Explaining and Explaining Away in Cosmology and Theology

Modern cosmology raises two significant questions that potentially relate to theology: does the universe have a beginning, and why is the universe so apparently fine tuned for life? In a significant paper, Mark McCartney and David Glass ask whether science can explain away, or at least explain away in part, such features of the universe in cosmology and other sciences that may alternatively invite a theological explanation. In this paper I argue that two proposals made by cosmologists fail to explain away the universe's beginning, and that science is powerless to explain away the more fundamental question as to why there is a universe at all. I argue similarly that scientific, or quasi-scientific, proposals such as the multiverse fail to explain away the fine tuning.     

Explaining and Explaining Away in Science and Religion

Abstract

There is no good reason to think that there is a necessary conflict between science and the existence of God, but is there still some way in which science might support atheism? The most plausible strategy for atheism is to argue that scientific explanations can remove the need for God in some cases via “explaining away.” This paper proposes a number of questions to help identify whether explaining away takes place in a given context, and explores several cases where explaining away might be thought to occur, with particular attention given to the most obvious case: the theory of evolution.     

Becoming a teller of tales: associations between children's fictional narratives and parent-child reminiscence narratives

Previous research has revealed a connection between the contributions parents make while reminiscing and their children’s narratives for personally experienced events. The current research expands the literature by focusing on the connection between parental reminiscing and children’s production of fictional narratives. After 4- to 9-year-olds and their parents reminisced about past shared events, the children (with an experimenter) produced narratives based on wordless picture books. The results revealed that the overall quality of the fictional narratives was correlated with parents’ provision statements that emphasized orientation and evaluation in the reminiscence narrative. For younger children, correlations held for reminiscence narratives about recent events. For older children, correlations held for reminiscence narratives about events from the distant past. The results are consistent with the suggestion that children learn general storytelling skills from adult models.     

Portrayal of personality in Victorian novels reflects modern research findings but amplifies the significance of agreeableness

All literature embodies an implicit theory of personality and human nature (Hogan, 1976). The research described here investigates the implicit personality theory embedded in the behavior of 435 characters in 143 canonical Victorian novels. Characters were rated on the Web by 519 scholars and students of 19th-century British literature. Ratings included the characters’ goals, success in achieving goals, mate preferences and strategies, and personality according to the Five Factor Model. Results suggest that novels by Victorian authors largely reflect personality and human nature as understood by modern personality psychology, but Victorian authors amplify the significance of agreeableness and thus, whether intentionally or not, encourage cooperative impulses in readers.     

Explaining Away and the Cognitive Science of Religion

In order to evaluate the claim that theistic belief can be explained away by science, four models of the relationship between science and theism are developed and their relevance to explaining away explored. These models are then used to evaluate an argument against theistic belief based on developments in the cognitive science of religion. It is argued that even if the processes that produce theistic belief are unreliable, this is insufficient to show that explaining away takes place. Indeed, given the difficulty of showing that the conditions for explaining away are met, it is very unlikely that such an argument can succeed.     

Why some surprises are more surprising than others: Surprise as a metacognitive sense of explanatory difficulty

Early theories of surprise, including Darwin’s, argued that it was predominantly a basic emotion. Recently, theories have taken a more cognitive view of surprise, casting it as a process of “making sense of surprising events”. The current paper advances the view that the essence of this sense-making process is explanation; specifically, that people’s perception of surprise is a metacognitive estimate of the cognitive work involved in explaining an abnormal event. So, some surprises are more surprising because they are harder to explain. This proposal is tested in eight experiments that explore how (i) the contents of memory can influence surprise, (ii) different classes of scenarios can retrieve more/less relevant knowledge from memory to explain surprising outcomes, (iii) how partial explanations constrain the explanation process, reducing surprise, and (iv) how, overall, any factor that acts to increase the cognitive work in explaining a surprising event, results in higher levels of surprise (e.g., task demands to find three rather than one explanations). Across the present studies, using different materials, paradigms and measures, it is consistently and repeatedly found that the difficulty of explaining a surprising outcome is the best predictor for people’s perceptions of the surprisingness of events. Alternative accounts of these results are considered, as are future directions for this research.     

Temporal reproductions are influenced by an internal reference: Explaining the Vierordt effect

Several findings from duration perception literature suggest that when making decisions about time, participants rely on an internal reference memory for time rather than merely on the current physical stimuli. According to a recent account, such an internal reference is formed by a continuous dynamic updating process that integrates duration information from previous trials and the current trial. In the present work, we show how such a dynamic mechanism can account for the classical yet unresolved Vierordt effect, which refers to the overestimation of relatively short and the underestimation of relatively long temporal intervals. We conducted an experiment to examine this and related predictions by means of a temporal reproduction task. Specifically, participants were presented with two successive time intervals — a standard s with constant duration and a comparison c with variable duration. Instead of performing a comparison judgment, however, the participants were subsequently cued to reproduce one of the two presented stimuli. Reproductions were affected not only by the temporal position of the to-be-reproduced stimulus, but also by the stimuli presented on earlier trials. These results support the notion of a dynamically updated internal reference underlying our judgments about the time elapsed, which might also be the basis of the Vierordt effect.     

How are habits formed: Modelling habit formation in the real world

To investigate the process of habit formation in everyday life, 96 volunteers chose an eating, drinking or activity behaviour to carry out daily in the same context (for example ‘after breakfast’) for 12 weeks. They completed the self‐report habit index (SRHI) each day and recorded whether they carried out the behaviour. The majority (82) of participants provided sufficient data for analysis, and increases in automaticity (calculated with a sub‐set of SRHI items) were examined over the study period. Nonlinear regressions fitted an asymptotic curve to each individual's automaticity scores over the 84 days. The model fitted for 62 individuals, of whom 39 showed a good fit. Performing the behaviour more consistently was associated with better model fit. The time it took participants to reach 95% of their asymptote of automaticity ranged from 18 to 254 days; indicating considerable variation in how long it takes people to reach their limit of automaticity and highlighting that it can take a very long time. Missing one opportunity to perform the behaviour did not materially affect the habit formation process. With repetition of a behaviour in a consistent context, automaticity increases following an asymptotic curve which can be modelled at the individual level. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Kant on the Number of Worlds

It has long been disputed whether Kant's transcendental idealism requires two worlds – one of appearances and one of things in themselves – or only one. The one-world view must be wrong if it claims that individual spatio-temporal things can be identified with particular things in themselves, and if it fails to take seriously the doctrine of double affection; versions that insist on one world, without making claims about the identity of individual things, cannot say in what way the world as we know it and the world of things in themselves can be ‘the same’. The two-world view must be wrong if it denies Kant's empirical realism, or offers a phenomenalist interpretation of it. On moral grounds Kant ‘identifies’ each human person with a particular thing in itself, but the relationship here cannot be strict identity; instead its closeness may warrant regarding the two distinct entities as part of a composite whole. Perhaps up to the first edition of the Critique, Kant thought that empirical knowledge required a particular kind of close correspondence between appearances and things in themselves, one that would make it appropriate to speak of composite wholes here also. By the time of the second edition, he saw that there could be no good grounds for thinking that. In this respect something a bit like the one-world theory might make more sense for the first edition than for the second; but in both cases there is room to speak of two worlds as well. Talk of the number of worlds is metaphorical, and both metaphors have their dangers.     

Predictability influences whether outcomes are processed in terms of original or relative values

Previous studies have provided insights into the representations of original and relative values and the influence of predictability on decision making. However, whether the predictability of outcomes can influence the processing manner of outcomes (i.e. whether the outcomes are processed in terms of original or relative values) is still unknown. To investigate this issue, we had participants perform a monetary decision task which resulted in two outcomes with the same relative values but different original values in either a predictable or unpredictable condition, while recording event-related potentials (ERP). ERP results showed that the outcome processing in the unpredictable condition elicited more positive deflections in the time window of 300–500 ms (P300) than did those in the predictable condition. More importantly, the outcome with high original value elicited a greater P300 component than did that with low original value in the unpredictable condition even though these two outcomes had the same relative values, while in the predictable condition no significant difference was observed between ERPs elicited by the two outcomes even though their original values were different. These results suggest that the outcomes might be processed in terms of relative values in the predictable condition but original values in the unpredictable condition.     

Attention, researchers! it is time to take a look at the real world

Theories of attention, too often generated from artificial laboratory experiments, may have limited validity when attention in the natural world is considered. For instance, for more than two decades, conceptualizations of "reflexive" and "volitional" shifts of spatial attention have been grounded in methodologies that do not recognize or utilize the basic fact that people routinely use the eyes of other people as rich and complex attentional cues. This fact was confirmed by our novel discovery that eyes will trigger a reflexive shift of attention even when they are presented centrally and are known to be spatially nonpredictive. This exploration of real-world attention also led to our finding that, contrary to popular wisdom, arrows, like eyes, are capable of producing reflexive shifts of attention—a discovery that brings into question much of the existing attention research. We argue that research needs to be grounded in the real world and not in experimental paradigms. It is time for cognitive psychology to reaffirm the difficult task of studying attention in a manner that has relevance to real-life situations.     

Explaining the Past in the Geosciences

Abductive reasoning is central to reconstructing the past in the geosciences. This paper outlines the nature of the abductive method and restates it in Bayesian terms. Evidence plays a key role in this working method and, in particular, traces of the past are important in this explanatory framework. Traces, whether singularly or as groups, are interpreted within the context of the event for which they have evidential claims. Traces are not considered as independent entities but rather as inter-related pieces of information concerning the likelihood of specific events. Exemplification of the use of such traces is provided by dissecting an example of their use in the environmental reconstruction of mountain climate.     

Artificial explanations: the epistemological interpretation of explanation in AI

In this paper I critically examine the notion of explanation used in artificial intelligence in general, and in the theory of belief revision in particular. I focus on two of the best known accounts in the literature: Pagnucco’s abductive expansion functions and Gärdenfors’ counterfactual analysis. I argue that both accounts are at odds with the way in which this notion has historically been understood in philosophy. They are also at odds with the explanatory strategies used in actual scientific practice. At the end of the paper I outline a set of desiderata for an epistemologically motivated, scientifically informed belief revision model for explanation.     

Moment of Truth: Why Aha! Experiences are Correct

Having a sudden insight is often associated with inherent confidence, enough for Archimedes to run naked through the streets shouting “Eureka!”. Recent evidence demonstrates that public displays of enthusiasm, such as the ancient polymath's, are actually supported by a higher likelihood of being correct.     

An investigation of aspects of the cry of pain model of suicide risk: the role of defeat in impairing memory

AIM: Feelings of defeat and deficits in autobiographical memory are thought to be central to the formation of suicidal thoughts and behaviours. However, no work has established the role of defeat, specifically, in directly leading to memory problems. This study sought to assess whether a defeating event and associated defeated mood impaired memory for a story. METHOD: Participants were from a student population. Those in the experimental condition (n=37) experienced an event which was designed to induce defeat prior to both the encoding and verbal retrieval of a story. Participants in control condition (n=37) experienced no such defeating event. Visual analogue scales of five mood states were taken at baseline, prior to encoding and prior to retrieval. RESULTS: Participants in the experimental condition reported increased feelings of defeat following baseline, and recalled fewer story units relative to the control condition. DISCUSSION: These results show that appraising an event as defeating increased subsequent defeated mood and led to impaired episodic memory, independently of low mood in general, thus suggesting a causal role of a specific negative mood state on impaired memory. Implications for clinical research are discussed.     

Explaining the Paradox of Hedonism

The paradox of hedonism is the idea that making pleasure the only thing that we desire for its own sake can be self-defeating. Why would this be true? In this paper, I survey two prominent explanations, then develop a third possible explanation, inspired by Joseph Butler's classic discussion of the paradox. The existing accounts claim that the paradox arises because we are systematically incompetent at predicting what will make us happy, or because the greatest pleasures for human beings are found in certain special goods which hedonists cannot enjoy. On the account that I develop, the paradox is a consequence of a theory about the nature of pleasure, together with a view about the requirements of rational belief. Which of these explanations is correct, I argue, bears on central questions about how to understand the nature and extent of the paradox.     

Explaining the Feelings of Justice

Philosophical theories about justice feelings and axiological feelings generally suffer from the fact that they look for simple criteria of justice, legitimacy, fairness. For this reason, they appear as of little help to account for the findings from sociological empirical studies. Weber's notion of "axiological rationality" can be interpreted as suggesting a "cognitivist" theory of axiological feelings. According to this theory, the causes responsible for the fact that a social actor endorses an axiological statement would not be basically different from the causes responsible for his endorsement of a representational statement. He would endorse the statement "X is fair" as he endorses "X is true", because these statements appear to him as grounded on strong reasons, though he may not perceive these reasons explicitly. This cognitivist theory was used by analysts of collective moral sentiments, as Adam Smith, before Max Weber. A careful examination of two empirical studies shows that the cognitivist theory can make the observational findings more easily understandable. The "cognitivist theory" eliminates the weaknesses of the major general philosophical and sociological theories of axiological feelings. It shows notably that these feelings can be context-dependent without this contextuality making them irrational. This theory includes two major principles: that instrumental rationality does not overlap with rationality shortly; that there are no simple criteria of "fairness", "legitimacy", etc.     

What friends are for! The use of routine standards in social comparison

Social comparisons are frequently used for self-evaluation. As a consequence, judges have to be efficient in each comparison step. Standard selection, however, is traditionally seen as an elaborate process in which judges deliberately select similar standards. We propose that often judges do not engage in such deliberate selection processes. Instead, they use routine standards--standards that have frequently been used for self-evaluation. Consistent with this assumption, Studies 1-3 demonstrate that student participants activate knowledge about their best friend--a likely routine standard--during self-evaluation. In Study 1, lexical decisions for the best friend's name are facilitated after self-evaluation. In Study 2, participants judge their best friend faster after evaluating themselves on the same dimension. In Study 3, this is even the case if the best friend is dissimilar and consequently undiagnostic. Finally, in Study 4, self-evaluations are primarily influenced by comparison information about an experimentally created routine standard.     

Dreams are more negative than real life: Implications for the function of dreaming

Dream content studies have revealed that dream experiences are negatively biased; negative dream contents are more frequent than corresponding positive dream contents. It is unclear, however, whether the bias is real or due to biased sampling, i.e., selective memory for intense negative emotions. The threat simulation theory (TST) claims that the negativity bias is real and reflects the evolved biological function of dreaming. In the present study, we tested the hypothesis of the TST that threatening events are overrepresented in dreams, i.e., more frequent and more severe in dreams than in real life. To control for biased sampling, we used as a baseline the corresponding negative events in real life rather than the corresponding positive events in dreams. We collected dream reports (N=419) and daily event logs (N=490) from 39 university students during a two-week period, and interviewed them about real threat experiences retrievable from autobiographical memory (N=714). Threat experiences proved to be much more frequent and severe in dreams than in real life, and Current Dream Threats more closely resembled Past than Current Real Threats. We conclude that the TST's predictions hold, and that the negativity bias is real.