THE ORIGINS AND ISSUES OF SCEPTICISM, EAST AND WEST

The scepticism of the academicians: the illusions of perception, the frailty of induction, the indecency of deduction, the conundrums of negation, is not the concern of this paper. It is thinkers for whom the human situation is a predicament demanding some kind of resolution who interest me. These are thinkers who see knowledge, philosophy if you will, within the horizon of predicament and resolution, who see knowledge exhausting itself well before any resolution of the human predicament is reached, who hold that knowing is not the model by which to understand how humans relate to the way things really are.     

SCEPTICISM AND THE JUSTIFICATION OF TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM

In this paper I explore a justification for transcendental idealism that emerges from the dialogue with philosophical scepticism in which Kant is on and off engaged throughout the Critique of Pure Reason. ¹ 1 References to the Critique of Pure Reason are to the translation by Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1929) of Immanucl Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Page references are given in the usual manner, ‘A’ referring to the first (1791) edition and ‘B’ to the second (1787) edition.
Many commentators, most prominently Strawson, have claimed that transcend- ental idealism is an unfortunate addition to the Critique, one that can profitably be excised in the interests of clarity and coherence. ² 2 I In The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant's Critique ofpure Reason (London: Methuen, 1966) P. F. Strawson famously urges that the confused doctrines of transcendental idealism be disentangled from ‘the analytical argument of Kant's positive metaphysics of experience’ (P. 42).
Against this general picture I urge that transcendental idealism is in fact a very natural consequence of some of the central doctrines of the Critical Philosophy. It is in the context of Kant's debate with scepticism that this emerges most clearly. Nonetheless, I argue that Kant's employment of transcendental idealism against the sceptic is seriously compromised by his postulating the existence of unknowable things-in-themselves. As long as he maintains that there are unknowable things-in-themselves which are responsible for our having the experience that we do have, his position seems to collapse into sceptical idealism. In the final section of the paper I suggest that the only possible escape from this difficulty would be to rule out the possibility of affirming that unknowable things-in-themselves exist. I also suggest that an argument to this effect exists in the Critique and that Kant's position would be more consistent had he adhered to it.     

COGNITIVE CLOSURE AND THE LIMITS OF UNDERSTANDING

The paper begins by distinguishing between two ways of effecting the dissolution of a philosophical problem: reductive and philosophical. Of these, the former holds out deflationary prospects greater than those of the latter. Attention focuses specifically on McGinn's proposed dissolution of the mind-body problem. Examination of his argument reveals that his naturalist dissolution involves traditional non-naturalist constraints, in a way that counts against his deflationary conclusions. At best his treatment constitutes a philosophical, rather than a reductive dissolution. But there is reason to think that it might in fact constitute a mere relocation of what is, essentially, the same problem that it set out to dissolve.     

TWO APPARENT PARADOXES ABOUT JUSTICE AND THE SEVERITY OF PUNISHMENT

The idea of Mitigation incorporates the conviction that though the amount or severity of punishment is primarily to be determined by reference to the General Aim, yet Justice requires that those who have special difficulties to face in keeping the law which they have broken should be punished less.     

中国人人格结构的确认与形容词评定结果

中西方的人格结构既存在相似性,又有明显的差异性。该研究根据杨国枢和王登峰探讨中国人人格结构的“大七”模型时所用的中文人格特质形容词表,经过化简,由410个形容词压缩为273个;并扩大了被试量,由原来的733人（项目与人数比为1:1.8）扩大为1511人（项目与人数比为1:5.5）。采用相同的评定方法、评定程序和统计方法,得到了完全相同的人格结构。采用另外的样本进行的验证性因素分析也确认了中国人人格的七因素结构。由此揭示了中国人的人格结构及其与西方理论的差异,为系统研究中国人的人格特点和编制测量量表奠定了扎实的基础。文中还比较了大学生被试和社会人士在各个因素上的分数差异。     

THE INTERPLAY OF DEDUCTIVE AND INDUCTIVE REASONING IN PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORIZING

Deductive and inductive reasoning both played an essential part in Freud's construction of psychoanalysis. In this paper, the author explores the happy marriage of empiricism and rationalism in Freud's use of deductive reasoning in the construction of psychoanalytic theory. To do this, the author considers three major amendments Freud made to his theory: (i) infant and childhood sexuality, (ii) the structural theory, and (iii) the theory of signal anxiety. Ultimately, the author argues for, and presents Freud as a proponent of, the epistemological position that he calls critical realism.     

MATHEMATICS,MODELS AND ZENO'S PARADOXES

A version of nonstandard analysis, Internal Set Theory, has been used to provide a resolution of Zeno's paradoxes of motion. This resolution is inadequate because the application of Internal Set Theory to the paradoxes requires a model of the world that is not in accordance with either experience or intuition. A model of standard mathematics in which the ordinary real numbers are defined in terms of rational intervals does provide a formalism for understanding the paradoxes. This model suggests that in discussing motion, only intervals, rather than instants, of time are meaningful. The approach presented here reconciles resolutions of the paradoxes based on considering a finite number of acts with those based on analysis of the full infinite set Zeno seems to require. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of the classical and quantum mechanics of performing an infinite number of acts in a finite time.     

SCEPTICISM AND THE IMAGINATION MODEL OF DREAMING

As a solution to dream scepticism, Ernest Sosa has argued that when we dream, we do not believe the contents of our dreams, but rather imagine them. Thus dreams do not cause false beliefs; so my beliefs cannot be false as a result of being caused by dreams. I argue that even assuming that Sosa is correct about the nature of dream experience, belief in wakefulness on these grounds is epistemically irresponsible. The proper upshot of the imagination model is to recharacterize the way we think about dream scepticism: the sceptical threat is not that we have false beliefs. So even though dreams do not involve false beliefs, they still pose a sceptical threat, which I elaborate.