THE WHOLE BRAIN AS THE BASIS OR THE ANALOGICAL EXPRESSION OF GOD

Abstract. As human beings we inevitably try to explain our experience. In philosophical language, we deal with transcendent assertions and aspirations. The issue, then, is: how can we talk about what matters, given the structures inherent in language and basic to the way we are made? Instead of the philosophical category of Being, I advance a case for giving the human brain privileged status as an analogical expression of God, the symbol-concept of what matters most, and then suggest the illumination which can come with using that analogical expression, especially as that analogy connects us with the environment at the limbic level and constructs our world at the cerebral level.     

THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF THE VIRTUES

The paper examines a single, apparently simple argument for the existence of incompatibilities between the virtues as traits of character. This argument appeals not to empirical truths about human psychology or human nature but to the possibility of conflict between the exercise of different virtues in action. There are, for example, situations in which we can exercise the virtue of truthfulness only at the expense of not exercising the virtue of tact, as when we are asked a question to which the straightforward answer will pain our questioner. The person who in these situations would give a straightforward answer possesses the virtue of truthfulness to a higher degree than the person who would respond more evasively, whereas the latter person possesses the virtue of tact to a higher degree than the former. But since the two responses are mutually exclusive, it follows that the degree to which we possess the virtue of truthfulness must, at least in some measure, correlate inversely with the degree to which we possess the virtue of tact. And similarly for many other pairs of virtues. My paper focusses on the two cardinal assumptions of this argument, viz., (i) that sometimes the exercise of one virtue can conflict with the exercise of another, and (ii) that the degree to which a person possesses a virtue correlates directly with the extent of its exercise, and defends both assumptions against a variety of objections which allege that, in different ways, they are insensitive to the complexity of the virtues.     

MAKING SPACE FOR THE METHODOLOGICAL MOSAIC: THE FUTURE OF THE FIELD OF SCIENCE-AND-RELIGION

This article is a response to Josh Reeves's recent book Against Methodology in Science and Religion: Recent Debates on Rationality and Theology that welcomes Reeves's proposal for an anti-essentialist future for the field of science-and-religion, particularly because it has the potential to move the field beyond current, well-worn methods: the dominance of Christian theology and doctrine, the importance of credibility strategies, and the dependence upon philosophical discourses. Reeves’ proposal has the potential to open the science-and-religion field to other topics, problems, and methods, such as studying lived science-and-religion. One way of doing this is to study popular culture and its artifacts such as literature, which portrays a co-mingling of religion and science at the level of day-to-day experiences and practices of characters. For at the level of lived experience, religion and science are not well-defined disciplines neatly compartmentalized into separate academic departments.     

THE INTERPLAY OF THE TWO HEMISPHERES OF THE BRAIN IN PSYCHOANALYSIS

Several authors have written intriguingly about the right and left hemispheres of the brain. Each hemisphere perceives the world differently, impacting that which it looks upon and reinforcing our particular world view. Notably, the left hemisphere, has always been assumed to be the dominant hemisphere, but only because it has language and is so adept at formulating arguments. The detached mode of the left hemisphere, while useful and necessary to get distance, is no more real than the engaged, imaginative approach of the right hemisphere. Having written about self-sufficiency as a defense against feeling alone and helpless, I now consider these rational, problem solving, answer generating, and planning activities as products of the left hemisphere. The approach that I am suggesting is of calling our patients’ attention to how their left hemisphere overpowers the new, more uncertain voice of the right hemisphere just after it speaks in a session.     

任务难度对于返回抑制出现时间的影响

在返回抑制的范式下,以大学生为被斌,采用线索一靶子模式进行了两项实验.实施一发现,在觉察任务中,返回抑制在线索和靶子的时间间隔(SOA)为300ms时出现;在辨别任务中,返回抑制在SOA为700ms时出现.实验二发现在选择任务中,返回抑制在SOA为1300ms时出现.这些结果表明,随着实验任务的难度逐渐增大,返回抑制出现越来越晚.实验任务的难度是影响返回抑制出现时间的一个重要因素.     

THE EXTERNAL OBSERVER AND THE LENS OF THE PATIENT-ANALYST MATCH

A focus on the match between patient and analyst places attention on the dynamic effect of the interaction of character and conflict of both participants on the process that evolves between them. Match is neither a predictive nor static concept. Rather it refers to an unfolding transaction that itself shifts and changes during the course of analytic work. The treating analyst's perception of the effect of this match is by necessity limited by the analyst's own blind spots and other countertransference phenomena. Reporting the analyst's clinical experience to an analytically trained observer, external to the dyad, may broaden the analyst's perspective. Using the lens of the match, a colleague in the role of supervisor, consultant or peer can provide feedback from which the analyst may acquire insight. As a result of this process, the influence that the participants' similarities and differences have upon each other becomes clear to the analyst. This awareness, in turn, may lead the analyst to appreciate the effect of the analyst's stance of distance or closeness and to evaluate whether at this phase of treatment it is beneficial or detrimental to the analytic process. Clinical illustrations of the effect of the external observer's feedback in relation to the patient—analyst match are provided.     

THE RECEPTION OF DIONYSIUS UP TO MAXIMUS THE CONFESSOR

There are various odd features about the initial reception of the Corpus Dionysiacum in the sixth century. The reception was, at first, slow and mainly concerned the few, controversial Christological assertions of the CD. The influence of the CD was mediated through a single edition, complete with introduction, variant readings, and scholia, all furnished by John of Scythopolis. The initial reception of the CD in the Syriac world seems very different: independent (at least to begin with) of Scythopolis’ edition, and deeply Origenistic. Yet, in other ways, the CD reflects the kind of historical interests we find elsewhere in the sixth century.     

THE INFERIORITY CURRICULUM

Bernard looks back at the last decade and notes that although many things have improved, women at all levels in academia still face more subtle forms of discrimination, which comprise what she calls the "Inferiority Curriculum." Exposure of these subtle discriminatory behaviors is gradually occurring through what Bernard has termed the "Feminist Enlightenment," a discipline-by-discipline process which began in the mid-1960s. Bernard documents many "down-putting" behaviors that continue to undermine women's achievement and argues the necessity of overcoming the damage by building positive self-images among women.     

专家与新手篮球后卫运动员的眼动研究

采用ASL504型眼动仪对后卫位置专家组和新手组青年男子篮球运动员在注视篮球比赛实景图片时的眼动特征进行研究。研究结果发现,专家组和新手组篮球后卫运动员具有不同的信息加工效率。在注视篮球比赛实景图片时,不同组别的篮球后卫运动员具有不同的注视分配和不同的注视模式。     

PAUL RICOEUR AT THE FOOT OF THE CROSS: NARRATIVE IDENTITY AND THE RESURRECTION OF THE BODY

This article attempts to reconcile the holistically understood and embodied philosophical anthropology indicated by Paul Ricoeur's concept of "narrative identity" with Christian personal eschatology, as realized in the bodily resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth. Narrative identity resonates with spiritual autobiography in the Christian tradition—evinced here by a brief comparison with the confessed self of St Augustine of Hippo—and offers to theology a means of explaining identity in a way which: 1) places care for the other firmly within the construction of one's sense of self; 2) accounts for radical change over time and 3) hints at the possibility of the in-breaking of the infinite into the finite. In this article I will contend that narrative identity provides theology with an exemplary means of framing selfhood which is ultimately congruent with the orthodox Christian belief in the resurrection of the body.     

THE PATIENT'S OBJECTS IN THE ANALYST'S MIND

In every analysis, the analyst develops an internal relationship with the patient's objects—that is, the people in the patient's life and mind. Sometimes these figures can inhabit the analyst's mind as a source of data, but at other times, the analyst may feel preoccupied with or even invaded by them. The author presents two clinical cases: one in which the seeming absence of a good object in the patient's mind made the analyst hesitate to proceed with an analysis, and another in which the patient's preoccupation with a “bad” object was shared and mirrored by the analyst's own inner preoccupation with the object. The use and experience of these two objects by the analyst are discussed with particular attention to the countertransference.     

MORAL PSYCHOLOGY AND THE UNITY OF THE VIRTUES

The ancient Greeks subscribed to the thesis of the Unity of Virtue, according to which the possession of one virtue is closely related to the possession of all the others. Yet empirical observation seems to contradict this thesis at every turn. What could the Greeks have been thinking of? The paper offers an interpretation and a tentative defence of a qualified version of the thesis. It argues that, as the Greeks recognized, virtue essentially involves knowledge – specifically, evaluative knowledge of what matters. Furthermore, such knowledge is essentially holistic. Perfect and complete possession of one virtue thus requires the knowledge that is needed for the possession of every other virtue. The enterprise of trying to reconcile the normative view embodied in this conception of virtue with empirical observation also serves as a case study for the field of moral psychology in which empirical and normative claims are often deeply and confusingly intertwined. ¹ 1 I owe thanks to audiences at the University of Arkansas, Rice University, the University of Texas, Princeton University, Yale University, Oxford University, the Australian National University, and Monash University, and more particularly to Robert Adams, John Cooper, and Jerome Schneewind for their extremely helpful and illuminating comments on an earlier version of this paper.
     

THE LINK AND THE OTHER1

The author begins by drawing attention to the current crisis in psychoanalysis, in which, following the great initial discoveries, he considers a certain solipsistic trend inimical to the role of the other and of the acceptance of innovation this entails has come to hold sway. This situation can in his view be overcome by the introduction of new applications and practices, as in the past with the acceptance of Klein's ideas in the field of child analysis. Theory is in the author's opinion always the product of clinical practice in our field, a thesis he illustrates by an account of his own work with couples and families, where the patient is deemed to be not any one individual in the group but the group itself considered as a nexus of links. The implications and theoretical repercussions of this link‐based conception are discussed at length and some novel terms are introduced ‐ for example, the link between subjects, imposition, the social subject, the subject relationship and the multiple subject. Alienness and the ‘other’, and presence and absence, are shown to be important concepts and are distinguished from object relations. The author concludes with a reference to a new resistance, namely to linking, and its implications in relation both to personality and to phenomena such as ethnic and religious conflict.     

ON THE LOGICAL UNSOLVABILITY OF THE GETTIER PROBLEM

The tripartite account of propositional, fallibilist knowledge that p as justified true belief can become adequate only if it can solve the Gettier Problem. However, the latter can be solved only if the problem of a successful coordination of the resources (at least truth and justification) necessary and sufficient to deliver propositional, fallibilist knowledge that p can be solved. In this paper, the coordination problem is proved to be insolvable by showing that it is equivalent to the 'coordinated attack' problem, which is demonstrably insolvable in epistemic logic. It follows that the tripartite account is not merely inadequate as it stands, as proved by Gettier-type counterexamples, but demonstrably irreparable in principle, so that efforts to improve it can never succeed.     

REASON-EXPLANATION AND THE CONTENTS OF THE MIND

This paper takes a close look at the kinds of considerations we use to reach agreement in our ordinary (non‐philosophical and non‐theoretical) judgments about a person's reasons for acting, and the following theses are defended. First, considering the circumstances in which the action occurs is often enough to remove our puzzlement as to why someone acts as she does. Second, in those situations where we do need to enquire about the agent's state of mind, this does not, in the normal case, lead us to look for hidden, inner events that are candidates for the causes of her action. Finally, even though there are cases in which the agent's introspections, reflections, and deliberations are relevant to our search for reasons, such cases do not lend support to the idea that reasons are hidden or inner causes of action. This suggests a problem for most philosophical accounts of what it is to act for reasons and for most philosophical accounts of the nature of mental states.     

PHILOSOPHY AND THE GOOD LIFE IN THE ZHUANGZI

The ancient Chinese text the Zhuangzi raises a mix of epistemological, psychological, and conceptual challenges against the value and usefulness of philosophical disputation. But instead of advocating the elimination of philosophy, it implicitly embraces a broader conception of philosophy, the goal of which is to engage us to reflect on our limitations, question things we take for granted, and better appreciate alternative perspectives and possibilities. Philosophy thus understood is compatible with a variety of methods and approaches: fictions, jokes, paradoxes, spiritual exercises, argument, disputation, and so on. Philosophical practices, on this view, also pave the way for an open-minded, adaptive and flexible way of living that is at the core of the Zhuangist good life.     

THE IDENTITY OF INDISCERNIBLES AND THE CO-LOCATION PROBLEM

Abstract:  The Identity of Indiscernibles is the principle that there cannot be two individual things in nature that are qualitatively identical. The principle is not exactly popular. Michael Della Rocca tries to resurrect it by arguing that we must accept this principle, for otherwise we cannot explain the impossibility of completely overlapping indiscernible objects of the same kind that share all their parts and exist in the same place at the same time. I try to show that his argument goes wrong: we need not embrace the identity of indiscernibles to deal with the co-location problem.     

THE CRY FOR THE OTHER: THE BIOCULTURAL WOMB OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

Abstract. The human experience of meaning-making lies at the roots of consciousness, creativity, and religious faith. It arises from the basic experience of separation from a loved object, suffered by all mammals, and, in general terms, from the experienced gap between ourselves and our environment. We fill the gap with transitional objects and symbols that reassure us of basic continuity in ourselves and in the world. These objects and symbols also serve the neurognostic function of demonstrating what the world is like. Thus, humanity lives by faith, as manifested in its pattern-making capacity, and not by literal sight.