‘Unwilling’ versus ‘unable’: capuchin monkeys’ (Cebus apella) understanding of human intentional action

A sensitivity to the intentions behind human action is a crucial developmental achievement in infants. Is this intention reading ability a unique and relatively recent product of human evolution and culture, or does this capacity instead have roots in our non‐human primate ancestors? Recent work by Call and colleagues (2004) lends credence to the latter hypothesis, providing evidence that chimpanzees are also sensitive to human intentions. Specifically, chimpanzees remained in a testing area longer and exhibited fewer frustration behaviors when an experimenter behaved as if he intended to give food but was unable to do so, than when the experimenter behaved as if he had no intention of giving food. The present research builds on and extends this paradigm, providing some of the first evidence of intention reading in a more distant primate relative, the capuchin monkey (Cebus apella). Like chimpanzees, capuchin monkeys distinguish between different goal‐directed acts, vacating an enclosure sooner when an experimenter acts unwilling to give food than when she acts unable to give food. Additionally, we found that this pattern is specific to animate action, and does not obtain when the same actions are performed by inanimate rods instead of human hands (for a similar logic, see Woodward, 1998 ). Taken together with the previous evidence, the present research suggests that our own intention reading is not a wholly unique aspect of the human species, but rather is shared broadly across the primate order.     

Neither ‘Good’ in Terms of ‘Better’ nor ‘Better’ in Terms of ‘Good’

In this paper, I argue against defining either of ‘good’ and ‘better’ in terms of the other. According to definitions of ‘good’ in terms of ‘better’, something is good if and only if it is better than some indifference point. Against this approach, I argue that the indifference point cannot be defined in terms of ‘better’ without ruling out some reasonable axiologies. Against defining ‘better’ in terms of ‘good’, I argue that this approach either cannot allow for the incorruptibility of intrinsic goodness or it breaks down in cases where both of the relata of ‘better’ are bad.     

Elucidating the psychosocial context of ‘post‐concussion syndrome’ (PCS): a case study from post‐Milan systemic family therapy

The literature on post‐concussion syndrome (PCS) following mild head injury includes biopsychosocial formulations. However, it is contended that the complexities of the psychosocial remain conceptually underdeveloped. An engagement with this complexity is presented via a case study from post‐Milan systemic family therapy. The work described is with grandparents, a mother and daughter. The latter two both initially experienced PCS following a road traffic accident, yet demonstrated contrasting outcomes in the year post‐injury. Implications for family therapy services and the wider literature are discussed.     

Still Not ‘Good’ in Terms of ‘Better’

Erik Carlson puts forward a new way of defining monadic value predicates, such as ‘good’, in terms of dyadic value relations, such as ‘better’. Earlier definitions of this kind have the unwanted feature that they rule out some reasonable axiologies by conceptual fiat. Carlson claims that his definitions do not have this drawback. In this paper, I argue that they do.     

The ‘crisis’ in social psychology,an empirical approach

The preponderance of empirical research in social psychology has ofren been a central issue in the ‘crisis literature’. However, no extensive empirical study has ever been undertaken vis a vis the ‘crisis’ in social psychology. In two studies, factors effecting the perceptions of social psychologists of their discipline were investigated. Although in the first study, among Dutch social psychologists, four hypotheses were tested and confirmed, a large part of the total variance in the perception of the ‘crisis’ remained unexplained. In the second study, both a worldwide sample of active social psychological researchers as well as a sample of authors of the ‘crisis literature’ were surveyed. The stances of both groups differed considerably. Although a majority of the active researchers did not agree that a crisis is at hand in social psychology, a large minority did. The active researchers agreed with many of the criticisms of social psychological research and theorizing. Attitudes on nine central issues, including the functioning of the editor/reviewer publishing system, predicted a large percentage of the total variance in the subjects' attitude toward the existence of a ‘crisis’ in their discipline.     

Understanding ‘Unlikely (20% Likelihood)’ or ‘20% Likelihood (Unlikely)’ Outcomes: The Robustness of the Extremity Effect

Calls to communicate uncertainty using mixed, verbal‐numerical formats (‘unlikely [0–33%]’) have stemmed from research comparing mixed with solely verbal communications. Research using the new ‘which outcome’ approach to investigate understanding of verbal probability expressions suggests, however, that mixed formats might convey disadvantages compared with purely numerical communications. When asked to indicate an outcome that is ‘unlikely’, participants have been shown to often indicate outcomes with a value exceeding the maximum value shown, equivalent to a 0% probability —an ‘extremity effect’. Recognising the potential consequences of communication recipients expecting an ‘unlikely’ event to never occur, we extend the ‘which outcome’ work across four experiments, using verbal, numerical, and verbal‐numerical communication formats, as well as a previously unconsidered numerical‐verbal format. We examine how robust the effect is in the context of consequential outcomes and over non‐normal distributions. We also investigate whether participants are aware of the inconsistency in their responses from a traditional ‘how likely’ and ‘which outcome’ task. We replicate and extend previous findings, with preference for extreme outcomes (including above maximum values) observed in both verbal and verbal‐numerical formats. Our results suggest caution in blanket usage of recently recommended verbal‐numerical formats for the communication of uncertainty. Copyright © 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Cross-cultural issues in the treatment of intractable anorexia nervosa

This paper presents a case of intractable anorexia nervosa in a child burdened beyond her capabilities by unresolved conflicts in a parent. The dynamics will be assessed in the context of open systems theory of family function to suggest that the mother's conflicts, fixated at the time she left her native country, and her attempts to adapt to a new one, combined with other family members' failure to understand or appreciate the mother's cultural roots, interrupted the patient's normal maturation/development. The paper also presents a successful course of treatment of the binational anorexic girl, using a comprehensive inpatient program, emphasizing intensive family therapy with an open systems theory framework.The earlier version of this paper was presented at the Sixth World Congress of the International College of Psychosomatic Medicine, Montreal, Canada, September, 1981. Helpful comments by Regina Casper, M.D., helpful discussion by Kenneth Calestro, M.A., and support and encouragement by Katharine N. Dixon, M.D. are greatly appreciated.     

Heidegger’s Destruktion of Theology: ‘Primordial Faith’ and ‘Recognition’ of the Messiah

Heidegger’s phenomenology of religious life offers important insights by engaging Paul’s Epistle to the Galatians, where he distinguishes ‘Paul the Pharisee’ from ‘Paul the Christian’ in order to explicate the nature of faith in contrast to systematic theology. Neither certitude in God’s existence is primordial to Christian faith, according to Heidegger, nor is rabbinic nor theological disputation concerning God’s existence or God’s nature. Instead, what is essential to Heidegger’s phenomenology of religious life are: (1) faith as lived experience and (2) recognition of ‘the Christ’ (ho christos/ha ma?ía?). This ‘recognition’, however, requires phenomenological clarification and not philosophy of religion as traditionally construed.     

Constructing the truth From ‘Confusion of tongues’ to ‘Constructions in analysis’1

The author hypothesizes that the papers Freud wrote in the period 1934‐9 constitute a fi nal turning point in his work resulting from an attempt to work through, by means of self‐analysis, early traumatic elements reactivated by the conditions of his life in the 1930s. The author emphasizes that the ups and downs of Freud's relationship with Sándor Ferenczi and the mourning which followed his death in 1933 played an important role in this traumatic situation. He suggests that through these last works, Freud pursued a posthumous dialogue with Ferenczi. This working through led Freud, in Moses and monotheism, to an ultimate revision of his theory of trauma, a revision which the author examines in full, in the light of the works of the Egyptologist, Jan Assmann. A new analytical paradigm emerges: that of constructions in analysis developed in the article of the same name. The activity of construction appears as an alternative to the mutual analysis proposed by Ferenczi and is closely bound up with the notion of historical truth. In psychoanalysis, it would mean constructing a historical truth whose anchoring in the material truth of the past is essential, though it should not be confused with it.     

Dissimilation and differential assimilation in social influence (situations of ‘normalization’)

We have presented two experiments on the processes of normalization (appraisal of an ambiguous stimulus). In the first experiment, pairs of subjects were taken from natural groups whose structure and functioning we had previously studied; the subjects were paired off in terms of (a) sociometric choices which they had put forward and (b) difference in hierarchical position in the ordinary life of the group. In the second experiment a definite image of the other ‘subject’ (an accomplice) was created in the subject such that he appeared very similar or very different to him (in areas in no way connected with the task). Furthermore, in the ‘collective’ phase of the estimation the accomplice replied exactly like the subject or in a way which was remote or very remote from the subject's replies. We did not observe the contrast phenomenon described by some authors, but we were able to show that the patterns of interaction of everyday life, stabilized social relationships or images of the other which are unconnected with the tasks to be performed play a role in the influence that the replies of one subject have on those of another. Apart from differential assimilation we have shown a process of dissimilation, these two phenomena being, in our opinion, rooted in the structures of action of the social agents' lives. Negotiation in influence is rarely something symmetrical, even in situations of normalization where the dissymmetry of everyday life can be transfered. We have shown, too, that in these types of situations the subjects do not always try to minimize conflict since when they are in agreement (there is nothing to negotiate) they can diverge from one another. It can thus be said that subjects are not rational in the usual sense and are quite clearly something different from logicians or statisticians. The explanation which we have outlined shows how notions of social identity, differentiation and otherness are brought into play.     

‘Lyin' Ted’, ‘Crooked Hillary’, and ‘Deceptive Donald’: Language of Lies in the 2016 US Presidential Debates

Language in the high‐stakes 2016 US presidential primary campaign was contentious, filled with name‐calling, personal attacks, and insults. Language in debates served at least three political functions: for image making, to imagine potential realities currently not in practice, and to disavow facts. In past research, the reality monitoring (RM) framework has discriminated accurately between truthful and deceptive accounts (~70% classification). Truthful accounts show greater sensory, time and space, and affective information, with little evidence of cognitive operations. An RM algorithm was used with Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count software to code candidates' language. RM scores were significantly higher in fact‐checked truth statements than in lies, and debate language in the 2016 primaries was as deceptive as fact‐checked lies. In a binary logistic regression model, one RM criterion, cognitive processes, predicted veracity using computerized RM, classifying 87% of fact‐checked truth statements but only 28% of fact‐checked lie statements (63% classification overall).Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

An alternative approach to calculating Area‐Under‐the‐Curve (AUC) in delay discounting research

Applied to delay discounting data, Area‐Under‐the‐Curve (AUC) provides an atheoretical index of the rate of delay discounting. The conventional method of calculating AUC, by summing the areas of the trapezoids formed by successive delay‐indifference point pairings, does not account for the fact that most delay discounting tasks scale delay pseudoexponentially, that is, time intervals between delays typically get larger as delays get longer. This results in a disproportionate contribution of indifference points at long delays to the total AUC, with minimal contribution from indifference points at short delays. We propose two modifications that correct for this imbalance via a base‐10 logarithmic transformation and an ordinal scaling transformation of delays. These newly proposed indices of discounting, AUC_{log d} and AUC_{or d,} address the limitation of AUC while preserving a primary strength (remaining atheoretical). Re‐examination of previously published data provides empirical support for both AUC_{log d} and AUC_{or d} . Thus, we believe theoretical and empirical arguments favor these methods as the preferred atheoretical indices of delay discounting.     

On the Motivational Primacy of the Individual Self: ‘I’ Is Stronger than ‘We’

The self‐concept is dynamic, with momentary definition shifting from a representation of self as a unique and independent social agent to an undifferentiated and interchangeable group member. Indeed, the individual self and collective self are fundamental components of the self‐concept, with each being important and meaningful to human experience. However, are those selves equally important and meaningful? We review a program of research empirically testing three competing hypotheses that suggests that the motivational core of human experience is (a) the individual self, (b) the collective self, or (c) determined by contextual factors that make a given self momentarily accessible. The research furnished unanimous and consistent evidence that the individual self is the motivationally primary form of self‐definition.