WHOSE INTERESTS ARE THEY,ANYWAY?

This review both praises Richard Miller's book--a thoughtful, judicious, and comprehensive analysis of bioethics for the pediatric age group, notably the first effort worthy of the name--and points out the work still to be done in this area, work firmly based in and illuminated by Miller's ground-breaking thesis. Specifically, the book rightly compels us to recognize obligations of beneficence as primary and to refocus on the child's basic interests, rather than putative "best" interests. There remains much to be done in defining and discerning basic interests and in distinguishing whose interests are on the table when decisions are being made for seriously ill and dying children.     

THEOLOGY AND SCIENCE: WHERE ARE WE?

Abstract. Revolutionary developments in both science and theology are moving the relation between the two far beyond the nineteenth-century “warfare” model. Both scientists and theologians are engaged in a common search for shared understanding. Eight models of interaction are outlined: scientism, scientific imperialism, ecclesiastical authoritarianism, scientific creationism, the two-language theory, hypothetical consonance, ethical overlap, and New Age spirituality. Developments in hypothetical consonance are explored in the work of various scholars, including Ian Barbour, Philip Clayton, Paul Davies, Willem Drees, Langdon Gilkey, Philip Hefner, Nancey Murphy, Wolfhart Pannenberg, Arthur Peacocke, John Polkinghorne, Robert John Russell, Thomas Torrence and Wenzel van Huyssteen.     

EVOLUTIONARY THEORY AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS: ARE THEY IN HARMONY?

Abstract. Does modern evolutionary theory (specifically Darwinism) pose a problem for the Christian's thinking about morality? It certainly poses threats for those who would argue that certain practices are wrong because they are “unnatural.” Liberal Christians can probably get around these questions. But at a deeper level, despite superficial similarities between its conclusions and the Love Commandment, Darwinism points to an essential relativism about morality, thereby striking at the very core of all Christian thought on moral behavior. Thus, those who are worried about the clash between science and religion have good reasons for their worries.     

OEDIPUS REX: WHERE ARE WE GOING,ESPECIALLY WITH FEMALES?

The Oedipus myth usefully informs triangulated object relations, though males, females, and “humankind” can become overly interchangeable. Freud's intentions to enlighten sexed gender are nowadays obscured. In 1931, he rejected Oedipus for females. Counterreactive gender blindness forecloses exploration about female development. Loewald's (1979) view of Oedipus Rex emancipates male heterosexuals from a recurring (universal), regressive pull back to mother. Ogden (1987) offers further insights into earliest female development. The author suggests a lifelong, progressive trajectory of mother/daughter closeness, in synch with a girl's shared slow body development into maturity and childbearing. Freeing the female dyad from obligatory pathological interpretation may inspire fresh sex and gender clinical theory.     

IF ATTITUDES AFFECT HOW STIMULI ARE PROCESSED, SHOULD THEY NOT AFFECT THE EVENT-RELATED BRAIN POTENTIAL?

Abstract— In Experiment 1, subjects completed an attitude survey to identify items toward which they held positive and negative attitudes. Subsequently, subjects were instructed to count the number of positive (or negative) stimuli in a series. Each series contained six attitude stimuli from a given semantic category (e.g., fruits), and the structure of the series was varied so that positive and negative stimuli, as indexed by subjects' idiosyncratic attitudes, were evaluatively consistent or inconsistent within the series. In Experiment 2, subjects were exposed to personality traits that were positive or negative in series of six. Again, the structure of the series was varied so that positive and negative traits were evaluatively consistent or inconsistent within the series. Results of Experiments 1 and 2 indicated that although the event-related brain potential did not differ as a function of stimulus valence per se, evaluatively inconsistent, in contrast to consistent, stimuli evoked a larger amplitude late P300-like positive component that was maximal over the centroparietal region.     

LARGE-GROUP IDENTITY,WHO ARE WE NOW? LEADER–FOLLOWER RELATIONSHIPS AND SOCIETAL–POLITICAL DIVISIONS

The American Journal of Psychoanalysis - This paper aims to explore severe societal–political divisions and interferences with democratic processes and human rights issues in many locations...     

WHAT ARE SEEMINGS?

We are all familiar with the phenomenon of a proposition seeming true. Many think that these seeming states can yield justified beliefs. Very few have seriously explored what these seeming states are. I argue that seeming states are not plausibly analyzed in terms of beliefs, partial beliefs, attractions to believe, or inclinations to believe. Given that the main candidates for analyzing seeming states are unsatisfactory, I argue for a brute view of seemings that treats seeming states as irreducible propositional attitudes.     

ARE THERE NON-EXISTENT INTENTIONALIA?

Tim Crane has maintained that intentional objects are to be conceived of as schematic entities, having no particular intrinsic nature. While I take this metaphysical thesis to be correct, I cast doubt on whether it excludes intentionalia, especially non-existent ones, from the general inventory of what there is, as Crane seems to think it does. There is a tension here, since Crane uses intentionalia in order to individuate intentional states, but at the same time attempts to dispense with them. If my doubts are grounded, the tension disappears.     

WHERE IS THE COMPARISON IN COMPARATIVE COGNITION?

Abstract— Contemporary research on comparative cognition reflects two distinct programs. The purpose of the an-thropocentric program is to discover whether nonhuman species process information in the same way as humans do. The ecological program analyzes ecologically significant aspects of cognition and compares them in closely and distantly related species. Research on memory for stored food in birds provides a detailed example of this latter program. Other examples include research on bird song learning and foraging and ecological analyses of human cognition.     

DO I HAVE TO BE HERE NOW?

Kaplan claims that (1) ‘I am here now’, though analytic, is not a necessary truth. But this sentence is not a proposition, in a sense of proposition in which some, but not all, sentences are propositions. Since it is not a proposition, it is not true, and consequently not analytic. It is in fact a fragment of a proposition, the same fragment as ‘he was there then’ in (2) ‘CJFW said in Oxford on 23 September 1991 that he was there then’. Sentences containing indexicals in general owe their sense to the corresponding fragments of sentences containing ‘quasi-indexicals’(‘then’, for example, is the quasi-indexical to ‘now’ as indexical). Someone uttering (1) assertively will thereby make a proposition like (2) true. (2) entails (3) ‘CJFW said in Oxford on 23 September 1993 that CJFW was in Oxford on 23 September 1991′. So by uttering (1) in the appropriate circumstances I made it true that I had asserted the proposition (4) ‘CJFW was in Oxford on 23 September 1991′. What is analytic and necessarily true is the proposition ‘If (3) then (4)’.     

WHAT ARE YOU TALKING ABOUT?

“Newton opened the book of nature and found that it urns written in the languge of mathematics”—A.J. Ayre (1985)     

RELIGIOUS NATURALISM—WHERE DOES IT LEAD?

I respond to the four symposiasts who commented on my recent book Religion Is Not About God (2005)—religious studies scholars Donald Braxton and David Klemm, philosopher William Rottschaefer, and cognitive scientist Leslie Marsh. Various general and specific points relative to the nature of religion and the future of religion are either clarified or defended. Among the issues that receive attention are (1) the status and adequacy of my proposals for religious naturalism: Can it motivate wholeness, and is it finally a form of pantheism? (2) ritual practices, particularly those of Christianity, reinterpreted within the framework of religious naturalism; and (3) the adequacy of any naturalistic position to account for subjective properties of consciousness.     

ARE EMOTIONS PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCES OF VALUE?

A number of emotion theorists hold that emotions are perceptions of value. In this paper I say why they are wrong. I claim that in the case of emotion there is nothing that can provide the perceptual modality that is needed if the perceptual theory is to succeed (where by ‘perceptual modality’ I mean the particular manner in which something is perceived). I argue that the five sensory modalities are not possible candidates for providing us with ‘emotional perception’. But I also say why the usual candidate offered – namely feeling or affectivity – does not give us the sought‐after perceptual modality. I conclude that as there seems to be nothing else that can provide the needed perceptual modality, we should reject the perceptual theory of emotion. 1     

WHAT ARE THE CONTENTS OF EXPERIENCES?

I address three interrelated issues concerning the contents of experiences. First, I address the preliminary issue of what it means to say that experiences have contents. Then I address the issue of why we should believe that experiences have contents. Finally, I address the issue of what the contents of experiences are.     

TREATMENT ACCEPTABILITY AND “FAKING GOOD”: ARE STAFF TELLING US WHAT THEY THINK WE WANT TO HEAR?

Treatment acceptability refers to how acceptable various treatment alternatives are to individuals who are subjected to and who implement those treatments. While treatment-acceptability research increases in popularity, some have questioned its usefulness. In particular, Schwartz and Baer (1991) question whether staff might be telling us what we want to hear, analogous to the phenomenon of test-takers “faking good” while taking personality tests. In this study, we sought to investigate the possibility of such bias in treatment-acceptability ratings. Direct-care staff at a large residential facility were presented with a clinical vignette and five treatment options to rate. They also received three different types of instructions (standard, “fake good,” and “prompted honesty”) designed to determine whether biases in ratings would appear. Results indicate that, under these conditions, staff do not fake good, i.e., there were no differences across instructional conditions. Collapsing across conditions, staff did differ in their ratings on the five treatment alternatives. Reasons for current results and suggestions for further research are discussed.