Weaving the fabric of social interaction: Articulating developmental psychology and cognitive neuroscience in the domain of motor cognition

In this article, we bring together recent findings from developmental science and cognitive neuroscience to argue that perception-action coupling constitutes the fundamental mechanism of motor cognition. A variety of empirical evidence suggests that observed and executed actions are coded in a common cognitive and neural framework, enabling individuals to construct shared representations of self and other actions. We review work to suggest that such shared representations support action anticipation, organization, and imitation. These processes, along with additional computational mechanisms for determining a sense of agency and behavioral regulation, form the fabric of social interaction. In addition, humans possess the capacity to move beyond these basic aspects of action analysis to interpret behavior at a deeper level, an ability that may be outside the scope of the mirror system. Understanding the nature of shared representations from the vantage point of developmental and cognitive science and neuroscience has the potential to inform a range of motor and social processes. This perspective also elucidates intriguing new directions and research questions and generates specific hypotheses regarding the impact of early disorders (e.g., developmental movement disorders) on subsequent action processing.     

Individual differences in cognitive representations of action influence the activation of goal concepts

Goal representations play a key role in various psychological processes, including behavioral regulation, self-perception and social understanding. Research on cognitive representations of action has identified individual differences in the general tendency to construe actions in terms of their goal (vs. movement parameters), which can be reliably assessed with the Behavior Identification Form (BIF). The aim of the present study was to examine how individual differences in action identification, as measured by the BIF, affect online processing of action in a laboratory study. The main results showed that the level of action identification predicted participants' performance in a task designed to implicitly assess people's automatic processing of action regarding goal features. We discussed the possible role of impaired goal processing in psychological dysfunctions.     

Joint action: bodies and minds moving together

The ability to coordinate our actions with those of others is crucial for our success as individuals and as a species. Progress in understanding the cognitive and neural processes involved in joint action has been slow and sparse, because cognitive neuroscientists have predominantly studied individual minds and brains in isolation. However, in recent years, major advances have been made by investigating perception and action in social context. In this article we outline how studies on joint attention, action observation, task sharing, action coordination and agency contribute to the understanding of the cognitive and neural processes supporting joint action. Several mechanisms are proposed that allow individuals to share representations, to predict actions, and to integrate predicted effects of own and others' actions.     

Sensory-motor and cognitive functions of the human posterior parietal cortex involved in manual actions

The posterior parietal cortex (PPC) is considered the dominant structure in the dorsal stream of visual processing, defined in the context of systems for perception and action. It is well-established that the human PPC is critical to sensory-motor transformations involved in online manual actions. A related body of literature identifies the PPC as important to cognitive aspects of action representation such as imagery, tool use, and gestures. The goal of the present paper is to review and compare the PPC contribution to representations of both motor control and motor cognition. Relating the sensory-motor and cognitive components of PPC function is important for an understanding of integrative representations of manual actions and the relation between perception, action, and cognition. Proposed theories of multiple dorsal stream systems supporting different action-relevant goals are discussed.     

Goal-discrepant situations prime goal-directed actions if goals are temporarily or chronically accessible

This research tested the hypothesis that perception of goal-discrepant situations automatically (i.e., without conscious intent) facilitates access to representations of instrumental actions if goal representations are mentally accessible. Employing a probe-recognition paradigm, Experiment 1 established that sentences describing situations that are discrepant with the goal of "looking well-groomed" (e.g., having dirty shoes) automatically increased the accessibility of representations of appropriate instrumental actions (e.g., polishing) in comparison to control situations, but only when participants frequently pursued the goal. Experiments 2a and 2b suggest that this effect was due to chronic accessibility of the goal representation and demonstrate that the same effects occur if the accessibility of the goal is temporarily enhanced (by subliminal priming) for people that nonfrequently pursue the goal.     

主动控制感在大脑表征中的时空标记

主动控制感是主动动作过程中产生的控制自身动作, 进而控制外部环境的主观体验。构成动作主动控制感的核心要素是主观意图与结果反馈。本研究试图通过操控这两个核心要素的不同属性, 借助脑磁图等技术, 探寻主动控制感在大脑额-顶为主的脑网络中前-后馈的作用方式及时空特异性标记, 并建构新的认知神经理论模型。这将有利于理解人类动作的产生及后效、为相关精神类疾病的临床诊断提供更加客观的参照标准。     

That's easy for you to say: action identification and speech fluency

Action identification theory holds that an action can be identified by the performer in different ways, and that these various act identities differ in their appropriateness for maintaining the action effectively. Optimal action identification exists when a personally easy action is identified in relatively high-level terms (i.e., the action's effects and implications) or a personally difficult action is identified in relatively low-level terms (i.e., the action's mechanical details). To test the optimality hypothesis with respect to speech fluency, subjects were asked to deliver a speech to either an easy-to-persuade audience or a difficult-to-persuade audience and induced to think about the action in either high-level or low-level terms. As predicted, subjects made fewer speech errors and felt more satisfied with their performance when the task was personally easy and identified at high level and when the task was personally difficult and identified at low level. Optimal action identification made things easier for them to say.     

Know thy sound: Perceiving self and others in musical contexts

This review article provides a summary of the findings from empirical studies that investigated recognition of an action's agent by using music and/or other auditory information. Embodied cognition accounts ground higher cognitive functions in lower level sensorimotor functioning. Action simulation, the recruitment of an observer's motor system and its neural substrates when observing actions, has been proposed to be particularly potent for actions that are self-produced. This review examines evidence for such claims from the music domain. It covers studies in which trained or untrained individuals generated and/or perceived (musical) sounds, and were subsequently asked to identify who was the author of the sounds (e.g., the self or another individual) in immediate (online) or delayed (offline) research designs. The review is structured according to the complexity of auditory–motor information available and includes sections on: 1) simple auditory information (e.g., clapping, piano, drum sounds), 2) complex instrumental sound sequences (e.g., piano/organ performances), and 3) musical information embedded within audiovisual performance contexts, when action sequences are both viewed as movements and/or listened to in synchrony with sounds (e.g., conductors' gestures, dance). This work has proven to be informative in unraveling the links between perceptual–motor processes, supporting embodied accounts of human cognition that address action observation. The reported findings are examined in relation to cues that contribute to agency judgments, and their implications for research concerning action understanding and applied musical practice.     

Feeling of doing in obsessive–compulsive checking

Research on self-agency emphasizes the importance of a comparing mechanism, which scans for a match between anticipated and actual outcomes, in the subjective experience of doing.This study explored the “feeling of doing” in individuals with checking symptoms by examining the mechanism involved in the experienced agency for outcomes that matched expectations. This mechanism was explored using a task in which the subliminal priming of potential action-effects (emulating outcome anticipation) generally enhances people’s feeling of causing these effects when they occur, due to the unconscious perception of a match between primed and observed outcomes. The main result revealed a negative relationship between checking and self-agency for observed outcomes that were primed prior to actions. This suggests that checking individuals fail to grasp the correspondence between actual outcomes of their actions and expected ones. We discuss the possible role of undermined self-agency in checking phenomena and its relationship with cognitive dysfunction.     

Maintaining faith in agency under immutable constraints: cognitive consequences of believing in negotiable fate

Negotiable fate refers to the idea that one can negotiate with fate for control, and that people can exercise personal agency within the limits that fate has determined. Research on negotiable fate has found greater prevalence of related beliefs in Southeast Asia, East Asia, and Eastern Europe than in Western Europe and English-speaking countries. The present research extends previous findings by exploring the cognitive consequences of the belief in negotiable fate. It was hypothesized that this belief enables individuals to maintain faith in the potency of their personal actions and to remain optimistic in their goal pursuits despite the immutable constraints. The belief in negotiable fate was predicted to (a) facilitate sense-making of surprising outcomes; (b) increase persistence in goal pursuits despite early unfavorable outcomes; and (c) increase risky choices when individuals have confidence in their luck. Using multiple methods (e.g., crosscultural comparisons, culture priming, experimental induction of fate beliefs), we found supporting evidence for our hypotheses in three studies. Furthermore, as expected, the cognitive effects of negotiable fate are observed only in cultural contexts where the fate belief is relatively prevalent. Implications of these findings are discussed in relation to the intersubjective approach to understanding the influence of culture on cognitive processes (e.g., Chiu, Gelfand, Yamagishi, Shteynberg, & Wan, 2010), the sociocultural foundations that foster the development of a belief in negotiable fate, and an alternative perspective for understanding the nature of agency in contexts where constraints are severe. Future research avenues are also discussed.     

Will any doll do? 12-month-olds' reasoning about goal objects

Infants as young as 5 months of age view familiar actions such as reaching as goal-directed (Woodward, 1998), but how do they construe the goal of an actor's reach? Six experiments investigated whether 12-month-old infants represent reaching actions as directed to a particular individual object, to a narrowly defined object category (e.g., an orange dump truck), or to a more broadly defined object category (e.g., any truck, vehicle, artifact, or inanimate object). The experiments provide evidence that infants are predisposed to represent reaching actions as directed to categories of objects at least as broad as the basic level, both when the objects represent artifacts (trucks) and when they represent people (dolls). Infants do not use either narrower category information or spatiotemporal information to specify goal objects. Because spatiotemporal information is central to infants' representations of inanimate object motions and interactions, the findings are discussed in relation to the development of object knowledge and action representations.     

Relative contributions of goal representation and kinematic information to self-monitoring by chimpanzees and humans

It is important to monitor feedback related to the intended result of an action while executing that action. This monitoring process occurs hierarchically; that is, sensorimotor processing occurs at a lower level, and conceptual representation of action goals occurs at a higher level. Although the hierarchical nature of self-monitoring may derive from the evolutionary history of humans, little is known about this cognitive process in non-human primates. This study showed that the relative contributions of kinematic information and goal representations to self-monitoring differ for chimpanzees and humans. Both species performed aiming actions whereby participants moved a cursor to hit targets. Additionally, a distractor cursor was presented simultaneously, and participants discriminated the cursor under their control from the cursor not under their control. The results showed that chimpanzees found it difficult to determine whether they were controlling the distractor when it moved toward the target, even though the distractor's kinematics and the participant's actions were dissociated. In contrast, humans performed efficiently regardless of any overlap between the presumptive and observed goals of the action. Our results suggest that goal representation, rather than motor kinematics, is the primary source of information for self-monitoring in chimpanzees, whereas humans efficiently integrate both dimensions of information. Our results are consistent with evidence showing species differences during imitation of others' actions, and suggest that humans have evolved the cognitive capacity to monitor motor kinematics in a more flexible manner than have chimpanzees.     

Individual Differences in Religious Motivation Influence How People Think

Motives matter and may have implications for how people cognitively experience meaning through religion and spirituality. Specifically, intrinsically motivated people perceive religion and spirituality are more central to meaning in life, which should promote a tendency to adopt more coherent, expansive cognitive representations. In contrast, extrinsically motivated people may adopt narrower cognitive representations since their motivation is more proximally oriented. The present study tests these possibilities by examining how religious motivation relates to action identification (tendency to use coherent, higher‐level cognitive representations). Results from 630 participants revealed that among religious people, intrinsic and extrinsic‐personal religious motivations indirectly influence higher‐level action identification through strength of spiritual beliefs. These relationships were not evident among nonreligious people. Furthermore, extrinsic‐social religious motivation and religious service attendance did not relate to action identification. These findings demonstrate that religious motivation differences are consequential for the action identities people rely upon to form a sense of meaning.     

Self-recognition of highly skilled actions: A study of orchestral conductors

The influence of movement skill on action representations and identification of agency was investigated. Point-light displays were created of highly skilled gestures of thirteen orchestral conductors in visual, auditory, and audiovisual versions and compared to two control conditions (static images and gait cycles of the same participants). In subsequent experimental sessions, participants indicated whether displays presented them or other conductors, whether the soundtrack contained their or others' musical interpretations, and rated the quality and emotional content of the gestures. Self-recognition was more accurate in conditions presenting highly skilled conducting movements as compared to other displays. Participants judged the quality of their own movements to be better than those of others, independently of whether or not they recognized movement agency. Emotional content was perceived accurately across conditions both for own and others' actions. These results point to the influence of dynamical characteristics of motor skill, rather than merely type of movement or emotional content, on action representations and self-other identification.     

The sound of you and me: Novices represent shared goals in joint action

People performing joint actions coordinate their individual actions with each other to achieve a shared goal. The current study investigated the mental representations that are formed when people learn a new skill as part of a joint action. In a musical transfer-of-learning paradigm, piano novices first learned to perform simple melodies in the joint action context of coordinating with an accompanist to produce musical duets. Participants then performed their previously learned actions with two types of auditory feedback: while hearing either their individual action goal (the melody) or the shared action goal (the duet). As predicted, participants made more performance errors in the individual goal condition than in the shared goal condition. Further experimental manipulations indicated that this difference was not due to different coordination requirements in the two conditions or perceptual dissimilarities between learning and test. Together, these findings indicate that people form representations of shared goals in contexts that promote minimal representations, such as when learning a new action together with another person.     

Experience of agency and sense of responsibility

The experience of agency refers to the feeling that we control our own actions, and through them the outside world. In many contexts, sense of agency has strong implications for moral responsibility. For example, a sense of agency may allow people to choose between right and wrong actions, either immediately, or on subsequent occasions through learning about the moral consequences of their actions. In this study we investigate the relation between the experience of operant action, and responsibility for action outcomes using the intentional binding effect (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002) as an implicit, quantitative measure related to sense of agency. We studied the time at which people perceived simple manual actions and their effects, when these actions were embedded in scenarios where their actions had unpredictable consequences that could be either moral or merely economic. We found an enhanced binding of effects back towards the actions that caused them, implying an enhanced sense of agency, in moral compared to non-moral contexts. We also found stronger binding for effects with severely negative, compared to moderately negative, values. A tight temporal association between action and effect may be a low-level phenomenal marker of the sense of responsibility.     

Self-denial and the role of intentions in the attribution of agency

The ability to distinguish between our own actions and those of an external agent is a fundamental component of normal human social interaction. Both low- and high-level mechanisms are thought to contribute to the sense of movement agency, but the contribution of each is yet to be fully understood. By applying small and incremental perturbations to realistic visual feedback of the limb, the influence of high-level action intentions and low-level motor predictive mechanisms were dissociated in two experiments. In the first, participants were induced to claim agency over movements that were subject to large perturbations and to deny agency over self-produced unperturbed movements despite the application of motor corrections by low-level mechanisms. A control experiment confirmed that if reaches met with their intended goal then they were more likely to be attributed to the agent, regardless of the discrepancy between the actual and seen positions of the limb.     

Action relevance induces an attentional weighting of representations in visual working memory

Information maintained in visual working memory (VWM) can be strategically weighted according to its task-relevance. This is typically studied by presenting cues during the maintenance interval, but under natural conditions, the importance of certain aspects of our visual environment is mostly determined by intended actions. We investigated whether representations in VWM are also weighted with respect to their potential action relevance. In a combined memory and movement task, participants memorized a number of items and performed a pointing movement during the maintenance interval. The test item in the memory task was subsequently presented either at the movement goal or at another location. We found that performance was better for test items presented at a location that corresponded to the movement goal than for test items presented at action-irrelevant locations. This effect was sensitive to the number of maintained items, suggesting that preferential maintenance of action relevant information becomes particularly important when the demand on VWM is high. We argue that weighting according to action relevance is mediated by the deployment of spatial attention to action goals, with representations spatially corresponding to the action goal benefitting from this attentional engagement. Performance was also better at locations next to the action goal than at locations farther away, indicating an attentional gradient spreading out from the action goal. We conclude that our actions continue to influence visual processing at the mnemonic level, ensuring preferential maintenance of information that is relevant for current behavioral goals.     

Cognitive confidence in obsessive-compulsive disorder: distrusting perception, attention and memory

Previous studies have established that obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is characterised by significant levels of distrust in memory (e.g. for actions). Ironically, this lowered confidence is at least in part due to repeated checking, which is assumed to lower perceptual processing and thereby reduces vividness and detail of the recollections. In a previous study, Hermans, D., Martens, K., De Cort, K., Pieters, G., and Eelen, P. [(2003). Reality monitoring and metacognitive beliefs related to cognitive confidence in OCD. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 41, 383-401] observed that OCD is not only characterised by reduced confidence in memory, but also by a similar distrust in attention (Hermans et al., 2003). The present study aimed at replicating and extending this finding. It was observed (a) that patients suffering from OCD showed less confidence in attention and memory than a clinical and a nonclinical control group; (b) that confidence in attention was uniquely related to checking behaviour, and (c) that repeated checking caused increased levels of distrust in attention. In addition, it was observed that cognitive distrust while performing OCD-related actions not only extends to attention, but also to perception. It is argued that research on metacognition in OCD should move beyond the study of memory.     

What do I think you're doing? Action identification and mind attribution

The authors examined how a perceiver's identification of a target person's actions co-varies with attributions of mind to the target. The authors found in Study 1 that the attribution of intentionality and cognition to a target was associated with identifying the target's action in terms of high-level effects rather than low-level details. In Study 2, both action identification and mind attribution were greater for a liked target, and in Study 3, they were reduced for a target suffering misfortune. In Study 4, it was again found that action identification and mind attribution were greater for a liked target, but like that for the self or a liked other, positive actions were identified at higher levels than negative actions, with the reverse being true for disliked others. In Study 5, the authors found that instructing participants to adopt the target's perspective did not affect mind attribution but did lead to higher level identifications of the target's actions.