Subject-centred reasons and bestowal love

Speaking roughly, there are two competing accounts of the basis of love. First, the appraisal view: love is based in reasons derived from the valuable properties of the beloved. Second, the bestowal view: love is not based in reasons derived from the valuable properties of the beloved, but love is based in the lover, who then bestows value onto the beloved. While both models deserve due attention, the bestowal model is of present concern. Despite numerous virtues, the bestowal model faces trenchant objections. In this paper, I outline and defend a version of bestowal love, according to which bestowal love is based in the lover’s motivating reasons, and which preserves the virtues while overcoming the difficulties facing bestowal love.     

Thinking About a Word—Love,for Example

What is it we do when we philosophize about a word? How are we to act as we ask the philosophical question par excellence, “What is … ?” These questions are addressed here with particular focus on Troy Jollimore's Love's Vision and contemporary theories of love. Jollimore's rationalist account of love, based on a specific understanding of “reasons for love,” illustrates a particular philosophical mistake: When we think about a word, we are prone to believe that even though “the sense of the word” that we investigate may be up for grabs, the other words we use when we do these investigations are not. Jollimore's exploration of love is guided by specific conceptions of “reasons” and “rationality” that remain unquestioned. The article argues that we may have to rethink a great number of words as we embark on the task of uncovering the sense of one word.     

Michael Smith and the rationality of immoral action

Although it goes against a widespread significant misunderstanding of his view, Michael Smith is one of the very few moral philosophers who explicitly wants to allow for the commonsense claim that, while morally required action is always favored by some reason, selfish and immoral action can also be rationally permissible. One point of this paper is to make it clear that this is indeed Smith’s view. It is a further point to show that his way of accommodating this claim is inconsistent with his well-known “practicality requirement” on moral judgments: the thesis that any rational person will always have at least some motivation to do what she judges to be right. The general conclusion is that no view that, like Smith’s, associates the normative strength of a reason with the motivational strength of an ideal desire will allow for the wide range of rational permissibility that Smith wants to capture. Many thanks to Michael Smith for his friendly and helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and for permission to make a very strong and explicit claim on his behalf.     

TWO FORMS OF LOVE: The Problem of Preferential Love in Kierkegaard's Works of Love

The duty to love one's neighbor as oneself is at the core of Kierkegaard's Works of Love. In this book, Kierkegaard unfolds the meaning of neighborly love and claims that it is the only valid form of true love. He contrasts between neighborly love and preferential love (which includes romantic love and friendship) and criticizes the latter for being nothing but a form of selfishness. However, in some contexts, Kierkegaard seems to acknowledge the significance of preferential love relationships, and does not disallow them. Therefore, his understanding of preferential love appears to be confused and inconsistent. My essay discusses the tension in Kierkegaard's position regarding preferential love, and by presenting recent readings of Works of Love, it asks whether this tension is resolvable and offers a suggestion for a possible solution.     

Syzygy: Love Made Strange

Abstract : This paper argues that there can be an intimate, non‐marital loving communion between two persons or, sometimes, two groups. The Christian tradition has its own concept, syzygy, for such love. An awareness of this forgotten tradition may be valuable in discussing some broader problems in the church, such as rivalry between different parties or homosexuality. The syzygic relationship of love and rivalry is characteristic of some well‐known biblical and mythological narratives.     

Love and Identity： Unconditional Concern and Particularity

Love for a person involves an idea of the other＇s particularity, or ＂irreplaceability＂： an idea that is linked with a fine grained attention to, and affection for, very specific features of the other. This attention is largely a consequence of--or manifestation of--my love, rather than its ground. What I see in the other is partly conditioned by an ＂unconditional＂ concern for her as an individual. A consideration of the importance of the face and of personal names in my interactions with another may bring into focus crucial aspects of the particularity and unconditionality that are characteristic of love.     

Love and Eschatology

Abstract : This article reflects on the connection between Christian hope for salvation and Christian praxis today. Following a discussion of Christian approaches to hope, salvation, and reconciliation, the eschatological potential of love is explored in conversation with significant theologies of love in Western Christianity. It is argued that love, properly understood, offers the most adequate and dynamic horizon for approaching God's coming reign and for being transformed in the process.     

品牌至爱的概念及其发展

牌至爱（brandlove）是Carroll和Ahuvia（2006）提出的一个概念,指的是消费者对满意品牌产生的情感上的依恋。这一概念的提出是对品牌管理实践者情感和关系营销的回应。文章对品牌至爱概念的定义和提出背景进行了回顾,指出品牌至爱的概念建立在品牌依恋、消费者—品牌关系和自我扩展理论的研究基础之上。文章最后辨析了品牌至爱与品牌情感和品牌忠诚等概念,并进一步提出了品牌至爱的研究方向和研究建议     

Redeeming Love:Rousseau and Eighteenth-Century Moral Philosophy

This essay employs Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) as a vehicle to explore love in eighteenth-century French moral philosophy and theological ethics. The relation between love of self and love of God was understood variously and produced contrasting models of the relation between the public and the private. Rousseau, perhaps more than any other figure in the eighteenth century, wrestled with the complex, competing traditions of love, and in doing so he probed and articulated the tension between and the harmony of life alone and life together. Using as ideal types a set of historical models of private and public vice and virtue, the author describes Rousseau's three contradictory proposals for dealing with the corruption of social institutions and the human heart and discloses their underlying cohesion.     

PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY,ETHICS, AND LOVE: TOWARD A NEW RELIGION AND SCIENCE DIALOGUE

Religion and science dialogues that orbit around rational method, knowledge, and truth are often, though not always, contentious. In this article, I suggest a different cluster of gravitational points around which religion and science dialogues might usefully travel: philosophical anthropology, ethics, and love. I propose seeing morality as a natural outgrowth of the human desire to establish and maintain social bonds so as not to experience the condition of being alone. Humans, of all animals, need to feel loved—defined as a compassionate present‐with in dynamic dyadic relation such that one experiences the sense of mattering—but that need has an equally natural tendency to be met by creating biased us‐and‐them distinctions. A “critical” natural ethics, then, is one in which we become aware of and work to undermine our tendency to reify in‐group distinctions between “us” and “them.” Religious communities that work intentionally on this can be seen, to some extent, as laboratories of love—or as sites for co‐creating knowledge in perilous times.     

For the Love of Cybernetics

This narrative is a response to an invitation to share my story regarding cybernetics. I begin with an exploration of what “for the love of cybernetics” means to me. Tracing experiences and connections to cybernetics over the course of 50?years I explore how I observe and give voice to my relation with people and situations both personal and professional. I explore life and how it is enriched by knowing cybernetics. Recent projects to encourage systems and cybernetic literacy building on work with ocean, earth, air, and energy literacies are described.     

Rationality and Judgment

Abstract: Philosophical/epistemic theories of rationality differ over the role of judgment in rational argumentation. According to the “classical model” of rationality, rational justification is a matter of conformity with explicit rules or principles. Critics of the classical model, such as Harold Brown and Trudy Govier, argue that the model is subject to insuperable difficulties. They propose, instead, that rationality be understood, ultimately, in terms of judgment rather than rules. In this article I respond to Brown's and Govier's criticisms of the classical model, and to the “judgment model” they propose in its place. I argue that that model is unable both to distinguish between rational and irrational judgment and to avoid recourse to rules, and is therefore inadequate as an account of rationality, critical thinking, or argument appraisal. More positively, I argue that an adequate account of rationality must include a place for both rules and judgment.     

Love and the need for comprehension

The question of how well we need to be known, to be loved, is considered. A ‘second-person’ model is argued for, on which love requires that the beloved's demands to be known be respected. This puts pressure on the idea that lovers need to make a beloved's interests their own, taking that to require comprehension of the beloved's interests: a lover would have to appreciate the normative intelligibility and motivating force of an interest. The possibility of love with failure of comprehension is defended, using illustrations from Marilynne Robinson's novel Gilead.     

More than a feeling: Wittgenstein and William James on love and other emotions

One of the most significant features of Wittgenstein's Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology (written after he had completed most of the Philosophical Investigations) is his reflections on emotions. Wittgenstein's treatment of this topic was developed in direct response to his reading of William James’s chapter on emotions in his 1890 masterpiece, The Principles of Psychology. This paper examines the competing views of emotions that emerge in these works, both of which attempt to overcome the Cartesian dualist conception in different ways. The main point of disagreement concerns the relation between emotions and their bodily expression (e.g. the relation between grief and weeping). My interpretation focuses on Wittgenstein's remarks on the emotion of love because, I argue, it is a particularly problematic case. To elucidate his largely unexplored view of love, I draw on his remarks on understanding and criteria in the Philosophical Investigations. I argue that by examining the examples of complex emotions like love, we can arrive at a more accurate characterization of Wittgenstein's general view of mental concepts and mental phenomena.     

Seeing Through the Fog: Love and Injustice in Bleak House

The author takes up a provocative question poised by Charles Taylor about the relationship between our commitments to a good such as neighbor love and the possibilities of achieving and sustaining social justice. Taylor's concern is not only that we make such a commitment but that we make it in such a way that we avoid its ability to lead us towards injustice rather than justice. After articulating conceptions of love, justice, and injustice, the author turns to Charles Dickens's treatment of love and injustice in Bleak House , to explore more fully how love can lead to injustice, and also its potential role in promoting justice. Dickens's view, profoundly shaped by his own sense of Christian virtues, helps us see the inner workings of love, justice, and injustice, so that we can appreciate their interconnectedness anew and understand better the urgency of Taylor's question for our time.     

The Price of Charity: Christian Love and Financial Anxieties

Love and money, according to the intuitive logic of Christian political theology, stand in opposition to each other. Where economic relations obtain, relations of love are understood to be absent or distorted. The opposition between the two has led social theorists and political theologians—including John Milbank, Kathryn Tanner, and Daniel M. Bell—to understand Christian love as a reservoir of opposition to the politics of contemporary financialized capital. This opposition, however, ignores the complex interrelationship that has characterized Christian thought about love and money. Love and money—and their apparent competitive relationship—have been understood throughout the history of Christian thought on the basis of a relationship both maintain to the notion of indebtedness. This paper argues that any apparent tension between Christian theological caritas and oikonomia must to be contextualized in terms of a shared relationship between both of these concepts and the organization and administration of relations of debt and obligation.     

Love in cross-cultural perspective: Mozambique-France comparison

The study aimed to characterise the conceptualisation of love in Mozambique (a collectivist society) and France (an individualistic society) on three attributes: passion, intimacy, and commitment. The study sample comprised 310 Mozambican adults (females = 57%; age range = 18-64) and 220 French adults (females = 54%; age range = 18-64). They completed 27 information scenarios on passion, intimacy, and commitment. The data were analysed utilising mixed-method estimation of the variance accounted for by the three components of love. Results indicated that for the Mozambican participants passion was the most important factor (46%) in love expression, followed by commitment (37%), and intimacy (17%). For the French participants, passion was the most important factor (50%), followed by intimacy (28%), and commitment (22%). Across countries, the weight given to passion was reported to decline over age while the weight assigned to commitment was reported to increase with age.