrated by top-down information. This research (a) provides insight into the format of young children’s mental images and (b) shows that children’s mental rotation performance is penetrable by top-down influences.     

Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of mind-reading

A new class of visuomotor neuron has been recently discovered in the monkey's premotor cortex: mirror neurons. These neurons respond both when a particular action is performed by the recorded monkey and when the same action, performed by another individual, is observed. Mirror neurons appear to form a cortical system matching observation and execution of goal-related motor actions. Experimental evidence suggests that a similar matching system also exists in humans. What might be the functional role of this matching system? One possible function is to enable an organism to detect certain mental states of observed conspecifics. This function might be part of, or a precursor to, a more general mind-reading ability. Two different accounts of mind-reading have been suggested. According to ‘theory theory', mental states are represented as inferred posits of a naive theory. According to ‘simulation theory', other people's mental states are represented by adopting their perspective: by tracking or matching their states with resonant states of one's own. The activity of mirror neurons, and the fact that observers undergo motor facilitation in the same muscular groups as those utilized by target agents, are findings that accord well with simulation theory but would not be predicted by theory theory.     

Epistemic Injustice in Social Cognition

Silencing is a practice that disrupts linguistic and communicative acts, but its relationship to knowledge and justice is not fully understood. Prior models of epistemic injustice tend to characterize silencing as a symptom that follows as a result of underrepresenting the knowledge of others. In this paper, I advance a model of epistemic injustice in which the opposite sometimes happens. Drawing on recent work in experimental cognitive science, I argue that silencing can cause misrepresentations of knowledge and, subsequently, epistemic injustice to occur. Drawing on recent work in epistemology, I also argue that, according to some leading theories, silencing potentially causes ignorance by depriving individuals and communities of knowledge itself. These findings expand our understanding of silencing in social practice, contribute a broader model of epistemic injustice for research at the intersection of ethics and philosophy of mind, and have implications for leading theories of knowledge in epistemology.