The Accuracy of Behavioral Intention Versus Behavioral Expectation for Predicting Behavioral Goals

Researchers have largely overlooked the distinction between behavioral intention and behavioral expectation as predictors of one's own behavior. Moreover, the distinction between purely volitional behavior and behavioral goals, the latter of which may be impeded by such nonvolitional factors as lack of ability, lack of opportunity, habit, and environmental impediments, has also been blurred in the literature. Behavioral expectation is theorized to be based on a cognitive appraisal of one's behavioral intention and all other behavioral determinants of which one is aware. The present study argues and gives evidence that, although behavioral expectation and behavioral intention may have similar predictive accuracy for volitional behaviors, behavioral expectation is adequate, but behavioral intention may be inadequate for prediction of the accomplishment of behavioral goals.     

Flat intentions – crazy dispositions?

Future-directed intentions, it is widely held, involve behavioral dispositions. But of what kind? Suppose you now intend to Φ at future time t. Are you thereby now disposed to Φ at t no matter what? If so, your intention disposes you to Φ even if around t you will come to believe that Φ-ing would be crazy. And would not that be a crazy intention to have? – Like considerations have led Luca Ferrero and others to believe that only intentions with strong internal conditions are capable of rationality. This paper explores in how far a broadly dispositional view of intention supports their claims. Its first point will come as a surprise: Intentions indeed involve dispositions toward follies in plenty. Natural objections against this bizarre-sounding claim are shown to fail, and standard counterfactual analyses of disposition locutions are shown to underpin it further. However, since the dispositions at issue are pro tanto dispositions, the consequences are not as odd as might be expected: When hedged by reasonable habits to reconsider one’s intentions, dispositions toward follies do not entail any actual crazy behavior. On balance, unconditional intention is therefore found rational after all. Dispositions toward crazy actions need not be crazy dispositions.     

Self‐Knowledge and Rational Agency: A Defense of Empiricism

How does one know one's own beliefs, intentions, and other attitudes? Many responses to this question are broadly empiricist, in that they take self‐knowledge to be epistemically based in empirical justification or warrant. Empiricism about self‐knowledge faces an influential objection: that it portrays us as mere observers of a passing cognitive show, and neglects the fact that believing and intending are things we do, for reasons. According to the competing, agentialist conception of self‐knowledge, our capacity for self‐knowledge derives from our rational agency—our ability to conform our attitudes to our reasons, and to commit ourselves to those attitudes through avowals (Burge 1996; Moran 2001; Bilgrami 2006; Boyle 2009). This paper has two goals. The first is exegetical: to identify agentialism's defining thesis and precisely formulate the agentialist challenge to empiricism. The second goal is to defend empiricism from the agentialist challenge. I propose a way to understand the role of agency in reasoning and avowals, one that does justice to what is distinctive about these phenomena yet is compatible with empiricism about self‐knowledge.     

Predictors of Intention to Take Precautions Against AIDS Among Black College Students1

This research explored the relationship between behavioral intentions to engage in AIDS-risky sexual practices and a variety of variables that are theoretically and/or popularly assumed to be important factors in AIDS prevention. These variables included beliefs and knowledge about AIDS, fear of AIDS, perceived vulnerability of self and others, as well as probability that self and others on one's campus would contract AIDS, perceived efficacy to control exposure to AIDS, self-esteem, general locus of control, and past behavioral reaction to the threat of AIDS. General intention to “do something to protect oneself against AIDS,” and specific behavioral intention to use condoms in vaginal sex were measured and considered as possible proxies for future behavior. Data were collected from 124 black respondents in a southeastern university. In a series of multiple regression analyses, each of these measures of behavioral intentions was “predicted” from the other variables. Results showed that situational efficacy (to protect oneself from AIDS) was the best predictor of general intention, followed by reports of past behavioral changes as a result of the AIDS epidemic, and by knowledge. Proximal fear of AIDS was a negative predictor. For specific intentions, a specific belief about inconvenience in condom use was the best predictor, followed by past behavioral change, followed by knowledge. Normative beliefs, a belief that condoms would prevent disease, and distant threat of AIDS were also significant predictors. Theoretical and policy implications of the findings are discussed.     

Can unpredicted outcomes be intended? The role of outcome-beliefs in children's judgments of intention

An adult-like concept of intention includes a deliberate action to achieve a goal and a belief that one's action (if successful) will cause the desired outcome. For example, good outcomes caused by accident or by chance are not believed to be caused intentionally. In two experiments, we asked whether children understand this connection between intentions and outcomes. Children played two games in which actions could produce unintended outcomes (i.e., causes were unplanned). Children sometimes received a desirable reward independent of intention. In Experiment 1, 4- and 5-year-olds mistakenly claimed they had intended the desirable outcome even when it was unexpected. Four-year-olds judged that they had not intended a deliberate action if it did not yield a rewarding outcome. Experiment 2 demonstrates that 6-year-olds seldom make these errors. The results suggest that 4- and 5-year-old children have not yet attained an adult-like concept of intention. Their inaccurate judgments regarding their intentions, given a rewarding yet unexpected outcome, can be explained by a positivity bias.     

To Have–or Not to Have–Another Child: Family Planning Attitudes,Intentions, and Behavior1

Two hundred eighty-two respondents, representing 141 married couples with either one child (N= 71 couples) or two children (N= 70 couples), were interviewed about their considerations and intentions regarding whether or not to have another child. Reports of their actual subsequent family planning behavior were obtained 12 months later via a mailed questionnaire. The data was gathered and analyzed according to Fishbein's attitude-behavior model which stipulates that the individual's actual behavior is a function of one's behavioral intention. This intention, in turn, is determined by two multiple factors: (a) the individual's beliefs about the consequences of performing the behavior multiplied by his/her evaluation of those consequences, and (b) one's normative beliefs multiplied by one's motivation to comply with the perceived norms. The results provided substantial support for the model; both behavioral intention and actual behavior were successfully predicted from the attitudinal and normative components of the model. It was also shown that the behavioral intention mediates the relationship between the model's attitudinal and normative components and actual behavior.     

Is An Agreement An Exchange of Intentions?

Abstract: Margaret Gilbert has argued that an agreement is not exchange of promises, since no such exchange plays all the roles she claims are distinctive of agreements. After briefly discussing the notion of intention and the principles governing intentions, I argue that a certain type of exchange of intentions – in which one person forms a conditional intention to act if the other does, and the other forms an unconditional intention to act on the presumption that the first will do what they have said – plays all these roles, and so conclude that an agreement is in fact an exchange of intentions.     

Shared intention and personal intentions

This article explores the question: what is it for two or more people to intend to do something in the future? In a technical phrase, what is it for people to share an intention? Extending and refining earlier work of the author’s, it argues for three criteria of adequacy for an account of shared intention (the disjunction, concurrence, and obligation criteria) and offers an account that satisfies them. According to this account, in technical terms explained in the paper, people share an intention when and only when they are jointly committed to intend as a body to do such-and-such in the future. This account is compared and contrasted with the common approach that treats shared intention as a matter of personal intentions, with particular reference to the work of Michael Bratman.     

Do Intentions Set Up Rational Defaults? Commitments,Reasons, and the Diachronic Dimension of Rationality

Suppose that you do not do what you have previously decided to do. Are you to be charged with irrationality? A number of otherwise divergent theories of practical rationality hold that by default, you are; there are rational pressures, it is claimed, that favor the long‐term stability and eventual execution of distal intentions. The article challenges this view by examining how these purported pressures can be spelled out. Is intention a normative commitment to act? Are intentions reasons for action – or at least for retaining one's intention until the time to act has come? Or is the rationality of ‘doing as you decide’ governed by diachronic wide‐scope norms, as Michael Bratman and John Broome suggest? All of these approaches are shown to raise severe problems, which suggests a more modest view: diachronic pressures on intending are at each point in time confined to the very next instant.     

Memory for pro-social intentions: When competing motives collide

Memory for future actions, or prospective memory (PM), often involves remembering to do things for others. The present article explores the motivational mechanisms underlying memory for pro-social intentions through the manipulation of the social relevance of goals and presence of material rewards during an activity-based PM task. Results revealed that memory for the intention was better under pro-social than under standard conditions. However, when a material reward was introduced under pro-social conditions, it had the detrimental effect of reducing prospective remembering. Ongoing task performance was faster under pro-social than under No PM and standard PM conditions and it was unrelated to PM performance. In addition, the outcome of the ratings of two independent groups of participants confirmed that people are not aware of the potential conflict between pro-social and self-gain motives. Taken together, these new findings extend current PM theories by suggesting a prominent role of latent motivational mechanisms in guiding memory for pro-social intentions.     

The Social Psychology of Tanning and Sunscreen Use: Self-Presentational Motives as a Predictor of Health Risk1

To the extent that many people seek and maintain a suntan because they believe it makes them more attractive, people who are particularly motivated to make good impressions on others or to be seen as physically attractive are at increased risk for skin cancer. This study examined cognitive, motivational, and attitudinal predictors of two factors that are associated with increased risk for skin cancer: engaging in behaviors that increase one's exposure to UV radiation and inadequate use of sunscreen. Self-presentational motives involving a concern for one's personal appearance and the belief that being tan enhances one's attractiveness were the strongest predictors of the degree to which respondents exposed themselves to natural and artificial sources of UV radiation. Sunscreen use was best predicted by knowing someone with skin cancer. Implications for attempts to promote safe-sun practices are discussed.     

The role of dark‐side of motivation and intention to continue in exercise: A self‐determination theory approach

Motivation plays an important role when it comes to regular physical exercise. Hence, low levels of intentions to continue exercising in the future may ultimately lead to higher rates of exercise dropout. The first objective of the present research was to test a theoretical model considering the dark side of motivational determinants on intentions towards exercising in the future. The second objective consisted in comparing groups with different characteristics, as a way to identify individuals with weaker intention, which is believed to be an indicator of a higher dropout risk. In total, 544 (294 female; 250 male) gym exercisers aged between 18 and 58 years (M = 35.00; SD = 11.57) partook in the present research. Participants were engaged in fitness group classes (n = 273) or in cardio/resistance workouts (n = 271), and their exercise experience ranged from 3 to 120 months (M = 47.41; SD = 7.54). Results showed that the measurement and the structural model had an excellent fit. In addition, the structural model was invariant between gender, fitness activities, and exercise experience. Each group displayed different explained variance in intention to continue exercising. Overall, male, young adults and more experienced exercisers had stronger intentions towards exercising. Fitness instructors should be aware of their own thwarting behaviors, especially when interacting with female, young and less experienced exercisers, since they have weaker intentions to exercise in the future, possibly representing an increased risk of withdrawal.     

The development of prospective memory in children: An executive framework

Prospective memory (PM), the ability to remember to carry out one's intentions in the future, is critical for children's daily functioning and their ability to become independent from caregivers. This review assesses the current state of research on children's prospective memory. Using an executive functioning framework the literature can be organized into studies examining four factors that influence PM. We discuss studies that have manipulated the nature of the intention, the content or length of the retention interval, the nature of the ongoing task, and the nature of the PM cue. Further, we propose a model that attempts to account for the development of PM across childhood based on advances in executive control. Finally, we suggest promising future directions for research.     

Intention,cognitive commitment,and planning

This paper defends a cognitive-motivational account of intending against recent criticism by J. Garcia, connects intending with a number of other concepts important in the theory of action — including decison, volition, and planning — and explores some principles of intention transfer construed as counterparts of epistemic principles governing closure for belief and justification. Several routes to intention formation are described; the role of intentions in planning is examined; and a holistic conception of intention formation and change is stressed. The proposed conception of intending as embodying at once a cognitive and a motivational commitment to action is thus shown to help in understanding both the explanation of action and the rationality of agents.     

So why can’t you intend to drink the toxin?

In this paper I revisit Gregory Kavka’s Toxin Puzzle and propose a novel solution to it. Like some previous accounts, mine postulates a tight link between intentions and reasons but, unlike them, in my account these are motivating rather than normative reasons, i.e. reasons that explain (rather than justify) the intended action. I argue that sensitivity to the absence of possible motivational explanations for the intended action is constitutive of deliberation-based intentions. Since ordinary rational agents display this sensitivity, when placed in the toxin scenario they will believe that there is no motivational explanation for actually drinking the toxin and this is why they can’t form the intention to drink it in the first place. I thus argue that my Motivating-Explanatory Reason Principle correctly explains the toxin puzzle, thereby revealing itself as a genuine metaphysical constraint on intentions. I also explore at length the implications of my account for the nature of intention and rational agency.     

Fallibility and Trust

I argue that while admission of one's own fallibility rationally requires one's readiness to stand corrected in the light of future evidence, it need have no consequences for one's present degrees of belief. In particular, I argue that one's fallibility in a given area gives one no reason to forego assigning credence 1 to propositions belonging to that area. I can thus be seen to take issue with David Christensen's recent claim that our fallibility has far‐reaching consequences for our account of rational belief and epistemic rationality. My arguments inter alia rely on the idea that in basing one's beliefs on one's evidence, one trusts both that one's evidence has the right pedigree and that one gets its probative force right, where such trust can rationally be invested without the need of any further evidence.     

Investigating the predictive validity of implicit and explicit measures of motivation on condom use,physical activity and healthy eating

The literature on health-related behaviours and motivation is replete with research involving explicit processes and their relations with intentions and behaviour. Recently, interest has been focused on the impact of implicit processes and measures on health-related behaviours. Dual-systems models have been proposed to provide a framework for understanding the effects of explicit or deliberative and implicit or impulsive processes on health behaviours. Informed by a dual-systems approach and self-determination theory, the aim of this study was to test the effects of implicit and explicit motivation on three health-related behaviours in a sample of undergraduate students (N?=?162). Implicit motives were hypothesised to predict behaviour independent of intentions while explicit motives would be mediated by intentions. Regression analyses indicated that implicit motivation predicted physical activity behaviour only. Across all behaviours, intention mediated the effects of explicit motivational variables from self-determination theory. This study provides limited support for dual-systems models and the role of implicit motivation in the prediction of health-related behaviour. Suggestions for future research into the role of implicit processes in motivation are outlined.     

To Brexit or not to Brexit: The roles of Islamophobia,conspiracist beliefs,and integrated threat in voting intentions for the United Kingdom European Union membership referendum

We used an identities approach to examine voting intentions in the June 2016 UK referendum on membership of the European Union (EU). In April 2016, 303 British adults (58.7% women, age M = 34.73) indicated their voting intentions for the referendum and completed measures of identification with the national in-group, perceived threat from Muslim immigrants, belief in Islamophobic conspiracy narratives, Islamophobia, general conspiracist beliefs, ambiguity tolerance, and belief in a clash of civilizations. Path and mediation analyses indicated that greater belief in Islamophobic conspiracy theories mediated the link between Islamophobia and intention to vote to leave. Islamophobia and Islamophobic conspiracist beliefs also mediated the effects of perceived threat from Muslims on voting intentions. Other variables acted as antecedents of perceived threat or Islamophobic conspiracy narratives. These findings highlight the role that identity-based cognitions may have played in shaping voting intentions for the UK EU referendum.