Correlations of trait and state emotions with utilitarian moral judgements

In four experiments, we asked subjects for judgements about scenarios that pit utilitarian outcomes against deontological moral rules, for example, saving more lives vs. a rule against active killing. We measured trait emotions of anger, disgust, sympathy and empathy (the last two in both specific and general forms, the latter referring to large groups of people), asked about the same emotions after each scenario (state emotions). We found that utilitarian responding to the scenarios, and higher scores on a utilitarianism scale, were correlated negatively with disgust, positively (but weakly and inconsistently) with anger, positively with specific sympathy and state sympathy, and less so with general sympathy or empathy. In a fifth experiment, we asked about anger and sympathy for specific outcomes, and we found that these are consistently predictive of utilitarian responding.     

专业背景、主观印象和情绪对量刑决策的影响

为了考察司法决策者对案件当事人的主观印象如何影响刑罚决策及情绪在其中的作用,本研究要求法律与非法律专业被试对案情相同但对案件当事人的主观印象不同的刑事案件进行刑罚强度决策,并要求被试对犯罪行为所引发的情绪强度进行评定。研究结果发现,被试对施害人的消极印象比积极印象条件下产生更强的愤怒和厌恶情绪,更少的同情情绪,同时,给予的刑罚更重;被试对受害人的积极印象比消极印象条件下,低年级组被试对施害人给予的刑罚更重,但在高年级组被试中不存在显著差异,两组被试在情绪强度上也没有显著差异。法律专业比非法律专业被试对犯罪行为所产生的情绪强度更低。被试的专业背景对量刑决策没有显著影响。中介效应检验发现,在施害人的主观印象对刑罚决策的影响过程中,愤怒和同情表现出部分中介效应,厌恶情绪表现出完全中介效应。     

Emotions as guardians of group norms: expressions of anger and disgust drive inferences about autonomy and purity violations

Other people’s emotional reactions to a third person’s behaviour are potentially informative about what is appropriate within a given situation. We investigated whether and how observers’ inferences of such injunctive norms are shaped by expressions of anger and disgust. Building on the moral emotions literature, we hypothesised that angry and disgusted expressions produce relative differences in the strength of autonomy-based versus purity-based norm inferences. We report three studies (plus three supplementary studies) using different types of stimuli (vignette-based, video clips) to investigate how emotional reactions shape norms about potential norm violations (eating snacks, drinking alcohol), and contexts (groups of friends, a university, a company). Consistent with our theoretical argument, the results indicate that observers use others’ emotional reactions not only to infer whether a particular behaviour is inappropriate, but also why it is inappropriate: because it primarily violates autonomy standards (as suggested relatively more strongly by expressions of anger) or purity standards (as suggested relatively more strongly by expressions of disgust). We conclude that the social functionality of emotions in groups extends to shaping norms based on moral standards.     

Whom to punish? How observers sanction norm-violating behavior in ostracism situations

When observing ostracism, individuals can either side with the target or the sources of ostracism. Here we demonstrate that side-taking depends on whether the target previously acted in adherence to or in violation of perceived social norms. In four studies, a target behaved either norm-consistently or violated a social norm, and was subsequently either excluded by the sources or was not. Next, participants could sanction the behavior of the observed persons by refraining to assign money (Studies 1 and 2), or by subtracting money from a bonus (Studies 3 and 4). Observers assigned less money to the sources when these excluded a norm-consistent target. However, when the target had violated a social norm before, participants assigned less money to the target instead. These results have far-reaching implications because the (in)actions of neutral individuals can legitimize the sources’ behavior, or help a target under attack.     

The role of maladaptive anger in self-criticism: A quasi-experimental study on emotional processes

The present study examines the role of emotion in the self-critical process of individuals with anger problems. Self-criticism is a prevalent intra-personal feature which greatly impacts an individual’s emotion. So far, it is unclear, which emotions individuals with maladaptive anger experience when they work through their self-criticism. Using a quasi-experimental design, the present study compared n = 23 anger-prone under-graduate students to n = 22 controls on process indices of contempt, fear, shame, anger and global distress, as well as on their access to underlying need, as participants were working through personalized self-critical content. This was achieved using a single-session enactment from emotion-focused therapy, augmented with a standardized procedure for priming participants to focus on their unmet needs. Findings suggested that this work on self-criticism reduced for both groups distress, fear and shame, as well as increased assertive anger (McNemar tests significant at p = .05). More centrally, anger-prone individuals expressed more self-contempt (t(1, 44) = 3.65; p < .05), and they had more difficulty in accessing their underlying need (χ² = 5.35; p < .05), when compared to controls. These results have implications for clinical work with anger-prone individuals, and clarify key features in the use of enactment interventions when working towards emotional resolution. The present study also demonstrates the use of personalized stimuli in the context of clinically relevant quasi-experimental research on emotional processes.     

Do emotions play an essential role in moral judgments?

The past few decades of moral psychology research have yielded empirical anomalies for rationalist theories of moral judgments. An increasing number of psychologists and philosophers argue that these anomalies are explained well by sentimentalism, the thesis that the presence of an emotion is necessary for the formation of a sincere moral judgment. The present review reveals that while emotions and moral judgments indeed often co-occur, there is scant evidence that emotions directly cause or constitute moral judgments. Research on disgust, anger, sympathy, and guilt indicates that people only reliably experience emotions when judging conduct that is relevant to the welfare of the self and valued others. Moreover, many recent studies have either failed to replicate or exposed crucial confounds in the most cited evidence in support of sentimentalism. Moral psychologists should jettison sentimentalism, and focus instead on how considerations of harm and welfare—the core concepts of rationalist theories— interact with empirical beliefs to shape moral judgments.     

厌恶与道德判断的关系

来自问卷调查和认知神经科学的证据表明,厌恶与道德判断可能存在密切关系,但是研究者对两者之间的关系是一般性的还是特异性的尚无定论。有若干证据表明厌恶影响一般的道德判断,也有研究认为厌恶主要影响人们对纯洁领域的道德判断。未来研究需要明确界定厌恶的类别,区分厌恶与道德厌恶两种不同的构念,从疾病防御的角度理解厌恶的进化根源,以及测量厌恶启动之后人们对不同道德冒犯的内隐态度。     

Emotional and behavioural reactions to moral transgressions: cross-cultural and individual variations in India and Britain

Reactions to moral transgressions are subject to influence at both the cultural and individual levels. Transgressions against an individual's rights or against social conventions of hierarchy may elicit different reactions in individualistic and collectivistic cultures. In the current study, affective and behavioural reactions to transgressions of autonomy (rights) and community (hierarchy) were examined in India and Britain. Results revealed that although reactions to autonomy transgressions are similar in India and Britain, Indian participants express more moral outrage than do Britons in response to transgressions of community. Results also supported the contention of emotion‐specificity in affective moral reaction: Participants in both India and Britain reported anger in response to autonomy transgressions, but contempt in response to violations of community. Importantly, these results extend previous research by demonstrating the importance of emotion specificity in moral reactions, as opposed to categorization or dilemma resolution. In addition, an individual difference measure of respect for persons was shown to moderate reactions to moral transgressions. Specifically, participants with high respect for persons were less negative to violators of the community ethic, but not the autonomy ethic. These findings highlight the importance of examining emotion‐specific responses in the moral domain and introduce a significant individual difference variable, respect for persons, into the psychology of morality.     

Enforcing Christian Nationalism: Examining the Link Between Group Identity and Punitive Attitudes in the United States

This article examines whether the convergence of an individual's religious and national identities promotes authoritarian attitudes towards crime and deviance. Drawing on theories of social control and group conformity, as well as Christian nationalism's influence on intolerance toward out‐groups, I argue that the inability to distinguish between religious and national identities increases desire for group homogeneity and therefore increases willingness to utilize formalized measures of social control. Analysis of 2007 Baylor Religion Survey data demonstrates that adherence to Christian nationalism predicts three indicators of authoritarian views toward controlling crime and deviance: support for capital punishment, stricter punishment for federal crime, and for society to “crackdown on troublemakers.” These effects are robust to the inclusion of a comprehensive battery of 20 socioeconomic, political, and religious controls, and are consistent with previous research on Christian nationalism showing it is not religious commitment or traditionalism per se that leads to intolerant attitudes, but rather the conflation of one's religious identity with other social identities, in this case national. These findings indicate that, beyond sociopolitical and religious influences, the belief that the United States is, and should be, a “Christian nation” increases desires for group conformity and strict control for both criminals and “troublemakers.”     

Regulating anger and sadness: an exploration of discrete emotions in emotion regulation

Do emotion regulation processes vary as a function of discrete emotions? Focusing on anger and sadness, this study examined: (a) the strategies that men and women use to regulate each emotion, (b) the extent to which strategies differ in their use and effectiveness, and (c) the relationship between effective regulation of these emotions and social functioning. One hundred ninety participants described recent situations that evoked anger and sadness and how they regulated each emotion. Emotion regulation attempts for anger and sadness differed to some extent in both use and effectiveness. In addition, effective regulation of each emotion was associated with different aspects of social functioning. Effective anger regulation was associated with constructive conflict resolution style, and effective sadness regulation was associated with positive social relations. The findings suggest that global approaches to studying emotion regulation may be limited and emphasize the importance of moving toward a discrete emotions framework.     

Defensive emotions and evaluative judgements: Sensitivity to anger and fear predicts moral judgements,whereas sensitivity to disgust predicts aesthetic judgements

Aesthetic and moral evaluations engage appetitive and defensive emotions. While the role played by pleasure in positive aesthetic and moral judgements has been extensively researched, little is known about how defensive emotions influence negative aesthetic and moral judgements. Specifically, it is unknown which defensive emotions such judgements tap into, and whether both kinds of judgement share a common emotional root. Here, we investigated how participants' individual sensitivity to disgust, fear, anger and sadness predicted subjective judgements of aesthetic and moral stimuli. Bayesian modelling revealed that participants who were more sensitive to anger and fear found conventional and moral transgressions more wrong. In contrast, participants who were more sensitive to disgust disliked asymmetrical geometric patterns and untidy rooms more. These findings suggest that aesthetic and moral evaluations engage multiple defensive emotions, not just disgust, and that they may rely on different defensive emotions as part of their computational mechanism.     

Effects of work‐related norm violations and general beliefs about the world on feelings of shame and guilt: A comparison between Turkey and the Netherlands

This paper aimed at investigating the effects of work‐related norm violations (i.e., violations of interpersonal and work regulation norms) and individuals' general beliefs about the world (i.e., social axioms: reward for application, social cynicism) on feelings of shame and guilt in Turkey and in the Netherlands. An experimental study involving 103 Turkish and 111 Dutch participants showed that work norm violations elicited feelings of guilt and shame differently in Turkey and the Netherlands. Specifically, interpersonal norm violation in Turkey elicited feelings of shame and guilt more strongly than did violation of a work regulation norm, whereas no differential effects were found in the Netherlands. As expected, violation of a work regulation norm elicited feelings of shame and guilt more strongly in the Netherlands than in Turkey, whereas violation of an interpersonal norm elicited feelings of shame and guilt more strongly in Turkey than in the Netherlands. The findings provide further evidence for the moderating effects of social axioms: in both countries, participants high in social cynicism felt less ashamed when they violated a work regulation norm than did those low in social cynicism. Our findings are relevant for understanding the underlying mechanisms of norm violations at work, thereby offering a new avenue for investigating cultural differences in the workplace. The latter may be of particular relevance in times of globalization and diversity in the workplace.     

The impact of onlooking and including bystander behaviour on judgments and emotions regarding peer exclusion

We investigated judgments and emotions in contexts of social exclusion that varied as a function of bystander behaviour (N = 173, 12‐ and 16‐year‐olds). Adolescents responded to film vignettes depicting a target excluded by a group with no bystanders, onlooking bystanders, or bystanders who included the target. Adolescents were asked to judge the behaviour and attribute emotions to the excluding group, the excluded target, and the bystanders. Younger adolescents judged the behaviour of the excluding group as more wrong than older adolescents when there were no bystanders present, indicating that the presence of bystanders was viewed as lessening the negative outcome of exclusion by the younger group. Yet, bystanders play a positive role only when they are includers, not when they are silent observers. This distinction was revealed by the findings that adolescents rated the behaviour of onlooking bystanders as more wrong compared with the behaviour of including bystanders. Moreover, all adolescents justified the inclusive behaviour more frequently with empathy than the onlooking behaviour. Adolescents also anticipated more empathy to including bystanders than to onlooking bystanders, as well as anticipated more guilt to onlooking bystanders than including bystanders. The findings are discussed in light of the role of group norms and group processes regarding bystanders' roles in social exclusion peer encounters.     

A multiple‐method analysis of appraisal–emotion relationships: The case of the prosocial intergroup emotions

Despite its status as a prominent set of theories for explaining the elicitation and differentiation of emotions, much appraisal theory and research offer little indication of the nature of the relationship expected between appraisals and emotions. Here, we present a three‐study, multiple‐method analysis in which we examine numerous ways of testing appraisal–emotion relationships using the “prosocial” intergroup emotions—sympathy, anger, and guilt—as an example. Results show that the set of appraisal dimensions that appears strongly characteristic of an emotion varies depending on the kind of appraisal—emotion relationship hypothesised and the experimental methodology/statistical analysis used. These findings demonstrate the utility of explicit theorising about the nature of the relationship between emotions and appraisals, and show how the hypothesised appraisal–emotion relationship and choice of methodology can affect the structure of appraisal theories. We recommend an analysis across multiple methods to provide a more complete picture of a given set of appraisal–emotion relationships.     

Social anxiety and the experience of positive emotion and anger in everyday life: an ecological momentary assessment approach

Abstract

A few recent studies have found evidence showing that social anxiety is associated with diminished positive affect and elevated anger. However, prior work has relied on trait self-report measures of global positive mood or anger. In this preliminary study, we examined how trait social anxiety relates to moment-to-moment positive and angry emotional states as people navigate through their natural environment in a given day. Of additional interest was whether any associations were limited to social situations or were evident more broadly in non-social situations as well. For 14 days, 38 non-clinical community adults carried electronic diaries to assess their experience of positive emotions, anger, and their current social context and activity. Participants were randomly prompted up to four times per day, leading to 1702 observations. Results showed that social anxiety was associated with less time spent feeling happy and relaxed and more time spent feeling angry throughout the day. In general, people felt happier when they were with other people compared to being alone. Interestingly, people with relatively higher levels of social anxiety reported fewer and less intense positive emotions and greater anger episodes across social and non-social situations.     

行为可见增加利他偏好及其社会规范机制

在不同社会偏好类型中,研究者较为关注利他偏好及其信号功能。本研究探究在独裁者游戏中,决策者的利他偏好如何受到分配方案对接受者可见性的影响。实验1采用行为实验结合计算建模的方法,发现无论在选择或评分条件下,相比于行为不可见,当分配者的行为能够为接受者所见时,分配者都表现出更大程度的利他偏好。此外,相比于评分条件,在选择时人们更加在意分配效率。实验2仅使用选择条件,并操纵社会规范,发现行为可见增加利他偏好的作用依赖于利他的社会规范,当存在非利他社会规范时,行为可见的影响减小。本研究结果表明,在利他社会规范下,当行为对接受者可见时,人们将表现出更多利他偏好。     

How Emotional Frames Moralize and Polarize Political Attitudes

Moralized issues, such as abortion and same‐sex marriage, are some of the most polarizing and divisive issues in politics. These topics motivate political engagement but present a barrier to democratic resolution. Yet we know little about how some issues become “moral issues” and others do not. In this article, I argue that exposure to persuasive frames, particularly those eliciting anger and disgust, serves to moralize and polarize public opinion. I test these hypotheses across three experiments on emerging debates over food politics. The results consistently show that persuasive frames increase issue moralization and, in turn, facilitate polarization. A panel analysis demonstrates that the effect of a single exposure lasts at least two weeks. Mediation analyses suggest that feelings of disgust and anger help explain how persuasive frames moralize political attitudes, while anger alone seems to explain the polarizing effects of framing. Overall, the findings provide new insight into framing, emotion, and the development of moral issues.     

Person‐centred positive emotions,object‐centred negative emotions: 2‐year‐olds generalize negative but not positive emotions across individuals

Prior work suggests that young children do not generalize others' preferences to new individuals. We hypothesized (following Vaish et al., 2008, Psychol. Bull., 134, 383–403) that this may only hold for positive emotions, which inform the child about the person's attitude towards the object but not about the positivity of the object itself. It may not hold for negative emotions, which additionally inform the child about the negativity of the object itself. Two‐year‐old children saw one individual (the emoter) emoting positively or negatively towards one and neutrally towards a second novel object. When a second individual then requested an object, children generalized the emoter's negative but not her positive emotion to the second individual. Children thus draw different inferences from others' positive versus negative emotions: Whereas they view others' positive emotions as person centred, they may view others' negative emotions as object centred and thus generalizable across people. The results are discussed with relation to the functions and implications of the negativity bias.     

“仁者”还是“智者”：第三方惩罚对惩罚者声誉的影响

第三方惩罚会对惩罚者的声誉产生显著影响,然而就影响的方向而言,现有文献给出了不同答案。上述问题的一个潜在原因是先前研究未能区分声誉的不同维度以及惩罚的不同动机与形式。通过将温暖-能力双维度结构引入惩罚者的声誉,实验结果显示,第三方惩罚从总体上降低了人们对惩罚者在温暖维度上的评价而提高了对其在能力维度上的评价。调节效应分析表明,动机被归因为集体聚焦的惩罚进一步提升了其对能力的正面作用而减缓了对温暖的负面作用,并且惩罚者的合作水平越高,其动机被归因为集体聚焦的程度也越高。针对不同惩罚形式的进一步分析显示,当惩罚动机被归因为个体聚焦时,经济惩罚对温暖的负面作用显著高于社会惩罚,而在集体聚焦的归因下经济惩罚对能力的正面作用显著低于社会惩罚。