厌恶情绪对法律判断的影响:基于进化心理学的视角

进化心理学认为,厌恶是人类在疾病、资源缺乏等适应性压力情境下,为抵御有害物质入侵通过自然选择而形成的进化心理机制。根据进化的观点,道德厌恶是由生理厌恶进化而来。道德厌恶有利于避免违反社会规范的行为。厌恶的激活会使道德判断更加苛刻,由此提出厌恶在法律判断中的几点启示:(1)避免直觉情绪对判断的干扰;(2)保持审议厅清洁,避免外在环境引起的厌恶情绪干扰法律判断;(3)对陪审团成员进行个体意识性和厌恶敏感性测量,避免道德过度警觉的现象发生。     

道德情绪：道德行为的中介调节

道德情绪是心理学的一个重要研究主题。道德情绪是个体根据一定的道德标准评价自己或他人的行为和思想时所产生的一种情绪体验。它是一种复合情绪, 主要包括厌恶、移情、内疚, 羞耻等。道德情绪影响下人类会产生某些典型行为, 这主要包括道德洁净行为和道德补偿行为。心理学研究道德情绪的实验范式很多, 主要有行为回忆范式、实物或图片刺激范式、情境设置范式等。有关道德情绪的未来研究主要应注重于探讨正性道德情绪在道德发展中的作用, 探讨道德情绪对群体行为的影响, 以及探讨道德情绪在不同文化背景下的价值意义。     

厌恶情绪影响道德判断的发展研究

厌恶情绪的产生是为了回避潜在的病菌的威胁。研究发现,相比中性情绪状态下,厌恶情绪让人们更反对违背道德的行为,认为这些行为更错。目前,对于厌恶情绪对道德判断影响的发展还没有相关的研究。本实验以小学一年级,四年级及成人为研究对象来考察厌恶情绪对道德判断影响的发展。实验中被试被随机分入厌恶启动组和控制组,完成厌恶情绪任务和行为的道德判断任务。研究结果显示,在启动厌恶情绪之后,四年级和成人被试对道德违背行为的错误程度判断更为严格,同时四年级被试对行为的回避程度更高。一年级被试在厌恶情绪和控制条件下道德判断差异不显著。研究结果说明厌恶情绪对道德判断的影响是从无到有逐渐发展的。     

核心厌恶与道德厌恶唤醒与适应的特异性：来自主观情绪体验和自主神经活动的证据

不同诱发物引发的厌恶情绪是否具有同质性目前存在争论。研究选择核心厌恶和道德厌恶图片为实验材料,以女大学生为被试,考察情绪诱发和适应阶段的主观情绪体验和自主神经活动变化。结果表明,（1）核心厌恶情绪下个体心率下降、心率变异性HF显著升高,在情绪主观体验和生理唤醒上出现适应性反应,表现为随刺激反复出现,厌恶反应减少;（2）道德厌恶下个体心率显著上升,没有出现情绪适应性反应。研究结果支持了核心厌恶和道德厌恶情绪的特异性观点。     

不同注意资源水平上核心厌恶和道德厌恶刺激加工分离效应的ERPs研究

厌恶帮助人类避免接触生物病菌、社会道德威胁物。本研究采用“线索—靶”范式考察不同注意资源水平上核心和道德厌恶刺激的认知加工特征。结果发现,核心厌恶刺激诱发的P2波幅显著大于道德厌恶和中性刺激;有效线索下核心厌恶刺激的P3波幅与道德厌恶刺激间差异不显著,而无效线索下核心厌恶刺激的P3波幅显著大于道德厌恶。结果表明两类厌恶刺激在不同注意资源水平上存在加工分离效应,支持了厌恶情绪“异质性”的观点。     

厌恶与道德判断的关系

来自问卷调查和认知神经科学的证据表明,厌恶与道德判断可能存在密切关系,但是研究者对两者之间的关系是一般性的还是特异性的尚无定论。有若干证据表明厌恶影响一般的道德判断,也有研究认为厌恶主要影响人们对纯洁领域的道德判断。未来研究需要明确界定厌恶的类别,区分厌恶与道德厌恶两种不同的构念,从疾病防御的角度理解厌恶的进化根源,以及测量厌恶启动之后人们对不同道德冒犯的内隐态度。     

西方道德心理学研究新进展:道德判断的五基准理论

文章将引入21世纪初西方道德心理学的一种新理论--道德的五基准理论.道德判断的五种基准是道德情绪论的代表人Haidt在社会直觉模型的基础上,结合了进化心理学的视角进而提出的全新概念.本文通过介绍道德五基准理论的形成及发展过程、阐述理论特征并预测理论的潜在应用前景,深入探讨了该理论在道德心理学研究中的重要价值和意义.     

损失规避的产生根源

损失规避是指由损失引发的负效用大于由等量收益引发的正效用的现象, 其产生根源能够从神经经济学和进化心理学两个方向进行解释。损失规避的脑机制分为两个系统：主观价值评价系统主要包括纹状体和前额皮层, 与主观价值的评估有关; 情绪唤醒系统主要包括杏仁核和脑岛, 与厌恶等消极情绪有关。在进化心理学的视角下, 通过回顾有关动物决策行为的研究来探索损失规避行为的进化历史, 并结合相关进化理论总结该行为产生的进化原因。未来可探索与行为损失规避相关的神经递质, 进一步研究损失规避的产生根源。     

情绪作为道德判断的“催化剂”：道德判断中的评价倾向与特异性效应

在不同领域的道德判断中,情绪可能起着“催化剂”的作用。一种特定情绪对应一种核心评价;一种情绪只影响某一道德领域的判断,不同情绪的影响是特异性的;进化心理学和具身认知对道德判断中存在的评价倾向和特异性效应进行了解释。未来研究需要探索评价倾向与特异性效应的内在心理机制。以及进一步探讨文化等第三变量对不同情绪与特定领域道德判断的影响。     

从具身视角看道德判断

道德判断是个体对于某类行为的善恶好坏和是非对错所进行的评价及判断。随着具身认知理论的兴起, 道德判断的具身研究随之展开。道德判断具身性的研究主要围绕身体清洁、厌恶, 身体温度及身体动作这3个维度展开。从皮亚杰及维果茨基的心理发展观, 概念隐喻理论和进化心理学3个角度对道德判断具身效应进行了理论解释和探讨。考虑到身体变量会通过情绪、认知因素进而影响道德判断, 今后具身认知视角下的道德判断应与道德判断中已有的理论进行整合, 同时对其与道德直觉的关系需要深入探讨, 并需进一步考察具身效应发生的时效性和动态性问题, 探讨道德判断具身效应的调节变量及个体差异, 同时要对道德判断具身效应进行跨文化比较。     

On the role of attention and emotion in morality: attentional control modulates unrelated disgust in moral judgments

The emotion of disgust can influence people's moral judgments, even if this emotion objectively is unrelated to the moral judgment in question. The present work demonstrates that attentional control regulates this effect. In three studies, disgust was induced. In an unrelated part of the studies, participants then judged a moral transgression. Disgust resulted in more severe moral judgments when attentional control (either measured by means of individual predisposition or manipulated with experimental control) was weak as opposed to strong (Studies 1-3). Findings further showed that attentional control mediated the positive relation between the intensity of participants' disgust responses and the severity of their moral judgments (Study 2). Moreover, attentional control has its effects through the regulation of affective processing (Study 3). Taken together, the findings suggest that unrelated influences of disgust on moral judgments are contingent on the attention system.     

不道德传染的心理机制及其影响

不道德传染, 是指道德违法者作为传染源将消极道德品质直接传递给传染对象, 或先传递给道德中性物品, 再由此物品传递给受传染对象, 引起其情绪、认知、生理等方面变化的过程。本文主要讨论了不道德传染发生的心理机制——厌恶, 围绕不道德传染对道德心理领域(道德情绪以及道德认知过程)产生的影响进行梳理; 进而将视角拓宽到非道德层面, 如具身认知、组织管理以及人际互动, 探究其对人类社会的广泛影响。最后, 从不同文化视阈、不同个体差异、传染过程的动态神经机制及正向道德传染等方面为研究提供新的思路。     

Do emotions play an essential role in moral judgments?

The past few decades of moral psychology research have yielded empirical anomalies for rationalist theories of moral judgments. An increasing number of psychologists and philosophers argue that these anomalies are explained well by sentimentalism, the thesis that the presence of an emotion is necessary for the formation of a sincere moral judgment. The present review reveals that while emotions and moral judgments indeed often co-occur, there is scant evidence that emotions directly cause or constitute moral judgments. Research on disgust, anger, sympathy, and guilt indicates that people only reliably experience emotions when judging conduct that is relevant to the welfare of the self and valued others. Moreover, many recent studies have either failed to replicate or exposed crucial confounds in the most cited evidence in support of sentimentalism. Moral psychologists should jettison sentimentalism, and focus instead on how considerations of harm and welfare—the core concepts of rationalist theories— interact with empirical beliefs to shape moral judgments.     

道德相对主义和厌恶情绪对道德直觉判断的影响

社会直觉模型认为有意识的道德推理过程发生在道德直觉判断之后。那么, 道德直觉判断又是怎么形成的, 是否受认知推理和情绪的影响?实验1首先验证道德直觉判断的存在; 实验2考察了道德相对主义对道德直觉判断的影响; 实验3考察了厌恶情绪对道德直觉判断的影响。结果发现: (1)道德绝对主义比道德相对主义条件下, 个体更倾向于做出道德直觉判断, 说明道德直觉判断受认知推理影响。(2)厌恶情绪比中立情绪启动条件下, 个体更倾向于做出道德直觉判断, 说明道德直觉判断受情绪影响。因此, 道德直觉判断会受认知推理和情绪的影响。     

Disgust,Harm, and Morality in Politics

This study experimentally tests a theoretical framework for moral judgment in politics, which integrates two research traditions, Domain‐Theory and Sentimentalism, to suggest that moral judgment is bidimensional, with one dimension pertaining to harm and the other to moral emotions. Two experiments demonstrate that priming harm associations and the moral emotion of disgust prior to a political issue facilitates moral conviction on the political issue as well as a harsher moral judgment compared to no‐prime and to nonmoral emotional and cognitive negative primes (sadness and damage to objects). In addition, harm cues and disgust, but not sadness or damage, interact with the preexisting attitude toward the political issue in affecting moral conviction.     

Embodied and Embedded Morality: Divinity, Identity, and Disgust

Our understanding of human morality would benefit from an integrated interdisciplinary approach, built on the assumption that human beings are multidimensional unities with real, irreducible, and mutually interdependent spiritual, relational, emotional, rational, and physiological aspects. We could integrate relevant information from neurobiological, psychosocial, and theological perspectives, avoiding unnecessary reductionism and naturalism. This approach is modeled by addressing the particular limited role of disgust in morality. Psychosocial research reveals disgust as a universal emotion that enables evaluation and regulation of certain moral behaviors and is involved in cultural identity. Theologically, many religious traditions, including the Judeo‐Christian, use disgust in conjunction with moral codes designed to preserve purity and communal identity as the people of God. The concept of natural moral law suggests that morality is embodied in human nature. Neurobiology is beginning to trace the neural circuitry involved in disgust and in moral evaluation, suggesting that emotions are a necessary basis for moral judgment and revealing intriguing relationships between disgust, morality, and other aspects of the psyche. Several problems that arise within these disciplines and at their intersections are identified. Extension of the model to other aspects of human morality would further illuminate our understanding of morality without sacrificing its complexity and richness.