The problem of mind in Confucianism

This essay explores the Confucian theory of mind. Doing so, it first examines the early Confucian concept of the human mind as a substance that has both moral and cognitive functions and a universal nature. It then explores the neo-Confucian concept of the human mind, the original mind, and the relationships between the human mind and human nature, as well as between the human mind and the human body. Finally, it explores the Confucian concept of cultivation of the mind.     

认知与身体:理论心理学的视角

文章站在理论心理学的立场,从具身的维度,探讨了认知与身体的可能关系。文章指出,自古希腊以来的西方文化中,二元论思想一直占据主导地位。柏拉图是二元论思想的最早代表,笛卡尔从认识论上确证了心、物二元世界的存在。传统认知心理学承袭了身心分离的二元论传统,视心智为独立于身体感觉运动系统的抽象符号信息加工。但是具身认知的兴起对二元论提出了挑战。从具身的维度来看,认知是身体的认知,身体是认知的主体。认知在以下三个方面表现出对身体的依赖性:a.身体限制着认知的特征与范围。有机体的身体结构、身体的活动能力限制了认知表征的性质和内容;b.身体不仅限制着认知加工,而且可以作为认知加工的一个组成部分,在大脑和身体之间分配认知任务,发挥着一种类似于分销商的作用;c.身体调节着认知,影响着思维、判断、情绪和动机等心智过程。上述事实说明,身心并非对立的二元,而是一体,身体与环境的互动造就了心智和认知。心智、身体、环境是一体化过程。     

Pressing the Flesh: A Tension in the Study of the Embodied,Embedded Mind?*

Mind, it is increasingly fashionable to assert, is an intrinsically embodied and environmentally embedded phenomenon. But there is a potential tension between two strands of thought prominent in this recent literature. One of those strands depicts the body as special, and the fine details of a creature’s embodiment as a major constraint on the nature of its mind: a kind of new‐wave body‐centrism. The other depicts the body as just one element in a kind of equal‐partners dance between brain, body and world, with the nature of the mind fixed by the overall balance thus achieved: a kind of extended functionalism (now with an even broader canvas for multiple realizability than ever before). The present paper displays the tension, scouts the space of possible responses, and ends by attempting to specify what the body actually needs to be, given its complex role in these recent debates.     

论儒家思想中的"人"与"自然"之关系:兼论其21世纪之启示

本文探讨儒家思想传统中“人”与“自然”之关系。本文先从比较文化史视野,析论中国思维方式之特质在于“联系性思维方式”。本文指出,儒家思想传统以“联系性思维方式”为基础,强调“人”与“自然”之间是一种相即相融并互相渗透的关系。“自然”是“人”的创生者,“人”也是“自然”的参与者。儒家思想家主张“人”与“自然”之间具有连续性与一体性之关系。这两种关系之所以可能,其基础正在于人与宇宙万物都以生生不已的仁德为其本性。“仁”既内在于每个人的心性之中,又超越于每个个体之上,成为宇宙万物之共同质素。而儒家思想中“人”与“自然”之连续性与一体观的建立与发展,正是以人“心”之自觉为其基础。     

The spatial intersection of minds

Spatial formats of information are ubiquitous in the cognitive and neural sciences. There are neural uses of space in the topographic maps found throughout cortex. There are metaphorical uses of space in cognitive linguistics, physical uses of space in ecological psychology, and mathematical uses of space in dynamical systems theory. These varied informational uses of space each provide a single contiguous medium through which cognitive processes can be shared across subsystems. As we further develop our understanding of how the human mind processes information in real time, the continuous sharing and cascading of information patterns between brain areas can be extended to a sharing and cascading of information between multiple brains and bodies to produce coordinated behavior. Essentially, the way you and the people around you negotiate your shared space affects the way you think, because space is a fundamental part of how you think. It is via space that the mental processes of one mind can form an intersection with the mental processes of another mind.     

Sandplay in Jungian analysis: matter and symbolic integration

Jung described a way of thinking, tied to sensations and feelings, that is a thought connected to the body. Again in The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious, Jung (1954) speaks of the symbol as a 'live body', corpus et anima. If the mind cannot credit itself with the discomfort that manifests through the body, this is a sign of a separation between mind and body. A consequence of all this is the literalization of the discomfort which makes it impossible to have a symbolic dimension. Therapy activates a process in which the patient can move from a stage of separation to a possible connection between mind and body, resulting in changes in the level of communication and of awareness. The mind opens itself to symbolization and the body becomes a field for a common language. From our reflections we have come to ascertain that we can speak of analysis only when an imaginary space is achieved, an intermediate space between the patient and the analyst, a space that is created from the intertwining of the symbolic capability of the patient with that of the analyst. Focusing our attention on the use of sandplay in analytic therapy, we know that one puts in the sand box objects that are marks of our psyche, visible traits that contain actions, corporeal movements and feelings. When one focuses on the overall representation built, one can go beyond the literal image and the analyst, keeping alive the image through his symbolic capability, opens the possibility of a dialogue with the symbolic dimension. The imagination as a symbolic thought is the humus that allows the analyst to maintain the intermediate symbolic level open by activating a symbolic process within the dialectic of the analysis.     

Neo-pragmatic intentionality and enactive perception: a compromise between extended and enactive minds

The general idea of enactive perception is that actual and potential embodied activities determine perceptual experience. Some extended mind theorists, such as Andy Clark, refute this claim despite their general emphasis on the importance of the body. I propose a compromise to this opposition. The extended mind thesis is allegedly a consequence of our commonsense understanding of the mind. Furthermore, extended mind theorists assume the existence of non-human minds. I explore the precise nature of the commonsense understanding of the mind, which accepts both extended minds and non-human minds. In the area of philosophy of mind, there are two theories of intentionality based on such commonsense understandings: neo-behaviorism defended, e.g., by Daniel Dennett, and neo-pragmatism advocated, e.g., by Robert Brandom. Neither account is in full agreement with how people ordinarily use their commonsense understanding. Neo-pragmatism, however, can overcome its problem—its inability to explain why people routinely find intentionality in non-humans—by incorporating the phenomenological suggestion that interactional bodily skills determine how we perceive others’ intentionality. I call this integrative position embodied neo-pragmatism. I conclude that the extended view of the mind makes sense, without denying the existence of non-human minds, only by assuming embodied neo-pragmatism and hence the general idea of enactive perception.     

The Value of Authenticity: Another Dimension of Confucian Ethics

This paper explores the Confucian value of authenticity. Taking as the starting point of the Confucian concept of becoming authentic persons of bo, da, jing, and shen, the paper first demonstrates that a high–far–firm zhixiang, creativity, an examined life, and sincerity are four necessary conditions for a self to be an authentic one of bo, da, jing, and shen. It then demonstrates that Confucian ethics operates with a metaphysical concept of a substantive self and Confucian self-cultivation implies authenticating such a substantive self. Finally, it demonstrates that in Confucian ethics, cultivating a person’s self (the primary substance) and cultivating the person’s humanity (the secondary substance) are not separable and entail one another.     

The spread and impact of Cartesian philosophy in China: historical and comparative perspectives

Cartesian philosophy has had a profound influence on modern Chinese intellectuals since the mid 19^th century. After the May Fourth Movement, there have been many Chinese scholars who worked immensely on Cartesian philosophy and conducted fruitful research including translations, biographies, monographs, and a large number of papers. The examination of mind/body has been one of the most important philosophic issues and also a fundamental truth-searching of the various great thinkers, from Confucius and Socrates to many later Eastern and Western philosophers. There are certain similarities and distinctions between Confucian ‘mind/body’ and Cartesian ‘mind/body’. As a super country with the highest population in the world, the studies of Cartesian philosophy in China have been very inadequate; it should be more prosperous and successful.     

Giving Dualism its Due

Despite the current resurgence of modest forms of mind–body dualism, traditional Cartesian immaterial-substance dualism has few, if any, defenders. This paper argues that no convincing case has been made against substance dualism, and that standard objections to it can be credibly answered.     

The “Extended Mind” Approach for a New Paradigm of Psychology

In this paper, I would like to propose the idea of “extended mind” for a new paradigm of psychology. Kohler (Integrative Psychology & Behavioral Science 44:39–57, 2010) correctly pointed out the serious problems of the machine paradigm, and proposed the “organic” view as a new paradigm. But the term “organic” signifying the processes inside the body, is inadequate to express the characteristic of human mind. The recent philosophy of mind suggests that the mind is realized neither only in the brain nor only in the body, but in the whole system of brain-body-environment, namely, in the “extended mind”. The characteristic of human mind resides in the interaction with the mediating tools, artifacts, and the humanized environment. We should propose an “extended mind approach” or an “ecological approach to humanized environment” as a new paradigm for a psychology.     

The Field of Consciousness and Extended Cognition

Extended cognition theorists claim that the definition of cognition can be extended to include not only the brain, but also the body and environment. In a series of works, Mark Rowlands has envisioned a new science of mind that explores the externalism of consciousness and cognition. This paper connects Rowlands’ work with the phenomenology of Aron Gurwitsch. It shows how Gurwitsch’s field of consciousness, in particular his conception of the marginal halo, can provide a distinct, organized way of thinking about extended cognition. A key question considered is from where do cognitive processes project and disclose meanings? By thinking of location as locus—a projecting pathway of points of intentional opportunity—organization in extended cognition becomes organization in a field of consciousness. The marginal halo in the field of consciousness is articulated as this locus of intentionality, what Rowlands (The new science of the mind: from extended mind to embodied phenomenology, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2010) calls “the noneliminable intentional core”. Problems of cognitive bloat and personal character are addressed in light of the findings. In addition to situating Gurwitsch’s work within the extended mind movement for the first time, this study highlights the importance of the marginal halo, largely neglected in previous Gurwitsch scholarship.     

The ontologicalization of the Confucian concept of Xin Xing: Zhou Lianxi’s founding contribution to the Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism

The Confucian concept of cheng  (integrity) emphasizes logical priority of value realization over zhen shi  (reality or truth). Through value realization and the completion of being, zhenshi can be achieved. Cheng demonstrates the original unity of value and reality. Taking the concept of cheng as the core, Zhou Lianxi s philosophy interpreted yi Da (the Dao of change), and integrated Yi Jing (The Book of Changes) and Zhong Yong (The Doctrine of the Mean). On the one hand?it ontologicalized the Confucian concept of xin xing (mind nature), and proved and established the significance of Dao ti(the ontological Dao) as the principle and origin of the utmost goodness. On the other hand, it also extended the significance of value realization to the process of qi hua (transformation of qi) and transformation of myriad things. He proved li yi (the One Principle) of Dao ti from its many manifestations and established his own metaphysical system. Zhou Lianxi s philosophy sets up a new theoretical direction for the Song-Ming Confucians to reconstruct Confucian Metaphysics.     

Mind and epistemic constructivism: Wang Yangming and Kant

This essay explores the philosophical insights of Zhu Xi, Wang YangMing, Kant, and Husserl and therefore proposes a new epistemic constructivism. It demonstrates that a knowing mind is a constructor, not merely a mirror-like copier or a camera-like copier in the experience of knowing. It argues that just as different kinds of machine produce kinds of product of different qualities, different kinds of mind produce different kinds of knowledge; to know X is to construct belief and understanding of X that has truth. Therefore, while Kant correctly indicated that before we set out to know things in the world, we should inquire what the mind can know, Confucian masters profoundly suggest that in order to know things in the world and know better, we should constantly expand our mind to the extent that it is broad（博）, great（大）, refined（精）and profound （深）so that our mind can know millions of things in the world.     

An Ethics of Propriety: Ritual,Roles, and Dependence in Early Confucianism

This study examines the normative foundations of early Confucian ethics and suggests that rather than attempting to understand Confucian ethics in the language of ‘morality’ a more productive way would be to appreciate Confucianism as an ethics of propriety that can be articulated in terms of social roles, ritual decorum, and relational dependence. I argue that Western notions of ‘morality’ betray a thicker, more culturally loaded concept that possesses a limited utility in regard to comparative study. We can appeal to a kind of methodological charity where we not only maximize the sense of the text or subject's sayings but also privilege the categories of thought that are native to the text's or speaker's lexicon. With this in mind, we can understand Confucian ethics as an ethics of propriety that departs substantially from Western moral systems, including virtue ethics, and challenges our received views on justice, autonomy, and personal identity.     

A model of the synchronic self

The phenomenology of the self includes the sense of control over one's body and mind, of being bounded in body and mind, of having perspective from within one's body and mind and of being extended in time. I argue that this phenomenology is to be accounted for by a set of five dissociable cognitive capacities that compose the self. The focus of this paper is on the four capacities that compose the synchronic self: the agentive(B) self, which underlies the sense of control over one's body; the boundary(B) self, which underlies the sense of being bounded within one's body; the agentive(M) self which underlies the sense of control over one's thoughts; and the boundary(M) self which underlies the sense of being bounded within one's mind. I model the agentive(B) and agentive(M) selves as parts of the motor control system and the boundary(B) self as the capacity to form and integrated map of the body. I point to the delusion of thought broadcast as a possible source of evidence for future research on the boundary(M) self.     

Is property dualism better off than substance dualism?

It is widely thought that mind–body substance dualism is implausible at best, though mere “property” dualism is defensible and even flourishing. This paper argues that substance dualism is no less plausible than property dualism and even has two advantages over it.     

Cognitive Spread: Under What Conditions Does the Mind Extend Beyond the Body?

The extended mind hypothesis (EMH) is the claim that the mind can and does extend beyond the human body. Adams and Aizawa (A&A) contend that arguments for EMH commit a ‘coupling constitution fallacy’. We deny that the master argument for EMH commits such a fallacy. But we think that there is an important question lurking behind A&A's allegation: under what conditions is cognition spread across a tightly coupled system? Building on some suggestions from Haugeland, we contend that the system must exhibit a distinctive sort of semantic activity, semantic activity that the system as a whole takes responsibility for.     

The mind‐body relationship in Pāli Buddhism: A philosophical investigation

The Suttas indicate physical conditions for success in meditation, and also acceptance of a not‐Self life‐principle (primarily viññana) which is (usually) dependent on the mortal physical body. In the Abhidhamma and commentaries, the physical acts on the mental through the senses and through the ‘basis’ for mind‐organ and mind‐consciousness, which came to be seen as the ‘heart‐basis’. Mind acts on the body through two ‘intimations’: fleeting modulations in the primary physical elements. Various forms of rūpa are also said to originate dependent on citta and other types of rūpa. Meditation makes possible the development of a ‘mind‐made body’ and control over physical elements through psychic powers. The formless rebirths and the state of cessation are anomalous states of mind‐without‐body, or body‐without‐mind, with the latter presenting the problem of how mental phenomena can arise after being completely absent. Does this twin‐category process pluralism avoid the problems of substance‐dualism?     

The Mind as Skills and Dispositions: On Normativity and Mediation

On the occasion of the critique of Alfredo Gaete and Carlos Cornejo, this article explains and extends the hybrid theory of the mind that I recently presented in this journal. Taking inspiration from Rom Harré’s program for a hybrid psychology, the theory is supposed to be integrative and aims to broaden Harré’s hybrid psychology by including not just the brain, but also the body, social practices, and technological artifacts as mediators of the mind. The mind is understood not as a substance of any kind, but as a set of skills and dispositions to act, think, and feel. This implies a normative view of the mind, according to which psychological phenomena do not simply happen, but are done, and can consequently be done more or less well. I provide arguments in favor of grounding psychology in normativity rather than conscious experience, and I explain why the emphasis on mediators does not represent a threat to the ontological primacy of the person in psychology.