HUSSERLIAN INTENTIONALITY AND THE CHINESE CONCEPT OF MIND

The phenomenology of Edmund Husserl is, in one sense, a theory of pure consciousness that aims to set forth an absolute, ultimate, rigorous ground for the sciences based on the field of pure consciousness. Husserl believed that, on the basis of this field of pure consciousness, he could secure eternal significance for the spiritual life of man. Intentionality is the key element in this theory of pure consciousness and it plays a crucial part in the realization of Husserl's philosophical goal. By contrast, traditional Chinese philosophy was not concerned to seek an absolute, ultimate ground for the sciences or to derive a set of moral norms and a theory of value for human life from logical and scientific truths. Rather, Chinese philosophy sought to adjust the relationships between man and nature and between man and man in their ordinary, secular existence. It placed no value in the ideas of pure logic, pure science, or pure consciousness. Traditional Chinese philosophers inquired into the experiential, intuitive 'mind' ( xin ^a). This approach to 'mind'was understood by the Chinese to require rigorous logical proof or scientific theory:— anyone can perceive one's 'mind'in daily life and, by analogy, anyone can 'perceive'other 'minds'. If Husserl's intentionality is the transcendental reason of Western philosophy, the 'mind'is the practical reason of Chinese philosophy. What, then, are the essential features of Husserl's 'intentionality'and the Chinese 'mind'? What are their respective theoretical features? Can they be brought together and compared in a philosophically significant fashion?     

目的、意向和意识

本文提出了一个意向性目标搜寻的计算机模型,它有两个部分,静态部分包括一个目标表征和到达这个目标的程序。动态部分是一个感觉输入、中间信息加工,行为输出的重复的反馈循环。人类意向必然伴有意识,但机器人则可能无意识而有意向。 利用目标搜寻系统机器人模型,我们对目标搜寻系统的目的连续统下了定义;这个连续统从简单的直接反应系统一直到意向性系统。对这个目的连续统有两种传统的解释:一是柏拉图、亚里士多德和普罗提诺的终极原因理论,二是希腊原子论者和现代进化生物学家的还原主义学说。本文评价了这些学说。 本文考察了几种类型的意识机能,提出了以自动机为依据的意识理论,比较了人类和计算机。从计算机结构的角度来看,人类意识是一类特殊的计算机控制系统。     

对心理理论两成分认知模型的验证

Tager-Flusberg 和 Sullivan（2000）从主体信息加工的角度出发首次提出了一个心理理论模型,认为心理理论包括两个成分：一个是社会知觉成分,一个是社会认知成分。本研究设计了一个适合儿童特点的测查社会知觉成分的任务,将对心理理论两成分模型作进一步的验证,并对语言和心理理论两个成分的关系进行了初步探讨。被试为90名3~5岁的儿童,男女各半。结果表明心理理论的认知成分同语言相关密切,而知觉成分同语言没有表现出明显的相关。这个结果为该认知模型提供了进一步的证据     

ON THE LIMITATIONS AND PROMISE OF QUANTUM THEORY FOR COMPREHENSION OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE AND CONSCIOUSNESS

Abstract. I present a partially historical discussion of the basis of the quantum theory in nonmathematical terms using human knowledge and consciousness as an underlying theme. I show that the philosophical position in both classical and quantum theory is the experimental and mathematical philosophy of Isaac Newton. Because almost all the systems we deal with are multicomponent, we must consider the limitations and openness imposed by thermodynamics on our claims in both classical and quantum treatments. Here the reality of measurement stands in the way of any simple picture but also provides the basis for considerations of free will. Particular care is taken with the concepts of quantum measurement, entanglement, and decoherence because of their importance in the discussion.     

母亲处理冲突方式与儿童心理理论发展的关系

以52名3～5岁幼儿为被试,考查了母亲处理亲子冲突的方式与儿童心理理论发展水平之间的关系.研究结果表明,不同性别和年龄阶段儿童的母亲,其处理亲子冲突的方式有所差异,隔离处理方式与儿童在心理理论任务上的得分存在显著的正相关.文章从冲突表征呈现的角度对上述结果进行了分析讨论.     

成年个体的心理理论与执行功能

为了说明成年个体心理理论与执行功能的发展及两者的关系,在匹配了智商和教育水平条件下,采用心理理论故事理解任务、失言理解任务和威斯康星卡片分类任务分别探察了30名62~77岁的老年人和30名19~25岁青年人的心理理论和执行功能。结果表明,老年人和青年人在2种心理理论任务上的得分与卡片分类任务的得分都不存在显著相关,老年人在失言任务上的得分显著低于青年人,在心理理论故事理解任务上和威斯康星卡片分类任务上,老年人的表现与青年人没有显著差异。结合已有的研究结果提示：心理理论与执行功能的相关模式在成年和学前阶段是不同的。     

SPIRITUAL TRANSFORMATION AS THE AWAKENING OF GLOBAL CONSCIOUSNESS: A DIMENSIONAL SHIFT IN THE TECHNOLOGY OF MIND

Abstract. Great spiritual and philosophical traditions through the ages have sought to tap and articulate the grammar or logic of the fundamental unified field that is the common generative ground of our diverse worldviews, religions, cultures, ideologies, and disciplinary languages. I suggest that we are in the midst of a profound dimensional shift in our rational capacity to process reality, and I seek to articulate the implications of this evolutionary shift to global reason and awakened consciousness for all aspects of our human and rational enterprise. It is clear that we are in the midst of an unprecedented shift in the human condition—a global renaissance that affects every aspect of our cultural lives, self‐understanding, experience, and world making. This evolutionary transformation, when seen through the dilated global lens, has been emerging through the ages on a global scale. I suggest that this advance in our technology of mind is of an order of magnitude that is so radical and comprehensive that the very concept of a person, of what it means to be human, of our encounter with Reality, and of all our hermeneutical arts including the sciences are likewise taken to a higher, global, dimension. I explore this emergent grammar of spiritual transformation to global, dialogic, integral, and holistic consciousness, the global awakening of reason, scientific knowing, and the holistic worldview.     

RAISING DARWIN'S CONSCIOUSNESS: FEMALES AND EVOLUTIONARY THEORY

Abstract Early studies of primate social behavior were distorted by observational, methodological, and ideological biases that caused researchers to overlook active roles played by females in the social lives of monkeys. Primatology provides a particularly well documented case illustrating why research programs in the social and natural sciences need multiple studies that enlist researchers from diverse backgrounds     

幼儿说谎行为的特点及其与心理理论水平的关系

首先考察3-4岁幼儿在抵制诱惑情景下出现违规行为后的说谎行为特点,然后进一步探讨了说谎行为与心理理论水平之间的关系。研究结果发现,3岁儿童中有59.3%出现说谎行为,而4岁时这个比例达到75%;但经统计检验没有发现显著的年龄差异,性别差异也不显著。另外,说谎与未说谎组在错误信念任务上的得分没有显著性差异,但有策略的说谎组比没有策略组在错误信念任务上的得分更高;说谎水平与错误信念任务之间有显著的正相关     

学前儿童的“心理理论”在不同ToM任务中的发展特点

考察了72名3～5岁儿童在三个改造过的经典错误信念任务中的表现,结果显示,大部分4岁儿童能够正确认识自我错误信念;大部分5岁儿童能够正确认识他人错误信念;大部分3～4岁儿童的自我错误信念认识显著好于他人（真人和玩偶）错误信念认识,5岁时这两种认识才没有显著差异;学前儿童对真人与玩偶错误信念的认识没有显著差异;学前儿童对“意外地点”任务和“意外内容”任务中错误信念问题回答的一致性较高,而对“外表—真实”任务的回答与前两种任务的一致性较低。     

REASON-EXPLANATION AND THE CONTENTS OF THE MIND

This paper takes a close look at the kinds of considerations we use to reach agreement in our ordinary (non‐philosophical and non‐theoretical) judgments about a person's reasons for acting, and the following theses are defended. First, considering the circumstances in which the action occurs is often enough to remove our puzzlement as to why someone acts as she does. Second, in those situations where we do need to enquire about the agent's state of mind, this does not, in the normal case, lead us to look for hidden, inner events that are candidates for the causes of her action. Finally, even though there are cases in which the agent's introspections, reflections, and deliberations are relevant to our search for reasons, such cases do not lend support to the idea that reasons are hidden or inner causes of action. This suggests a problem for most philosophical accounts of what it is to act for reasons and for most philosophical accounts of the nature of mental states.     

THE ARTIFICIALIZATION OF MIND AND WORLD

The rapid advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) has led to renewed ambitions of developing artificial general intelligence. Alongside this has been a resurgence in the development of virtual and augmented reality (V/AR) technologies, which are viewed as “disruptive” technologies and the computing platforms of the future. V/AR effectively bring the digital world of machines, robots, and artificial agents to our senses while entailing the transposition of human activity and presence into the digital world of artificial agents and machine forms of intelligence. The intersection of humans and machines in this shared space brings humans and machines into ontological continuity as informational entities in a totalizing informational environment, which subsumes both cyber and physical space in an artificially constructed virtual world. The reconstruction of mind (through AI) and world (through V/AR) thus has significant epistemological, ontological, and anthropological implications, which constitute the underlying features in the artificialization of mind and world.