A Gricean Interpretation of Nāgārjuna’s Catuṣkoṭi and the No-Thesis View

Nāgārjuna (c. 150–250 CE), the famous founder of the Madhyamika School, proposed the positive catu?ko?i in his seminal work, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā: ‘All is real, or all is unreal, all is both real and unreal, all is neither unreal nor real; this is the graded teaching of the Buddha’. He also proposed the negative catu?ko?i: ‘“It is empty” is not to be said, nor “It is non-empty,” nor that it is both, nor that it is neither; [“empty”] is said only for the sake of instruction’ and the no-thesis view: ‘No dharma whatsoever was ever taught by the Buddha to anyone’. In this essay, I adopt Gricean pragmatics to explain the positive and negative catu?ko?i and the no-thesis view proposed by Nāgārjuna in a way that does not violate classical logic. For Nāgārjuna, all statements are false as long as the hearer understands them within a reified conceptual scheme, according to which (a) substance is a basic categorical concept; (b) substances have svabhāva, and (c) names and sentences have svabhāva.     

Tradition,Reason, and Qur’anic Exegesis in the Modern Period: The Hermeneutics of Said Nursi

Key figures in modernist Qur’an exegesis include Sayyid Ahmad Khan (d. 1898) and Muhammad ?Abduh (d. 1905). This article presents the exegetical principles of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi (1877–1960), a Muslim thinker and a major twentieth-century Turkish scholar who is not necessarily to be labelled a ‘modernist’, on tafsīr bi-al-ma?thūr (tradition-based exegesis) and tafsīr bi-al-ra?y (reason-based exegesis) with special reference to the views of early Muslim modernist thinkers. It particularly refers to Nursi’s work on u?ūl al-tafsīr, Mu?ākamāt (Reasonings), and his one-volume commentary, Ishārāt al-i?jāz (Signs of Inimitability), in order to understand his method of tafsīr. The purpose of the article is to place Nursi within the historical framework of Qur’an exegesis and it argues that, while there are some similarities between ?Abduh and Nursi since the latter is influenced by the former, the methodological differences are clear. While ?Abduh’s method is text-based, Nursi’s is based on kalām (Islamic theology). While ?Abduh is critical of the classical style tafsīr and linguistic discussions in tafsīr, Nursi can be considered to be a modern representative of the Ottoman exegetical school and a follower in the way of al-Zamakhsharī (d. 538?1144), Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606?1210) and al-Bay?āwī (d. 685/1286).     

Thinking with,against, and beyond the Pratyabhijñā philosophy—and back again

We argue that the pratyabhijñā (recognition) system of Ka?mir ?aivism holds an inconsistent position. On the one hand, the Pratyabhijñā regards ?iva as an impersonal mechanism and the universe, including persons, as not having agency; call this the Impersonal Component. On the other hand, it considers ?iva himself as a person, and individual persons as having agency sufficient to respond to ?iva; call this the Personal Component. We maintain that the Personal Component should be affirmed and the Impersonal Component rejected. The Impersonal Component’s claim that ?iva is unaware of and unaffected by his manifestation should be rejected, and the doctrine of satkāryavāda should be modified. The universe is ?iva’s manifestation, in the first instance, but it also has a relative autonomy from him. Moreover, humans have agency and freedom. Their actions effect ?iva. He grows and develops in response to his manifestation.     

佛教五蕴系统——一种信息加工模型

作为佛教基础教义的“五蕴”是对心理机能尤其是认知过程的高度概括——人类信息加工包括色蕴、受蕴、想蕴、行蕴和识蕴五大机能系统。色蕴对感官信息进行初级加工;受蕴进行信息的情绪编码;随后在想蕴阶段进行高级整合,完成信息的概念语言表征;行蕴则为信息加工提供能量及方向导控;识蕴负责信息储存、监控调节及信息输出,最终形成完整的认知判断。佛教五蕴提供了一种信息加工的新模型。     

A Buddhist Explanation of Episodic Memory: From Self to Mind

In this paper, I argue that some of the work to be done by the concept of self is done by the concept of mind in Buddhist philosophy. For the purposes of this paper, I shall focus on an account of memory and its ownership. The task of this paper is to analyse Vasubandhu’s heroic effort to defend the no-self doctrine against the Nyāya-Vai?e?ikas in order to bring to the fore the Buddhist model of mind. For this, I will discuss Vasubandhu’s theory of mind in the early Abhidharma as well as post-Abhidharma period to show the continuity in his work.     

From criticism to approval: A reconsideration of Ji’s Yogācāra position on Madhyamaka

Madhyamaka and Yogācāra are two Mahāyāna schools which have distinct systems. In the seventh century East Asia, the doctrinal distinction between the two schools was received as doctrinal contrast in the polemic circumstance of Emptiness-Existence (C. kongyou 空有) controversy. In this context, Ji 基 (632–682), the putative founder of East Asian Yogācāra school, has been normally considered by scholars to have advocated ‘Existence’ (viz., Yogācāra) in opposition to ‘Emptiness’ (viz., Madhyamaka). It is problematic, however, to brand Ji’s Yogācāra position simply as anti-Madhyamaka. Although Ji evidently expresses evident criticism on such a Madhyamaka exegete as Bhāvaviveka (ca. 500–570) in some of his works, he also describes Bhāvaviveka in an amicable or even respective way in other works. By analyzing Ji’s extant works, this article argues that Ji’s scholastic attitude toward Madhyamaka changed from criticism to approval.     

The Problem of Foundation in Early Nyāya and in Navya-Nyāya

The evaluation of arguments was not the sole concern of logicians in ancient India. Early Nyāya and the later Navya-Nyāya provide an interesting example of the interaction between logic and ontology. In their attempt to develop a kind of property-location logic (Navya-)Naiyāyikas had to consider what kind of restrictions they should impose on the residence relation between a property and its locus (which might again be a property). Can we admit circular residence relations or infinitely descending chains of properties, each depending on its successor as its locus? Early Naiyāyikas and to some extent also Navya-Naiyāyikas regard these phenomena as a kind of absurdity and they want to rule them out. Their intuitions about properties are close to well-founded systems of set theory, whereas the author of the Navya-Nyāya work Upādhidarpa?a is a proponent of a non-well-founded property concept. Despite certain similarities with sets properties are still regarded as intensional objects in Navya-Nyāya. In the present article I demonstrate that a Quine/Morse-style extension of George Bealer's property calculus T1 (with or without a property adaptation of the axiom of regularity) may serve as a formal system which adequately mirrors the Navya-Nyāya property-location logic.     

Nagarjuna’s no-thesis view revisited: the significance of classical Indian debate culture on verse 29 of the Vigrahavyāvartanī

The aim of this essay is to clarify Nāgārjuna’s use of the term pratijñā (thesis) in verse 29 of the Vigrahavyāvartanī (VV) as situated in its contemporaneous thriving debate culture. In contrast to the standard formulation, which interprets the term pratijñā as a reference to the thesis of ?ūnyatā (emptiness) proffered by Nāgārjuna in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, an examination of the debate culture in, and leading up to, second-century CE India shows that the term pratijñā refers to the first of five steps within the Nyaya five-membered syllogism as it functions within a vita??ā form of debate. Through an examination of the context in which this verse was written, the association made between Nāgārjuna’s use of pratijñā in the VV and ?ūnyatā within other texts becomes dislodged, thereby demonstrating the inadequacy of the standard formulation and the need for a revised understanding of the intent of the VV.     

The Self in Early Nyāya: A Minimal Conclusion

In this paper I revisit the early Nyāya argument for the existence of a self. In section 1, I reconstruct the argument in Nyāya-sūtra 1.1.10 as an argument from recognition following the interpretation in the Nyāyasūtra-Bhā?ya and the Nyāya-Vārttika. In Section 2, I reassess the plausibility of the Nyāya argument from memory/recognition in the Bhā?ya and the Vārttika in the light of recent empirical research. I conclude that the early Nyāya version of the argument from recognition can only establish a minimal conclusion that self is a unitary and persisting conscious agent, in contrast to the ontological conclusion that the self is distinct a substance qualified by consciousness. In the final section, I address the tension between the two conclusions in Nyāya and suggest how it might be resolved.     

Prāmāṇyavāda in the Text Tātparyaṭīkā and Pariśuddhi

In the thirteenth century, Gaṅgeśapādhyāya of Mithilā wrote his magnum opus Tattvacintāmaṇi which marked the inception of the Navya- Nyāya School. It was from this time that the works of the Nyāya beginning with the Nyāyasūtra of Gautama, and ending with Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s Nyāyamanjarī as well as Udayana’s Nyāya-Vārttika-Tātparyaṭīkāpariśuddhi came to be designated as Prācīna-nyāya. We have elaborated the arguments of Vācaspati Miśra and Udayana in order to support and prove the extrinsic nature of pramāṇa. In this paper, we have also shown that they have added extra strength to the views of the former Māsters—their predecessors by declaring that the inference (which is advanced by Bhāṣyakāra) is purged of fallacies of all sorts in the field of the validity of pramāṇa.

     

On the Coherence of Dignāga’s Epistemology: Evaluating the Critiques of Candrakīrti and Jayarāśi

I discuss two critiques of Dignāga’s epistemology, one from Candrakīrti and another from Jayarā?i. I argue that they are two versions of what I call the core problem: if the content of Dignāga’s epistemology were correct, two fundamental beliefs within this epistemological theory could not be established or known to be true, as Dignāga claims they are. In response to objections found within the classical Indian tradition as well as several plausible contemporary objections, I then argue that the core problem remains a serious issue with which those sympathetic to Dignāga ought to contend.     

A Reader’s Guide to al-Shāfiʿī’s Epistle on Legal Theory (al-Risāla)

Al-Shāfi?ī’s famous Epistle on Legal Theory (al-Risāla) has long been hailed as formative for the discipline of Islamic legal theory (u?ūl al-fiqh), but its structure and the wording of some of its most important passages remain a puzzle. This essay is intended as an aide for the study of the Risāla’s Arabic text. It surveys scholarly disagreements about the work’s significance and structure, and argues that it is best understood as a sequence of three distinct compositions, the second and third having been appended to address issues raised by opponents during discussions about the first. Each ‘book’ makes a separate argument, has its own internal structure, and is distinguished by terminological and stylistic features. Most of the article consists of a detailed analytical outline that spells out what point al-Shāfi?ī is trying to make with each of his concrete legal examples, and shows how they fit together into a sequence of three related but separately organized arguments.     

The ethical implications of Sengzhao’s concept of the Sage

This paper is an exploration of the ethical significance of Sengzhao’s concept of the sage as exhibited through a Buddhist practitioner’s expanded understanding and cognition of reality. From a philosophical point of view, I aim to show that the ethical significance of his concept of the sage comprises a shift first from ontology to epistemology, and then from epistemology to ethics. I firstly define Sengzhao’s concept of the sage and present a preliminary account of this concept before elaborating on its philosophical aspects. Next, I attempt to illustrate how ethical implications can be derived from Sengzhao’s ethical shift, and lastly, I shed light on the value and significance of this philosophical standpoint within Buddhist philosophy.     

Language and Extra-linguistic Reality in Bhartṛhari’s Vākyapadīya

Relation between language and extra-linguistic reality is an important problem of Bhart?hari’s linguistic philosophy. In the ‘Vākyapadīya,’ this problem is discussed several times, but in accordance with the general perspectivist trend of Bhart?hari’s philosophy each time it is framed through different concepts and different solutions are provided. In this essay, an attempt is undertaken to summarize the variety of different and mutually exclusive views on language and extra-linguistic reality in VP and to formulate the hidden presuppositions on which the actual viewpoints expressed in the kārikās are based. As a result, the following approaches are formulated: (A1) Language is coextensive with external reality. (A2a) Language, designated as kalpanā/vikalpa, is distinct from reality. (A2b) Language refers to the secondary/metaphorical reality (upacārasattā/aupacārikī sattā). (A3) Language and reality somehow correlate, because otherwise, practical/linguistic activity (vyavahāra) would be impossible. The origin of these approaches and their affinities with different schools of Indian philosophy (Nyāya-Vai?e?ika and Buddhist Pramā?avāda) are examined. Approach (A3), according to which correlation between language and reality is functional and not ontological, seems very close to Dharmakīrti’s concept of arthakriyā. This approach accords with Bhart?hari’s perspectivist philosophical strategy. It enabled him to explain how effective linguistic activity is possible, capturing language in its dynamic aspect, without limitative static ontological constructions.     

Analogies between al-Māturīdī’s and Duns Scotus’s Ethical Perspectives

Al-Māturīdī and Duns Scotus share an ethical paradigm that represents the middle ground between divine command and natural law theories in ethics. While al-Māturīdī’s theory can generally be located between Ash?arite divine command and Mu?tazilite natural law theories in Islamic ethics, Scotus’s theory can be placed between William of Ockham’s divine command and Thomas Aquinas’s natural law theories in Christian ethics. Although the starting point of their ethical perspectives is fundamentally based on criticism of natural law theory, neither theologian can be labelled as a typical divine command theorist. This moderate theory may therefore be described as the theory of soft divine command. The main purpose of this article is to draw attention to some similarities between al-Māturīdī’s and Duns Scotus’s ethical perspectives: First, both theologians highlight the composite picture of human nature in terms of morality. In other words, they posit that humans have two opposite tendencies: ‘affection for justice’ and ‘affection for advantage’. Second, although both theologians grant reason an ontological authority in determining what is good and bad, this authority is not limitless. Finally, both theologians argue that, unless one takes account of God’s freedom and wisdom, the moral order in the world cannot be fully comprehended.     

Indian Rational Theology: Proof,Justification, and Epistemic Liberality in Nyāya's Argument for God

In classical India, debates over rational theology naturally become the occasion for fundamental questions about the scope and power of inference itself. This is well evinced in the classical proofs for God by the Hindu Nyāya tradition and the opposing arguments of classical Buddhists and Mīmā?sā philosophers. This paper calls attention to, and provides analysis of, a number of key nodes in these debates, particularly questions of inferential boundaries and whether inductive reasoning has the power to support inferences to wholly unique entities (like God). Further questions probed involve the supposed connection between structured objects and agential creators, and the status of examples used in traditional inference. Further, it calls attention to and defends what may be called an epistemological liberalism, championed—paradoxically perhaps—by Nyāya, and opposed by Buddhists and Mīmā?sakas.     

Predication and the Problem of Universals

Abstract

This paper contrasts the scholastic realisms of David Armstrong and Charles Peirce. It is argued that the so-called ‘problem of universals’ is not a problem in pure ontology (concerning whether universals exist) as Armstrong construes it to be. Rather, it extends to issues concerning which predicates should be applied where, issues which Armstrong sets aside under the label of ‘semantics’, and which from a Peircean perspective encompass even the fundamentals of scientific methodology. It is argued that Peirce's scholastic realism not only presents a more nuanced ontology (distinguishing the existent from the real) but also provides more of a sense of why realism should be a position worth fighting for.     

On recognition and self: a discussion based on Nyāya,Mīmāṃsā and Buddhism

The phenomenon of recognition is a point of contention in the debate between the orthodox Hindus and Buddhists on whether the self (ātman) exists. The Hindus, including Naiyāyikas and Mīmā?sakas, argue that recognition evidences the existence of the self, while Buddhist philosopher ?āntarak?ita maintains that there is no self and recognition should be explained in another way. This article examined two disputes, focusing on the two subsidiary aspects of a recognition: memory and self-recognition. For Hindus, it is the existence of the self that makes memory and self-recognition possible. For Buddhists, it is due to the phenomena of memories and self-recognitions that people postulate the existence of the self. I argue that Buddhist explanation of memory is more acceptable, while their debates on self-recognition should be considered as a tie.