The Three Princesses

This article introduces three princesses: Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia (1618–1680); her sister, Princess Sophie who became the Electress of Hanover (1630–1714); and Sophie's daughter, Sophie Charlotte, who became the first Queen of Prussia (1668–1705). After summarizing their common family background, the article presents, for each in turn, her biography and a discussion of her relation to philosophy. In each case their philosophical involvement stems from their friendships with the leading philosophers of their day; Princess Elizabeth was a friend of Descartes while the Electress Sophie and Sophie Charlotte were friends of Leibniz. The article concludes that anyone who has made the acquaintance of the three princesses and has studied their interaction with their philosopher-friends will always see them as part of the history of modem philosophy.     

The scientific positivism of Michael Oakeshott

Seventeenth-century philosopher Margaret Cavendish wrote not only several philosophical treatises, but also many fictional works. I argue for taking the latter as serious objects of study for historians of philosophy, and sketch a method for doing so. Cavendish's fiction is full of conflicting viewpoints, and many authors have argued that this demonstrates that she did not intend her literary works to serve serious philosophical purpose. But if we consider philosophers more central to the canon, such as Plato or Kierkegaard, who sometimes used literary forms to do serious philosophy, we see that these arguments are unfounded. Like those philosophers, Cavendish had several philosophical motivations for pursuing value-theoretic issues through the flexible formats of literary genres. This suggests that Cavendish's literary corpus may be fruitful and largely unexplored ground for the history of philosophy.     

W. E. B. Du Bois’s “Conservation of Races”

Nothing was more important for W. E. B. Du Bois than to promote the upward mobility of African Americans. This essay revisits his “Conversation of Races” to demonstrate its general philosophical importance. Ultimately, Du Bois’s three motivations for giving the address reveal his view of the nature of philosophical inquiry: to critique earlier phenotypic conceptions of race, to show the essentiality of history, and to promote a reflexive practice. Commentators have been unduly invested in the hermeneutic readings and as a result have misunderstood its philosophical dimensions. Du Bois did more than introduce the concept of race into the purview of philosophy, he provided a method for philosophical inquiry into a concept that is notoriously difficult to approach with precision. The goal here is to show why no introduction to philosophy and no discussion about the nature of philosophical inquiry is complete without consideration of “Conservation.” Certainly, it is a text about race, but it is also an important philosophical text in general.     

What Is Realistic Political Philosophy?

In the study of politics, Cambridge is sometimes associated with a school of political philosophical “realism.” This article discusses what realism in political philosophy might mean, by examining first what might count as “unrealistic” political philosophy (looking at Sidgwick and Rawls), and then some recent attempts to identify a more realistic philosophical approach to politics. It argues that realistic political philosophy tends to emerge as a thin account of politics that falls between the stools of either more philosophical (i.e., more idealistic) or less philosophical (i.e., more historical) accounts. It illustrates this in relation to Sidgwick and also Hobbes, who is often held up as the quintessential realist in the history of political philosophy.     

Philosophy Unbound: The Idea of Global Philosophy

The future of philosophy is moving towards “global philosophy.” The idea of global philosophy is the view that different philosophical approaches may engage more substantially with each other to solve philosophical problems. Most solutions attempt to use only those available resources located within one philosophical tradition. A more promising approach might be to expand the range of available resources to better assist our ability to offer more compelling solutions. This search for new horizons in order to improve our clarity about philosophical issues is at the heart of global philosophy. The idea of global philosophy encourages us to look beyond our traditions to improve our philosophical problem‐solving by our own lights. Global philosophy is a new approach whose time is coming. This essay offers the first account of this approach and an assessment of its future promise.     

中国传统哲学范式的现代转型

中国传统哲学范式在历史上经历了从古典范式、近代范式到现代范式的转型,“哲学范式转型”意味着哲学重心的转移和透视问题的角度发生了根本的变迁。20世纪上半叶,可以称为传统哲学范式向现代转型的最初阶段。应当说,传统哲学范式的转型是与历史事件分不开的。传统哲学范式向现代的转型得益于五四新文化运动。它有两个基本的转型路向：首先表现为由意识形态向学术资源或知识形态的转型。这种转型突出地表现为现代新儒学对传统儒学范式进行了新的思考和变革,确立了它的现代形态。其次是为传统哲学范式向现代的转型做了准备,表现在对传统哲学进行了深入的思考和清理,并以新的哲学思想(西方哲学、马克思主义哲学)对传统哲学的整体框架给以全面审视。20世纪初的传统哲学范式的转型是中国哲学史上的一次重大飞跃。自此以后,传统哲学从语言表述到问题视阈,从内容到方法都进入了一个崭新的时期。     

Making history philosophical: Kant,Maimon, and the evolution of the historiography of philosophy in the critical period

ABSTRACT

In this article I explore Maimon’s role in the evolution of Kant’s understanding of the function of the history of philosophy in philosophical enquiry. Kant is often viewed as holding an ambivalent relation to the history of philosophy. On the one hand, he dismisses past philosophers as victims of transcendental illusion and downplays the value of the historiography of philosophy. On the other hand, by framing his project as a synthesis of several philosophical traditions, Kant embeds the critical philosophy into a sweeping historical narrative in a manner that highlights the importance of the past for present philosophical aims. In this article, I argue that for most of his career Kant held a position reflective of the former view, but that the publication of Maimon’s response to a prize question announced by the Royal Academy led Kant to develop an understanding of the history of philosophy more in line with the latter view. The result is a distinctively post-Kantian model for a ‘philosophical history of philosophy’ that is both methodologically nuanced and potentially relevant to contemporary debates.     

Philosophie der Philosophiegeschichte von Hegel bis Hartmann

Summary In this paper the author discusses the conceptions of the subject and the method of the history of philosophy by Hegel, Windelband, Dilthey, Hartmann, and other philosophers of the history of philosophy. The history of philosophy as a philosophical discipline was first connected by Hegel with the very system of philosophy. His history of philosophy was the closing and integrating part of his philosophical system. The critics have accepted the view that Hegel had determined the intrinsic regularity of the historico-philosophical development, but they rejected his identification of logical determinations of the idea with the sequence of appearances of philosophical systems in history. While Hegel followed the history of philosophical systems, Windelband followed the history of philosophical problems and concepts created for the solution of the same problems. Dilthey invented the method of understanding, which he applied to all products of cultural creativity of mankind through history. Dilthey substituted life for the Hegelian spirit. The life of the spirit expresses itself in language, religion, morality, art, philosophy and becomes evident only through history. History became by Dilthey the decisive form of the philosophical selfknowledge of man. The aim of Dilthey's spiritual-historical method was to follow the great role of cultural-historical factors in the shaping of philosophical doctrines. Contrary to Dilthey, Hartmann supports the problem-historical method. He was of the opinion that the history of philosophical problems contains the genuine historical continuity of philosophy. The philosophical problem is by nature the linking ring between history and philosophy.The conceptions of history of philosophy by all those philosophers are functionally dependent on their conceptions of philosophy.In addition to discussing the conceptions of the history of philosophy, of those four philosophers, the author also presents his own critical comments.     

Writing the history of Russian philosophy

This article addresses the writing of the history of Russian philosophy from the first of such works—Archimandrite Gavriil’s Russian Philosophy [Russkaja filosofija, 1840]—to philosophical histories/textbooks in the twenty-first century. In the majority of these histories, both past and present, we find a relentless insistence on the delineation of “characterizing traits” of Russian philosophy and appeals to “historiosophy,” where historiosophy is employed as being distinct from the historiographical method. In the 1990s and 2000s, the genre of the history of Russian philosophy has grown increasingly conservative with regards to content, with histories from this period demonstrating an almost exclusive Orthodox focus. This conservatism, in turn, has contributed to widespread contention in recent years over the status of these philosophical textbooks—disagreements that often lead to either (1) further appeals to “historiosophical” methods; or (2) denials of the domestic philosophical tradition altogether, where the response to the query “Is there philosophy in Russia?” is emphatically negative. This article argues that the contemporary disputes over the development and preservation of the Russian philosophical canon are in many ways part of a larger debate over the roles of Orthodoxy and the history of philosophy in post-Soviet philosophical thought.     

What Is Trans Philosophy?

In this article, I explore the question “What is trans philosophy?” by viewing trans philosophy as a contribution to the field of trans studies. This requires positioning the question vis à vis Judith Butler’s notion of philosophy’s Other (that is, the philosophical work done outside of the boundaries of professional philosophy), as trans studies has largely grown from this Other. It also requires taking seriously Susan Stryker’s distinction between the mere study of trans phenomena and trans studies as the coming to academic voice of trans people. Finally, it requires thinking about the types of questions that emerge when philosophy is placed within a multidisciplinary context: (1) What does philosophy have to offer? (2) Given that philosophy typically does not use data, what grounds philosophical claims about the world? (3) What is the relation between philosophy and “the literature”? In attempting to answer these questions, I examine the notion of philosophical perplexity and the relation of philosophy to “the everyday.” Rather than guiding us to perplexity, I argue, trans philosophy attempts to illuminate trans experiences in an everyday that is confusing and hostile. Alternative socialities are required, I argue, in order to make trans philosophy possible.     

‘Why not Lukács?’ or: on Non-Bourgeois Bourgeois Being

The Lukács Circle in Szeged, a spontaneous, unofficial organization of young Hungarian scholars and philosophy teachers, characteristically represented Georg Lukács' influence on young Hungarian intelligentsia in the period of late socialism. In this paper, the author recalls and critically analyses the intellectual milieu and motives that led a considerable part of young Hungarian intelligentsia of that time to make a cult of Lukács' philosophy. The key to the analysis is the ambiguous character of the political feelings and philosophical orientation of many young people in the period of late socialism and the paradoxical non-bourgeois bourgeois character of Lukács' philosophy. Lukács' young followers were dissatisfied with the political conditions of real socialism and with official Marxism. However, they considered themselves Marxists and were convinced by the anti-capitalist, romantic idea of democratic socialism. In the eyes of his young followers, Lukács was a genuine philosopher whose teaching was interwoven by his wide-ranging bourgeois middle-class education, promising both a real philosophical alternative to official Marxism and a high-level philosophical foundation for a non-capitalist but democratic future human history. The author argues that Lukács' philosophy did not satisfy these expectations. In his political philosophy, the philosopher could not move away from the mythological idea concerning the leading role of the communist party and therefore could not elaborate a genuine philosophical foundation for the idea of democratic socialism. Despite the superiority of his philosophy, his methodology and approach to the history of philosophy failed to provide a real philosophical alternative to the Bolshevik tradition of Marxism.     

How new is the new philosophy of psychiatry?

In their recent paper, Natalie Banner and Tim Thornton evaluate seven volumes of the Oxford University Press series “International Perspectives in Philosophy and Psychiatry,” an international book series begun in 2003 focusing on the emerging interdisciplinary field at the interface of philosophy and psychiatry. According to Natalie Banner and Tim Thornton, the series represents a clear indication that the interdisciplinary field of philosophy of psychiatry has been flourishing lately. Philosophers and psychiatrists face a “new philosophy of psychiatry”. However, the optimism which the “new” philosophy of psychiatry celebrates is precisely the exiling of philosophy from the foundations of psychiatry. The 150 year old belief that psychopathology cannot do without philosophical reflection has virtually disappeared from common psychiatric education and daily clinical practice. Though the discipline of psychiatry is particularly suited to contributions from philosophy, the impact of philosophy on psychiatry nowadays remains limited. With some exceptions, philosophical papers are embedded in a philosophical context inscrutable to ordinary psychiatrists. Much current philosophical work is perceived by psychiatrists as negativistic. I would encourage the field of psychiatry to incorporate once again basic philosophical attitudes which render possible true dialogue with philosophy and enrich both disciplines. The views developed here should not discredit the value and importance of Natalie Banner and Tim Thornton’s paper and the excellent series “International Perspectives in Philosophy and Psychiatry.” As Jaspers said “Everybody inclined to disregard philosophy will be overwhelmed by philosophy in an unperceived way”.     

KARL BARTH AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY

It is commonly held that Karl Barth emphatically rejected the usefulness of philosophy for theology. In this essay I explore the implications of Barth's theological epistemology for the relationship and proper boundaries between philosophy and theology, given its origin in Barth's theology of revelation. I seek to clarify Barth's position with respect to philosophy by distinguishing the contingency of its offence from any necessary incompatibility. Barth does not reject philosophy per se, but the way in which philosophy is typically conducted. This is made explicit through an analysis of Barth's censure of the uncritical acceptance in theology of modernist philosophical presuppositions. I nuance Barth's response to a collection of philosophical assumptions that are rarely distinguished in theological literature. Finally, I highlight a representative instance of Barth's reflections on philosophy in relationship to theology, to demonstrate that the criterion for evaluating the usefulness of philosophical assumptions and methods in the service of theology is the same criterion by which theology is itself evaluated.     

易、庄哲学中“通”的观念及其当代启示

"通"是中国传统哲学与文化中的重要语词之一,也是重要的思想与哲学的概念和观念之一。《周易》哲学中的"穷变通久"观念,庄子哲学中的"道通为一"的观念,都是中国古代哲学的对"通"所作出的智慧性的哲学思考。就学术史而言,章学诚《释通》一文则比较全面地阐释了中国传统文化中"通"的观念,以及"通"与"专"的辩证关系。本文则在传统哲学思想的基础之上,提出了"通性"的哲学思考,希望能以"通"为核心观念建立当代中国哲学的"通"论。     

SCEPTICISM ABOUT PHILOSOPHY

Suppose a person who is agnostic about most philosophical issues wishes to have true philosophical beliefs but equally wishes to avoid false philosophical beliefs. I argue that this truth-seeking, error-avoiding agnostic would not have good grounds for pursuing philosophy. Widespread disagreement shows that pursuing philosophy is not a reliable method of discovering true answers to philosophical questions. More likely than not, pursuing philosophy leads to false belief. Many attempts to rebut this sceptical argument fail.     

Ontology and Metaphysics in Chinese Philosophy

This paper begins with a critique of the uses of the term "bentilun 體論 (ontology)" in modem Chinese scholarship by tracing their claim to being theoretical paradigms for understanding Chinese philosophy as a philosophical tradition.It is supplemented by a contrastive discussion of bentilun and its original ancient Greek counterpart,i.e.ontology,to show that the object of discourse in bentilun does not match up with that of ontology,namely "being qua being." This comparative study also demonstrates that bentilun finds its philosophical significance in connection with the theory of xinxing心性(heart-mind).In the second section of this paper,a comparative study of "xingershangxue形而上學 (metaphysics)" and "metaphysics" highlights the central tenet that the dao essentially transcends language.Daoist philosophy is used as an example that identifies a unique predilection toward philosophical concepts that transcend the realm of nameable thoughts and objects in Chinese philosophy.Textual evidence is provided to show that the conceptual possibility of xingershangxue is based upon a fundamental difference between you (being) and wu無 (not-being),in a way that is similar to philosophical developments in other early civilizations.Nonetheless,in addition to a philosophical interest in principles and values that transcend the material world,Daoist xingershangxue exhibits an idiosyncratic attention to notions and theories whose object of discourse is essentially unnameable.This characteristic philosophical interest is identified with the aim of locating essential disciplines within Chinese philosophy,including the theory of xinxing,practical wisdom,and the theory of jingjie境界 (state-of-attainment) in a wider framework of east and west philosophical traditions.     

Philosophy in the ‘house of stone’: a critical review

Post-colonial African philosophy has emerged as a viable discipline in a number of African countries. In particular, Ghana, Kenya, Uganda, Nigeria and to some extent, Malawi and South Africa, have contributed to the fledging discipline. Although it does not receive prominent coverage, Zimbabwe has witnessed a growing expansion in the teaching of philosophy, as well as in published philosophical reflection. This article provides an overview of the developments of philosophy in Zimbabwe, paying particular attention to the post-colonial period. It surveys the context in which philosophical reflection has taken place in Zimbabwe, alongside highlighting the key themes that have preoccupied practitioners in the field. The article explores some problematic aspects of philosophy in Zimbabwe, and interrogates the possibility (or lack thereof) of locating Zimbabwean philosophy within the broader philosophical traditions such as the analytic and continental traditions.     

Normativity in the Philosophy of Science

This paper analyzes what it means for philosophy of science to be normative. It argues that normativity is a multifaceted phenomenon rather than a general feature that a philosophical theory either has or lacks. It analyzes the normativity of philosophy of science by articulating three ways in which a philosophical theory can be normative. Methodological normativity arises from normative assumptions that philosophers make when they select, interpret, evaluate, and mutually adjust relevant empirical information, on which they base their philosophical theories. Object normativity emerges from the fact that the object of philosophical theorizing can itself be normative, such as when philosophers discuss epistemic norms in science. Metanormativity arises from the kind of claims that a philosophical theory contains, such as normative claims about science as it should be. Distinguishing these three kinds of normativity gives rise to a nuanced and illuminating view of how philosophy of science can be normative.     

African and Islamic philosophy: Expanding the horizons of philosophical counselling

Philosophical counselling has traditionally utilized a limited number of philosophical traditions: Existentialism, Stoicism, and the employment of Socratic dialogues being the most common ones. Focusing on a limited number of philosophical views does not exploit the potential therapeutic value of many other philosophical traditions, and may enhance dogmatism. In this paper we illustrate the need for a wider philosophical toolkit by showing the potential value of two rarely-employed philosophical traditions: African and Islamic philosophy. From the plethora of issues in these philosophical traditions, we highlight the relevance of African philosophy to conflicts between social duties and individual desires, and the relevance of Islamic philosophy to conflicts between faith and reason. We then emphasize the relevance of these philosophies in the current social and political situation in the Western world in general, and in Europe in particular.